THE 


JACKSONIAN     EPOCH 


BY 


CHAKLES    H.  PECK 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
HARPER    &    BROTHERS    PUBLISHERS 

1899 


SPRECKELS 


Copyright,  1899,  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS. 


All  righti  rteerved. 


PKEFACE 


THIS  book  is  an  attempt  to  accomplish  two  objects:  a 
critical  survey  of  the  political  history  of  the  United  States, 
particularly  in  its  parliamentary  phase,  from  the  Presiden 
tial  candidacy  of  Jackson  to  the  accession  of  Tyler,  with  a 
preliminary  review  of  the  preceding  period  beginning  with 
the  origin  of  the  War  of  1812 ;  and  to  exhibit  the  influence 
of  the  men  who  shaped  events.  The  first  permits  a  rapid 
and  independent  treatment  of  the  subject  from  a  new  point 
of  view;  and  the  second,  the  introduction  of  the  personal 
element,  which  gives  to  history  its  keenest  interest  and  its 
greatest  charm. 

The  epoch  treated  is  the  most  suggestive  and  dramatic  in 
our  history.  It  marks  the  full  development  of  American 
political  methods,  and  possesses  the  most  distinguished 
galaxy  of  public  men  ever  brought  together  on  the  politi 
cal  scene  in  this  country.  General  histories,  however  useful 
and  excellent,  subordinate  men,  and  biographies  either  mag 
nify  individuals  beyond  their  influence  and  importance,  or 
do  not  adequately  portray  their  contemporaries  and  the 
general  perspective.  This  book,  therefore,  is  an  effort  to 
combine  and  symmetrize  both  historical  elements  in  order 
to  present  a  true  and  lifelike  picture  of  a  most  animated 
political  epoch. 


100270 


iv  PREFACE 

Much  use  has  necessarily  been  made  of  Schurz's  Clay 
and  Sumner's"  Jackson,  each  helpful  in  a  distinctly  different 
way.  But  perhaps  it  will  be  perceived  that  a  mass  of 
material  never  before  collected  has  been  utilized  for  the 
portraiture  of  Clay  and  Jackson  and  the  other  leading 
characters  of  their  time.  For  the  general  course  of  histori 
cal  events  it  has  not  been  deemed  necessary  to  cite  authori 
ties.  Wherever  opinions  have  been  expressed  at  variance 
with  commonly  accepted  views,  a  candid  effort  has  been 
made  to  submit  all  the  essential  facts,  that  the  reader  may 
be  in  a  position  to  judge  for  himself. 

THE  AUTHOK. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

Florida  and  Jackson's  Seminole  Campaign — The  Attempt  to  Censure  the 
General  for  his  Conduct  in  the  War  —  The  Beginning  of  the  Feud 
between  him  and  Clay  —  The  Relation  of  Clay  and  Jackson  to  the 
Ensuing  Political  Period  —  Clay's  Early  History,  to  his  Election  as 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1811— The  New  Political 
Conditions  of  the  Country Page  1 


CHAPTER  II 

Maritime  Aggressions  of  England  and  France — The  Restrictive  System — 
Clay  as  Speaker  of  the  House — Preparations  for  War — Madison  Accepts 
Clay's  Programme  and  is  Re-elected — The  Embargo  and  the  Declara 
tion  of  War  against  England— The  Political  Aspect  of  the  War— Clay's 
Reply  to  Quincy— The  Treaty  of  Ghent— The  Effect  of  the  War— The 
Bank  of  the  United  States — Clay's  Change  of  Opinion  in  Regard  to  it — 
The  Tariff  of  1816— The  Policy  of  Internal  Improvements,  Madison's 
Veto,  and  Monroe's  Hostile  Position — Clay  Opposes  Monroe's  Adminis 
tration—He  Advocates  Internal  Improvements  and  the  Recognition  of 
the  South  American  Republics 46 


CHAPTER  III 

Clay's  Political  Position — The  Missouri  Compromise,  the  Statesmanship  of 
It,  and  Clay's  Agency  in  Effecting  It — He  Renews  his  Efforts  for  the 
Recognition  of  the  South  American  Republics,  and  Finally  Succeeds — 
He  Temporarily  Retires,  but  Returns  to  the  House  at  the  Opening  of  the 
Eighteenth  Congress — He  Defeats  a  Bill  to  Pension  Commodore  Perry's 
Mother,  and  Advocates  Internal  Improvements  and  Webster's  Resolu 
tion  Concerning  the  Recognition  of  Greece — The  Monroe  Doctrine — 
The  Tariff  of  1824  and  Clay's  Relation  to  Protection-^The  Political 
Situation  in  1824 — William  H.  Crawford  —  John  Quincy  Adams  is 


vi  CONTENTS 

Elected  President  by  the  House  Through  Clay's  Influence,  and  Clay 
becomes  Secretary  of  State — Clay's  Administration  of  the  State  Depart 
ment — The  Panama  Mission— John  Randolph — His  Duel  with  Clay — 
Adams  and  his  Administration  —  Jackson  is  Elected  over  Adams  in 
1828— Clay's  Home,  Family,  Personal  Appearance,  Temperament,  and 
Mind Page  79 

/  CHAPTER  IV 

^  The  New  Development  and  Arrangement  of  Political  Forces  —  Andrew 
Jackson,  and  the  Significance  of  his  Political  Rise — His  First  Adminis 
tration — The  Spoils  System — The  "Kitchen  Cabinet" — Party  Dissen 
sion  and  Reorganization  of  the  Cabinet  —  The  Political  Issues  —  Clay 
Nominated  for  President  and  Re-elected  to  the  Senate— The  Political 
Activity  of  the  Period — The  Whig  Programme — The  Rejection  of  Van 
Buren's  Nomination  for  Minister  to  England  —  Clay's  Plan  of  Tariff 
Revision — His  Defence  of  the  American  System — The  Tariff  of  1832 — 
The  Public  Lands — The  Effort  to  Compromise  Clay  on  the  Subject — 
His  Laud  Bill ! .  123 

/  CHAPTER  V 

The  Controversy  over  the  Bank  of  the  United  States— Thomas  H.  Benton 
— The  Whig  Leaders  Refuse  to  Compromise  with  Jackson  on  the 
Question  of  Rechartering  the  Bank— The  Bank  as  a  Political  Issue — 
The  Veto  of  the  Bill  to  Recharter— The  Error  of  the  Whig  Policy— 
The  Debate  on  the  Veto— The  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832— Jack 
son's  Triumph— Nullification— The  Force  Bill  and  the  Verplanck  Tariff 
Bill— John  C.  Calhoun— Clay's  Compromise  Bill— It  is  Substituted  for 
the  Verplanck  Bill  in  the  House  and  Passed  by  the  Senate— The  Com 
promise  Bill  and  the  Force  Bill  become  Laws,  and  South  Carolina 
Repeals  the  Nullification  Ordinance — The  Wisdom  of  the  Compromise 
and  Clay's  Responsibility  for  it  —  His  Land  Bill  is  Passed  by  both 
Houses,  but  Vetoed  by  the  President 167 

/  CHAPTER  VI 

Clay  and  Jackson  make  Northern  Tours— The  Removal  of  the  Deposits — 
Tactics  of  the  Whigs  in  the  Senate — Clay's  Resolutions  Censuring  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury— The  Debate— The  Anti- 
Bank  Resolutions  of  the  House  —  The  Distress  Petitions  —  Jackson's 
Protest  against  the  Censure  and  the  Subsequent  Proceedings — Taney's 
Nomination  for  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Rejected — Other  Phases  of 
the  Bank  Struggle  —  Coinage  Legislation  —  The  Land  Bill  —  The  De 
posits  Bill  — The  French  Spoliations— The  Cherokee  Indians  — The 
Four  Years  Law  and  the  Spoils  System 215 


CONTENTS  vii 


CHAPTER  VII 

Distribution  of  the  Surplus—  The  French  Spoliations—  The  Slavery  Ques 
tion  —  The  Abolition  Petitions  and  Incendiary  Publications  —  Admission 
of  Arkansas  and  Michigan  into  the  Union  —  Texas  —  Madison's  Death 
and  Character  —  The  Colonization  Society  —  Clay  and  Garrison  —  Taney 
Becomes  Chief  Justice^The  Political  Situation—  The  Election  of  1836 
—  Politico-Finance  —  Jackson's  Physical  and  Mental  Traits  —  Efforts  for 
Further  Distribution  —  The  Financial  Condition  of  the  Country  —  The 
Mania  for  Speculation  —  The  Specie  Circular  ................  Page  261 

/  CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Recognition  of  Texas  —  The  Mexican  Claims  —  International  Copy 
right—Slavery  —  Benton's  Resolution  to  Expunge  the  Senate's  Censure 
of  Jackson  for  the  Removal  of  the  Deposits  —  The  Final  Preparations  — 
The  Debate  —  Clay's  Speech,  Buchanan's  Speech,  and  Webster's  Pro 
test  —  The  Resolution  Adopted  and  Executed  —  Jackson's  Gratification  — 

-  Analysis  of  his  Presidency—  Clay  Decides  to  Remain  in  the  Senate.  307 

CHAPTER  IX 

Van  Buren's  Intellectual  and  Political  Characteristics  —  His  Policy  as 
Jackson's  Successor—  The  Crisis  of  1837—  The  Tactics  of  the  Whigs- 
Webster's  Speech  at  Niblo's  —  The  Appeal  of  the  New  York  Merchants 
to  the  President  —  The  Extra  Session  of  Congress,  the  President's  Mes 
sage,  and  the  Democratic  Programme—  Clay  Organizes  the  Opposition, 
and  Calhoun  Supports  the  Administration  —  The  Opening  Debate  on 
the  Independent  Treasury  —  The  Banks  and  Resumption  —  The  Regular 
Session—  Renewal  of  the  Excitement  Over  the  Slavery  Question  —  Cal- 
houn's  Attitude  ................................................  343 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Debate  on  Calhoun's  Slavery  Resolutions  and  Clay's  Substitutes  —  The 

-  Independent  Treasury  again  Defeated  —  Minor  Financial  Legislation  — 
The  Doctrine  of  Instructions  —  The  Subsidiary  Coin  —  Clay's  Set  Speech 
on  the  Slavery  Question  and  Calhoun's  Comments  —  Clay's  Northern 
Tour  —  The  Obstacles  to  His  Nomination  —  The  Whig  National  Conven 
tion  —  Harrison  and  Tyler  Nominated  —  Clay's  Disgust  and  Acquies 
cence  ........................  ,  ................................  381 

CHAPTER  XI 

The  Financial  and  Political  Situation  —  Organization  of  the  House—  The 
Independent  Treasury  Established  —  Other  Proceedings  of  Congress  — 
Slavery  and  International  Law  —  The  Democratic  Convention  —  The 


viii  CONTENTS 

Campaign  of  1840— Clay's  Platform  for  the  Whig  Party— William  H. 
Harrison  and  his  Opinions — The  Election — Harrison  and  Clay  and  the 
Construction  of  the  Cabinet  —  The  Inaugural  Address  —  The  Clamor 
for  the  Spoils  —  Strained  Relations  Between  Clay  and  Harrison  —  The 
Death  of  the  President  — John  Tyler  —  The  Close  of  the  Jacksonian 
Epoch Page  431 


THE  JACKSONIAN"  EPOCH 


THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH 


CHAPTER    I 

Florida  and  Jackson's  Seminole  Campaign — The  Attempt  to  Censure  the 
General  for  his  Conduct  in  the  War — The  Beginning  of  the  Feud 
between  him  and  Clay — The  Relation  of  Clay  and  Jackson  to  the 
Ensuing  Political  Period  — Clay's  Early  History,  to  his  Election  as 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  1811 — The  New  Political 
Conditions  of  the  Country 

FLORIDA  had  long  been  a  prolific  cause  of  trouble.  It  was 
the  abode  of  outlaws,  hostile  Indians,  and  runaway  slaves, 
constantly  increasing  in  number.  During  the  war  with 
England  they  had  acted,  to  whatever  extent  they  could,  with 
the  British,  who  left  in  their  possession  a  fortification  on 
the  Appalachicola,  known  as  Negro  Fort,  containing  a  large 
quantity  of  arms  and  military  stores.  It  was  the  source  of 
serious  mischief  to  the  adjoining  frontier,  and  particularly 
to  the  Georgia  slave-owners.  In  the  summer  of  1816  our 
troops,  under  General  Gaines,  with  the  consent  of  the  Span 
ish  authorities  at  Pensacola,  invested  the  fort  and  destroyed 
it.  But  the  condition  which  had  permitted  this  annoyance 
still  continued,  and  would  continue  so  long  as  Spain  owned 
the  territory  and  was  unwilling  or  unable  to  perform  the 
duties  of  sovereignty  as  well  as  her  treaty  obligations.  The 
next  year  after  the  destruction  of  Negro  Fort  the  govern 
ment  took  similar  measures  to  abate  a  still  greater  nuisance 
i 


2  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1816 

— the  occupation  of  Amelia  Island,  off  the  northeast  coast 
of  Florida,  by  pirates,  smugglers,  and  slaves  who  had  over 
powered  the  Spanish  garrison  stationed  there  and  made  it 
their  depot  and  retreat.  Meantime,  affrays  between  the 
Indians  and  whites  quite  as  lawless  became  more  frequent, 
and  culminated  in  an  attack  by  General  Gaines  and  his 
forces  upon  the  Creeks  at  Fowltown.  Their  village  was 
sacked  and  a  few  reds  were  killed.  This  trivial  affair  was 
the  beginning  of  an  Indian  war  which  proved  to  be  the 
origin  of  a  vastly  greater  political  war. 

General  Jackson  was  forthwith  ordered  to  the  scene. 
His  victory  at  New  Orleans  had  made  him  the  foremost 
captain  of  the  country.  He  had  since  commanded  the 
Western  Department.  He  had  experience  in  Indian  war 
fare,  having  won  his  first  military  reputation  in  the  Creek 
war  of  1814.  He  was  in  cordial  relations  with  the  adminis 
tration.  That  he  should  be  put  in  command  was  a  natural 
consequence.  With  his  characteristic  vigor,  and  assuming 
authority  in  disregard  of  his  orders  to  draw  upon  State 
militia  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  law,  he  raised  a  body  of 
volunteers,  appointed  their  officers,  and  pushed  with  celerity 
to  the  Florida  frontier.  The  campaign  which  followed  was 
all  that  such  preliminaries  promised. 

With  a  force  of  eighteen  hundred  he  plunged  into  Florida, 
where  he  was  soon  afterward  joined  by  a  brigade  of  friendly 
Indians.  Before  this  array  the  enemy  vanished  into  the 
swamps  and  forests,  leaving  only  their  wretched  villages  to 
be  destroyed.  Not  more  than  sixty  of  the  hostile  Indians, 
who  did  not  number  more  than  a  thousand,  were  killed 
during  the  campaign,  and  these  without  the  loss  of  a  single 
white  soldier.  The  chiefs  were  captured  by  displaying  the 
English  flag,  and  hanged.  But  for  Jackson  to  execute  his 


CH.  L]  THE   FLORIDA  WAR  3 

orders  to  pursue  and  subdue  the  Indians  was  not  enough. 
On  the  supposition  that  the  Spaniards  were  in  complicity 
with  the  Indians,  he  seized  St.  Clark's  and  Pensacola,  and 
placed  in  each  an  American  garrison.  The  Spanish  gov 
ernor  had  fled  from  Pensacola  and  taken  refuge  in  the  fort 
at  Barrancas.  This  place  Jackson  bombarded  into  surren 
der.  He  then  transported  the  Spanish  officers  to  Havana, 
and  established  a  military  government. 

Among  the  numerous  arbitrary  acts  of  this  unique  cam 
paign  was  the  execution  of  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister,  des 
tined  to  more  conspicuous  historical  note  than  any  other. 
The  former  was  an  old  Scotch  trader  found  at  St.  Mark's ; 
the  latter  was  a  young  Englishman  taken  in  one  of  the 
Indian  towns.  Both  were  tried  by  court-martial.  Arbuth 
not  was  convicted  of  exciting  the  Creeks  to  war  and  of  sup 
plying  them  with  means.  He  was  sentenced  to  be  hanged. 
Ambrister  was  convicted  of  supplying  means  and  leading 
the  lower  Creeks.  He  was  sentenced  to  be  shot.  For  some 
reason,  Ambrister's  sentence  was  reconsidered  by  the  court, 
and  changed  to  flogging  and  imprisonment.  This,  however, 
Jackson  disapproved,  and  restored  the  original  sentence. 
Both  men  were  then  executed. 

Jackson  announced  that  the  war  was  ended,  and  returned 
to  Nashville.  But,  upon  reflection,  he  ordered  General 
Gaines  to  take  St.  Augustine.  This  order,  if  executed, 
would  have  completed  the  conquest  of  the  Floridas.  It 
was  sent  to  the  "War  Department,  which  by  this  time  had 
full  cognizance  of  Jackson's  proceedings.  The  Spanish 
Minister  was  also  apprised,  and  was  already  protesting 
vehemently.  The  administration  was  in  a  predicament. 
Jackson  had  grossly  exceeded  our  national  rights  as  well  as 
his  instructions.  Unless  his  acts  were  disavowed  the  pend- 


4  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1819 

ing  negotiations  with  Spain  would  be  frustrated ;  and  to 
secure  the  peaceable  cession  of  the  Floridas  was,  without 
doubt,  the  preferable  policy.  There  was  plainly  but  one 
course  to  pursue,  and  that  was  immediately  taken.  Jack 
son's  order  to  Gaines  was  quickly  countermanded.  The 
posts  Jackson  seized  were  restored,  and  the  provisional 
government  he  had  set  up  was  withdrawn. 

But  Jackson  himself  was  too  popular  to  admit  of  his 
being  censured  by  the  administration.  As  so  often  hap 
pens  with  political  administrations,  it  said  one  thing  and 
did  another.  But  this  course  was  adopted  only  after  a 
struggle  in  the  Cabinet.  Calhoun,  Secretary  of  War,  and 
Crawford,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  were  for  censure. 
Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  alone  defended  the  General. 
The  discussion  was  finally  allayed,  so  far  as  appearances 
were  concerned,  by  disavowing  in  fact  what  was  verbally 
approved  as  having  been  necessary  under  the  circumstances. 
However  bold  and  arbitrary  Jackson's  conduct  had  been, 
no  one  supposed  that  he  had  been  influenced  by  any  other 
motive  than  to  suppress  the  frontier  troubles,  both  Indian 
and  Spanish,  unless,  perhaps,  to  distinguish  himself.  The 
mass  of  the  people  believed,  with  Adams,  that  Jackson 
had  done  the  right  thing,  though  possibly  in  the  wrong 
way.  But  the  politicians  with  Presidential  aspirations 
were  alarmed,  professedly  for  the  institutions  and  character 
of  their  country,  but  really  because  of  Jackson's  threatening 
popularity. 

As  soon  as  Congress  convened,  the  subject  of  the  Semi- 
nole  campaign  was  taken  up.  In  due  time  committee 
reports  were  made  condemning  Jackson's  operations.  In 
the  Senate  nothing  further  was  done ;  but  in  the  House 
a  violent  and  protracted  debate  ensued.  In  this  debate 


CH.  I.]  CLAY'S   SPEECH  5 

Henry  Clay  was  the  principal  figure.  "  But,"  says  Adams, 
in  his  Diary,  "of  that  mighty  controversy  he  was  no  longer 
the  primary  leader.  He  had  ranged  himself  under  the 
Crawford  banners."  The  debate  began  January  16,  1819, 
and  lasted  until  February  8th.  Thirty-three  set  speeches 
were  delivered,  twenty  of  them  being  against  the  proposed 
resolutions  of  censure.  One  of  the  resolutions  expressed 
disapproval  of  the  execution  of  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister, 
and  the  others  proposed  legislation  to  prevent  like  acts  in 
the  future.  Clay  spoke  twice.  His  first  speech  was  on 
January  17th.  The  second  was  at  the  close  of  the  debate, 
and  was  not  reported. 

The  whole  debate  is  disappointing.  It  is  no  great  com 
pliment  to  Clay  to  say  that  his  speech  was  the  strongest 
and  most  striking  of  the  debate;  no  small  part  of  which  was 
bad  declamation.  He  disclaimed  all  personal  unfriendli 
ness  either  to  General  Jackson  or  to  the  administration. 
"  Toward  that  distinguished  captain,"  said  he,  "  who  shed 
so  much  glory  on  our  country,  whose  renown  constitutes 
so  great  a  portion  of  its  moral  property,  I  never  had,  I 
never  can  have,  any  other  feelings  than  those  of  profound 
respect  and  of  the  utmost  kindness.  .  .  .  Rather  than  throw 
obstructions  in  the  way  of  the  President,  I  would  precede 
him  and  pick  out  those,  if  I  could,  which  might  jostle  him 
in  his  progress;  I  would  sympathize  with  him  in  his  em 
barrassments,  and  commiserate  with  him  in  his  misfort 
unes."  To  neutralize  the  effect  he  had  produced  in  his  pre 
vious  hostility  to  the  administration,  he  assured  the  House, 
with  great  show  of  candor  but  with  poor  prophecy,  that 
he  had  not  engaged  and  would  not  engage  in  systematic 
opposition  to  Monroe,  nor  to  the  administration  of  any  other 
Chief  Magistrate.  "  I  will  say,"  he  added,  "  that  I  approve 


6  THE   JACKSONIAN    EPOCH  [1819 

entirely  of  the  conduct  of  our  government,  and  that  Spain 
has  no  just  cause  of  complaint.  We  having  violated  no 
important  stipulation  of  the  treaty  of  1796,  that  power  has 
justly  subjected  herself  to  all  the  consequences  which  en 
sued  upon  the  entry  into  her  dominions." 

He  sought  the  origin  of  the  war,  by  a  far-fetched  argu 
ment  based  on  imperfect  acquaintance  with  the  facts,  in 
the  treaty  of  Fort  Jackson,  concluded  in  August,  1814,  by 
which  the  Creeks  were  subjected  to  grinding  conditions. 
This  treaty  he  posted  as  tyrannical  and  unconscionable,  ex 
torted  by  the  sword.  He  contended  that  it  served  "  but  to 
whet  and  stimulate  revenge,  and  give  old  hostilities,  smoth 
ered,  not  extinguished,  by  the  pretended  peace,  a  greater 
exasperation  and  more  ferocity.  A  truce  thus  patched  up 
with  an  unfortunate  people  without  means  of  existence, 
without  bread,  is  no  real  peace.  The  instant  there  is  the 
slightest  prospect  of  relief  from  such  harsh  and  severe  con 
ditions,  the  conquered  party  will  fly  to  arms  and  spend  the 
last  drop  of  blood  rather  than  live  in  such  degraded  bond 
age."  He  arraigned  the  capture  of  the  Indian  chiefs  "  by 
means  of  deception — hoisting  foreign  colors  on  the  staff 
from  which  the  stars  and  stripes  alone  should  have  floated," 
and  stigmatized  as  barbaric  the  retaliation  for  enormities 
that  the  Indians  had  perpetrated.  He  examined  at  length 
the  proceedings  under  which  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister  were 
executed,  and  pronounced  the  whole  transaction  to  be  in 
flagrant  violation  of  civilized  law  and  principle.  He  de 
nounced  the  seizure  of  St.  Mark's,  Pensacola,  and  Barrancas 
as  unauthorized  war  against  Spain,  and  hence  a  lawless 
usurpation  of  the  constitutional  powers  of  Congress.  But 
notwithstanding  the  severity  of  his  strictures  upon  the 
General's  acts,  he  attributed  to  him  no  improper  motives. 


CH.  L]  CLAY'S   SPEECH  7 

"  I  must  cheerfully  and  entirely,"  said  he,  "  acquit  General 
Jackson  of  any  intention  to  violate  the  laws  of  the  country 
or  the  obligations  of  humanity.  I  am  persuaded  from  all  I 
have  heard  that  he  considered  himself  as  equally  respecting 
and  observing  both."  And  again :  "  I  hope  not  to  be  mis 
understood  ;  I  am  far  from  intimating  that  General  Jackson 
cherished  any  designs  inimical  to  the  liberty  of  the  country. 
I  believe  his  intentions  to  be  pure  and  patriotic."  Yet  his 
peroration  was  as  intense  as  though  Jackson  had  been  en 
gaged  in  conspiracy  and  treason. 

"  Against  the  alarming  doctrine  of  unlimited  discretion  in 
our  military  commanders,  when  applied  even  to  prisoners 
of  war,  I  must  enter  my  protest.  It  begins  upon  them  ;  it 
will  end  on  us.  ...  "We  are  lighting  a  great  moral  battle 
for  the  benefit  not  onty  of  our  country,  but  of  all  mankind. 
The  eyes  of  the  whole  world  are  in  fixed  attention  upon 
us.  One,  the  largest  portion  of  it,  is  gazing  with  contempt, 
with  jealousy,  and  with  envy;  the  other  portion,  with 
hope,  with  confidence,  and  with  affection.  Everywhere 
the  black  cloud  of  legitimacy  is  suspended  over  the  world, 
save  only  one  bright  spot  which  breaks  out  from  the  politi 
cal  hemisphere  of  the  West  to  enlighten  and  animate  and 
gladden  the  human  heart.  Obscure  that  by  the  downfall 
of  liberty  here,  and  all  mankind  are  enshrouded  in  a  pall 
of  universal  darkness.  .  .  .  Beware  how  you  forfeit  this  ex 
alted  character.  Beware  how  you  give  a  fatal  sanction  in 
this  infant  period  of  our  republic,  scarcely  yet  two  score 
years  old,  to  military  insubordination.  Remember  that 
Greece  had  her  Alexander,  Rome  her  Cassar,  England  her 
Cromwell,  France  her  Bonaparte ;  and  that  if  we  escape  the 
rock  on  which  they  split  we  must  avoid  their  errors.  ...  I 
hope  gentlemen  will  deliberately  survey  the  awful  isthmus 


8  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1819 

on  which  we  stand.  They  may  bear  down  all  opposition ; 
they  may  even  vote  the  General  the  public  thanks.  But  if 
they  do,  in  my  humble  judgment,  it  will  be  a  triumph  of 
the  principle  of  insubordination — a  triumph  of  the  military 
over  the  civil  authority — a  triumph  over  the  powers  of  this 
House — a  triumph  over  the  Constitution  of  the  land.  And 
I  pray  most  devoutly  to  Heaven  that  it  may  not  prove  in 
its  ultimate  effects  and  consequences  a  triumph  over  the 
liberties  of  the  people." 

The  resolutions  decisively  failed.  The  sum  of  the  Gen 
eral's  acts  was  advantageous  to  the  country  ;  and  whatever 
they  were,  they  were  the  acts  of  the  "  Hero  of  New 
Orleans."  However  correct  it  may  have  been  to  class  the 
Seminoles  within  the  pale  of  international  law,  to  the  mass 
of  the  people  they  were  but  a  horde  of  blood-thirsty  savages, 
to  be  exterminated  by  any  means  that  offered.  Likewise, 
the  effort  to  convict  Jackson  of  murder  by  the  principles 
of  Yattel  seemed  to  most  minds  absurdly  technical.  Even 
though  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister  were  irregularly  execut 
ed,  the  suspicious  circumstances  attending  their  capture 
among  the  red-skins  in  the  wilds  of  Florida  placed  them  in 
a  precarious  position ;  and  this  view  was  subsequently  taken 
by  the  British  government.  As  not  even  Jackson's  fiercest 
assailants  questioned  that  he  acted,  however  rashly,  as  he 
thought  was  best  and  for  the  public  good,  a  justification 
sufficient  for  all  practical  purposes  was  conceded.  During 
the  debate  Jackson  was  in  "Washington ;  but  immediately 
afterward  he  visited  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  and  New  York, 
and  was  received  with  ovations.  The  attack  was  ill-advised. 
It  proved  the  most  calamitous  and  far-reaching  of  Clay's 
political  mistakes.  "  The  rage  and  disgust  of  the  General," 
says  Parton,  "when  he  read  the  speech,  were  extreme. 


CH.  L]  THE   FEUD  9 

The  long  feud  between  General  Jackson  and  Mr.  Clay 
dated  from  the  delivery  of  this  speech.  Jackson  never 
hated  any  man  so  bitterly  and  so  long  as  he  hated  Henry 
Clay." 

Such  was  the  origin  of  the  most  remarkable  contest  in 
our  political  history.  It  was  the  combat  of  two  masterful 
personalities  aided  by  conditions  which  had  been  long  ma 
turing.  The  character  and  quality  of  both  men  had  been 
trained  and  tried,  and  through  individuality  and  circum 
stance  they  were  soon  to  lead  opposing  political  forces. 
Clay  had  been  longer  in  the  public  eye.  His  career  was 
solely  civic,  while  Jackson's  reputation  was  solely  military. 
To  appreciate  the  struggle  waged  under  their  leadership, 
it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  respective  positions  in 
which  they  stood  in  the  popular  mind  when  the  struggle 
began ;  and  to  do  this  requires  that  their  previous  history 
should  be  sketched.  We  must  know  the  men  before  we 
can  fully  comprehend  the  events  they  moulded.  Adequate 
biographies  of  such  men  cannot  be  written ;  their  lives  are 
components  of  history,  and  cannot  properly  be  separated 
from  it.  At  the  risk  of  apparent  departure  from  the  pur 
pose  of  this  study,  let  us  first  examine  at  some  length  Clay's 
early  career  and  its  environment.  It  will  serve  the  double 
purpose  of  depicting  the  individual  and  the  conditions  that 
produced  a  new  political  era. 

Clay  was  born  April  12,  1777,  in  Hanover  County,  Vir 
ginia.  Little  is  known  of  his  ancestry.  In  the  reign  of 
Queen  Elizabeth,  and  soon  after  the  colonization  of  Virginia, 
three  brothers — Charles,  Thomas,  and  Henry — sons  of  Sir 
John  Clay,  of  "Wales,  came  to  the  colony  with  Sir  Walter 
Kaleigh,  who  gave  each  of  them  ten  thousand  pounds. 
They  settled  near  Jamestown.  Henry  ]eft  no  children,  but 


10  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1777-91 

Charles  and  Thomas  became  the  founders  of  a  numerous 
family.  The  future  statesman  was  a  descendant  of  the 
former.1  His  immediate  origin  was  humble.  His  father, 
John  Clay,  was  the  pastor  of  a  small  congregation  of  Bap 
tists,  to  whom  he  frequently  preached  from  a  rock  on  the 
shore  of  the  South  Anna  Eiver,  no  doubt  before  adminis 
tering  the  peculiar  rite  of  his  creed.  The  sect  was  then  in 
low  esteem  in  the  South;  so  late  as  in  1775  its  ministers 
were  often  arrested  as  disturbers  of  the  peace.  In  the  pre 
ceding  year,  Madison,  disgusted  by  this  intolerant  practice, 
wrote  to  a  Northern  friend :  "  I  want  again  to  breathe  your 
free  air.  .  .  .  That  diabolical,  hell -conceived  principle  of 
persecution  rages  among  some ;  and  to  their  eternal  infamy 
the  clergy  can  furnish  their  quota  of  imps  for  such  purposes. 
There  are  at  this  time  in  the  adjacent  county  not  less  than 
five  or  six  well-meaning  men  in  close  jail  for  publishing 
their  religious  sentiments,  which  in  the  main  are  very  or 
thodox."2 

Kindly  tradition  represents  the  Rev.  Mr.  Clay  as  possess 
ing  some  of  the  oratorical  qualities  that  characterized  his 
famous  son.  He  died  in  1781,  leaving  in  straitened  circum 
stances  a  widow  and  seven  children,  one  of  his  five  sons 
having  previously  died.  Henry  was  next  to  the  youngest 
child,  and  the  only  one  to  rise  from  obscurity.  Mrs.  Clay's 
maiden  name  was  Hudson.  She  was  an  intelligent,  esti 
mable  woman,  and  a  worthy  mother.  She  lived  more  than 
eighty  years,  surviving  most  of  her  fifteen  children,  having 
seven  bv  her  second  husband,  whom  she  married  after  a  few 


1  "I  believe  I  have  the  only  reliable  record  of  the  Clay  family  extant. 
It  is  written  on  blank  leaves  in  the  '  Works  of  Samuel  Johnson,  London, 
1713.'  "—Life  of  Cassius  M.  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  18. 

2  Parton's  Life  of  Jefferson,  p.  203. 


Cn.  L]  CLAY'S  YOUTH  11 

years  of  widowhood.  It  is  related  as  indicative  of  her  spirit 
that  she  indignantly  threw  into  the  fireplace  some  money 
left  on  her  table  by  one  of  Tarleton's  officers  to  pay  for 
property  of  hers  taken  on  one  of  his  raids  through  the 
county.  But  the  correct  account  of  the  incident  out  of 
which  the  story  arose  was  doubtless  recounted  by  Clay 
himself  in  a  political  speech  delivered  in  1840.  "I  was 
born  a  democrat,"  said  he,  "rocked  in  the  cradle  of  the 
Revolution,  and  at  the  darkest  period  of  that  ever -memo 
rable  struggle  for  freedom.  I  recollect,  in  1781  or  1782, 
a  visit  made  by  Tarleton's  troops  to  the  house  of  my  mother, 
and  of  their  running  their  swords  into  the  new-made  graves 
of  my  father  and  grandfather,  thinking  they  contained 
hidden  treasures.  Though  not  more  than  four  or  five  years 
of  age,  the  circumstance  of  that  visit  is  vividly  remembered, 
and  it  will  be  to  the  last  moment  of  my  life." 

As  soon  as  he  was  old  enough  he  aided  in  such  ways  as 
he  could  in  the  support  of  the  family,  which  depended  on 
the  produce  of  some  indifferent  land  in  the  "  Slashes,"  as 
the  region  was  known.  Barefooted  and  coarsely  clad,  he 
often  followed  the  plough.  It  was  his  duty  to  replenish 
the  meal -barrel,  which  he  did  by  taking  the  grist  to  Darri- 
cott's  mill,  on  the  Pamunky.  The  bag  was  his  saddle,  and 
with  a  rope  bridle  he  guided  the  pony  he  rode.  It  is  prob 
able  that  he  performed  similar  errands  for  others,  for  he 
was  commonly  called  by  the  people  along  the  route  the 
"Mill-boy  of  the  Slashes" — a  sobriquet  that  always  clung 
to  him. 

In  the  neighboring  district- school,  taught  in  a  log-cabin 
by  an  intemperate  Englishman  named  Peter  Deacon,  he 
received  his  only  regular  education,  which  consisted  of  the 
mere  rudiments.  At  the  age  of  fourteen  he  was  placed  in 


12  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1791-1837 

a  retail  store  at  Kichmond,  where  he  worked  for  nearly  a 
year.  He  then  sought,  through  the  hopeful  efforts  of  his 
step-father  —  probably  inspired  by  the  boy's  budding  ambi 
tion — a  position  in  the  office  of  the  Clerk  of  the  High  Court 
of  Chancery.  There  was  no  vacancy,  but  he  was  neverthe 
less  installed  by  the  influence  of  a  brother  of  the  clerk,  who 
was  a  friend  of  Captain  Watkins. 

His  first  entrance  into  the  office  was  long  remembered  by 
his  fellow-clerks.  Plain  of  features,  overgrown  and  ungainly 
for  his  years,  and  clothed  in  rustic  fashion,  he  presented  a 
rather  curious  appearance.  "  His  mother  had  dressed  him  up 
in  a  new  suit  of  Figinny  cloth,  cotton  and  silk  mixed,  com 
plexion  of  pepper-and-salt,  with  clean  linen  well  starched, 
and  the  tail  of  his  coat  standing  out  from  his  legs  at  an 
angle  of  forty-five  degrees,  like  that  of  a  dragoon.  The 
clerks  looked  askance  at  each  other,  and  were  not  a  little 
amused  at  the  apparently  awkward  chap  who  had  been 
thrust  in  upon  them."1  But  they  were  not  long  in  dis 
covering  that "  Harry  "  was  like  the  toad  in  the  adage.  His 
natural  gifts  were  even  then  not  wholly  undeveloped,  and 
he  speedily  rose  in  the  estimation  of  his  companions. 

It  was  this  early  introduction  to  politics  that  opened  the 
way  to  his  career.  His  faithful  and  competent  attention,  to 
his  duties  was  observed  by  all  with  whom  he  came  in  con 
tact,  particularly  by  Chancellor  Wythe —  a  distinguished 
character  in  a  distinguished  time.  "Wythe  was  a  scholarly, 
liberal-minded  gentleman  of  the  true  Virginian  school,  a 
signer  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  an  able  jurist, 
and  the  Chief  of  the  High  Court  of  Chancery.  It  was, 
therefore,  no  small  compliment  to  Clay  that  he  should  be 


Colton's  Life  of  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  20. 


CH.  L]  CLAY'S   STUDIES  13 

chosen  as  the  Chancellor's  amanuensis.  He  acted  in  that 
capacity  for  four  years.  His  duties  at  first  were  very  exact 
ing  and  laborious,  as  the  subject-matter  of  the  Chancellor's 
dictation — he  being  unable  to  write  because  of  a  tremulous 
hand — was  strange  to  him ;  besides,  he  was  required  to  copy 
quotations  in  Latin,  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant. 

This  situation — or  rather  relation,  from  the  warm  interest 
of  the  Chancellor  in  the  promising  youth — was  an  inestima 
ble  advantage  to  him.  It  might  well  seem  providential 
were  it  not  that  uncommon  capacity  usually  attracts  patrons. 
Besides  a  livelihood,  it  gave  him  character  in  the  commu 
nity  and  brought  him  into  constant  observation  of  perhaps 
the  ablest  bar  in  the  country.  He  made  the  most  of  the  op 
portunity,  which  was  his  only  means  to  remedy  his  extreme 
lack  of  education.  His  habits  were  studious  and  exem 
plary;  his  reading,  tastes,  and  aspirations  were  guided  by 
his  venerable  friend.  His  leisure  was  mostly  devoted  to 
books;  but  his  reading  appears  to  have  been  desultory — 
Harris's  Hermes,  Tooke's  Diversions  of  Purley,  Lowth's 
Grammar,  and  various  historical  works.  Perhaps  a  further 
indication  of  his  studies  during  this  time  is  contained  in  a 
letter  to  his  son  James,  written  in  1837.  "  Your  resolution 
to  study,"  he  wrote,  "  and  to  begin  with  history,  is  a  good 
one,  and  I  hope  you  will  persevere  in  it.  Gillies's  Greece, 
with  Plutarch's  Lives';  Gibbon's  Decline  and  Fall  of  the 
Roman  Empire;  Tacitus;  Hume,  with  the  continuation; 
Russell's  Modern  Europe  ;  Hallam's  Middle  Ages;  Robert 
son's  Charles  V.,  Indies,  etc. ;  Marshall's  Life  of  Washing 
ton ;  Botta's  History  of  the  American  Revolution.  These 
books  and  others  may  be  read  with  advantage ;  and  you 
should  adopt  some  systematic  course  as  to  time — that  is,  to 
read  so  many  hours  out  of  the  twenty-four." 


14  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1796-7 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  natural  that  he  should 
decide  to  pursue  the  profession  of  the  law.  Accordingly,  in 
the  latter  part  of  1796,  in  his  twentieth  year,  he  entered  the 
office  of  the  Attorney  -  General,  Eobert  Brooke,  as  a  law- 
student.  Within  a  year  he  procured  a  license  to  practise. 
While  his  regular  novitiate  was  of  itself  inadequate  to  pre 
pare  him  for  the  bar,  his  long  association  with  the  Chan 
cellor  was  undoubtedly  a  valuable  training  in  the  principles 
and  application  of  equity  jurisprudence,  and  was  probably 
so  considered  in  hastening  his  admission  to  practice. 

Concerning  this  early  period  of  Clay's  life  there  is  but 
little  positive  information.  Though  Kichmond  was  a  city  of 
but  five  thousand  inhabitants,  it  was  the  social  and  political 
centre  of  Yirginia.  Despite  the  levelling  influences  of  the 
Eevolution,  the  subsequent  abolition  of  primogeniture  and 
entail  and  the  progress  of  Jefferson's  political  principles, 
there  still  remained  strong  aristocratic  tendencies,  which 
largely  dominated  society.  Yet  that  society  was  ever 
ready  to  open  its  doors  to  character  and  ability,  and  Clay 
was  accorded  the  attention  and  respect  of  such  men  as 
John  Marshall,  Edmund  Pendleton,  and  Spencer  Eoane. 
Instead,  however,  of  remaining  in  Kichmond,  he  decided  to 
settle  in  Lexington,  Kentucky.  "  The  public  attention  was 
at  that  time  strongly  drawn  to  Kentucky  as  a  field  especially 
propitious  to  the  enterprise  of  the  young.  Members  of  the 
most  respectable  families  of  Yirginia  had  already  emigrated 
to  that  State,  and  the  marvels  of  its  rapid  growth  and 
teeming  prosperity  were  recounted  with  such  commenda 
tion  as  to  rouse  a  general  fervor  in  behalf  of  settlement  in 
this  Eldorado  of  the  West." l  Moreover,  Kentucky  was  still 


Kennedy's  Life  of  Wirt,  vol.  i.  p.  92. 


CH.  I.]  CLAY'S  LIFE  AT  LEXINGTON  15 

practically  a  colony  of  Virginia,  most  of  her  people,  cus 
toms,  laws,  and  institutions  being  thence  derived.  Clay's 
decision  may  also  have  been  influenced  by  the  removal  to 
that  country  of  his  mother  and  family  several  years  before. 
But  doubtless  he  sagaciously  perceived  that  the  surround 
ings  would  yield  him  congenial  opportunities  and  a  better 
immediate  prospect  than  he  would  find  in  Richmond  or  any 
other  town  in  his  native  State. 

When  Clay  settled  in  Lexington,  in  1797,  the  Indian 
troubles,  which  gave  the  State  its  name  (Indian  for  dark 
and  bloody  ground),  had  long  been  subdued  by  Daniel 
Boone  and  his  successors.  "Within  a  decade  the  population 
of  the  State  had  trebled,  and  was  then  nearly  two  hundred 
thousand.  The  settlement  of  Lexington  began  thirty-two 
years  before  and  had  advanced  with  remarkable  rapidity. 
The  original  pioneers  and  their  descendants  formed  but  a 
small  portion  of  the  towns-people,  who  constantly  increased 
in  number  by  fresh  arrivals,  bringing  with  them  more  or 
less  of  the  cultivation  and  habits  of  life  acquired  in  the 
older  States.  Schools  were  soon  established  and  improved. 
The  Transylvania  Seminary  was  founded  in  1788,  and  in  a 
few  years  developed  into  a  university.  But,  though  Lexing 
ton  possessed  more  of  the  refinements  of  the  East  than  any 
otner  place  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  it  was  essentially  a 
frontier  town.  The  free  and  hearty  spirit  of  the  original 
settlers  still  prevailed,  and  with  it  many  of  the  character 
istics  of  such  a  population.  Drinking,  gaming,  and  horse- 
racing  were  general  diversions.  Social  distinctions  were 
practically  unknown.  To  the  situation  in  which  Clay  now 
found  himself  his  popular  genius  was  perfectly  suited. 

The  wisdom  of  his  course  was  soon  manifest.  "  I  remem 
ber,"  said  he  in  his  old  age,  "  how  comfortable  I  thought  I 


16  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1797 

should  be  if  I  could  make  one  hundred  pounds,  Virginia 
money,  per  year,  and  with  what  delight  I  received  the  first 
fifteen -shilling  fee.  My  hopes  were  more  than  realized. 
I  immediately  rushed  into  a  lucrative  practice." 

At  that  period  debating  societies  were  very  generally  in 
vogue.  Clay  had  been  a  diligent  member  of  one  in  Rich 
mond,  and  immediately  joined  another  in  Lexington.  He 
attended  several  meetings  of  the  Lexington  club  without 
participating  in  the  discussions.  One  evening,  however, 
after  a  long  debate,  and  as  the  question  was  about  to  be  put, 
he  remarked  to  some  one  near  him  that  the  subject  did  not 
appear  to  him  to  have  been  exhausted.  The  chairman  was 
informed  that  Mr.  Clay  desired  to  speak.  He  accepted  the 
invitation  then  given  him  and  attempted  to  proceed.  In  his 
extreme  embarrassment  he  opened  by  saying,  "  Gentlemen 
of  the  jury."  This  caused  some  merriment  in  the  audience 
and  more  confusion  to  himself,  for  he  repeated  the  blun 
der,  which  was  probably  caused  by  his  practice  of  making 
speeches  to  imaginary  juries  in  preparation  for  his  debut  in 
court.  But  he  quickly  recovered  his  composure,  and  spoke 
with  such  unexpected  eloquence  and  power  as  to  gain  en 
thusiastic  applause  and  admiration.  While  yet  a  boy  his 
conversation  was  noticeable  for  its  ease  and  propriety,  and 
his  earliest  efforts  in  public  discussion  displayed  a  singular 
force  and  fluency  of  diction.  His  associations  had  been  such 
as  to  spur  and  improve  this  natural  gift.  He  was  an  eager 
listener  to  the  eminent  counsel  who  appeared  in  the  Rich 
mond  courts ;  twice  he  heard  Patrick  Henry,  one  occasion 
being  that  of  Henry's  greatest  forensic  argument,  in  the 
case  of  the  British  debts,  which  Wirt  so  graphically  describes. 
But  during  this  time,  what  was  more  directly  to  the  purpose 
was  the  efficient  exercise  he  followed  privatel}7,  as  indicated 


CH.  L]  CLAY'S   EARLY   TRAINING  17 

by  his  mistake  in  the  debating  club.  The  importance  he 
attached  to  this  training,  as  well  as  a  glimpse  of  his  youthful 
ambition,  is  shown  by  a  statement  made  by  him  many  years 
afterward  before  a  class  of  law  -  graduates.  "  I  owe  my 
success  in  life,"  said  he,  "to  one  single  fact — namely,  that  at 
an  early  period  I  commenced  and  continued  for  some  years 
the  practice  of  daily  reading  and  speaking  the  contents  of 
some  historical  or  scientific  book.  These  off-hand  efforts 
were  sometimes  made  in  a  cornfield ;  at  others  in  the  forest ; 
and  not  infrequently  in  some  distant  barn,  with  the  horse 
and  ox  for  my  only  auditors.  It  is  to  this  practice  of  the 
art  of  all  arts  that  I  am  indebted  for  the  primary  and  lead 
ing  impulses  that  stimulated  my  progress  and  have  shaped 
and  moulded  my  entire  destiny."  1  His  presence  was  im 
pressive  and  commanding;  his  voice  the  perfection  of 
human  tones.  "With  these  great  gifts  he  possessed  a  genial, 
generous  temperament,  keen  discernment  of  character, 
practical  judgment,  and  ready  tact.2  Such  qualities  found 


1  "Oratory  was  esteemed  the  first  attribute  of  superior  minds,  and 
was  assiduously  cultivated.     There  were  few  newspapers,  and  the  press 
had  not  attained  the  controlling  power  over  the  public  mind  as  now. 
Political  information  was  disseminated  chiefly  by  public  speaking,  and  ev 
ery  one  aspiring  to  lead  was  expected  to  be  a  fine  speaker.     This  method, 
and'the  manner  of  voting,  forced  the  open  avowal  of  political  opinion." — 
Sparks's  Memories  of  Fifty  Years,  p.  22. 

2  "Of  all  the  men  I  have  known,  Clay  had  more  of  what  is  called,  in 
modern  times,  magnetism.     He  was  quite  tall,  yet  commanding,  and  very 
graceful  in  manner  and  movement.     He  had  the  most  wonderful  voice  in 
compass,  purity,  and   sweetness,  and  which,  with  the  wrhole  science  of 
gesticulation  and  manner,  he  sedulously  cultivated.  ...   In  this  Clay 
had  a  great  source  of  power.     There  was  also  a  natural  common-sense, 
which,  in  him  and  Abraham  Lincoln,  outweighed  all  the  culture  in  books 
of  their  great  rivals.   .  .  .  Thus  Mr.  Clay,  in  the  backwoods,  where  men 
are  seen  more  in  their  real  characters  than  in  older  societies  and  cities,  was 
better  able  to  understand  them  (and  men  are  at  bottom  much  the  same 
everywhere),  or  any  audience  elsewhere.   .  .  .    Mr.  Clay  had  a  very  highly 


18  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCPI  [1797-1806 

their  best  arena  in  jury  practice,  where  his  powers  were 
so  transcendent  that  none  of  the  many  persons  charged 
with  murder  whom  he  defended  were  condemned  to  death. 
His  early  professional  years  abound  with  anecdotes  of  his 
exploits,  some  of  them  almost  magical  and  romantic. 

He  was  never  deterred  from  performing  his  professional 
duty  by  fear  of  consequences.  The  barbarous  arbitrament 
of  duelling  to  settle  personal  grievances  was  nowhere  rec 
ognized  and  practised  more  generally  than  in  Kentucky; 
and  Clay's  known  disposition  to  maintain  his  honor  at  the 
peril  of  the  pistol  no  doubt  made  his  forensic  adversaries 
careful  to  avoid  offence.  Only  once  was  he  drawn  into  an 
" affair"  through  conduct  in  court.  Colonel  Joseph  H. 
Daviess,  a  prominent  Federalist,  and  the  United  States 
district -attorney  for  that  region,  had  assaulted  a  tavern- 
keeper  named  Bush,  at  Frankfort.  The  details  of  the  oc 
currence  are  not  known,  but  presumably  it  grew  out  of  an 
altercation  provoked  by  politics  and  whiskey,  after  the  com 
mon  fashion  of  that  day  and  country.  Such  was  the  awe 
of  Daviess's  influence  that  Bush  could  not  procure  an  at 
torney  in  Frankfort  to  act  for  him.  He  then  applied  to 
Clay,  who  promptly  brought  suit  against  Daviess  in  Lex 
ington.  In  the  course  of  the  proceedings  Clay  criticised 
the  conduct  of  the  Colonel,  who,  after  the  adjournment  of 
the  court,  sent  a  note  to  Clay,  remonstrating  against  his 
language  and  expressing  the  wish  that  he  would  not  persist 
in  his  course.  Clay  replied  that  he  had  undertaken  the  cause 
from  a  sense  of  duty,  and  that  he  would  conduct  it  accord 
ing  to  his  own  judgment,  holding  himself  responsible  in 


developed  nervous  structure  and  temperament,  by  which,  as  in  war,  all 
liis  forces  could  be  at  once  rapidly  concentrated  on  one  point  of  attack." — 
Life  of  Cassius  M.  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  88. 


CH.  L]  CLAY'S    FEARLESSNESS  19 

or  out  of  court  for  what  he  said  and  did.  Daviess  then 
sent  a  challenge,  which  Clay  accepted.  Through  the  in 
fluence  of  mutual  friends  the  difficulty  was  settled  on  the 
field  where  the  duel  was  to  be  fought.  Another  instance 
of  Clay's  fearlessness  was  in  behalf  of  a  man  who  had  suf 
fered  extreme  hardship  by  incurring  the  hostility  of  a  gang 
of  backwoods  ruffians  known  as  "  Eegulators."  At  the  risk 
of  his  personal  safety,  Clay  volunteered  his  services,  and  by 
obtaining  a  heavy  verdict  for  exemplary  damages  effectually 
broke  up  the  lawless  pest. 

Clay  was  repeatedly  urged  to  accept  the  office  of  district- 
attorney,  but  criminal  prosecution  was  so  distasteful  to 
him  that  he  had  declined  the  position.  He  was  finally 
induced,  however,  to  take  it  for  a  short  time,  hoping  to 
procure  the  appointment  of  a  friend  whom  he  desired  to 
have  the  place.  He  was  immediately  called  upon  to  prose 
cute  a  slave,  who,  in  defending  himself  from  the  brutality 
of  an  overseer,  had  killed  his  assailant  with  an  axe.  The 
slave  was  uncommonly  intelligent  and  proud,  and  his  case 
aroused  much  interest  and  sympathy.  Had  he  been  free, 
his  act  at  most  would  have  been  manslaughter;  but  as 
slaves  were  required  by  the  law  to  submit  to  chastisement, 
the  offence  was  legally  that  of  murder,  whatever  the  palliat 
ing  circumstances.  The  negro  was  convicted  and  executed; 
but  he  died  with  such  fortitude  and  manly  spirit  that  Clay 
deeply  deplored  his  participation  in  the  trial.  He  imme 
diately  resigned  his  commission  ;  and  whenever  afterward 
the  subject  was  mentioned  he  spoke  sorrowfully  of  the  fate 
of  the  unfortunate  slave. 

Clay's  extraordinary  success  as  an  advocate  might  be 
readily  imagined  from  his  subsequent  public  life.  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  so  remarkable  a  man  should  have 


20  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1806 

made  such  rapid  progress  under  the  circumstances  then  ex 
isting  in  that  frontier  country.  The  fame  he  soon  achieved 
is  evidenced  by  his  being  retained  (though  he  declined  to 
accept  a  fee)  by  Aaron  Burr,  himself  one  of  the  most  adroit 
of  lawyers,  when  the  first  efforts  were  made  to  indict  him 
in  Kentucky,  in  1806.  And  Clay's  high  personal  standing 
is  at  the  same  time  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Burr's  im 
munity  was  then  largely  due  to  his  unqualified  pledge  to 
Clay  that  he  was  not  engaged  in  any  unlawful  or  improper 
designs,  which  Clay  implicitly  believed.  Besides  his  celeb 
rity  in  criminal  practice,  he  gained  high  reputation  for  his 
skill  in  the  conduct  of  causes  arising  out  of  the  mixed  state 
of  the  land  laws  and  titles.1  It  is  not  unlikely,  as  tradition 
indicates,  that  his  success  in  the  latter  as  well  as  in  the 
former  class  of  cases  was  occasionally  aided  by  his  fertile 
and  dramatic  dexterity.  In  older  communities,  where  con 
ditions  and  relations  are  more  varied  and  involved,  where 
property  and  rights  are  more  secure  and  valuable,  and,  con 
sequently,  where  jurisprudence  is  matured  more  to  a  nicely 
adjusted  science  and  the  practice  to  a  minutely  defined 
system,  to  say  naught  of  the  less  emotional  temper  of  the 
people,  the  triumphs  of  mere  advocacy  and  forensic  magic 
are  more  difficult  and  rare. 

Clay  was  not  a  deep  student,  and  never  approached  the 
distinction  of  jurist  which  marked  "Webster's  intellectual 
supremacy.9  Even  had  his  tastes  been  scholarly,  he  would 


1  "I  have  heard  it  stated  that  the  Kentucky  bar  was  at  that  time  supe 
rior  to  the  bar  of  any  other  State.  This  was  perhaps  attributable  to  the 
fact  that  every  acre  of  ground  was  covered  over  by  conflicting  law-claims." 
— Coleman's  Crittenden,  vol.  i.  p.  14. 

a  "'In  the  course  of  my  professional  life,'  said  Mr.  Webster,  'it  has 
happened  many  times  that  I  found  myself  retained  in  the  same  cause  with 
Mr.  Clay.  He  was  my  senior  by  several  years,  in  the  profession  and  in 


CH.  I.J  CLAY'S  CHARACTERISTICS  21 

have  found  little  time  or  necessity  for  the  prolonged  and 
ramiiied  thought  essential  to  eminence  at  the  Eastern  bar. 
But  his  tastes  were  not  of  that  kind,  except  so  far  as  re 
lated  to  the  cultivation  of  his  potent  art  of  speech — and 
that  was  never  distinctly  literary.  He  was  convivial,  san 
guine,  and  restless.  His  leading  characteristic  was  action, 
not  reflection.  The  movement  of  his  mind  was  rapid  and 
rhetorical ;  hence  it  was  not  laborious  and  profound.  Such 
a  mind  is  attracted  by  prominent  externals ;  it  sees  vividly, 
but  forms  its  deductions  peremptorily:  the  crystal  clearness 
of  its  partial  perceptions  endangers  complete  and  propor 
tioned  judgment.  Thus  Clay's  extraordinary  gifts  were  at 
tended  by  their  corresponding  defects.  Whatever  knowl 
edge  he  acquired  was  always  and  entirely  at  his  service ; 
and  this  frequently  had  the  effect  of  obscuring  the  need  of 
more.  His  fragments  of  knowledge  he  wielded  as  the 
Titans  the  rocks ;  this  almost  inevitably  rendered  his  prin 
cipal  fault  as  incorrigible  as  it  was  imposing. 

It  has  been  urged  that  his  lack  of  systematic  education 
proved  a  practical  advantage  to  him  by  increasing  the  self- 
reliance  that  was  the  most  magnetic  and  imperial  attribute 
of  his  leadership.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  so  competent  a 
critic  as  Schurz  implies  that  a  thorough  early  training 
would  have  made  him  more  cautious  in  forming  opinions 
and  less  commanding  in  his  advocacy  of  them,  but  would 
have  led  him  to  avoid  grave  errors  as  a  statesman.  Such 


age.  That  fact  gave  him  the  right  to  speak  first  in  all  such  cases.  Often, 
before  beginning  my  argument,  I  have  had  to  labor  hard  to  do  away  with 
the  effect  and  impression  of  his.  Some  of  the  most  labored  acts  of  my 
professional  life  have  consisted  in  getting  matters  back  to  the  starting- 
point  after  Clay  had  spoken.  The  fact  is,  he  was  no  lawyer.  He  was  a 
statesman,  a  politician,  an  orator,  but  no  reasoner.'" — March's  Reminis 
cences  of  Webster,  p.  217. 


22  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1799-1829 

conjectures,  it  may  be  ventured,  have  but  little  value.  Men 
of  great  genius,  which  is  not  least  a  matter  of  tempera 
ment,  are  not  materially  changed  by  any  cause ;  circum 
stances  may  favor,  modify,  or  suppress,  but  do  not  trans 
form,  their  qualities.  If  Clay's  public  policy  was  wrong  in 
any  main  features,  it  was  not  owing  to  his  lack  of  collegiate 
training,  but  to  a  natural  fault  or  bias  of  his  mind — or  to 
politics.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  with  other  preparation 
and  surroundings  his  career  would  have  been  different ; 
not  in  character,  however,  but  in  degree.  More  likely,  in 
that  event,  we  should,  have  been  deprived  of  the  historical 
Henry  Clay  ;  the  history  of  the  country  would  be  different. 
As  it  was,  his  native  powers  developed  to  their  fullest  pitch 
speedily  and  with  perfect  freedom.  The  atmosphere  in 
which  he  moved  was  charged  with  the  chivalrous  and  un- 
inquiring  spirit  of  the  South  and  West.  There  were  no 
customs,  standards,  or  rivalries  formidable  enough  to  im 
pede  his  early  growth  and  rise.  But  a  youth,  he  plunged 
into  the  current  of  important  affairs.  Before  he  reached 
maturity  he  had  gained  the  experience  of  middle  age  and 
the  prestige  of  his  genius. 

The  qualities  that  gave  him  his  peculiar  force  at  the  bar 
were  those  also  to  give  him  popularity  and  power  in  the 
sphere  of  politics.  In  truth,  the  courts  were  too  narrow  a 
theatre  for  him.  Notwithstanding  his  marvellous  skill, 
the  vocation  of  settling  personal  and  property  differences, 
and  keeping  the  accused  from  jail  or  the  gallows,  could  not 
long  be  satisfying  to  a  man  of  his  mould,  whatever  the 
rewards ;  *  and  civil  litigation  in  the  East,  much  less  in  the 


1  "Your  friend  Clay  has  argued  before  us  with  a  good  deal  of  ability  ; 
and  if  he  were  not  a  candidate  for  higher  office  I  should  think  he  might 
attain  great  eminence  at  this  bar.  But  he  prefers  the  fame  of  popular 


CH.  L]   CLAY   FAVORS   GRADUAL  EMANCIPATION          23 

West,  did  not  involve  the  wealth  and  weight  concerned  in 
later  times  when  corporate  interests  began  to  assert  their 
expansive  force  in  society.  That  he  would  take  part  in  poli 
tics  was  inevitable. 

His  first  political  efforts  were  in  the  cause  of  abolishing 
slavery.  Soon  after  his  arrival  in  Lexington  a  convention 
was  called  to  meet  in  1799  to  revise  the  constitution  of  the 
State.  Not  more  than  one-fifth  of  the  population  (about 
forty  thousand)  were  slaves ;  nor  was  slavery  deeply  engraft 
ed  on  the  nascent  social  structure  of  the  commonwealth. 
It  was  therefore  very  practicable  to  effect  by  the  new  con 
stitution  the  gradual  emancipation  of  the  blacks.  This  plan 
was  adopted  in  Pennsylvania  in  1780,  through  the  charac 
teristic  counsel  of  Franklin ;  it  had  already  been  followed 
in  Connecticut;  and  was  then  being  agitated  in  New  York, 
where  it  succeeded  two  years  later.  Clay  forthwith  joined 
it,  and  zealously  labored  in  its  behalf.  He  began  by  con 
tributing  a  series  of  articles  to  the  Kentucky  Gazette,  over 
the  signature  "  Scaavola."  He  then  boldly  championed  the 
cause  before  public  meetings.  He  was  prompted  both  by  his 
feelings  and  the  opinions  he  had  imbibed  from  Chancellor 
Wythe,  Avho  with  other  leading  characters — among  them 
Washington,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Henry,  and  Marshall — had 
vainly  sought  to  extinguish  slavery  in  Virginia  in  the  same 
mode.  In  Kentucky,  as  in  the  mother  State,  the  movement 
was  confined  to  a  small  and  select  circle,  and  did  not  suc 
ceed.  Clay  and  his  coadjutors  were  "  overpowered  by  num 
bers,"  as  he  said  in  a  speech  at  Frankfort  in  1829.  But  he 
always  regarded  his  action  with  unchanged  convictions.1 


talents  to  the  steady   fame  of  the  bar." — Judge  Story  to  Dodd,  March, 
1823. 

1  "The  sentiment,  however,  had  taken  deep  root.     It  continued  with 


24  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1798 

In  the  Frankfort  speech  he  expressed  his  regret  over  the 
result,  which  he  admitted  had  placed  Kentucky  in  the  rear 
of  her  free  neighbors  "in  the  state  of  agriculture,  the  prog 
ress  of  manufactures,  the  advance  of  improvements,  and 
the  general  progress  of  society."  For  some  years  he  set  the 
example — followed  half  a  century  later  by  Dana,  Seward,  and 
other  Northern  advocates — of  volunteering  his  professional 
aid,  whenever  occasion  offered,  to  such  as  sought  their  free 
dom  by  means  of  the  law.  Nevertheless,  he  very  soon  be 
came  a  slave-holder  himself,  and  remained  one  the  rest  of  his 
life.  Politically,  it  was  fortunate  for  him  that  Kentucky  con 
tinued  to  be  a  slave  State.  It  was  easy  for  a  slave-holder  to 
avow  antislavery  sentiments ;  for  a  long  time  they  sounded 
all  the  more  noble  at  the  North,  and  involved  no  risk  at 
the  South.  This  hybrid  policy,  while  doubtless  sincere, 
proved  a  material  resource  of  Clay's  political  influence. 

If  he  suffered  any  unpopularity  through  his  course  on 
the  slavery  question,  which  is  not  improbable,  it  was  more 
than  counteracted  by  his  participation  at  about  the  same 
time  in  the  excited  opposition  to  the  Alien  and  Sedition 
laws.  These  extraordinary  statutes  were  enacted  in  1798 
by  a  Federalist  Congress.  Although  much  modified  in  scope 
and  detail  after  their  introduction,  enough  remained  to  give 
them  that  despotic  character  which  renders  them  a  notorious 
topic  in  our  political  history.  They  mark  the  extreme  and 

increasing  strength  until  the  Rebellion,  when  it  proved  one  of  the  con 
trolling  influences  that  prevented  the  State  from  secession.  The  increase 
of  free  blacks  is  fairly  to  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  the  autislavery 
propaganda  that  began  with  Henry  Clay." — Shaler's  Kentucky,  p.  155. 

"In  Kentucky,  as  lam  told  by  several  gentlemen  of  high  standing, 
there  is  so  strong  an  opposition  to  slavery  that  the  chief  slave-holders 
have  long  feared  to  call  a  convention  to  alter  the  Constitution,  though 
much  desired,  lest  measures  should  be  adopted  that  might  lead  to  gradual 
emancipation." — JNiles's  Register,  vol.  xviii.  p.  27  (1820). 


CH.  I.]  KENTUCKY'S   REPUBLICANISM  25 

fatal  stretch  of  the  Federalist  doctrine.  Among  other,  but 
less  obnoxious,  features,  they  gave  the  President  power  to 
banish  alien  residents  whom  he  might  judge  to  be  dangerous 
to  the  country,  and  to  imprison  them  if  they  did  not  leave 
within  the  time  he  fixed.  They  also  made  it  a  felony  to 
libel  the  government,  either  House  of  Congress,  or  the 
President.  The  principal  design  was  to  suppress  the  chief 
Republican  journalists,  mostly  foreigners, whose  intemperate 
advocacy  of  French  Republicanism  was  harassing  and  hate 
ful  to  the  Federal  party.  The  excitement  they  kindled, 
fanned  by  the  adroit  management  of  Jefferson,  was  more 
intense  in  Kentucky  than  elsewhere. 

Kentucky  was  admitted  into  the  Union  but  six  years 
before.  The  struggle  for  separation  from  Virginia  had 
been  long  and  acrimonious ;  to  accomplish  it,  even  foreign 
alliance  had  been  threatened.  Separation  achieved,  the 
most  pressing  desire  and  problem  were  to  free  the  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi,  which  was  under  the  control  of  Spain, 
then  allied  with  England.  It  was  so  vital  to  the  develop 
ment  of  the  State,  and  so  plainly  proper,  that  it  seemed  a 
natural  right  of  which  the  State  should  not  be  deprived  for 
any  reason;  and  the  demand  was  loud  for  the  national 
government  to  secure  it — if  necessary,  by  force.1  Little 
concern,  however,  was  apparent  in  that  quarter  for  this  or 
any  of  the  peculiar  interests  of  the  West.  This  indifference 
was  largely  ascribed  to  Eastern  hostility,  and  therefore  to 
the  Federal  party.  When  Genet,  the  rashly  officious  French 


1  "  There  are  those  now  living  [1850]  in  the  valley  who  can  remember 
that  the  possession  of  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi  by  Spain  was  fast  sepa 
rating  the  East  and  the  West.  A  delay  of  five  years  in  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana  would  have  dismembered  the  Union  and  created  a  separate 
government  in  the  valley." — Democratic  Review,  vol.  xxvi.  p.  11. 


26  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1798-1806 

ambassador,  projected  an  expedition  against  Spanish  Loui 
siana,  an  enthusiastic  friendship  for  France  was  aroused. 
Numerous  societies  were  formed,  patterned  after  the  Jacobin 
Clubs,  and  an  active  French  sentiment  soon  pervaded  the 
State.  But  after  Genet's  presumptuous  follies  were  quenched 
by  "Washington  and  a  treaty  with  Spain  had  been  effected 
opening  the  Mississippi,  with  a  place  of  deposit  at  New 
Orleans,  there  set  in  a  strong  reaction,  which  was  furthered 
for  a  time  in  the  early  part  of  1T98  by  the  piratical  demands 
of  the  French  Directory  disclosed  by  the  famous  "  X.  Y.  Z. 
Mission."  Nevertheless,  at  heart,  Kentucky  was  still  the 
most  radically  anti-Federal  of  all  the  States ;  and  when  the 
Federalists,  in  the  over -confidence  of  their  sudden  pop 
ularity,  committed  the  amazing  mistake  of  enacting  the 
Alien  and  Sedition  laws,  Kentucky's  former  Republican- 
ism  vehemently  revived.  The  excitement  that  soon  raged 
almost  reached  the  pitch  of  frenzy.  All  the  machinery 
with  which  the  Kentuckians,  through  their  prolonged  efforts 
for  independence,  were  peculiarly  familiar  was  set  in  motion. 
Public  meetings  were  held  throughout  the  State,  at  which 
the  odious  laws  were  violently  denounced.  At  one  of  the 
first  and  largest  of  these  gatherings,  Clay,  then  in  his 
twenty-second  year,  was  called  to  speak.  George  Nicholas, 
an  experienced  lawyer  and  politician,  had  preceded  with  a 
long  and  able  address;  but  the  thrilling  power  of  Clay's 
impassioned  harangue  on  the  menaced  liberties  of  the  people 
so  affected  the  crowd  that  an  opposing  orator  was  silenced, 
and  Clay  and  Nicholas  were  shouldered,  put  in  a  carriage, 
and  drawn  by  shouting  men  through  tho  streets  of  Lexing 
ton.  Clay,  of  course,  continued  to  be  a  prominent  and 
efficient  actor  during  the  commotion,  the  outcome  of  which 
was  the  celebrated  Kentucky  and  Virginia  Resolutions, 


CH..L]  CLAY   IN  THE  LEGISLATURE  27 

adopted  by  the  legislatures  of  those  States,  and  destined  to 
become  the  canon  of  the  future  doctrines  of  nullification 
and  secession. 

After  this,  aside  from  speaking  in  support  of  Jefferson's 
election  in  1800,  Clay  devoted  his  entire  attention  to  the  law 
until  1803,  when,  in  his  absence  and  without  his  knowledge, 
he  was  made  a  candidate  for  a  seat  in  the  State  Assembly. 
It  was  induced  by  a  desire  to  place  Clay  in  a  position  to 
oppose  a  movement  which  had  been  started  to  repeal  a  law 
creating  a  Lexington  insurance  company.  This  movement 
was  led  by  Felix  Gruncly,  who,  years  afterward,  was  a 
Representative  and  Senator  from  Tennessee.  There  was 
much  local  interest  in  the  subject,  and  Clay  was  selected  by 
the  friends  of  the  company  as  best  adapted  to  perform  the 
desired  service.  The  election  had  been  in  progress  a  day 
or  so  before  a  poll  was  opened  for  him.  Returning  at  this 
juncture,  and  learning  the  situation,  he  accepted  the  candi 
dacy  and  was  elected.  Pie  not  only  accomplished  the  par 
ticular  object  for  which  he  was  chosen,  but  his  power  in 
debate  quickly  won  for  him  the  leading  position  in  the 
legislature.  Whenever  he  spoke  at  length  a  quorum  could 
not  be  maintained  in  the  other  House.  The  rapidity  of  his 
political  progress  equalled  that  which  he  had  made  in  his 
profession.  So  high  was  his  standing  that  he  was  elected 
to  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  at  the  first  opportunity. 
This  occurred  in  1806,  when  John  Adair  resigned  his  seat 
because  of  his  complicity  with  Burr. 

"When  Clay  took  the  oath  as  Senator,  December  29,  he  had 
not  attained  the  age  of  thirty,  as  prescribed  by  the  Consti 
tution.  His  eligibility,  however,  was  not  questioned  ;  but  in 
after-years  he  was  charged  with  the  act  as  a  wilful  violation 
of  the  Constitution,  and  it  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  he 


28  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1807-8 

acted  in  ignorance.1  The  vacancy  he  was  elected  to  fill 
was  only  for  one  session,  ending  March  3,  1807.  He  took 
part  in  the  most  important  proceedings,  served  on  various 
committees,  and  introduced  several  resolutions,  one  of  them 
proposing  a  Constitutional  amendment  concerning  the  judi 
cial  power.  He  not  only  entered  freely  into  the  debates,  but 
in  his  first  speech  took  occasion  to  rebuke  an  old  member 
for  his  manner  of  assuming  superior  wisdom,  and  amused 
the  Senate  by  quoting  from  Peter  Pindar  : 

"Thus  have  I  seen  a  magpie  on  the  street, 
A  chattering  bird  we  often  meet ; 
A  bird  for  curiosity  well  known, 

With  head  awry,  and  cunning  eye, 
Peep  knowingly  into  a  marrow-bone." 

He  created  a  favorable  impression  as  an  orator,  although 
he  had  no  opportunity  to  exhibit  his  powers  to  the  best  advan 
tage  ;  yet  some  grave  Senators,  unaccustomed  to  Clay's 
energetic  style  in  their  small  chamber,  thought  it  rather  de 
clamatory.  "  This  session  of  Congress,"  he  wrote  to  a  friend, 
"has  not  been  so  interesting  as  I  had  anticipated.  No 
questions  in  relation  to  our  foreign  intercourse  involving 
much  discussion  have  been  agitated ;  everything  depends 
upon  the  result  of  pending  negotiations,  and  this  will  not  be 
known,  it  is  probable,  until  the  session  expires."  His  first 
speech,  which  was  very  gratifying  to  those  who  were  locally 
interested,  was  in  support  of  a  bill  to  provide  for  the  ereo 


1  "  While  welcoming  Mr.  Clay  to  Boston  as  chairman  of  a  young  men's 
committee,  in  the  autumn  of  1833,  I  found  that  he  was  indisposed  to  have 
this  early  breach  of  the  Constitutional  requirements  alluded  to  or  inquired 
into  with  much  particularity.  '  I  think,  my  young  friend/  said  he,  '  we 
may  as  well  omit  any  reference  to  my  supposed  juvenile  indiscretions.'" 
—  Winthrop's  Addresses,  vol.  iv.  p.  41. 

Claiborne's  election  to  the  House  from  Tennessee,  in  1803,  was  a  similar 
lapse,  for  he  was  not  twenty-five  years  of  age. 


CH.  L]  CLAY   IN  THE   SENATE  29 

tion  of  a  bridge  over  the  Potomac  at  Georgetown.  The 
measure  to  which  he  gave  most  attention  was  preliminary 
to  the  proposed  construction  of  a  canal  in  Kentucky,  at  the 
rapids  in  the  Ohio  River.  By  his  attitude  in  regard  to  these 
subjects  he  espoused  the  doctrine  that  Congress  possessed 
Constitutional  power  to  promote  internal  improvements,  al 
though  in  so  doing  he  disagreed  with  Jefferson,  who  in  his 
annual  message  recommended  a  Constitutional  amendment 
as  necessary  to  give  the  power.  Clay  also  advocated  na 
tional  aid  to  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  canal,  and  a  resolu 
tion  calling  upon  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  submit 
to  the  Senate  at  the  next  session  a  report  on  the  policy  and 
plan  of  a  s\^stem  of  improvements.  The  report  was  made, 
but  it  was  not  until  some  years  later  that  the  subject  as 
sumed  political  importance.  Clay  regarded  his  service  at 
this  session  as  a  recreation.  He  was  also  before  the  Su 
preme  Court  in  several  cases.  In  his  social  relations,  which 
he  cultivated,  he  was  much  admired  and  esteemed.1  Prefer 
ring  not  to  neglect  his  law  practice,  he  declined  a  re-elec 
tion  ;  but  he  was  immediately  returned  to  the  State  Assem 
bly,  despite  an  unseemly  opposition  grounded  on  his  having 
acted  as  Burr's  counsel. 

During  his  former  service  in  the  Assembly  the  discussions 
had  all  related  to  local  topics ;  they  now  took  a  wider  range. 
Portentous  foreign  troubles  had  begun  to  disturb  the  tran 
quillity  which  the  country  had  previously  enjoyed  under 
Jefferson's  administration.  Political  differences,  which  had 
slumbered  for  some  time,  were  stoutly  renewed.  The 
chronic  Western  aversion  for  Great  Britain  was  displayed 
in  a  senseless,  but  not  wholly  novel,  way.  It  was  proposed 


Life  of  William  Plumer,  p.  351  ;  Adams's  Diary,  January  15,  1807. 


30  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1811 

to  forbid  the  use  of  any  British  legal  citations  whatever  in 
the  courts  of  the  State  ;  and  the  proposition  was  favored  by 
a  large  majority.  The  administration  of  justice,  it  was 
urged,  should  not  be  governed  by  the  decisions  of  foreign 
courts,  particularly  those  of  Great  Britain.  Clay  had  the 
judgment  and  courage  to  oppose  the  measure,  notwithstand 
ing  he  shared  the  sentiment  that  induced  it.  But  his 
method  was  the  same  as  that  which  he  employed  on  several 
historic  occasions  long  afterward  —  he  proposed  a  com 
promise.  He  moved  to  limit  the  prohibition  to  the  period 
after  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  supported  the 
motion  by  resounding  argument  and  a  just  and  brilliant 
eulogy  of  the  common  law.  His  motion  prevailed,  and 
arrested  the  demagogic  folly  that  threatened  the  juris 
prudence  of  the  State.1 

At  this  session  he  was  Speaker.  At  the  next,  Humphrey 
Marshall,  formerly  a  United  States  Senator,  and  the  leader 
of  the  small  contingent  of  Kentucky  Federalists,  appeared 
in  the  Assembly  for  the  purpose  of  making  war  on  Clay  and 
the  Republican  party,  and  Clay  remained  on  the  floor  be 
cause  of  the  greater  freedom  it  gave  him.  He  did  not  wait  for 
attack,  but  soon  introduced  a  series  of  emphatic  resolutions 
denouncing  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  toward  our  mari 
time  commerce,  pledging  to  the  government  the  co-opera 
tion  of  Kentucky  in  resisting  British  aggressions,  and  laud 
ing  Jefferson  and  his  policy.  Marshall  proposed  resolutions 
to  the  contrary  effect ;  but  he  had  the  mortification  of  vot 
ing  alone  for  them  after  delivering  a  harsh  invective  against 
those  which  Clay  had  offered  and  advocated  in  his  charac 
teristic  manner.  Following  the  whim  of  the  day,  Clay  next 


1  A  similar  law  had  been  enacted  in  New  Jersey  in  1801,  and  the  exam 
ple  was  followed  in  Pennsylvania  in  1810. 


CH.  I.]     DUEL  BETWEEN  CLAY  AND  MARSHALL  31 

proposed  a  resolution  declaring  that  every  member  of  the 
legislature  should  wear  clothing  of  domestic  manufacture 
only,  to  manifest  his  practical  devotion  to  the  policy  of  en 
couraging  American  industry,  which  was  already  popular 
in  Kentucky,  partly  because  of  the  hostile  feeling  against 
England.  This  was  Clay's  first  effort  in  behalf  of  the  sys 
tem  which  he  contributed  more  than  any  one  else  to  estab 
lish  as  a  distinct  national  policy.  Nothing  could  have 
been  better  calculated  to  inflame  Marshall's  hostility  and  to 
afford  him  an  opportunity  to  exercise  his  talent  for  abuse. 
He  abandoned  himself  to  his  violent  animosities,  and  applied 
to  Clay  and  his  resolution  a  variety  of  offensive  and  insult 
ing  epithets,  to  which  Clay  responded  with  vigor  and  free 
dom.  The  consequence  was  a  challenge  from  Marshall  to  a 
duel,  which  Clay  promptly  accepted.  They  met  and  fired  at 
each  other  twice,  each  receiving  a  slight  wound.  At  this 
point  the  seconds  intervened  and  ended  the  combat.  Pre 
sumably  the  principals  regarded  the  demands  of  honor  as 
satisfied.1 

In  the  town  of  Hebron,  Ohio,  there  still  lingers  the  tradi 
tion  of  a  peculiar  sequel  to  this  duel.  For  several  }^ears 
subsequent  to  1809  the  middle  counties  of  Ohio  were  infested 
by  gangs  of  horse-thieves.  The  leader  of  the  Licking  County 
gang  was  one  Eli  Marshall,  who  was  generally  regarded  as 
the  most  dangerous  desperado  in  the  West,  a  giant  in  stature, 


1  "  It  was  calculated  with  certainty  by  Clay's  friends  at  Louisville  (oppo 
site  to  which,  on  the  Indiana  side  of  the  Ohio  River,  the  fight  took  place) 
that  Marshall  would  be  killed  or  badly  wounded.  Mr.  Clay,  in  this  event, 
was  to  be  welcomed  on  his  return  from  the  scene  of  the  combat  by  a  dinner 
provided  by  his  friends.  He  was  not  in  condition,  of  course,  to  partake  of 
it,  but  tradition  goes  on  further  to  relate  that  he  returned  the  compliment 
of  his  friends  by  giving  them  card-parties  in  his  room  during  the  whole 
time  he  was  confined  to  it  by  his  wound." — Headlands  in  the  Life  of  Henry 
Clay,  No.  1,  p.  2. 


32  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1809 

and  a  villain  every  inch.  For  a  long  time  the  farmers  near 
Hebron  had  remained  unmolested,  but  finally  they  were  raid 
ed  and  their  best  horses  taken.  Of  the  party  that  was  organ 
ized  and  pursued  the  gang  six  were  killed,  and  as  a  result 
the  community  was  in  a  state  of  terror.  During  this  excite 
ment,  Clay  was  on  his  way  to  Washington  over  the  national 
road.  He  was  advised  to  accept  an  armed  escort,  but  he 
declined.  One  afternoon  immediately  afterward  he  stopped 
at  the  "  Licking  Arms,"  a  hostelry  in  Hebron.  As  a  heavy 
rain  was  falling,  it  was  decided  to  travel  no  farther  until 
the  next  day.  In  the  evening  a  large  number  of  citizens 
gathered  at  the  tavern  to  pay  their  respects  to  Clay ;  and 
in  the  course  of  the  conversation  the  subject  of  the  recent 
depredations  was  discussed.  Clay  freely  expressed  his  opin 
ions  on  the  subject.  He  said  he  had  no  fear  of  being 
molested,  and,  furthermore,  that  he  would  not  mind  meeting 
Marshall  and  calling  him  to  account. 

This  remark  was  probably  reported  by  a  spy ;  at  all 
events,  Marshall  and  three  of  his  gang  came  to  the  tavern 
after  the  people  had  dispersed.  Clay  was  in  his  room  writ 
ing  letters  when  he  was  informed  of  the  situation  by  the 
landlord,  who  reported  that  Marshall  demanded  to  see  him. 
Clay  sent  back  the  reply  that  he  never  complied  with  de 
mands.  Marshall  forthwith  came  up  the  stairs,  threw  open 
Clay's  door,  and  strode  into  the  room — but  to  look  into  the 
muzzle  of  a  pistol.  At  Clay's  command  he  halted,  deposited 
his  weapons  on  a  chair  near  him,  and  then  stepped  into  an 
adjoining  store-room.  Clay  securely  fastened  the  door  and 
went  down-stairs.  There  the  other  three  desperadoes  were 
overawed  in  the  same  manner,  disarmed,  and  bound.  Return 
ing  above,  Clay  released  Marshall  from  the  store-room  and 
bade  him  sit  down  and  explain  his  object  in  perpetrating  such 


CH.  I.]  CLAY  AND   THE   HORSE-THIEF  33 

an  outrage.  He  replied  that  he  was  a  second  cousin  to  Hum 
phrey  Marshall,  with  whom  Clay  had  fought  in  1808 ;  that 
he  had  been  told  that  the  duel  was  not  finished  because  Clay 
showed  cowardice ;  and  that  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to 
compel  Clay  to  apologize  to  him  for  the  injury  done  his 
kinsman.  Clay  then  proposed  that  they  go  to  the  large 
room  below  and  take  three  shots  at  each  other.  Marshall 
agreed  and  asked  for  his  pistol ;  but  Clay  refused  to  restore 
it  until  they  were  ready  to  shoot.  He  directed  the  landlord 
and  his  son  to  stand  with  their  pistols  close  to  Marshall 
until  the  word  was  given  to  fire,  and  to  shoot  him  if  he 
made  a  move  to  turn  before  the  word.  By  this  time  Mar 
shall  was  pale  and  trembling.  He  showed  the  craven,  and 
finally  refused  to  fight.  Clay  then  made  him  get  down  on  his 
knees  and  apologize  both  to  himself  and  to  the  landlord  for 
the  outrage,  and  to  sign  a  paper  acknowledging  that  he  was 
a  coward.  This  done,  he  was  bound,  and,  with  the  other 
three  ruffians,  delivered  over  to  the  authorities.  "Whether 
or  not  this  story  is  true,  Clay  was  entirely  capable  of  the 
action  ascribed  to  him,  and  was  so  regarded  by  the  people 
of  that  region.1 

The  session  at  which  the  duel  with  Marshall  occurred 
terminated  Clay's  service  in  the  State  legislature.  He  was 
again  elected  to  the  Senate,  this  time  to  fill  a  vacancy  for 
two  years.  If  he  had  previously  hesitated  to  enter  upon  a 
public  career  in  the  national  arena,  it  is  quite  apparent 
that  he  had  now  overcome  his  indecision.  Few  details 


1  This  tradition  was  first  published  with  considerable  detail  in  the  Louis 
ville  Courier  Journal,  in  June,  1896,  and  afterward  in  the  New  York  Sun. 
It  is  there  related  that  the  prisoners  managed  to  escape  ;  but  that  the  gang 
was  soon  broken  up,  Marshall  and  one  other  fleeing  into  Virginia,  where 
they  were  captured  and  hanged  to  a  tree.  Marshall's  sheath-knife,  it  is 
said,  was  sent  to  Clay,  and  is  still  in  possession  of  the  family. 


34  THE   JACKSONIAN    EPOCH  [1810 

of  his  history  during  this  early  period  are  known,  but  it 
may  be  assumed  that  his  circumstances  had  improved  to  a 
degree  that  warranted  him  in  yielding  to  the  ambition  his 
brilliant  success  thus  far  undoubtedly  stimulated. 

He  re-appeared  in  the  Senate  February  5,  1810,  and  im 
mediately  renewed  his  activity  in  that  body  with  that  in 
dependence  and  initiative  which  always  characterized  him. 
Our  foreign  relations  and  maritime  troubles  were  growing 
daily  more  threatening,  and  the  warlike  spirit,  particular 
ly  in  the  West,  was  rapidly  rising.  It  was  doubtless  this 
situation  that  furnished  Clay's  main  incentive  for  returning 
to  the  Senate.  The  long -continued  system  of  commercial 
restrictions — non-importation,  embargo,  and  non-intercourse 
— was  nearly  exhausted.  It  was  always  obnoxious  to  one 
party,  and  was  now  becoming  unsatisfactory  to  the  other. 
That  Clay  was  ready  to  advocate  war  he  soon  made  mani 
fest.  The  existing  restrictive  act  was  to  expire  with  the 
session.  To  meet  the  situation,  a  bill  proposed  by  the  ad 
ministration  was  passed  by  the  House,  after  much  wrangling, 
to  exclude  from  our  ports  all  British  and  French  vessels, 
and  to  admit  British  and  French  merchandise  only  when 
directly  imported  in  American  bottoms  ;  but  to  permit  the 
renewal  of  trade,  upon  the  proclamation  of  the  President, 
with  the  power  that  rescinded  or  changed  its  decrees  so  as 
no  longer  to  violate  our  neutral  trade.  Shortly  after  Clay's 
return  to  the  Senate  the  bill  was  there  taken  up  and  an 
amendment  carried  striking  out  all  the  provisions  except 
those  to  exclude  belligerent  ships  of  war.  February  25, 
Clay  moved  to  recommit  the  bill,  and  delivered  a  passionate 
speech  against  the  emasculation  of  it.  This  is  the  first  of 
his  reported  speeches,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  was  taken 
fully  or  with  verbal  accuracy,  though  it  sufficiently  discloses 


CH.  I.]         CLAY   FAVORS   NATIVE   INDUSTRIES  35 

his  belligerent  views.  His  motion  was  defeated,  but  he 
voiced  a  sentiment  that  soon  became  controlling.  His  speech 
was  the  inception  of  the  leadership  he  soon  acquired.1  The 
bill  failed,  as  the  two  Houses  could  not  agree  ;  but  another 
bill  less  stringent  in  character  was  enacted  in  place  of  it. 

Clay  spoke  frequently,  but  not  again  at  length  until  April 
6,  when  he  addressed  the  Senate  on  the  "  encouragement  of 
home  industry."  The  question  arose  on  a  motion  to  strike 
out  an  amendment  to  an  appropriation  bill  directing  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  give  preference,  in  purchasing  sail- 
duck,  cordage,  hemp,  flax,  and  the  like,  to  domestic  produc 
tions,  whenever  it  could  be  done  without  material  detriment 
to  the  public  service.  It  evoked  discussion  of  the  general 
policy  of  promoting  manufactures.  Immediately  after  Clay's 
speech  against  it  the  motion  was  defeated,  9  to  22.  Never 
theless,  the  House  struck  out  the  provision,  and  the  bill  be 
came  a  law  without  it.  It  was  probably  thought  more  dig 
nified  and  equally  advantageous  to  leave  the  matter  wholly 
to  the  discretion  of  the  Navy  Department ;  indeed,  had  the 
provision  been  enacted  it  could  have  had  no  effect  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  department,  which  was  alone  to 
determine  what  was  to  the  "  detriment  of  the  public  ser 
vice."  According  to  Clay's  own  statement,  the  progress 
already  made  in  the  production  of  those  articles  was  good 
evidence  that  those  industries  were  quite  independent  of 


1  "Clay's  speech  marked  the  appearance  of  a  school  which  was  for  fifty 
years  to  express  the  national  ideas  of  statesmanship,  drawing  elevation  of 
character  from  confidence  in  itself,  and  from  devotion  to  ideas  of  national 
ity  and  union  which  redeemed  every  mistake  committed  in  their  names. 
In  Clay's  speech,  almost  for  the  first  time,  the  two  rhetorical  marks  of  his 
generation  made  their  appearance,  and  during  the  next  half -century  the 
Union  and  the  Fathers  were  rarely  omitted  from  any  popular  harangue." 
—Adams's  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  v.  p.  190. 


36  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1810 

governmental  aid.  And  this  view  was  strongly  reinforced 
in  a  report  on  manufactures  presented  to  Congress  by 
Gallatin  not  long  after  Clay's  speech.  The  significance 
of  Clay's  views  at  this  time  is  that  he  was  far -more 
moderate  in  his  advocacy  of  protection  than  he  afterward 
became;  for  even  then  a  distinctly  protective  policy  was 
favored  by  many.  So  far  as  he  expressed  his  opinions, 
he  apparently  differed  little  from  those  who  were  free 
traders  in  principle,  but  who  approved  such  incidental  en 
couragement  to  domestic  production  as  would  not  involve 
extra  burdens  of  taxation. 

Besides  participating  in  the  debates,  he  was  industrious 
in  the  routine  duties  of  legislation.  Among  numerous  sub 
jects  that  engaged  his  attention  were  bills  to  grant  pre 
emptive  rights  to  settlers  upon  the  public  lands,  and  to 
regulate  trade  and  intercourse  with  the  Indians.  On  each 
of  these  bills  he  drew  a  committee  report  which  dis 
played  just  and  sagacious  views.  He  no  doubt  felt  at 
the  close  of  the  session  a  greater  degree  of  satisfaction 
than  he  had  experienced  during  his  former  service  in  the 
Senate.  It  was  unmistakable  that  he  was  a  rising  man. 
His  genius  as  a  parliamentarian  and  his  attractive  personal 
qualities  were  ungrudging^  admired.  He  was  rapidly  per 
fecting  himself  in  the  art  that,  with  his  mind  and  per 
sonality,  was  to  make  him  a  potent  character  in  politics 
and  legislation  through  a  long  career.  The  time  was  pro 
pitious — events  were  approaching  a  climax  suited  to  bold 
and  self-reliant  men.  Clay  had  neglected  no  opportunity, 
and  could  look  forward  with  confidence  to  a  position  of 
conspicuous  influence. 

The  next  session  of  Congress  convened  December  3. 
Ten  days  later  Clay  was  in  his  seat,  and  on  Christmas  Day 


CH.  I.]         CONFLICTING  TERRITORIAL  CLAIMS  37 

he  delivered  the  most  able  and  telling  speech  he  had  thus 
far  addressed  to  the  Senate. 

The  southeastern  boundary  of  the  Louisiana  purchase 
was  not  precisely  defined ;  and  with  the  progress  of  settle 
ment  in  West  Florida,  conflicting  claims  to  that  territory 
by  Spain  and  the  United  States  had  inevitably  arisen,  as 
our  negotiations  for  the  purchase  of  Florida  had  not  suc 
ceeded.  Spain  claimed  title  to  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
United  States  to  the  Kio  Perdido.  Our  government,  how 
ever,  had  not  taken  possession,  and  the  Spanish  flag  flew 
unmolested  from  Baton  Rouge  to  Pensacola,  until  in  the 
summer  of  1810,  when  the  increasing  population — composed 
of  various  nationalities,  with  a  large  portion  from  the 
United  States  —  imitating  the  example  of  many  of  the 
Spanish  -  American  provinces,  declared  independence,  after 
some  confusion,  and  applied  for  annexation  to  the  United 
States.  Madison  then  performed  an  act  that  for  him  was 
of  extraordinary  audacity.  In  October  he  issued  a  proc 
lamation  asserting  our  title  to  the  territory,  and  direct 
ing  its  annexation  to  Orleans.  He  professed  to  be  actu 
ated  by  the  desire  to  prevent  further  disorder  in  the  dis 
trict,  and  announced  that  the  seizure  would,  notwithstand 
ing,  be  "the  subject  of  fair  and  friendly  negotiation  and 
adjustment"  with  Spain.  Nevertheless,  the  declaration  of 
independence  and  the  application  for  annexation  were  re 
buffed  as  an  impertinence.  Measures  were  at  once  taken  to 
enforce  the  edict  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Pearl 
rivers;  beyond  the  Pearl  the  confusion  still  continued. 
Madison,  of  course,  stated  the  situation  to  Congress  at  the 
opening  of  the  session,  and  a  bill  in  conformitjr  with  his 
proclamation  was  introduced  in  the  Senate.  The  proceed 
ing  met  with  intense  approval  in  the  West,  but  was  opposed 


38  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1810 

by  the  Federalists.  The  principal  speech  against  the  bill 
had  been  delivered  by  Horsey,  of  Delaware.  Clay  imme 
diately  replied.  While  his  animated  speech — in  which  he 
again  vigorously  denounced  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain 
toward  this  country  —  bears  some  marks  of  being  extempo 
raneous,  its  decided  superiority  over  his  previous  reported 
utterances  suggests  that  it  had  been  thoroughly  considered. 
Before  Madison's  proclamation  the  press  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  had  energetically  argued  the  importance  of  our 
acquiring  exclusive  control  of  the  Gulf  coast,  and  that  if  we 
did  not  take  possession  of  West  Florida,  England,  by  some 
means,  would.  It  is  probable  that  Clay's  perfect  familiar 
ity  with  the  treaties  and  the  President's  justification  of  his 
course,  unsound  in  law  but  sound  in  policy,  was  derived 
from  Madison,  who  doubtless  selected  him  to  present  the 
case  to  the  Senate.  This  supposition  is  aided  by  his  subse 
quent  leadership  in  the  proceedings.  Pickering,  of  Massa 
chusetts,  a  zealous  Federalist,  quoted,  in  replying  to  Clay,  a 
letter  from  Talleyrand  to  Jefferson,  which  had  been  confi 
dentially  communicated  to  the  Senate  by  Jefferson  in  1805. 
Clay  at  once  moved  a  resolution  censuring  him  for  his  breach 
of  the  rules,  and  procured  its  adoption. 

While  this  debate  was  in  progress,  Madison  sent  to  Con 
gress  a  secret  message  asking  for  authority  to  take  posses 
sion  of  West  Florida,  and  that  a  declaration  be  made  that 
the  United  States  could  not,  unconcerned,  see  the  Floridas 
pass  from  Spain  to  any  other  foreign  power.  This  message 
was  accompanied  by  a  letter  from  Folch,  the  Spanish  gov 
ernor  of  the  Floridas,  offering  to  surrender  the  whole  terri 
tory  to  the  United  States  if  Spain  should  not  send  him  suc 
cor  by  the  first  day  of  January.  The  situation  was  further 
complicated  by  the  application  of  Louisiana  (Orleans  terri- 


CH.  L]  ACQUISITION   OF   THE   FLORIDAS  39 

tory)  for  admission  into  the  Union.  The  final  result  was 
the  enactment  of  the  usual  preliminary  law  for  the  admis 
sion  of  Louisiana,  including  the  small  part  of  "West  Florida 
between  the  Mississippi,  the  Iberville,  Lake  Maurepas,  and 
Lake  Pontchartrain  ;  of  another  authorizing  the  President 
to  take  possession  of  East  Florida  if  the  local  authorities 
assented,  or  should  any  foreign  power  attempt  to  occupy 
it;  and  the  adoption  of  a  joint  resolution  declaring,  pur 
suant  to  the  President's  request,  that,  in  view  of  the  situa 
tion  of  Spain  and  her  American  colonies,  it  was  impossible 
to  see  without  alarm  any  part  of  the  territory  pass  to  any 
foreign  power,  and  that  safety  required  our  occupation  of 
the  territory,  but  subject  to  future  negotiation.  By  a  sub 
sequent  law  these  acts  and  resolutions  concerning  East 
Florida  were  not  to  be  promulgated  before  the  end  of  the 
next  session  of  Congress;  and  they  were  not  until  about 
the  time  of  the  treaty  by  which  Spain  ceded  the  Floridas 
to  the  United  States,  and  thus  closed  the  train  of  controver 
sies  which  had  arisen  in  relation  to  this  domain.  The  bill 
concerning  West  Florida  was  dropped,  and  the  situation  was 
left  as  it  was.  At  the  next  session,  however,  all  that  part 
of  West  Florida  west  of  the  Pearl  was  added  to  Louisiana, 
which  was  then  admitted  into  the  Union.  The  rest  of  the 
tract  was  incorporated  into  the  Mississippi  territory  not 
withstanding  the  Spanish  garrison  at  Mobile.  At  this  ses 
sion  also  a  bill  to  authorize  the  President  to  take  posses 
sion  of  Florida  entire,  and  establish  a  government  over  it, 
was  passed  by  the  House ;  but  it  was  factiously  defeated  in 
the  Senate. 

These  subjects  gave  Clay  a  rapid  experience  in  the  larger 
statecraft  of  the  period ;  and  this,  with  the  increasing  defer 
ence  shown  him,  doubtless  increased  his  confidence  in  his 


40  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1811 

powers.  He  entered  into  the  discussion  of  the  most  im 
portant  topic  before  Congress  with  such  assurance  and  in 
trepidity  that  the  position  he  took  caused  him  much  em 
barrassment  later. 

The  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  enacted 
in  1791,  was  about  to  expire,  and  the  renewal  of  it  was 
urged  upon  Congress.  Both  Madison  and  Gallatin  opposed 
the  bank  as  unconstitutional  when  it  was  established,  but 
had  gradually  changed  their  opinions.  It  had  performed 
important  functions  in  the  finances  of  the  government  and 
the  country  by  supplying  a  sound  and  uniform  currency, 
facilitating  exchanges,  aiding  in  the  collection  and  custody 
of  the  public  revenues,  and  in  various  operations  of  the 
Treasury.  Hence  Gallatin,  the  ablest  financier  of  the  pe 
riod,  deemed  it  of  great  moment  that  the  bank  should  be 
continued,  particularly  in  view  of  the  possibility  of  war. 
Its  termination  would  cause  a  large  export  of  specie  to  pay 
the  foreign  stockholders,  and  would  produce  for  a  long 
time  a  serious  contraction  of  the  currency,  besides  a  de 
terioration  in  the  character  of  the  inevitable  issues  of  the 
State  banks.  But  notwithstanding  the  strong  support  it 
received  from  many  important  business  interests,  a  strong 
sentiment  had  arisen  against  the  recharter.  The  Constitu 
tional  objections  to  a  national  bank  were  strongly  renewed. 
The  legislatures  of  several  States,  and  among  them  Ken 
tucky,  instructed  their  Senators  to  oppose  the  recharter. 
The  old  cry  was  raised  that  the  bank  was  an  aristocratic 
monopoly  adverse  to  the  spirit  of  our  institutions.  As  two- 
thirds  of  the  stock  was  held  abroad,  the  bank  was  charged 
with  being  controlled  by  foreign  influence  and  with  send 
ing  its  profits  abroad.  It  was  also  accused  of  favoritism 
in  its  accommodations,  and  consequently  of  being  a  politi- 


CH.  L]     CLAY  AND  THE  UNITED   STATES  BANK          41 

cal  factor  —  the  remaining  bulwark  of  Federalism.  The 
local  banks  were  also  clamorous  in  their  opposition,  for  the 
policy  of  the  bank  imposed  a  decisive  check  on  their  pro 
fuse  issues  of  paper,  which  customers  were  eager  to  pro 
cure,  and,  failing,  were  instructed  that  their  misfortune  was 
due  to  the  hostility  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  to  the 
State  banks.  The  people  were  thus  moved  by  a  desire  to 
put  down  the  institution.  Moreover,  the  proposed  plan  of 
recharter  was  unsatisfactory  to  many,  and  opposed  for  that 
reason.  But  underneath  all  this  was  a  political  movement, 
extending  even  into  the  cabinet,  to  hamper  Gallatin  and 
banish  him  from  office.  While  it  is  not  probable  that  Clay 
was  influenced  by  this  political  design,  he  did  not  hesitate 
to  join  the  motley  opposition.  On  April  6  he  expressed 
himself  in  the  most  effective  speech  delivered  against  the 
bill.1  Several  Senators  in  favor  of  it  had  preceded  him, 
Crawford,  of  Georgia,  having  spoken  writh  great  ability. 

Clay,  as  usual  with  him  at  this  time,  opened  his  speech 
in  a  vein  of  sarcasm  that  displayed  his  self-confidence, 
which,  in  the  absence  of  the  charm  of  his  personal  inter 
course,  would  have  been  regarded  as  presumptuous  and 
offensive.  His  first  objection  to  the  bill  was  that  it  would 
not  become  operative  without  the  assent  of  the  bank's  di 
rectors,  thus  placing  them  superior  to  Congress.  He  then, 
contrary  to  his  previous  views  in  relation  to  internal  im- 


1  Concerning  this  speech,  Washington  Irving  wrote  :  "  Clay,  from  Ken 
tucky,  spoke  against  the  bank.  He  is  one  of  the  finest  fellows  I  have 
seen  here,  and  one  of  the  finest  orators  in  the  Senate,  though,  I  believe, 
the  youngest  man  in  it.  The  galleries,  however,  were  so  crowded  with 
ladies  and  gentlemen,  and  such  expectations  had  been  expressed  concern 
ing  his  speech,  that  he  was  completely  frightened,  and  acquitted  himself 
very  little  to  his  own  satisfaction.  He  is  a  man  I  have  great  personal  re 
gard  for." 


42  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1811 

pro vements,  took  the  ground  of  the  strict -constructionist, 
and  argued  against  the  Constitutional  power  to  establish  a 
bank — the  chief  subject  on  which,  years  afterward,  he  led 
the  great  contest  with  Jackson,  but  as  the  advocate  of  the 
opposite  doctrine.  The  argument  against  implied  powers  of 
the  Constitution  has  never  been  more  felicitously  stated.1 
He  denied  the  utility  and  expediency  of  the  bank,  and  pro 
nounced  it  "  a  splendid  association  of  favored  individuals 
taken  from  the  mass  of  society  and  invested  with  exemp 
tions  and  surrounded  by  immunities  and  privileges."  He 
also  descanted  on  the  danger  in  the  union  of  the  sword 
and  the  purse,  and  allowing  foreigners  to  own  stock  in  the 
bank.  To  the  suggestion  that  British  capital  invested  in 
this  country  exerted  an  influence  over  the  British  govern 
ment  in  our  favor,  he  replied  with  great  fervor,  and  added : 
"  It  has  often  been  stated,  and  although  I  do  not  know  that 
it  is  susceptible  of  strict  proof,  I  believe  it  to  be  a  fact  that 
this  bank  exercised  its  influence  in  support  of  Jay's  treaty ; 
and  may  it  not  have  contributed  to  blunt  the  public  senti 
ment  or  paralyze  this  nation  against  British  aggression  ?" 
Nevertheless,  the  commercial  and  moneyed  interests  of  Great 
Britain  were  afterward  enlisted  in  the  abrogating  the  Brit 
ish  policy,  and  they  finally  exerted  a  decisive  influence  in 
bringing  the  War  of  1812  to  a  close.2 


1  In  1837  he  said:  "I  was  present  as  a  member  of  Congress  on  the  oc 
casion  of  the  termination  of  the  charters  of  both  of  the  banks  of  the 
United  States,  took  part  in  the  discussion  to  which  they  gave  rise,  and 
had  an  opportunity  of  extensively  knowing  the  opinions  of  members ; 
and  I  declare  my  deliberate  conviction  that  upon  neither  was  there  one- 
third  of  the  members  in  either  House  who  entertained  the  opinion  that 
Congress  did  not  possess  the  Constitutional  power  to  charter  a  bank." 

2  Clay  admitted  this  in  a  speech  on  the  tariff  in  1820.     "Our  late 
war,"  said  he,  "would  not  have  existed  if  the  counsels  of  the  manufact 
urers  in  England  had  been  listened  to.     They  finally  did  prevail  in  their 


CH.  L]          CLAY'S   POLITICAL  ADVANCEMENT  43 

The  opposition  to  the  recharter  succeeded — yet  barely  suc 
ceeded.  In  the  Senate  the  bill  was  defeated  by  the  casting 
vote  of  the  Vice -President.  In  the  House  a  like  bill  was 
rejected  by  a  vote  of  65  to  64.  Happening  at  that  juncture 
of  affairs,  the  result  proved  a  serious  misfortune  to  the 
country ;  and  Clay,  who  could  probably  have  prevented  it, 
soon  regretted  his  action.1 

The  only  other  business  of  importance  transacted  during 
the  remainder  of  the  session  was  the  enactment  of  a  law  re 
viving  non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain.  The  bill  encoun 
tered  no  difficulty  in  the  Senate,  but  its  passage  by  the  House 
was  signalized  by  the  adoption  of  the  rule  of  the  previous 
question  to  terminate  the  dilatory  tactics  of  the  opposition. 
The  government  had  reached  a  state  of  truly  pitiful  weak 
ness.  Our  foreign  relations  were  in  a  contemptible  plight, 
while  the  feebleness  of  the  domestic  polic}^,  caused  by  the 
timidity  of  Madison  and  the  want  of  vigorous  support  in 
Congress,  had  brought  the  administration  into  a  precarious 
situation.  The  time  had  at  last  arrived  when  energy  was 
indispensable.  Madison  yielded  to  forceful  counsels ;  there 
was  no  other  escape  from  the  dilemma  in  which  he  was 
placed.  Smith,  the  inefficient  Secretary  of  State,  was  dis 
missed,  and  Monroe  took  his  place,  with  a  disposition  to 
retrieve  our  humbled  national  dignity.  But  what  was  still 
more  important,  Clay  was  selected  to  assume  the  leadership 


steady  and  persevering  effort  to  produce  a  repeal  of  the  Orders  in  Coun 
cil,  but  it  was  too  late  to  prevent  war." 

1  Martin  Van  Buren,  from  the  bias  of  his  political  principles,  ranked 
Clay's  speech  higher  than  it  deserves.  "It  [the  bank  controversy]  gave 
position  to  Henry  Clay  as  one  of  the  strong  minds  of  the  country,  derived 
from  his  speech  against  rechartering  the  bank,  by  far  the  best  speech  he 
ever  made,  and  nearly  equal  to  that  of  Madison  in  1790." — Van  Buren's 
Political  Parties  in  the  United  States,  p.  413. 


44  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1811 

in  Congress.  His  hour  had  come.  He  decided  to  retire 
from  the  Senate  and  enter  the  House.  He  was  readily 
elected,  and  on  his  first  appearance  in  that  body,  Novem 
ber  4,  1811,  in  his  thirty-fifth  year,  he  was  chosen  Speaker 
— the  only  instance  where  the  position  has  been  given  to 
a  new  member. 

This  political  rise  entitles  Clay  to  rank  among  the  most 
precocious  men  notable  in  civil  history ;  and  this  is  rendered 
still  more  remarkable  by  the  age  he  attained  without  dimi 
nution  of  his  powers  and  influence.  The  beginning  of  the 
parliamentary  career  of  Fox,  Pitt,  Canning,  or  Gladstone  is 
hardly  more  extraordinary,  if  we  consider  the  differences 
in  training  and  surroundings.  Although  none  of  Clay's 
speeches  before  his  second  service  in  the  Senate  were  pre 
served,  they  were  not  less  effective,  judging  from  tradition 
and  results,  than  those  of  his  later  years.  Certainly  his 
speech  "On  the  Line  of  the  Perdido"  is  equal  in  all  the 
elements  of  skilful  debate  to  any  he  ever  pronounced. 
Precocious  display  of  this  order,  however,  is  not  the  product 
of  sheer  oratorical  genius.  Capacity  for  affairs  and  the 
management  of  men  that  is  requisite  to  success  in  the 
higher  grades  of  politics  indicates  a  proportionately  superior 
mind,  and  is  usually  accompanied  by  a  considerable  faculty 
for  public  speech  of  one  type  or  another ;  but  the  period 
when  the  powers  of  such  a  mind  are  revealed  depends  upon 
favoring  circumstances,  be  it  early  or  late. 

At  this  time  Congress  had  not  attained  much  prestige 
among  the  people.  The  best -known  statesmen  had  ac 
quired  their  reputation  for  the  most  part  during  the  Revo 
lution  and  the  period  preceding  the  adoption  of  the  Consti 
tution.  They  were  not  in  Congress.  A  new  state  of  things 
and  a  new  generation  of  public  men  were  making  their 


Cn.  I.J        A  NEW  ORDER  OF  STATESMANSHIP  45 

appearance.  Since  the  Revolution,  not  only  the  form  of  the 
government  but  the  general  situation  had  changed.  During 
the  Avar  few  of  the  bearings  and  necessities  of  expanding 
nationality,  now  rapidly  presenting  themselves,  were  dis 
closed.  The  establishment  of  the  Constitution  was  naturally 
followed  by  a  stage  that  may  be  likened  to  molecular  change. 
Conditions,  foreign  and  domestic,  had  arisen  that  called  for 
a  new  order  of  statesmanship.  Congress,  which  had  thus 
far  been  little  more  than  the  echo  of  the  executive  depart 
ment,  began  to  assume  in  the  public  eye  the  place  belong 
ing  to  it  as  the  prime  political  factor  under  the  Constitu 
tion.  "What  may  be  termed  the  parliamentary  period  now 
opened ;  and  the  character  it  soon  derived  owes  much  to 
the  example  of  Henry  Clay. 


CHAPTER   II 

Maritime  Aggressions  of  England  and  France — The  Restrictive  System — 
Clay  as  Speaker  of  the  House — Preparations  for  War — Madison  Accepts 
Clay's  Programme  and  is  Re-elected — The  Embargo  and  the  Declara 
tion  of  War  against  England — The  Political  Aspect  of  the  War — Clay's 
Reply  to  Quincy— The  Treaty  of  Ghent— The  Effect  of  the  War— The 
Bank  of  the  United  States — Clay's  Change  of  Opinion  in  Regard  to  it — 
The  Tariff  of  1816 — The  Policy  of  Internal  Improvements,  Madison's 
Veto,  and  Monroe's  Hostile  Position — Clay  Opposes  Monroe's  Adminis 
tration — He  Advocates  Internal  Improvements  and  the  Recognition  of 
the  South  American  Republics 

WHEN  Clay  entered  the  House,  at  the  opening  of  the 
Twelfth  Congress,  it  was  perfectly  suited,  unlike  the  Senate, 
for  a  theatre  of  debate.  It  had  one  hundred  and  forty-two 
members  and  but  eight  standing  committees,  and  most  of 
its  important  business  was  transacted  in  committee  of  the 
whole.  It  had  only  lacked  the  occasion  to  develop  its  qual 
ity  as  a  debating  body,  and  the  occasion  was  now  supplied 
by  the  complications  that  resulted  in  the  war  with  Eng 
land. 

For  nearly  thirty  years  England  had  harassed  our  mari 
time  commerce.  Prior  to  1805  the  difficulties  so  caused 
had  been  smoothed  or  smothered ;  but  with  Fox  gone  and 
Canning  in  power  her  depredations  increased  in  number 
and  her  admiralty  rulings  in  rigor,  to  the  havoc  of  our 
neutral  carrying  trade.  For  twenty  years  our  vessels  had 
been  boarded  and  our  seamen  impressed  into  her  naval  ser 
vice,  both  aggressions  springing  from  the  unlimited  assump 
tion  of  the  right  of  search.  It  is  not  to  be  doubted,  however, 


CH.  II.]  MARITIME   TROUBLES  47 

that  the  boldness  of  our  traders,  instigated  by  the  immense 
profits  of  success,  led  to  the  perpetration  of  gross  frauds 
upon  England  during  the  wars  of  the  period,  through  forged 
British  licenses  and  the  use  of  the  American  flag  to  cover 
belligerent  property.  The  status  of  impressment  was  some 
what  similar.  It  had  been  practised  by  England  at  home 
from  an  early  period,  and  notoriously  during  the  American 
Revolution.1  And  if  she  had  been  previously  compelled 
thus  to  recruit  her  navy,  her  need  was  now  the  greater. 
In  consequence  of  the  European  wars  the  growth  of  our 
commerce  was  phenomenal,  and  chiefly  at  the  expense  of 
the  British.  It  had  also  proved  a  serious  detriment  to  the 
British  marine,  whose  sailors  were  attracted  in  large  num 
bers  to  our  sea-service,  where  they  were  better  paid,  better 
fed,  and  better  treated.  Few  of  them  were  or  could  be 
naturalized,  and  therefore  entitled  to  protection  as  American 
citizens.  Besides,  the  British  government  did  not  recognize 
the  right  of  naturalization.  In  the  effort  to  capture  Brit 
ish  subjects,  many  of  them  being  deserters  from  the  royal 
service,  native  Americans,  whom  they  closely  resembled  in 
speech  and  appearance,  were  often  taken.2  Yet  such  deser 
tions  were  not  discouraged  by  our  government ;  on  the  con 
trary,  deserters  were  knowingly  mustered  into  our  naval 
service  and  their  surrender  refused. 

In  view  of  the  great  events  occurring  in  Europe  our 
national  interests  seemed  insignificant,  and  England,  as  her 
own  cares  increased  in  the  contest  with  Napoleon,  grew 
more  indifferent  to  our  just  complaints — if,  indeed,  she  were 
disposed  to  regard  any  as  being  just.  The  name  of  America 
was  still  odious  to  the  governing  classes.  The  poignant 


Hall's  Retrospect,  p.  48.  9  Niles's  Register,  vol.  i.  p.  148. 


48  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1811 

recollection  survived  of  the  many  millions  sterling  of  con 
fiscated  debts  and  of  the  millions  more  appropriated  to 
compensate  banished  Tories  and  pension  American  place 
men. 

Meantime,  Napoleon's  treatment  of  our  interests  was  only 
less  injurious  and  ignominious.  By  her  Orders  in  Council, 
England  had  first  put  qualified  restrictions  upon  neutral 
trade ;  these  had  been  answered  by  Napoleon's  Berlin  decree 
to  similar  effect.  Then  followed  still  more  sweeping  Orders 
in  Council,  responded  to  by  Napoleon's  Milan  decree,  which 
was  at  once  imitated  by  Spain  and  Holland,  his  subject 
nations.1  The  effect  of  these  measures  was  to  place  America, 
as  well  as  most  of  commercial  Europe,  under  a  paper  block 
ade,  and  subject  most  of  the  vessels  of  our  maritime  com 
merce  to  seizure.  There  is  no  period  in  modern  history  so 
characterized  by  such  wide  and  flagrant  disregard  of  inter 
national  law.  England,  by  such  operations  as  the  piratical 
capture  of  the  Spanish  treasure-ships  and  the  Danish  fleet, 
and  the  attack  on  the  Chesapeake,  seemed  to  emulate  on 
sea  Napoleon's  example  on  land;  while  at  home  the  most 
stringent  and  despotic  laws  were  enforced.2  Nevertheless, 


1  "Whatever  the  merits  of  the  system,"  says  Bourrienne,  in  his  Memoirs, 
"and  although  it  was  the  cause  of  war  between  the  United  States  and 
England,  its  execution  did  most  damage  to  France  and  England,  and  to 
baud  all  Europe  against  it.  ...  The  Emperor  gave  me  so  many  orders 
for  army  clothing  that  all  that  could  be  supplied  by  the  cities  of  Hamburg, 
Bremen,  and  Lubeck  would  have  been  insufficient  for  executing  the  com 
missions.     I  entered  into  a  treaty  with  a  house  in  Hamburg,  which.  I 
authorized,  in  spite  of  the  Berlin  decree,  to  bring  cloth  and  leathers  from 
England.     Thus  I  procured  those  articles  in  a  sure  and  cheap  way.     Our 
troops  might  have  perished  of  cold  had  the  Continental  system  and  the 
absurd  mass  of  inextricable  decrees  relative  to  English  merchandise  been 
enforced." 

2  Spencer's  Principles  of  Sociology,  vol.  ii.  pp.  626,  632 ;   Buckle's  Post- 
Jiumous  Works,  vol.  i.  pp.  230,  242-3 ;    vol.  iii.  p.  465  ;  Lecky's  England, 
vol.  iii.  p.  581. 


Cn.  II.]  CLAY  AS   SPEAKER  49 

a  social  and  intellectual  movement,  destined  to  bring  in  a 
liberal  era,  had  already  well  begun ;  and  a  conspicuous  sign 
of  that  movement  was  Brougham's  assault  on  the  Orders  in 
Council,  succeeding  just  too  late  to  avert  the  war.1 

Despite  our  grievances  and  the  contempt  with  which  our 
diplomatic  remonstrances  were  received,  the  growth  of  pop 
ular  feeling  was  slow.  The  mass  of  the  people  knew  little 
and  cared  less  about  the  epistolary  discussions  of  ministers 
and  diplomats,  and  the  commercial  depredations  were  chiefly 
felt  at  the  seaports.  Jefferson  was  horrified  at  the  possible 
prospect  of  Avar,  equally  justifiable  against  England,  France, 
and  Spain.  The  need  of  some  defensive  course  was  recog 
nized,  with  arbitrary  supineness,  by  a  series  of  commercial 
restrictions  under  penalties  and  forfeitures,  beginning  in  the 
fall  of  1806 :  first,  partial  non-intercourse,  then  non-importa 
tion,  then  non  -  intercourse,  then  again  non- importation. 
Madison,  whose  administration  began  in  1809,  had  fallen 
heir  to  Jefferson's  pacific  sentiments  and  timorous  policy. 
But  the  restrictive  system  was  extremely  unpopular  in 
quarters  most  directly  affected  by  it.  New  England,  in 
particular,  more  generally  concerned  in  shipping  than  any 
other  portion  of  the  country — perhaps  more  than  all  the 
rest  combined2  —  was  vehemently  opposed  to  any  inter 
ference  with  commercial  freedom,  whatever  the  risks  of 
going  to  sea  and  whatever  the  considerations  of  national 
honor.3 

1  Life  and  Times  of  BrougJiam,  vol.  ii.  pp.  1,  23  ;    Levi's  History  of 
British  Commerce,  p.  118. 

2  "Six  towns  in  New  England  possessed  more  than  one -third  of  the 
tonnage  of  the  whole  Union."     "A  single  State  then  possessed  four  times 
as  much  shipping  as  was  owned  by  England  in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth." — 
Curtis's  Life  of  Webster,  vol.  i.  pp.  94,  106. 

8  Garland's  Life  of  Randolph,  vol.  ii.  p.  49. 
4 


50  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1811 

Clay  professed  as  his  reason  for  changing  to  the  House  of 
Eepresentatives  that  he  "preferred  the  turbulence  of  the 
House  to  the  ominous  stillness  of  the  Senate."  This  was 
doubtless  true,  but  it  was  an  open  secret  that  the  growing 
war  party,  recognizing  his  peculiar  powers,  wanted  him  in 
the  House,  where  war  measures  would  most  effectively  origi 
nate  and  the  popular  ear  be  best  obtained.1  In  fact,  the 
want  of  efficient  Republican  leadership  in  that  body  had 
been  the  main  cause  of  the  feeble  and  dilatory  policj^  more 
hurtful  than  war.  The  leaders  of  the  opposition  were  John 
Randolph,  nondescript,  and  Josiah  Quincy,2  Federalist, 
neither  of  whom  has  during  the  history  of  Congress  been 
surpassed  in  caustic,  truculent  speech.  Randolph  had  been 
the  torment  and  the  terror  of  the  House.  He  spoke  on 
all  subjects,  in  season  and  out  of  season.  Able  as  he  was 
at  times,  he  was  desultory  and  interminable,  and  his  indis- 
criminating  and  unsparing  invective  had  become  intolerable. 
To  curb  him  was  understood  to  be  a  part  of  Clay's  new  func 
tions,  which  the  preceding  Speakers,  Macon  and  Yarnum,  had 
not  satisfactorily  exercised.3  In  his  brief  speech  on  taking 
the  chair  he  gave  a  distinct  intimation  of  this  purpose. 
"  Should  the  rare  and  delicate  occasion  present  itself,"  said 
he,  "  when  your  Speaker  shall  be  called  upon  to  check  or 
control  wanderings  or  intemperance  in  debate,  your  justice 
will,  I  hope,  ascribe  to  his  interposition  the  motives  only  of 


1  "Not  long  after  the  opening  of  Congress,  Randolph  said  to  a  friend  con 
cerning  Clay  and  Calhoun  :  '  They  have  entered  this  House  with  their  eye 
on  the  Presidency,  and,  mark  my  word,  sir,  we  shall  have  war  before  the 
end  of  the  session.'  "—Garland's  Life  of  Randolph,  vol.  i.  p.  306. 

2  He  was  first  elected  to  the  House,  from  Massachusetts,  in  1800.     "He 
•was  twenty-eight  years  old,  but  this  was  regarded  then  as  so  infantile  an 
age  for  a  member  of  Congress  that  the  Democratic  papers  called  aloud 
for  a  cradle  to  rock  the  Federal  candidate  in." — Life  of  Quincy,  p.  60. 

3  Prentice's  Life  of  Clay,  p.  62  ;  Sargent's  Life  of  Clay,  p.  41. 


CH.  II.]  WAR  MEASURES  51 

the  public  good  and  a  regard  to  the  dignity  of  the  House." 
And  he  was  not  long  in  demonstrating  the  wisdom  of  his 
election.  Under  his  guidance  debate  became  orderly  and 
pertinent,  and  markedly  improved  in  quality.  As  a  presid 
ing  officer  he  has  had  no  superior.  Notwithstanding  his  ex 
uberant  temperament,  his  decided  opinions,  and  his  politics, 
his  impartiality  was  rarely  impugned  after  the  rules  of  the 
House  were  settled.  He  was  continued  Speaker  so  long  as  he 
remained  in  the  House — with  three  brief  absences,  until  1825, 
longer  than  any  one  else  who  has  held  the  position.1 

Foreign  affairs  were,  of  course,  the  paramount  topic  before 
Congress.  After  much  duplicity,  and  nearly  as  much  spolia 
tion  as  England  had  committed,  Napoleon  professed  to  revoke 
his  decrees  as  to  American  vessels,  although  he  did  not  en 
tirely  cease  to  enforce  them,  while  England  refused  to  treat 
upon  any  of  the  difficulties.  Thus  the  war  party  was  ready 
to  accept  Napoleon's  conciliatory  professions,  if  for  no  other 
reason  than  to  direct  the  energies  of  the  country  against 
England  alone,  at  best  an  unpropitious  undertaking.  As  a 
sole  policy,  restriction  could  no  longer  be  maintained.  The 
disastrous  effects  of  the  system  on  the  business  and  commerce 
of  the  country  had  wrought  a  political  revolution.  Half  the 
members  of  the  House  at  this  session,  which  was  convoked  a 
month  earlier  than  the  regular  day,  were  there  for  the  first 
time,  and  the  ablest  of  these  were  young  men  who  were  to 

1 "  He  was  in  a  sense  a  law  unto  himself.  .  .  .  He  betrayed  to  me  one 
of  the  characteristic  secrets  of  his  success,  more  than  thirty  years  after 
wards,  when  I  had  the  honor  of  occupying  the  same  chair.  'I  have  atten 
tively  observed  your  course  as  Speaker,'  said  he,  to  me  one  day  most  kindly, 
'and  I  have  heartily  approved  it.  But  let  me  give  you  one  hint  from  the 
oldest  survivor  of  your  predecessors  :  Decide — decide  promptly — and  never 
give  reasons  for  your  decisions.  The  House  will  sustain  your  decisions,  but 
there  will  always  be  some  to  cavil  and  quarrel  about  your  reasons.'" — 
Winthrop's  Addresses,  vol.  iv.  p.  42. 


52  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1811 

achieve  distinction.  They  were  for  war.  Clay,  by  position  as 
well  as  by  ability,  was  the  leader  of  the  war  party,  and  he 
organized  the  proper  committees  to  declare  its  sentiment  and 
initiate  its  policy.  Madison,  timid  and  faltering  in  the  pres 
ence  of  the  approaching  conflict,  was  nevertheless  nerved  to 
a  sufficient  degree  of  belligerent  energy  to  recommend  in  his 
message  that  the  country  be  put  "into  an  armor  and  attitude 
demanded  by  the  crisis  and  corresponding  with  the  national 
spirit  and  expectations."  Congress  soon  responded.  In  the 
House,  the  select  committee  on  foreign  relations  made  a 
stirring  report  imbued  with  warlike  sentiments,  and  sub 
mitted  a  series  of  resolutions  in  favor  of  increasing  the  army, 
placing  the  vessels  of  the  navy  in  commission,  and  permit 
ting  merchant-men  to  arm.  The  resolutions  were  adopted 
after  a  vigorous  debate,  and  were  followed  by  an  act  provid 
ing  for  the  addition  of  twenty -five  thousand  men  to  the 
army  for  five  years.  By  another  act  the  President  was  em 
powered  to  accept  the  service  of  fifty  thousand  volunteers ; 
but  this  act  was  vitally  defective,  as  events  proved,  by  not 
granting  authority  to  use  this  force  across  the  borders.  A 
bill  was  then  reported  in  the  House  to  repair  and  fit  for  ser 
vice  the  existing  navy  (which  consisted  of  six  frigates  and 
ten  smaller  vessels,  but  not  a  ship  of  the  line),  to  construct 
ten  new  frigates  of  thirty-eight  guns,  to  purchase  timber 
for  future  use,  and  to  build  a  dry-dock.  But  through  the 
chronic  Republican  antipathy  to  a  navy  and  the  remarkable 
lack  of  appreciation  of  its  utility,  the  latter  provisions  were 
defeated. 

For  a  time  the  failure  of  the  effort  to  strengthen  the  navy 
had  a  dispiriting  effect.  It  caused  serious  dissensions.  A 
bill  to  provide  for  a  uniform  militia  was  defeated ;  another 
to  arm  the  militia  was  passed  by  only  a  small  majority ;  and 


CH.  II.]     REPUBLICAN  INDECISION  AS   TO   WAR  53 

a  resolution  for  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  frame  a 
bill  for  a  provisional  army  of  twenty  thousand  was  defeated. 
Such  was  the  pique  of  some  who  favored  increasing  the 
navy.  The  war  leaders  had  temporarily  lost  control  of  their 
party.  Some  degree  of  unity,  however,  wras  restored  in  the 
effort  to  raise  the  means  to  pay  for  what  had  already  been 
authorized;  and  a  bill  for  a  loan  of  eleven  millions  was 
enacted.  Most  that  had  thus  far  been  accomplished  was 
by  the  aid  of  the  Federalists,  who  said  little,  but  did  what 
they  could  to  bring  on  the  war,  in  the  belief  that  it  would 
be  a  failure,  and  by  reaction  cause  the  overthrow  of  the  Re 
publican  party.  They  even  confided  their  views  to  the  Brit 
ish  minister.  But  now  that  the  Republicans  were  brought 
to  the  necessity  of  determining  the  question  of  war  or  peace, 
they  hesitated  to  take  the  decisive  step.  Many  were  averse 
to  war,  but  dreaded  the  disruption  of  the  party ;  others  were 
indifferent.  It  required  all  the  energy  and  fertility  of  re 
source  possessed  by  Clay,  Calhoun,  Cheves,  Lowndes,  and 
Porter  to  hold  their  wavering  ranks  together.  Their  efforts 
were  somewhat  aided  by  the  "  Henry  Letters,"  which  were 
purchased  by  the  government  for  fifty  thousand  dollars  from 
one  John  Henry,  an  Irish  adventurer,  who  had  prowled 
through  the  Eastern  States,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Gov 
ernor  of  Canada,  in  quest  of  information.  It  was  contended 
that  they  disclosed  a  British  design  to  promote  the  seces 
sion  of  New  England.  In  fact,  they  proved  nothing  except 
the  extreme  exasperation  of  that  section  against  the  re 
strictive  system ;  and  this  feeling  had  long  been  displayed 
in  speech  and  in  print  with  the  utmost  license.  But  to 
haters  of  all  that  was  British  they  served  their  transient 
purpose.  They  were  submitted  to  Congress  on  March  9. 
Madison,  naturally,  was  anxious  to  be  re-elected,  and  the 


54  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1812 

time  was  nearly  at  hand  for  the  party  nomination  to  be 
made.  That  he  was  reluctant  to  consent  to  war  was  well 
understood ;  but  his  success  depended  upon  the  support  of 
the  war  leaders.  He  received  their  support,  was  renomi- 
nated  by  the  Congressional  caucus,  and  subsequently  re- 
elected.  It  was  common  rumor  that  he  was  compelled  to 
accept  their  programme  as  the  condition  of  his  re-election. 
It  is  beyond  doubt  that  Clay  presented  that  programme  to 
him,  and  that  it  was  afterward  carried  out.  Clay  denied  that 
he  exercised  any  coercion ;  but  it  is  not  improbable  that 
Madison  was  influenced  by  the  desires  of  those  whose  aid  he 
most  needed,  however  those  desires  may  have  been  communi 
cated.  April  1  he  sent  a  message  to  Congress,  proposing  a 
general  embargo  for  sixty  days.  A  bill  in  compliance  with 
it  was  quickly  passed  by  the  House,  Clay  supporting  it  in  a 
vehement  speech  "as  a  direct  precursor  of  war."1  To  give 
it  the  appearance  of  a  desire  for  further  negotiations,  the 
Senate  extended  the  time  to  ninety  days.  The  House  con 
curred  in  the  amendment,  and  on  the  4th  it  became  a  law. 
Had  an  ultimatum  been  sent  to  the  British  government, 
as  many  desired,  the  delay  alone  would  have  averted  war. 
April  and  May  passed  without  further  important  action 
by  Congress.  Only  by  the  greatest  pressure  was  a  recess 
from  May  28  to  June  9  prevented.  The  war  party  was  in 
a  state  of  uncertainty  and  discouragement.  The  placing  of 
the  loan  had  progressed  with  disheartening  slowness,  and  the 
elections  in  Massachusetts  and  "New  York  had  resulted  in 
favor,  of  the  Federalists.  The  outcry  against  the  embargo 
was  growing  daily  louder  and  more  angered.  Then  came 
the  information  that  the  British  government  persisted  in 


1  Sargent's  Life  of  Clay,  p.  39. 


CH.  II.]  WAR  DECLARED  55 

its  refusal  to  revoke  the  Orders  in  Council.  Inaction  was 
no  longer  deemed  possible.  "No  choice  remained,"  de 
clared  Madison,  long  afterward,  "but  between  war  and 
degradation."  June  1  his  war  message  was  delivered  to 
Congress.  Three  days  later  a  bill  to  declare  war  was  passed 
by  the  House,  79  to  49.  The  Senate  was  more  deliberate; 
but  on  the  18th  it  passed  the  bill,  19  to  13.  The  Senate's 
amendments  were  forthwith  accepted  by  the  House,  and  the 
bill  was  immediately  signed  by  the  President.  The  next 
day  the  proclamation  of  war  was  issued. 

The  Republicans  had  practically  exchanged  principles 
with  the  Federalists.  They  had  gone  as  far  in  compassing 
the  Louisiana  purchase,  under  the  lead  of  Jefferson  him 
self,  as  the  Federalists  had  ever  sought  to  go ;  and  their  re 
strictive  system  Avas  quite  as  arbitrary,  and  far  more  harm 
ful,  than  the  Alien  and  Sedition  laws.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Federalists,  now  indeed  a  faction  mostly  confined  to 
New  England,  vociferously  opposed  the  increase  of  the  mili 
tary  as  inimical  to  liberty,  and  restriction  as  the  tyranny  of 
centralized  government.  The  opposition  became  so  intense 
in  that  section  that,  upon  the  declaration  of  war,  flags  were 
hung  at  half-mast,  bells  tolled,  and  maledictions  hurled  from 
the  pulpits.  Secession  was  openly  proposed,  and  later 
on  the  famous  Hartford  Convention  debated  the  proposi 
tion.1 

As  insulting  and  injurious  as  the  course  of  England  toward 
the  United  States  had  been,  there  is  little  doubt  but  that, 
under  all  the  circumstances — with  our  want  of  seasoned 


1  When  Quincy  was  asked  what  the  result  of  the  convention  would  be, 
he  replied  :  "I  can  tell  you  exactly — a  great  pamphlet." — Life  of  Quincy, 
p.  358.  As  to  the  Eastern  disaffection,  see  ibid.  p.  356  ;  Memoirs  of  Dix, 
vol.  i.  p.  100  ;  Life  of  Story,  vol.  i.  p.  229. 


56  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1812 

nationality,  of  resources,  unanimity,  and  preparation  —  it 
was  unwise  to  go  to  war.  The  worst  features  of  the  situ 
ation  were  mainly  due  to  our  own  inert  policy  during  a  long 
period  of  years  preceding.  A  vigorous  armed  assertion  of 
our  rights  in  the  beginning  would  probably  have  prevented 
any  extensive  injuries  and  saved  our  character  in  the  eyes 
of  Europe.  Certainly,  patience  for  a  short  time  longer,  since 
we  had  borne  so  much,  would  hardly  have  aggravated  our 
disgrace,  and  would  have  settled  the  difficulties  without  re 
course  to  war — a  dire  expedient  even  under  extreme  provo 
cation.  However  outrageous  and  however  stimulating  to 
the  patriotism  of  those  in  authority,  the  causes  of  the  war 
were  not  so  serious  or  so  general  as  to  be  superior  to  the 
common  motives  of  interest  among  the  people.  There  was 
irony  in  the  fact  that  the  concern  for  "  sailors'  rights"  was 
most  warlike  remote  from  the  seaboard.  The  evils  com 
plained  of  could  not  be  equal  to  the  ravages  of  war,  and  the 
most  and  worst  of  them  had  already  been  suffered  with  such 
feeble  resistance  as  to  amount  almost  to  estoppel.  The  pur 
pose  of  the  leaders  far  exceeded  the  power  of  the  nation,  as 
their  enthusiasm  exceeded  that  of  the  people  at  large.  The 
war  was  practically  a  party  war.  For  these  reasons  there 
was  not  the  occasion  for  that  type  of  exalted  oratory  which 
springs  from  a  vital  national  crisis.  The  supporters  of  the 
war  were  put  continually  on  the  defensive.  As  Clay  had 
most  to  do  with  bringing  on  the  war,  so  he  was  foremost  in 
sustaining  its  prosecution,  which  was  attended  with  great 
difficulties  and  little  glory,  except  on  sea.  The  subject  was 
adapted  to  his  genius.  It  appealed  to  his  lofty  and  im 
pulsive  patriotism ;  and  it  offered  the  means  of  furthering 
his  ambition  and  of  enhancing  the  sentiment  of  nationality, 
which  was  the  best  consequence  of  the  war.  He  had  spoken 


Cn.  II.]        POLITICAL  ASPECT  OF  THE  WAR  57 

with  great  vigor  on  all  the  leading  measures  before  Con 
gress,  but  his  reply  to  Quincy,  January  8  and  9,  1813,  was 
incomparably  the  most  brilliant  piece  of  oratory  of  that 
period. 

The  bill  declaring  war  had  been  hurried  through  both 
Houses  in  secret  session,  thus  preventing  a  full  discussion. 
Moreover,  the  opportunity  of  the  opposition  was  now  at 
its  best.  "While  our  meagre  navy  had  gained  renown,  the 
operations  on  land  had  been  paltry  and  unfortunate.  The 
attempt  to  conquer  Canada  was  an  utter  failure,  and  Hull's 
surrender  of  Detroit  a  profound  humiliation.  When,  there 
fore,  the  proposition  was  made  to  increase  the  army  and 
invade  Canada  the  occasion  was  presented  for  a  critical  and 
exhaustive  discussion  of  the  causes,  conduct,  and  policy  of 
the  war.  Quincy  had  watched  his  opportunity,  and  at  the 
right  moment  he  savagely  assailed  the  measure.  He  had 
more  than  plausible  grounds.  Within  a  week  after  the  dec 
laration  of  war,  and  before  knowledge  of  it  had  crossed  the 
ocean,  the  obnoxious  Orders  in  Council  had  been  repealed. 
Though  grievances  stood  unreclressed,  the  only  remaining 
active  cause  of  war  was  the  impressment  of  our  seamen. 
Yet  the  number  of  these  in  captivity  at  the  commencement 
of  the  war  must  have  been  far  less  than  of  the  lives  already 
lost  through  the  hostilities ;  and  it  was  now  proposed  to 
carry  on  the  war  for  sailors'  rights  by  marching  inland  upon 
Canada.  Quincy  surpassed  his  wonted  ability,  incisiveness, 
and  rancor.  He  reviewed  in  his  characteristic  style  the 
history  of  our  foreign  relations.  He  ridiculed  the  war 
leaders  as  "young  politicians,  their  pinfeathers  not  yet 
grown,  and  however  they  may  flutter  on  this  floor  they 
are  not  yet  fledged  for  any  high  or  distant  flight."  He 
denounced  the  proposed  invasion  as  wanton  and  infamous, 


58  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1813 

and  exposed  with  pungent  satire  the  underlying  political 
motives.1 

The  assault  was  staggering  to  the  war  party.  Others 
essayed  to  meet  it,  but  it  was  felt  that  no  one  but  Clay  could 
cope  with  Quincy  on  this  occasion,  and  a  few  days  later 
Clay  took  the  floor.  Both  speeches  were  toned  down  in 
the  report,  but  they  still  seem  like  living  voices  from  the 
passions  of  the  time.  The  grave  fault  in  Quincy's  speech 
was  its  extreme  virulence,'  which  Clay  was  too  sagacious  to 
return  in  kind ;  his  retorts,  though  harsh,  were  adroit,  and, 
above  all,  fused  with  flaming  patriotism.  The  whole  per 
formance  was  marked  by  his  unrivalled  skill  and  power  as 
a  debater.2  The  prodigious  effect  it  produced  upon  Con 
gress  soon  spread  through  the  country,  invigorating  the  war 
spirit. 

Patriotic  sentiment,  however,  did  not  produce  success  in 
arms.  Aside  from  the  noble  strokes  of  the  navy,  the  cause 
sorely  suffered.  The  finances  were  at  the  lowest  ebb.  The 
departments  were  blighted  with  incapacity  and  mismanage 
ment.  New  England  grew  more  clamorous  and  threatening. 
Besides,  Napoleon's  disasters  in  Eussia  would  enable  England 
to  divert  her  veteran  forces  to  the  United  States.  At  this 
ominous  juncture  there  fortunately  opened  an  avenue  to 
peace.  The  Emperor  of  Russia  proposed  a  mediation  between 


1  Life  of  Quincy,  pp.  256,  294. 

2  Quincy  expressed  this  opinion  of  Clay:  "Bold,  aspiring,  presumptuous, 
•with  a  rough,  overbearing  eloquence,  neither  exact  nor  comprehensive,  .  .  . 
he  had  not  yet  that  polish  of  language  and  refinement  of  manners  which  he 
afterwards  acquired  by  familiarity  and  attrition  with  highly  cultivated 
men.  .  .  .  Such  was  the  man  whose  influence  and  power  more  than  that 
of  any  other  produced  the  war  of  1812." — Life  of  Quincy,  p.  256.    A  some 
what  similar  impression  was  created  by  Webster's  early  manner. — Life  of 
William  Plumer,  p.  215. 


CH.  II.]  ANXIETY  FOR  PEACE  59 

England,  his  ally,  and  this  country.  So  anxious  was  Madison 
for  peace  that  he  eagerly  grasped  the  opportunity.  Forth 
with,  and  before  knowing  the  disposition  of  the  British 
government,  he  nominated  envoys  to  St.  Petersburg.  The 
news  now  came  that  England  declined  the  mediation,  but 
offered  to  treat  directly.  The  proposal  was  accepted,  and 
Gallatin,  Adams,  Bayard,  Eussell,  and  Clay  were  selected  as 
plenipotentiaries.1 

They  arrived  at  Ghent,  the  place  fixed  for  the  negotiations, 
July  6,  1814,  a  month  before  the  British  envoys.  Some 
time  passed  before  the  two  commissions  could  find  any 
point  or  possibility  of  agreement.  The  British  demands 
were  extortionate  and  humiliating ;  they  appeared  to  be 
prompted  by  the  assumption  that  the  United  States  was  van 
quished  and  solicitous  for  peace  at  any  cost.  The  conditions 
were  haughtily  rejected.  The  Americans  pronounced  as  use 
less  any  further  attempt  to  negotiate  :  they  had  come  to  pre 
serve,  not  to  sacrifice,  national  independence.  Their  attitude 
was  so  firm  that  the  British  government,  which  was  practi- 


1  "The  following,  said  to  be  a  letter  from  Washington,  dated  February 
21,  1814,  first  appeared  in  the  Boston  Gazette,  and  is  called  'interesting.' 
We  copy  it  to  preserve  a  sample  of  the  stuff  that  floats  in  the  newspapers  : 
'  After  the  arrival  of  the  Bramble,  and  before  the  nomination  of  Clay,  the 
President  sent  for  him  and  observed,  "  There  is  a  proposal  from  the  British 
government  to  negotiate,  and  we  must  have  peace.  You  have  driven  me 
into  this  war  ;  what  can  you  do  to  help  me  out  of  it  ?"  And  it  was  finally 
concluded  that,  with  a  view  to  conciliate  the  Southern  and  Western  people 
to  peace,  that  Clay  was  to  go  and  make  a  treaty  in  which  no  mention  was  to 
be  made  about  the  right  of  impressment,  but  enter  into  the  best  arrange 
ment  they  could  make  about  the  practice.  Clay  was  to  stand  and  bluster 
about  it  at  first,  but  eventually  agree  to  the  treaty  with  the  other  commis 
sioners.  In  the  mean  time  the  warlike  attitude  was  to  be  kept  up  and  prep 
arations  made  as  if  for  a  vigorous  campaign.  Clay  gave  this  information 
himself  gratuitously ;  and  I  have  it  from  a  gentleman  upon  whom  I  can 
place  the  greatest  reliance,  and  I  have  not  the  least  doubt  of  the  fact.'" — 
Niles's  Register,  vol.  vi.  p.  45. 


60  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1814 

cally  present  at  the  deliberations  of  its  envoys,  wisely  deter 
mined  to  relax  its  rigorous  demands.  It  was  impolitic  to 
give  us  just  grounds  for  breaking  off  the  negotiations ;  and, 
more  than  this,  the  commercial  classes,  whose  pressure  had 
forced  the  repeal  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  were  strenuous 
for  peace.  Accordingly,  the  proposals  grew  less  offensive. 
At  the  same  time,  the  necessities  of  our  cause  grew  more 
urgent.  At  length,  Madison  sent  instructions  to  treat  upon 
a  condition  that  would  have  existed  had  the  war  not  oc 
curred.  This  basis  of  negotiation  was  adopted,  and  on 
December  24  a  treaty  substantially  to  that  effect  was  con 
cluded.1 

Clay's  objections  had  been  the  main  obstacle  to  the 
adoption  of  this  basis  of  peace.  As  he  had  been  the  chief 
champion  of  the  war,  and  had  even  talked  of  dictating 
peace  at  Quebec  or  Halifax,  it  was  deep  humiliation  to 
sign  a  treaty  silent  upon  the  main  causes  of  the  war — 
impressment  and  the  principles  of  blockade.  Nor  were 
these  questions  ever  settled  by  treaty.  The  rules  that 
now  regulate  the  right  of  search  and  seizure  were  event 
ually  established  by  the  progressive  practice  of  nations, 
and  have  thus  become  elementary  in  the  international  code.2 
Time  was  to  evolve  our  sufficient  guarantee.  Clay  strove  hard 
to  within  a  few  days  before  the  treaty  was  signed  to  break 
off  the  negotiations ;  but  when  the  British  commissioners  of 
fered  to  accept  a  treaty  silent  as  to  the  Mississippi,  for  the 
exclusive  control  of  which  the  Kentuckian  had  from  the  be- 


1  "When  it  is  so  notorious  that  the  issue  of  our  late  war  was  at  best  a 
drawn  game,  there  is  nothing  but  the  most  egregious  national  vanity  that 
can  turn  it  to  a  triumph." — Adams's  Diary,  December  13,  1817. 

8  See  Webster's  speech  on  the  treaty  of  Washington,  Works,  vol.  v. 
p.  145  ;  Sumner's  speech  on  the  Trent  case,  Works,  vol.  vi.  p.  190. 


CH.  II.]  THE   TREATY   OF  GHENT  61 

ginning  taken  an  un}Tielding  stand,  he  was  compelled  to  con 
cur,  but  with  extreme  repugnance.1  One  of  the  several 
unexpected  results  of  this  singular  treaty  was  that  its  silence 
upon  the  British  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  conceded 
by  Jay's  treaty  in  1794,  proved  as  effectual  to  liberate  the 
river  as  though  there  had  been  an  express  provision  for 
that  purpose. 

Contrary  to  the  fears  of  the  American  envoys,  the  treaty 
was  received  with  general  satisfaction.  It  was  enough  that 
peace  was  attained ;  the  country  was  weary  of  the  war.  In 
IS^ew  England  the  intelligence  was  greeted  by  processions, 
the  ringing  of  bells,  and  general  jubilation.  In  other  parts 
of  the  country  it  was  hailed  with  less  enthusiastic  yet  grate 
ful  demonstrations. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  Clay  visited  Paris.  It 
was  there  that  he  heard  of  Jackson's  victory  at  New  Or 
leans,  the  battle  having  been  fought  after  the  treaty  was 
signed,  but  before  it  was  known  in  America.2  This  sug 
gests  the  reflection  that  had  Clay  been  less  determined  in 
his  opposition  to  the  British  overtures,  the  treaty  would 
have  been  signed  earlier,  the  battle  would  have  been  pre 
vented,  and  the  subsequent  course  of  our  political  history 
would  have  been  different ;  for  without  the  prestige  of  this 


1  Adams's  Diary  (vol.  iii.  pp.  1-120)  contains  a  minute  and  entertain 
ing  record  of  this  mission. 

2  "The  news  of  the  treaty  of  peace  arrived  in  New  York  on  the 
llth  of  February,  1815."— Goodrich's  Recollections,  vol.  i.  p.  503.     "We 
received  the  news  of  Waterloo  sixty  -  five  days  after  the  event,  when 
Louis  XVIII.  was  on  the  throne,  and  Bonaparte  was  on  his  way  to  St. 
Helena.    And  how  much  do  you  think  we  got  in  our  papers  of  the 
great    transactions    that    followed   after  Ligny  ?     A   leading  American 
journal  devoted  a  third  of  a  column  to  the  subject,  sparing  five  lines  for 
a  description  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo."— Stanton's  Random  Recollections, 
p.  257. 


62  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1815 

victory,  Jackson  would  not  have  been  elected  President.  To 
Clay,  at  the  time,  however,  the  event  was  keenly  gratifying. 
"  JSTow,"  he  exclaimed,  "  I  can  go  to  England  without  mor 
tification  !" ' 

After  the  treaty  had  been  ratified,  Adams,  Gallatin,  and 
Clay  proceeded  to  London,  where  they  had  been  deputed 
to  negotiate  a  commercial  arrangement.  Several  months 
were  thus  employed,  resulting  in  a  convention,  which,  be 
sides  securing  some  advantages  in  the  East  Indian  trade,  was 
the  first  departure  from  the  system  of  discriminating  du 
ties  adopted  after  the  Constitution.2  Clay  reached  home 
in  September,  1815,  and  was  unanimously  returned  to  the 
House. 

Congress  was  in  the  ascendant.  Its  superior  importance 
in  the  scheme  of  the  Constitution  had  been  revealed  by  the 
war,  and  that  importance  was  to  become  more  dominant 
through  the  national  necessities  succeeding  the  war.  Colo 
nialism  in  American  politics  ended  with  the  treaty  of  Ghent. 
It  lends  too  much  importance  to  the  war  to  say  that  it 
produced  that  result ;  no  single  cause  howsoever  great 
makes,  though  it  may  mark,  as  the  culmination  of  a  ten 
dency,  an  epoch  in  national  history.  The  country  had 
nearly  outgrown  that  colonial  spirit  which  lingered  with 
the  persistence  due  to  the  associations  of  two  centuries. 
The  effect  of  the  war  was  to  hasten  the  expulsion  of  that 
influence.  Congress  had  risen  with  the  progress  of  the  na- 


1  "  I  have  heard  from  undoubted  authority  that  immediately  after  the 
signing  of  the  treaty  of  peace  at  Ghent,  Lord  Goulburn,  one  of  the  Brit 
ish  commissioners,  said:  'By  this  act,  gentlemen,  you  have  saved  New 
Orleans  from  capture.'     'No  danger  of  that,'  said  Henry  Clay;  'Jackson 
is  there.'  " — Recollections  of  John  Binns,  p.  242. 

2  North  American  Review,  vol.  Ivii.  p.  318  ;  Lyman's  Diplomacy  of  the 
United  States,  vol.  ii.  p.  69. 


OH.  II.]  A   NATIONAL  BANK  63 

tion ;  it  was  apparent  that  the  course  of  development  our 
institutions  would  take  chiefly  depended  on  the  latitude  to 
be  exercised  by  the  law-making  power.  The  first  division 
of  parties  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  was  induced 
by  opposing  opinions  on  this  subject.  Yet  thus  far  each 
party  had  been  inconsistent  with  itself  and  the  principles  it 
had  first  declared.  When  in  office  each  had  felt  the  need 
of  power,  and  so  far  as  possible  seized  it.  But  through  all 
their  contentions  and  contortions,  there  had  been  a  constant 
activity  of  foreign  sympathies.  Each  party  was  in  the 
eyes  of  the  other  a  French  or  a  British  faction.  This  had 
excluded  an  unalloyed  American  ideal.  The  long  period 
of  restriction  and  war  turned  the  thoughts  of  the  people 
upon  themselves.  They  were  almost  wholly  shut  off  from 
the  foreign  world,  and  when  peace  reopened  the  way  to 
normal  Delations,  the  former  spirit  had  been  exorcised.  At 
home  and  abroad  the  country  was  nationalized.  Hence 
forth  the  predominant  concerns  and  habits  of  thought  of 
the  nation  were  domestic.  ^ 

The  foremost  problem  that  confronted  Congress  at  the 
restoration  of  peace  was  the  distressed  financial  condition 
of  the  government  and  the  country.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  war  the  finances  of  the  national  government  were  not 
so  considerable  and  complex  as  those  of  a  modern  metrop 
olis;  nor  was  it  long  before  that  the  administration  of 
them  became  methodical  and  businesslike,  and  appropria 
tion  bills  detailed  and  precise.  After  the  multiplied  ex 
penses  of  the  war  were  encountered,  the  Treasury  was  soon 
in  desperate  straits.  As  urgent  appeals  were  made  to  the 
people  for  loans  of  money  as  had  previously  been  made  to 
take  up  arms.  The  financial  weakness  of  the  government  be 
came  so  extreme  that  Monroe,  Secretary  of  War,  was  com- 


64:  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1815 

pelled  to  pledge  his  personal  credit  to  obtain  the  means  in 
dispensable  to  the  defence  of  New  Orleans.  The  worst 
features  of  this  financial  distress  resulted  from  the  failure 
to  renew  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
which  expired  in  1811.  Disorder  of  the  currency,  the  most 
ruinous  of  public  ills,  quickly  followed.  A  horde  of  local 
banks  sprang  into  existence,  sapping  the  financial  vitality 
of  the  country  by  loaning  their  spurious  issues  at  extortion 
ate  rates  of  interest.  Banks  that  were  solid  could  remain 
so  only  by  limiting  their  operations  to  a  degree  that  was 
disastrous  to  their  debtors. 

In  January,  1815,  a  bank  charter  was  passed  by  Congress, 
but  it  was  vetoed  by  the  President  because  of  its  defective 
plan.  He  was  anxious  that  a  bank  should  be  established  on 
a  satisfactory  basis.  Clay  had  now  come  to  the  same  con 
clusion,  reversing  the  opinions  he  declared  in  1811.  He 
endeavored  to  shield  his  change  as  much  as  possible  by 
the  defects  in  the  plan  proposed  at  that  time ;  but  he  had 
nevertheless  overcome  his  Constitutional  scruples.  And  he 
was  not  alone  in  changing  his  views,  for  Madison  had  led 
the  way  and  was  followed  by  his  party.  Despite  the  strong 
opposition  to  it,  a  national  bank  was  probably  the  only 
means  at  that  time  of  restoring  financial  health.  It  was 
necessitated  by  the  situation,  and  it  was  soon  justified  by  its 
operation.  Clay's  support  of  the  measure  marks  his  com 
plete  acceptance  of  the  theory  of  broad  construction  toward 
which  he  had  been  steadily  tending  since  his  entrance  into 
public  life. 

Two  other  subjects,  also  depending  substantially  on  the 
same  Constitutional  doctrine,  engaged  the  attention  of  Con 
gress  at  this  period  —  a  protective  tariff  and  internal  im 
provements.  As  to  these  subjects,  Clay's  course  involved 


CH.  II.]  THE  TARIFF  65 

no  change,  although  an  expansion,  of  opinion.  So  far  as 
both  had  previously  been  acted  upon,  he  had  given  them 
zealous  support.  But  they  were  now  to  assume  larger  pro 
portions  and  importance  than  ever  before,  and  were  to  find 
in  him  their  chief  champion. 

Prior  to  1812,  numerous  tariff  laws  had  been  enacted. 
But  while  they  had  to  some  extent  increased  both  the  duties 
and  the  number  of  dutiable  articles,  the  motive  was  revenue 
more  distinctively  than  protection.  The  protective  purpose 
was  incidental,  yet  it  was  gaining  in  influence.  In  view 
of  all  the  surroundings,  at  that  period  as  well  as  afterward, 
absolute  freedom  of  trade  was  not  a  possibility.  It  was 
inevitable  that  for  the  support  of  the  government,  duties 
on  importations  rather  than  direct  taxation  would  be  re 
sorted  to.  Direct  taxation  for  national  purposes  was  not, 
and  never  has  been,  acceptable  to  the  people ;  yet  it  was  a 
favorite  doctrine  with  the  Republican  party,  immediately 
preceding  Jefferson's  administration,  that  direct  taxes  are 
preferable  to  duties  on  imports,  because  they  are  more  eco 
nomically  collected,  and  because  the  burden  of  them  is  more 
accurately  known  by  the  people.  Thus,  with  a  revenue 
basis,  it  was  not  difficult  for  prospecting  capital  to  intro 
duce  the  protective  system  by  a  slow  and  gradual  process, 
and,  with  such  an  opportunity,  this  method  of  introduction 
was  quite  certain  to  be  instituted.  It  may  be  that,  with 
out  the  aid  of  extraneous  circumstances,  protection  would 
have  expanded  into  a  predominant  policy.  Yet  this  was  not 
likely,  and  without  reference  to  the  probability  of  its  meet 
ing  an  overruling  opposition  from  the  South  before  the 
policy  could  have  acquired  sufficient  strength  and  stand 
ing  to  maintain  a  successful  struggle.  But  it  was  not 
the  product  of  deliberate  doctrinal  choice.  It  was  pri- 

5 


66  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1815 

marily  due  to  other  causes  not  designed  to  establish  pro 
tection. 

Except  for  the  lurid  events  that  turned  the  energies  of 
Europe  from  production  to  destruction,  it  is  probable  that 
the  growth  of  American  manufactures  would  in  the  end 
have  mainly  depended  on  the  law  of  natural  selection.  It 
was  those  events  that  led  the  Republicans  to  adopt  the 
series  of  commercial  restrictions  which  had  all  the  effect  of 
prohibitive  tariffs.  It  is  true  that  those  restrictions  were 
flagrantly  adverse  to  sound  economics ;  yet  it  must  be  ad 
mitted  that  what  is  now  held  by  all  competent  authorities 
to  be  elementary  in  economic  science  in  this  regard  was  not 
generally  received  at  that  time.  Non-importation,  non-in 
tercourse,  and  embargo  were  commonly  considered  quite  as 
properly  defensive  measures  as  armament  and  fortification. 
Nevertheless,  the  fallacy  and  harm  of  such  measures  were 
then  explained  in  Congress  with  as  much  clearness  and 
vigor  as  they  have  been  anywhere  since. 

Our  people  had  more  or  less  depended  on  England  for 
articles  alike  of  fashion,  comfort,  and  necessity.  In  the 
same  manner  England  had  depended  on  this  country,  in  a 
less  but  increasing  degree,  for  many  of  our  native  produc 
tions,  particularly  agricultural.  For  a  time  after  foreign 
importations  were  stayed  the  inconvenience  of  being  de 
prived  of  those  habitual  supplies  amounted  almost  to  hard 
ship.  Thus  constrained,  our  people  began  to  supply  their 
own  wants  at  home  to  an  extent  never  practised  before. 
This  private  production  was  soon  imitated  on  a  large  scale 
by  the  establishment  of  many  manufactories  of  various 
kinds.1  At  the  close  of  the  war  they  represented  a  heavy 


1  For  details  of  this  rapid  growth  of  manufacturing,  see  Niles's  Register, 


CH.  II.]  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  67 

investment  of  capital.  When  the  channels  of  trade  were 
reopened  there  "was  an  immediate  influx  of  cheaper  English 
goods.  The  news  of  peace  alone  sufficed  to  send  prices  ab 
ruptly  down,  to  the  ruin  of  many  merchants.1  Investments 
in  manufacturing  which  had  prospered  through  the  tem 
porary  misfortunes  of  the  country  were  threatened  with 
disaster.  Unless  the  commercial  conditions  produced  by 
restriction  and  war  were  continued  by  legislation  the  "in 
fant  industries  "  would  be  overwhelmed.  So  the  cry  went 
through  the  land  that  capital,  labor,  and  the  welfare  of 
the  country  were  in  danger.  Congress  was  appealed  to  for 
protection.  The  claims  assumed  a  patriotic  hue.  New 
wars  might  come.  Americans  should  be  independent,  able 
at  all  times  to  rely  upon  their  own  resources.  England 
was  our  implacable  enemy.  Her  importation  of  low-priced 
merchandise,  menacing  native  production,  was  another  hos 
tile  invasion.  These  interests  and  opinions  combined  to 
produce  the  tariff  of  1816.  It  was  the  first  whose  avowedly 
paramount  policy  was  protection ;  and  it  was  typical  of  all 
subsequent  protective  tariffs  in  the  character  and  method  of 
its  construction. 

In  the  last  of  the  triad  of  economic  problems  —  internal 
improvements  —  Clay  had,  as  in  the  tariff,  a  local  interest 
that  early  fixed  his  opinions.  The  development  of  the  West 
depended  much  on  good  roads,  by  which  to  send  its  produc 
tions  to  the  seaboard  with  all  facility  possible.  In  the  West 
communication — to  say  naught  of  the  transportation  of  agri- 


vol.  i.  pp.  343,  390,  406  ;  vol.  ii.  p.  227  ;  vol.  v.  p.  317  ;  vol.  vi.  pp.  173,  198, 
331. 

1  Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  ii.  p.  255  ;  Diary  and  Correspondence  of  Amos 
Lawrence,  p.  47;  Barrett's  Old  Merchants  of  New  York  (second  series), 
p.  372. 


68  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1816 

cultural  products  by  cart  and  oxen — was  at  best  an  arduous 
effort.  The  coastwise  States,  by  reason  of  their  older  and 
denser  settlement,  were  better  provided,  yet  they  had  need 
of  extensive  improvements.  This  need  was  recognized  by 
the  many  schemes  for  the  construction  of  roads  and  water 
ways  that  marked  the  period.  These  schemes,  however, 
were  those  of  State  and  private  enterprise,  while  the  nascent 
"West,  without  the  resources  of  the  older  East— as  well  as 
without  the  benefits  arising  from  the  maintenance  of  fortifi 
cations,  arsenals,  and  ship-yards — pressed  for  aid  from  the 
national  government.  But  what  was  granted  to  one  sec 
tion  would  be  demanded  by  others,  and  so  arose  the  general 
question  of  internal  improvements.  There  was  a  strong 
favorable  sentiment ;  but  such  had  been  the  issue  over  the 
interpretation  of  the  Constitution  that  many  who  were  best 
disposed  toward  the  policy  were  forced  by  their  own  past 
arguments  to  deny  the  power  to  execute  it.  They  were 
willing  that  the  Constitution  be  amended  so  as  to  provide 
the  power  expressly ;  but  that  course  was  deemed  inexpe 
dient,  as  it  would  be  in  danger  of  defeat  by  those  who 
opposed  government  control  of  roads  and  canals  in  any 
case,  together  with  those  who  approved  the  policy,  but  who 
believed  the  power  already  existed,  and  were  therefore 
unwilling  to  hazard  their  Constitutional  opinions  and  the 
political  interests  dependent  on  them  by  a  possible  adverse 
vote  that  would  operate  as  a  practical  construction  against 
them. 

Notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  Clay,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  labored  from  the  first  in  furtherance  of  internal  im 
provements.  Little,  however,  had  been  accomplished  beyond 
attracting  public  interest.  After  the  war  the  subject  took 
great  prominence.  Clay  at  once  recurred  to  it  as  an  im- 


CH.  II.]  MADISON  VETOES  INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENTS  69 

portant  feature  of  his  programme.  "  I  would  see,"  said  he, 
"  a  chain  of  turnpike  roads  and  canals  from  Passamaquoddy 
to  New  Orleans;  and  other  similar  roads  intersecting  the 
mountains,  to  facilitate  intercourse  between  all  parts  of  the 
country  and  to  bind  and  connect  us  together."  This  was 
in  January,  1816.  In  December,  Madison,  in  his  last  annual 
message,  recommended  a  comprehensive  system  of  roads 
and  canals.  The  usual  preliminary  process  of  important 
legislation  was  immediately  started  in  the  House,  Calhoun, 
it  should  be  remembered,  being  in  zealous  accord  with  Clay 
in  his  support  of  the  project,  as  he  was  also  in  regard  to  the 
bank  and  the  tariff.  With  all  seemly  speed  a  committee 
report  was  made,  depicting  the  advantages  of  such  a  system 
and  presenting  plans  and  estimates  that  called  for  an  outlay 
of  twenty  million  dollars.  The  report  was  followed  by  a 
bill  to  make  the  bonus  of  a  million  and  a  half  to  be  paid 
by  the  new  bank  for  its  charter  and  the  share  of  the  gov 
ernment  in  its  dividends  a  permanent  fund  pledged  to  the 
policy.  The  bill  was  passed  by  both  Houses,  but  it  met  the 
obstacle  least  expected.  Despite  his  recommendation,  al 
though  it  was  stated  in  rather  vague  and  general  terms, 
Madison,  the  day  before  Monroe's  inauguration,  vetoed  the 
bill  as  unconstitutional.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the  mo 
tive  of  the  veto  was  political  as  well  as  Constitutional — to 
prevent  the  prestige  that  Clay  might  gain  as  the  successful 
promoter  of  the  policy  of  internal  improvements.  Madison 
furnished  only  a  brief  statement  of  his  objections;  but  Mon 
roe,  in  whose  interest  the  bill  had  been  vetoed,  supplied  the 
reasoning  at  length.  In  his  first  message  to  Congress  he 
made  bold  to  announce  in  advance  of  further  legislation  that 
the  power  to  make  internal  improvements  was  not  granted 
by  the  Constitution;  but  he  proposed,  as  both  Jefferson 


70  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1817 

and  Madison  had  done,  the  impracticable  expedient  of 
a  Constitutional  amendment.  This  announcement  extin 
guished  all  hope  of  carrying  out  the  policy  during  his 
Presidency.  But  a  long  debate  ensued  on  resolutions  assert 
ing  the  power  of  Congress  to  appropriate  money  for  internal 
improvements,  and  also  to  construct  them.  The  first  was 
adopted,  but  the  others  were  not.  In  this  discussion  Clay 
took  the  leading  part.  He  not  only  defined  his  Constitu 
tional  and  political  views  more  fully  and  clearly  than  ever 
before,  but  used  the  occasion  to  declare  open  opposition  to 
Monroe's  administration.  He  had  entered  upon  a  new 
stage  of  his  public  career. 

He  had  returned  from  Europe  with  stimulated  ambition 
to  become  President.  He  was  the  most  conspicuous  figure 
in  Congress,  and  the  foremost  of  the  new  generation  of 
public  men.1  He  was  the  acknowledged  representative  of 
the  West,  while  by  nativity  and  as  a  slave-holder  he  stood 
essentially  with  the  South.  Moreover,  his  general  policy 
was  certain  to  grow  in  favor  in  the  East.  Such  were  the 
elements  of  his  political  influence,  combined  with  the  most 
popular  genius  the  country  has  ever  known.  He  had  good 
grounds  for  his  aspirations. 

To  Monroe's  elevation  there  had  been  no  substantial  op 
position.  It  had  been  in  course  of  long  and  assiduous  prep 
aration.  Political  tradition  and  skilful  management  had 
united  in  his  support.  But  he  was  the  last  of  the  Virginian 
succession.  It  was  plain  that  his  term  of  office  would  wit- 


1  "  An  able  writer  in  the  Boston  Patriot  has  commenced  a  series  of 
essays  addressed  to  Henry  Clay  respecting  the  peace  establishment  of  the 
army." — Niles's  Register,  vol.  ix.  p.  214,  November  25,  1815.  A  similar 
course  was  taken  by  Channing  in  1837  to  promulgate  his  views  concerning 
the  annexation  of  Texas. 


CH.  II.]  CLAY'S   POLITICAL  POSITION  71 

ness  a  new  disposition  of  political  forces.  Clay  had  deter 
mined  to  succeed  him ;  and  to  gain  the  advantage  of  stand 
ing  next  in  line  of  promotion,  according  to  precedent,  he 
desired  to  be  Secretary  of  State. 

Shortly  after  Clay's  return  from  Europe,  Madison  offered 
him  the  mission  to  Russia,1  and  within  a  year  afterward  in 
vited  him  to  the  Cabinet  as  Secretary  of  War.  Madison  held 
him  in  high  esteem.  In  1813  he  would  have  offered  him  the 
command  of  the  army  had  not  his  presence  in  Congress  been 
regarded  as  indispensable.2  Yet  it  is  probable  that  politics 
more  than  esteem  induced  Madison  to  propose  the  Russian 
mission  and  the  Department  of  War.  Clay's  acceptance  of 
either,  even  had  he  been  willing  to  exchange  his  notable  po 
sition  in  Congress  for  so  slight  an  official  distinction,  would 
have  been  a  tacit  consent  to  the  deferment  of  his  hopes; 
for  the  offers,  coming  so  late  in  Madison's  term,  must  have 
been  approved  by  Monroe,  by  whom  it  was  doubtless  under 
stood  that  if  Clay  accepted  an  appointment  it  was  to  be 
continued.  Both  were  declined ;  but  they  were  significant 
that  he  would  not  be  given  the  first  place  in  Monroe's  cab 
inet.  It  was  apparent  soon  after  Monroe's  election  that 


1  "  Seventeen  years  later,  in  1832,  Buchanan,  Minister  to  Russia,  wrote  : 
'To  be  an  American  Minister  is  but  a  slender  passport  to  the  kind  atten 
tion  of  the  Russian  nobility.     They  know  but  little  of  our  country,  and 
probably  desire  to  know  still  less,  as  they  are  afraid  of  the  contamination 
of  liberty.'  " — Curtis's  Buchanan,  vol.  i.  p.  156. 

2  "Henry  Clay  had  equal  moral  courage  with  Jackson,  but  he  lacked 
military  glory  ;  and  with  the  ignorant  majority  military  glory  is  apprecia 
ble,  whilst  moral  courage  and  intellectual  statesmanship  are  incomprehensi 
ble.     In  such  a  conflict,  Jackson,  of  course,  triumphed.     Had  Mr.  Clay  ac 
cepted  the  generalship-in-chief  in  the  war  of  1812,  as  proposed  by  his 
friends — the  President,  Madison,  being  out — there  is  no  doubt  but  he  would 
have  made  a  great  and  successful  general  ;  for  of  all  men  who  ever  came 
into  political  rivalry  in  our  country,  Henry  Clay  and  Andrew  Jackson 
were  most  alike  in  character." — Life  of  Cassius  M.  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  49. 


72  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1817 

Clay's  wishes  were  to  be  disregarded — that  not  he  but  John 
Quincy  Adams  was  to  be  the  administration  candidate  for 
the  Presidential  succession.  Adams  was  made  Secretary  of 
State.  Clay  was  again  pressed  to  take  the  War  Department 
or  the  mission  to  England — practically  anything  he  wanted 
save  the  coveted  post.  But  nothing  else  would  suffice. 

He  was  disappointed  and  angered.  Justly  or  not,  in  view 
of  Adams's  experience  and  the  Northern  support  he  brought 
to  Monroe,  Clay  held  his  own  claims  to  be  higher.1  And 
to  be  pushed  aside  by  such  a  man  as  Monroe  added  to  his 
spleen.  The  President  was  a  sagacious,  cautious,  methodi 
cal,  and  mediocre  man,  advanced  over  abler  men  by  political 
machinery.  Both  he  and  Adams  had  been  chiefly  occupied 
abroad  in  diplomacy,  while  Clay's  service  had  been  for  the 
most  part  in  the  gaze  of  the  nation.  He  assumed  that  the 
prominence  he  had  achieved  justified  his  aspirations.  But 
his  principal  source  of  influence — his  diffused  popularity, 
arising  from  admiration  for  the  man,  his  manner,  his  ora- 
tory,  and  his  showy  policy  —  was  not  alone  sufficient  to 
raise  him  to  the  Presidency.  Popular  admiration  of  the 
talents  of  a  statesman  has  seldom  been  successful  in  the 
strife  for  that  position  against  the  concrete  interests  and 
material  means  that  aid  shrewd  but  otherwise  ordinary 
men.  Immeasurably  superior  to  the  horde  of  brawling, 
scrambling  mediocres  that  ever  throng  the  ways  to  prefer 
ment,  he  was  impatient  of  resistance,  and  often  asserted  his 
opinions  in  a  dictatorial  and  overbearing  way.  "When  his 


1  MacMaster  says  (vol.  iv.  p.  376)  that  Clay  prevented  the  use  of  the 
chamber  of  the  House  for  the  inauguration,  which  was  therefore  held  out 
side  ;  and  that  he  did  not  attend  the  ceremonies.  In  Clay's  Correspondence, 
however  (p.  53),  is  a  note  from  Monroe,  dated  March  4, 1817,  thanking  Clay 
for  his  offer  to  put  the  chamber  in  order  for  the  proceedings. 


CH.  II.]    CLAY  AND  THE  MONROE  ADMINISTRATION    73 

feelings  and  prejudices  were  aroused,  they  were  apt  to  be 
too  strong  and  impetuous  for  calculating  prudence  and 
sound  judgment.  After  Monroe's  administration  was  or 
ganized  these  traits  came  into  full  play  by  the  independent 
and  hostile  attitude  that  Clay  assumed.  Henceforth,  recog 
nizing  no  leadership  above  his  own,  he  was  often  to  commit 
the  error  of  excess.  In  making  war  on  Monroe,  however 
good  the  grounds,  he  allowed  his  fervor  and  his  personal 
grievance  to  be  obtruded  too  far  for  circumspect  and  suc 
cessful  opposition. 

His  persistence  in  behalf  of  internal  improvements  after 
Monroe's  announcement  of  his  Constitutional  objections 
would  have  excited  no  surprise  had  he  gone  no  further  than 
to  urge  the  legal  and  economic  arguments  that  he  held  to 
be  valid.  To  that  extent  he  would  only  have  been  con 
sistent  with  what  he  had  previously  advocated.  But  he  ex 
ceeded  the  necessities  of  debate  by  not  only  harshly  com 
bating  the  President's  reasoning,  but  also  denouncing  what 
he  chose  to  regard  as  gross  presumption  in  vetoing  legisla 
tion  before  it  had  been  introduced  in  Congress.  This  he 
did  in  terms  so  ill-restrained  as  to  evince  personal  resent 
ment  at  his  failure  to  obtain  the  Secretaryship  of  State  in 
the  new  cabinet.  Such  at  least  was  the  construction  put 
upon  it — to  his  serious  disadvantage.  It  was  received  as  the 
public  declaration  of  revolt  against  the  administration.  It 
was  not,  however,  the  first  intimation  of  his  designs ;  for  he 
had  at  once  made  his  sentiments  known  through  various 
channels,  and  had  been  exerting  himself  to  marshal  all  his 
available  forces.1  Nor  was  his  stand  for  internal  improve- 


1  Adams's  Diary,  December  25, 1817;  July  28,  1818;  February  2,  3,  1819. 
Niles's  Register,  August  29,  1819. 


74  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1818 

ments,  as  prominent  as  that  policy  was  in  his  plan  of  opera 
tions,  more  than  a  preliminary  stroke.  The  principal  onset 
followed  immediately.  March  24,  1818,  but  eleven  days 
afterward,  he  "  came  out  with  his  great  opposition  speech," 
as  Adams  expressed  it,  on  the  emancipation  of  South 
America. 

The  decrepitude  of  Spain,  caused  by  the  subversion  of  her 
power  by  Napoleon,  was  extreme,  and  her  colonies  had  taken 
advantage  of  it  to  attain  independence.  Mexico  and  the 
whole  of  South  America — except  Brazil,  which  was  under 
the  dominion  of  Portugal — were  in  more  or  less  active  re 
bellion.  In  those  countries  where  the  revolution  had  been 
successful,  republican  institutions  were  organized.  Many  of 
the  revolutionary  movements  were  stained  by  cruelty  and 
excess,  and  among  the  new  states  jealousy  and  discord  pre 
vailed.  Yet  their  former  condition  could  justly  be  urged  in 
palliation  of  this  state  of  things.  Any  struggle  for  liberty, 
however  violent  and  irregular,  on  the  part  of  those  peoples, 
who  had  been  long  subjected  to  the  most  barbarizing  des 
potism  that  ever  existed,  was  deserving  of  sympathy.  Clay 
was  enthusiastically  of  that  belief.  He  had  proclaimed  it 
early.  In  January,  1816,  he  expressed  a  desire  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  should  interpose  in  aid 
of  the  South  American  cause.  He  subsequently  opposed  a 
bill  to  prevent  the  equipment  in  our  ports  of  cruisers  to  be 
sold  to  the  insurgents.  The  bill  became  a  law  as  a  measure 
of  neutrality;  but  after  Monroe's  administration  began,  Clay 
urged  the  repeal  of  the  law  and  the  assumption  of  such  an 
attitude  as  would  benefit  the  struggling  colonies  instead  of 
Spain,  which  he  deeply  detested.  The  debate  on  this  ques 
tion  prepared  the  way  for  his  proposal  to  recognize  the 
patriot  flag.  To  supply  the  want  of  exact  information  as 


CH.  II.]        THE   SOUTH  AMERICAN  REPUBLICS  75 

to  the  condition  of  the  insurgent  countries,  Madison  had 
sent  thither  three  commissioners  on  a  tour  of  investiga 
tion.  They  had  not  yet  made  their  report,  but  it  was 
proposed  to  provide  for  their  compensation.  To  this  Clay 
objected,  contending  that  their  appointment  was  uncon 
stitutional,  having  been  made  without  the  advice  and  con 
sent  of  the  Senate.  He  then  moved  an  appropriation  for 
one  year's  salary  and  outfit  for  a  minister  to  the  United 
Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  whenever  the  President 
should  deem  it  expedient  to  send  one. 

His  speech  on  this  motion  was  in  his  best  style.  The 
subject,  as  he  viewed  it,  was  exalted,  yet  it  was  not  one 
upon  which  to  form  a  party  division.  The  proposition  in 
volved  no  existing  interests ;  it  simply  represented  a  senti 
ment,  though  a  large  and  lofty  sentiment.  But  the  subject 
was  fascinating,  and  Clay  was  determined  to  discredit  the 
administration.  Perhaps  no  speech  he  ever  delivered  re 
flects  more  completely  his  strongest  and  his  weakest  traits. 

He  deplored  his  difference  with  many  friends  on  the  ques 
tion,  but  found  some  consolation  in  that,  if  he  erred,  it  was 
"  on  the  side  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  a  large  portion 
of  the  human  family."  He  was  averse  to  war  with  Spain, 
yet  he  criticised  with  harshness  and  asperity  the  manner  in 
which  the  long-continued  negotiations  with  Spain  had  been 
conducted,  and  defined  a  course  that  would  result  in  war 
unless  the  many  injuries  done  us  were  redressed.  He  elo 
quently  described  the  immense  region  throughout  which 
"the  spirit  of  revolt  against  the  dominion  of  Spain  had 
manifested  itself,"  its  diverse  and  magnificent  resources,  the 
character  and  promise  of  its  inhabitants,  the  blighting 
tyranny  they  had  suffered,  and  the  scenes  of  atrocity  their 
efforts  for  freedom  had  provoked.  He  urged  the  commer- 


76  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1818 

cial  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  independence  of  the 
revolted  provinces,  and  the  likelihood  of  their  adopting  in 
stitutions  modelled  after  ours.  He  showed  that  the  states 
of  the  Eio  de  la  Plata  were  already  free  and  independent, 
and  that  within  their  territory  there  was  not  a  Spanish  bay 
onet  to  contest  the  authority  of  their  government.  This  de 
facto  government,  he  insisted,  was  entitled  to  recognition, 
according  to  the  practice  of  Washington,  Jefferson,  and 
Madison,  the  established  principles  of  international  law  and 
of  a  true  neutrality.  Such  a  recognition,  he  maintained,  would 
not  be  to  Spain  a  just  cause  of  war ;  but  he  contended  that  if 
she  should  make  war  on  that  pretext  her  weakness  would  com 
plete  her  ruin  in  the  Americas — that  it  would  "  ensure  beyond 
all  doubt  the  cause  of  American  independence  "  and  "  would 
be  attended  with  the  immediate  and  certain  loss  of  Florida." 
Notwithstanding  the  sentiment  evoked  and  the  merit  of 
the  speech,  which  was  strikingly  superior  to  the  speeches 
in  the  debate  that  followed,  the  measure  he  advocated  was 
too  premature  not  to  encounter  certain  defeat.  The  position 
of  the  administration  was  well  understood.  While  it  was 
unwilling  to  appear  at  all  precipitate,  it  was  not  opposed  to 
recognizing  any  of  the  new  governments  when  that  could 
be  done  with  assurance  of  their  independence  and  the  ap 
proval  of  public  sentiment.  But  there  was  no  call  for  haste, 
especially  as  it  was  proposed  to  send  a  minister  to  a  govern 
ment  which  had  not  as  yet  sought  recognition  by  sending 
an  accredited  minister  here.1  Besides,  there  was  the  con 
sideration,  which  Clay  had  boldly  combated,  that  it  was  im 
politic  needlessly  to  offend  the  Spanish  government  pend 
ing  the  negotiations  for  the  acquisition  of  Florida.  The 


1  Ly man's  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States,  vol.  ii.  p.  424. 


CH.  IL]  CLAY'S   DEFEAT   IN  CONGRESS  77 

main  effect,  therefore,  of  his  censure  of  the  administration 
was,  as  in  the  debate  on  internal  improvements,  to  foment 
bitterness  of  feeling.  The  execution  of  his  aggressive  plan 
might  have  quickly  secured  the  results  he  looked  for  with 
a  great  gain  of  national  prestige;  but  the  wisdom  of  seek 
ing  them  by  diplomacy  was  shown  by  the  event,  and  was 
more  in  accord  with  the  character  of  our  institutions. 

The  motion  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  45  to  115.  Though 
he  made  two  further  speeches  during  the  debate,1  and  ex 
hausted  every  resource,  he  could  hardly  have  expected  a 
different  result,  and  probably  he  did  not.  In  this  view 
some  allowance  should  be  made  for  the  extent  to  which 
he  pressed  his  advocacy.  The  proposition  itself  was  as 
limited  as  it  could  well  be ;  yet  the  chief  argument  used 
against  it  was  that  the  Constitutional  power  to  manage  our 
foreign  relations  is  vested  in  the  President,  and  therefore 
that  it  was  improper  for  Congress  to  interfere.2  If  adopted 
it  would  have  been  merely  an  expression  by  Congress  of  its 


1  At  a  banquet  which  followed  the  unveiling  of  a  monument  to  Clay  at 
Richmond,  in  1SGO,  John  Tyler  had  the  magnanimity  to  extol  Clay's 
ability  as  Speaker  and  debater.  "His  gesture,"  said  he,  among  other 
things,  "  was  impressive,  and  he  had  the  faculty  of  throwing  the  power 
of  his  voice  into  a  single  sentence  after  such  a  manner  as  to  produce  some 
times  an  electric  effect.  The  late  Philip  P.  Barbour  often  quoted  to  me  an 
illustration  of  this  power  of  voice  and  expression  used  by  Mr.  Clay  in  dis 
cussing  the  recognition  of  the  Spanish- American  colonies.  The  speaker 
had  drawn  a  desponding  picture  of  the  condition  of  Mexico  in  her  struggle 
for  independence.  Her  hopes  were  reported  to  be  blasted  ;  Mina,  her 
great  leader,  either  killed  or  captured.  At  that  moment  a  page  put  in  his 
hand  a  morning  paper.  His  eye  fell  on  a  paragraph,  when  his  whole  man 
ner  changed,  and  holding  the  paper  up,  he  exclaimed,  'Mina  still  lives  !' 
The  effect  was  wonderful.  Mr.  Barbour  said,  'I  sprang  to  my  feet,  and 
some  moments  elapsed  before  I  recovered  from  my  trance.'" 

8  An  excellent  memoir  on  this  subject  was  submitted  to  the  Senate  in 
January,  1897,  in  connection  with  a  pending  proposition  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  Cuba.  The  Constitutional  phase  of  the  debates  in  1818, 


78  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1818 

desire  that  the  specified  government  be  recognized,  and  a 
provision  of  the  means  for  such  recognition,  leaving  the 
subject  otherwise  to  the  discretion  of  the  President.  If  that 
government  were  independent  the  cause  of  republicanism 
demanded  its  recognition  as  soon  as  prudence  and  propriety 
would  permit.  Whatever  criticism,  therefore,  Clay's  course 
warranted,  it  had  the  merit  of  bringing  an  important  and 
worthy  subject  into  national  prominence,  and  of  charging 
the  administration  with  a  responsibility  that  it  could  not 
ignore.  A  more  ordinary  and  moderate  effort  would  not 
have  produced  that  result. 

Despite  the  large  majority  of  the  administration  forces 
in  Congress,  Clay's  opposition  caused  Monroe  much  anxiety 
and  Adams  much  wrath.  It  was  evident  that  hostilities  had 
only  begun.  The  subject  of  South  American  independence 
was  one  to  which  he  could  recur  as  often  as  he  chose,  with 
the  probability  of  improving  grounds  and  increasing  popu 
lar  support.1  Moreover,  another  opportunity  of  attack  had 
already  arisen.  Even  while  the  South  American  debate 
was  in  progress  the  events  that  occasioned  the  next  parlia 
mentary  battle  were  taking  place.  General  Jackson  was  in 
the  midst  of  his  operations  in  the  Seminole  "War. 

We  have  now  reached  the  origin  of  the  fateful  feud  be 
tween  Jackson  and  Clay  described  at  the  opening  of  this 
volume.  It  remains  to  sketch  the  ensuing  events  to  the 
election  of  1828,  and  to  complete  the  portrait  of  Clay  as 
he  was  when  he  re-entered  the  Senate  to  take  up  the  gage 
of  battle  with  Jackson. 


1821,  and  1822  is  there  fully  presented.    See  Congressional  Record,  Fifty- 
fourth  Congress,  Second  Session,  p.  684. 

1  The  Supreme  Congress  of  Mexico  gave  Clay  a  vote  of  thanks  for  his 
efforts  in  the  cause,  and  extracts  from  his  speeches  were  read  at  the  head 
of  the  South  American  armies. 


CHAPTER  III 

Clay's  Political  Position — The  Missouri  Compromise,  the  Statesmanship  of 
It,  and  Clay's  Agency  in  Effecting  It. — He  Renews  his  Efforts  for  the 
Recognition  of  the  South  American  Republics,  and  Finally  Succeeds — 
He  Temporarily  Retires,  but  Returns  to  the  House  at  the  Opening  of  the 
Eighteenth  Congress — He  Defeats  a  Bill  to  Pension  Commodore  Perry's 
Mother,  and  Advocates  Internal  Improvements  and  Webster's  Resolu 
tion  Concerning  the  Recognition  of  Greece — The  Monroe  Doctrine — 
The  Tariff  of  1824  and  Clay's  Relation  to  Protection  — The  Political 
Situation  in  1824  —  William  H.  Crawford  —  John  Quincy  Adams  is 
Elected  President  by  the  House  Through  Clay's  Influence,  and  Clay 
becomes  Secretary  of  State — Clay's  Administration  of  the  State  Depart 
ment — The  Panama  Mission — John  Randolph — His  Duel  with  Clay — 
Adams  and  his  Administration — Jackson  is  Elected  over  Adams  in 
1828 — Clay's  Home,  Family,  Personal  Appearance,  Temperament,  and 
Mind. 

CLAY'S  repeated  defeats  told  heavily.  "Without  his  pecul 
iar  and  remarkable  powers  he  would  have  been  undone. 
His  home  constituency,  however,  was  always  loyal  to  him. 
Only  once  was  he  threatened  from  that  quarter.  In  1816  he 
voted  for  a  bill  increasing  the  compensation  of  members  of 
Congress  from  six  dollars  per  day  while  in  session  to  fifteen 
hundred  per  year,  and  twice  that  sum  to  the  Speaker.  It 
met  with  the  stormy  but  unreasonable  opposition  of  the 
country.  By  voting  for  it  many  members  lost  their  seats. 
Clay's  return  was  contested  on  that  ground.  After  a  short 
and  spirited  canvass  of  his  district — the  only  one  he  ever 
made — he  was  successful,1  though  he  pledged  himself  to 


1  See  Mles's  Register,  vol.  xliii.  p.  19  ;  Headlands  in  the  Life  of  Henry 
Clay,  No.  1,  p.  3. 


80  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1820 


advocate  the  repeal  of  the  law  and  the  substitution  of  a. per 
diem  compensation.  The  other  candidate  had  been  opposed 
to  the  war,  and  in  joint  debate  with  Clay  he  fared  badly. 
But  though  secure  of  his  seat  in  the  House,  his  position 
there  was  not  so  assured.  There  is  always  danger  of  a 
thwarted  statesman  degenerating  into  a  political  guerilla. 
Clay's  course  was  still  imputed  to  factious  vindictiveness. 
His  character  suffered.  It  was  seriously  considered  by  the 
adherents  of  the  administration  whether  he  should  not  be 
retired  from  the  Speakership ;  but  Monroe  prudently  pre 
vented  this  action,  as  magnifying  Clay's  importance,  and 
also  because  it  would,  if  successful,  deprive  the  West  of 
official  representation,  there  being  no  Western  man  in  the 
cabinet  and  none  in  the  House  of  sufficient  strength  and 
eminence  to  contend  with  Clay  for  the  chair.  He  was 
keenly  sensible  of  his  decline,  and  for  a  time  was  much 
depressed  by  it,  even  neglecting  his  duties  as  presiding  offi 
cer.1  Rumor  had  it  that  he  sought  diversion  in  the  excite 
ment  of  the  card-table,  a  prevalent  passion  among  Southern 
gentlemen  of  that  period.2  However  this  may  be,  his  weak 
ness  was  of  short  duration.  He  soon  recovered  himself, 
and  through  the  part  he  took  in  the  controversy  over  the 
admission  of  Missouri,  he  won  the  title  of  the  "  Great 
Pacificator." 

The  details  of  that  controversy,  which  extended  over 
three  sessions  of  Congress,  need  not  be  recounted  here. 
The  expanding  cotton  culture  had  largely  increased  the 
number  and  value  of  slaves,  and  this  was  accompanied  by  a 


1  Niles's  Register,  vol.  xviii.  p.  4. 

2  In  regard  to  the  charge  that  Clay  gambled,  see  Schurz's  Clay,  vol.  i. 
p.  160 ;  Mallory's  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  192  ;  Headlands  in  the  Life  of  Henry 
Clay,  Xo.  1,  p.  2. 


CH.  III.]  THE   MI^ffiTRI   COMPROMISE  81 

more  general  and  racffl^belief  in  the  propriety  of  their 
bondage.  At  the  North  slavery  had  gradually  become  ex 
tinct,  yet  the  growth  of  Northern  wealth  and  population 
was  deranging  the  political  balance  with  the  South.  To 
increase  the  slave  territory  had,  therefore,  become  to  the 
South  an  active  political  principle,  naturally  obnoxious  to 
Northern  sentiment.  The  effort  of  Missouri  for  admission 
into  the  Union  as  a  slave  State  brought  to  light  this  vital 
difference  which  had  insensibly  developed  between  the  two 
sections  of  the  country. 

After  an  excited  struggle  during  two  sessions  of  Con 
gress,  Maine  was  admitted  into  the  Union,  Missouri  was 
authorized  to  form  a  State  constitution,  and  slavery  was 
prohibited  in  all  the  territory  north  of  thirty -six  degrees 
and  thirty  minutes,  except  Missouri.  The  difficulty  was 
supposed  to  be  settled. 

The  second  session  of  the  Sixteenth  Congress  convened 
November  13,  1820.  Clay  was  not  in  attendance,  owing  to 
the  pressure  of  his  private  affairs.1  As  it  was  understood 
at  the  close  of  the  preceding  session  that  he  would  do,  he 
resigned  the  Speakership.  A  stubborn  contest  arose  over 
his  successor.  Twenty-two  ballots,  with  many  variations, 
were  required  to  reach  a  decision,  Taylor,  of  New  York, 
being  elected  over  Lowndes,  of  South  Carolina.2  As  this 


1  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  v.  p.  58. 

2  "  William  Lowndes,  after  Clay,  exercised  more  influence  in  the  House 
than  any  other  man.  .  .  .  He  had  been  elaborately  educated,  and  improved 
by  foreign  travel,  extensive   reading,  and  research.     As  a  belles-lettres 
scholar  he  was  even  superior  to  Mr.  Randolph.    Very  retiring  and  modest 
in  his  demeanor,  he  rarely  obtruded  himself  upon  the  House.     "When  he 
did,  it  seemed  only  to  remind  the  House  of  something  which  had  been  for 
gotten  by  his  predecessors  in  debate.     Sometimes  he  would  make  a  set 
speech.     When  he  did,  it  was  always  remarkable  for  profound  reasoning 
and  profound  thought.  .  .  .  His  impression  upon  the  nation  had  made 


82  THE  JACKSONI^^EPOCH  [1820 


indicates,  the  chief  cause  of  the  Protest  was  the  renewal  of 
the  antislavery  agitation.  The  Missouri  question  had  not 
been  laid.  There  was  deep  dissatisfaction  in  diverse  quar 
ters,  and  for  opposite  reasons,  over  the  conditions  of  the 
Compromise.  Many  at  the  North  objected  to  the  permission 
of  slavery  in  Missouri,  while  many  at  the  South  objected  to 
the  restriction  of  it  anywhere.  It  needed  only  a  slight  rea 
son  to  unsettle  the  arrangement,  and  this  was  furnished  by 
the  constitution  upon  which  Missouri  sought  formal  ad 
mission  into  the  Union.  It  contained  a  provision  directing 
the  legislature  to  enact  a  law  "  to  prevent  free  negroes  and 
mulattoes  from  coming  to,  and  settling  in,  said  State  on 
any  pretext  whatever."  This  was  charged  to  be  a  violation 
of  the  federal  Constitution,  which  declares  that  "the  citi 
zens  of  each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  States."  The  same 
objection  had  been  urged  against  the  Compromise. 

The  perturbation  that  prevailed  in  Congress  was  fully 
shared  by  the  country.  The  debates,  increasing  in  vehe 
mence  and  heat,  and  covering  all  phases — moral,  economic, 
and  Constitutional — of  the  slavery  question,  had  been  every 
where  read  and  discussed  with  fevered  interest.  Public 
meetings  held  throughout  the  land  fulminated  resolutions ; 
legislatures,  municipalities,  and  the  people,  presented  memo 
rials  and  petitions  to  Congress  praying  on  one  or  the  other 
side.  The  feeling  was  general  that  the  Union  was  imperilled. 
Extremists  of  the  South  boldly  threatened  secession,  to  be 
answered  with  equally  violent  defiance  by  extremists  of  the 
North.  

him  the  favored  candidate  of  every  section  for  the  next  President ;  and  it 
is  not,  perhaps,  saying  too  much  that,  had  his  life  been  spared,  he,  and 
not  John  Quincy  Adams,  would  have  been  President  in  1824." — Sparks's 
Memories  of  Fifty  Years,  p.  338. 


CH.  III.]     THE   FIGHT   OVER   THE   COMPROMISE  83 

PP 

The  question  was  wrangled  over  in  various  forms,  but 
with,  no  other  result  than  to  leave  the  real  difficulty,  from 
the  temper  aroused,  more  arduous  than  before.  January 
11,  1821,  when  the  excitement  was  at  its  height,  Clay 
appeared  in  the  House.  His  coming  had  been  anxiously 
awaited,  in  the  belief  that  he  could  work  out  some  solution 
of  the  problem.1  The  belief  was  not  misplaced.  While 
the  public  excitement  constantly  increased,  the  temper  of 
Congress  now  underwent  a  gradual  change.  This  was 
mainly  due  to  Clay's  tireless  and  undiscouraged  efforts, 
which  were  even  more  effective  in  private  than  in  public. 
From  the  first  he  had  been  steadily  gaining  converts  to  a 
compromise,  as  well  as  allaying  the  violence  of  opposi 
tion  that  could  not  be  wholly  converted.2  He  tried  various 
means  to  settle  the  question,  but  they  were  unavailing  ex 
cept  to  prepare  the  way  for  his  final  resort.  At  length  he 
made  a  motion  for  a  joint  committee  of  both  Houses.  Feb 
ruary  23  the  committee  was  elected.  It  was  virtually  his 
selection,  and  he  was  chairman  of  it.  This  was  on  Friday. 
On  the  following  Monday  he  presented  the  report  of  the 
committee,  which  recommended  the  admission  of  Missouri 
practically  on  the  terms  of  the  former  compromise,  and  on 
the  further  condition  that  no  law  should  be  passed  abridg- 

1  Sparks's  Memories  of  Fifty  Tears,  p.  230  ;  Goodrich's  Recollections, 
vol.  ii.  p.  395. 

2  An  instance  of  bis  persistent  energy  on  the  floor  was  related  by  Crit- 
tenden.     Clay  had   made  a  motion  to  allow  some  members  to  vote  who 
were  absent  when  their  names  were  called.     The  Speaker  ruled  that  the 
motion  was  out  of  order.     Clay  then  moved  to  suspend  the  rules  forbid 
ding  it.     This  motion  was  likewise  ruled  out.     "Then,"  said  Clay,  exert 
ing  his  voice  beyond  its  highest  wont,  "  I  move  to  suspend  all  the  rules  of 
the  House  !    Away  with  them  !    Is  it  to  be  endured  that  we  shall  be  tram 
melled  in  our  action  by  mere  forms  and  technicalities  at  a  moment  like 
this,  when  the  peace,  and  perhaps  the  existence,  of  this  Union  is  at  stake  ?" 
— Coleman's  Crittenden,  vol.  ii.  p.  53. 


84  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1821 

ing  the  right  of  any  citizens  to  settle  in  the  State.  On  the 
same  day,  with  little  debate,  the  resolution  reported  was 
adopted  by  the  House,  and  on  the  next  day  by  the  Senate.1 
The  condition  was  in  due  time  complied  with,  and  Missouri 
became  a  State. 

The  settlement  of  this  portentous  controversy  brought 
profound  relief.  The  struggle  had  reached  a  pass  that 
would  have  impelled  the  secession  of  the  slave  States  had 
Missouri  been  denied  admission ;  and  secession  would  not, 
could  not,  have  been  prevented.  When  the  excitement  was 
highest,  Clay  repeatedly  expressed  his  doubt  as  to  the  con 
tinuance  of  the  Union.  The  hypercritical  complain  because 
the  antislavery  principle  yielded  to  compromise,  and  im 
pugn  the  policy  that  effected  it.  Compromise,  it  is  said, 
was  but  an  expedient  to  put  off  the  inevitable  crisis ;  instead 
of  multiplying  both  terms  of  the  equation,  the  problem 
should  have  been  solved  while  yet  the  forces  were  small. 
This  answer  should  be  sufficient  —  comm-pmise  preserved 
the  Union.  Thus  far  politics  more  than  the  altruistic  sen- 
timent  of  liberty  was  the  motive  of  the  antislavery  move 
ment  ;  and  it  was  politics  that  eventually  constrained  the 
compromise.  Love  for  the  Union  was  not  a  general  and  in- 


1  In  a  political  speech  in  1844,  Clay  said  :  "  I  moved  for  the  appointment 
of  a  committee  of  one  from  each  State,  and  that  they  should  be  elected  by 
ballot — a  means  of  designating  a  committee  then  unknown  in  the  House. 
On  that  committee  I  placed  the  names  of  several  that  had  voted  against 
the  reception  of  Missouri  into  the  Union,  and  had  the  influence  to  have 
them  elected  ;  eighteen  on  the  first  ballot,  and  the  remaining  six  were, 
upon  my  suggestion,  made  up  of  those  having  the  highest  number  of 
votes.  The  committee  met  and  readily  agreed  to  report  favorably  to  the 
reception  of  the  new  State  into  the  Union.  But  this  did  not  satisfy  me.  I 
urged  on  A,  B,  and  C  the  question,  '  Will  you  vote  for  it  in  the  House  ?' 
and  had  the  happiness  to  wring  from  them  the  positive  promise  I  desired. 
This  gave  the  turn  to  the  scale  in  the  House,  and  I  now  knew  that  the 
question  was  settled." 


Cn.  III.]  THE  COMPROMISE   CARRIED  85 

veterate  instinct  in  any  section  of  the  country.  The  dura 
tion  of  the  Union  and  the  consequences  of  its  dissolution 
were  freely  and  coolly  discussed  by  public  men.  Had  the 
South  seceded,  slavery  would  have  received  a  still  greater 
impetus  and  protection,  not  to  speak  of  the  manifold  evils 
that  must  have  followed  in  the  wake  of  separation,  which 
would  have  increased  and  strengthened  the  territorial  de 
mands  of  slavery.  The  future  of  our  political  institutions 
was  at  stake;  and  they  were  wise  who  trusted  that  the 
right  would  profit  most  by  time,  and  in  the  end  prevail. 

It  may  be  that  Clay's  persistent  efforts  to  effect  the  com 
promise  were  not  governed  by  the  deliberate  calculation  of 
remote  consequences.  At  such  a  time  those  considerations 
are  secondary,  if  entertained  at  all.  Clay  was  not  a  phi 
losopher,  but  a  man  of  action.  His  paramount  impulse 
throughout  his  career  was  to  maintain  and  glorify  the  Un 
ion.  He  was  intensely  patriotic,  and  ambitious  to  become 
President  of  the  Union  intact.  He  was  a  Southerner  and  a 
slave-holder,  and  as  such  wras  imbued  to  a  large  degree  with 
Southern  sentiments ;  yet  his  instinctive  feeling  was  adverse 
to  slavery.  But  it  was  certain  that  slavery  could  not  be 
eradicated  in  his  day.  As  a  practical  man  he  met  each  con 
dition  as  it  arose,  with  an  incidental  but  not  unworthy  view 
to  his  own  elevation.  To  solve  the  present  and  urgent 
problem,  in  a  way  to  preserve  and  expand  our  nationality 
on  the  existing  basis,  was  therefore  the  leading  principle  of 
his  statesmanship ;  and  when  instant  action  is  imperative, 
only  that  type  of  statesmanship  is  efficient.  Clay  was  the 
sole  possessor  of  the  genius  and  influence  to  quell  the  storm 
that  would  otherwise  have  destroyed  the  Union.  He  felt 
his  responsibility  and  fully  met  it.  So  far  as  one  man  can 
achieve  so  great  a  result,  Clay  saved  the  Union  at  that  crisis. 


86  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1821 

In  the  midst  of  the  Missouri  struggle,  Clay  recurred  to 
his  favorite  subject — the  recognition  of  the  South  American 
republics.  At  the  preceding  session  he  assailed  the  admin 
istration  for  negotiating  a  treaty  with  Spain  for  the  pur 
chase  of  Florida  with  the  Sabine  instead  of  the  Eio  del 
Norte  as  our  southwestern  boundary,  which  had  the  effect 
of  relinquishing  our  claim  to  Texas  as  a  part  of  the  Loui 
siana  purchase.1  But  the  treaty  was  not  ratified  by  Spain 
within  the  stipulated  time,  and  Clay  attempted  to  prevent  a 
renewal ;  he  introduced  resolutions  declaring  the  treaty  in 
valid  inasmuch  as  it  amounted  to  a  cession  of  Texas  to  Spain, 
thus  requiring  the  joint  action  of  both  Houses  of  Congress  ; 
and  that  the  consideration  from  Spain  for  the  territory  west 
of  the  Sabine  was  inadequate.2  The  resolutions  were  de 
feated  ;  but  in  the  course  of  his  speech  in  support  of  them 
he  again  brought  into  full  view  his  South  American  policy, 
and  not  long  afterward  he  made  a  direct  effort  in  its  be 
half  by  moving  a  resolution  declaring  that  it  was  expedient 
to  provide  by  law  for  sending  ministers  to  the  South  Ameri 
can  governments  then  maintaining  their  independence.  This 
resolution  was  adopted,3  but  no  further  action  was  taken 

1  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  v.  p.  25 ;  Monroe  to  Jackson,  May  22,  1820. 

2  "  We  want  Florida,"  said  he, "  or  rather  we  shall  want  it;  or,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  we  want  nobody  else  to  have  it.     We  do  not  desire  it  for 
immediate  use.     It  fills  a  space  in  our  imagination,  and  we  wish  to  com 
plete  the  dTrondissement  of  our  territory.     It  must  certainly  come  to  us. 
The  ripened  fruit  will  not  more  surely  fall.     Florida  is  enclosed  between 
Alabama  and  Georgia,  and  cannot  escape.     Texas  may.     Whether  we  get 
Florida  now  or  some  five  or  ten  years  hence,  it  is  of  no  consequence.     I 
would  not  give  Texas  for  Florida  in  naked  exchange.     We  are  bound  by 
the  treaty  to  give  not  merely  Texas,  but  five  millions  of  dollars  also,  and 
the  excess  beyond  that  sum  of  all  claims  upon  Spain,  which  have  been 
variously  estimated  at  from  fifteen  to  twenty  millions  of  dollars." 

3  "It  is,  no  doubt,  an  indication  of  Clay's  influence  in  the  House,  and 
of  his  increasing  popularity  in  the  nation,  as  the  great  antagonist  of  the 
administration."— Adams's  Diary,  May  14, 1820. 


CH.  III.]        CLAY   RETIRES   FROM   CONGRESS  87 

during  the  session.  In  February,  1821,  he  moved  an  appro 
priation  for  the  purpose.  This  narrowly  failing,  he  pro 
posed  a  resolution  declaring  the  interest  of  the  people  and 
the  House  in  the  South  American  cause,  and  the  readiness 
of  the  House  to  co-operate  with  the  President  in  recog 
nizing  the  independent  nationalities.  It  was  adopted  by 
a  large  majority,  and  was  presented  writh  somewhat  of 
triumph  to  the  President  by  a  committee  of  the  House 
headed  by  Clay.1  But  Monroe  still  halted,  to  avoid,  it  may 
be  supposed,  the  appearance  of  coercion ;  and  it  was  not 
until  March,  1822,  that  he  formally  recommended  the  rec 
ognition  of  the  independent  governments.  Congress  then 
took  prompt  action,  and  ministers  were  subsequently  sent 
to  several  of  the  new  states.2 

At  the  close  of  the  session  Clay  retired  from  Congress, 
and  with  much  eclat!1  His  embarrassed  financial  circum 
stances,  caused  by  the  failure  of  a  friend  whose  paper  he 
had  endorsed  to  a  large  amount,  rendered  it  necessary  for 
him  to  resume  his  practice,  which  his  great  prestige  now 
made  weighty  and  lucrative.  He  was  retained  by  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  in  much  important  litigation.  He  was 
also  retained  at  this  time  by  the  legislature  of  Kentucky 
to  assist  in  arranging  with  the  legislature  of  Virginia  a 
mode  of  settling  disputed  land -titles  arising  out  of  the 
former  relations  between  the  two  States.  This  engage 
ment  recalled  him  to  the  scenes  of  his  youth ;  and  the  dra 
matic  use  he  made  of  it  attracted  considerable  attention.4 
During  this  period  he  actively  opposed  the  agitation  against 
the  State  court,  caused  by  its  holding  unconstitutional  cer- 


1  Colton's  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  242. 

2  Lyman's  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States,  vol.  ii.  p.  447. 

3  Adams's  Diary,  March  9,  14, 1821.  4  Sargent's  Clay,  p. 


88  THE    JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1823 

tain  acts  that  had  been  passed  to  afford  "relief"  to  dis 
tressed  debtors,  and  to  create  a  "  new  court "  designed  to 
uphold  the  popular  movement.  The  people  were  suffering 
the  consequences  of  paper  inflation,  which  they  did  not 
comprehend.  For  several  years  this  agitation  was  pro 
moted  by  demagogues ;  but  it  finally  subsided,  as  all  such 
political  manias  do,  under  the  sustained  efforts  and  influ 
ence  of  the  conservative  elements,  which  formed  Clay's 
chief  political  support.  For  a  time  his  great  popularity  was 
seriously  menaced ;  but  his  district  did  not  waver  in  its 
loyalty  to  him.  In  the  fall  of  1823  he  was  re-elected  to  the 
House,  and  there  to  the  Speakership.1 

The  business  of  the  session  had  much  variety  and  inter 
est,2  and  in  it  Clay  evinced  his  usual  spirit  and  initiative, 
notwithstanding  he  was  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency, 
having  already  been  nominated  by  the  legislatures  of  Ken 
tucky,  Ohio,  Missouri,  and  Louisiana.  At  the  outset  his 
habitual  and  critical  watchfulness  of  legislation,  to  which 
the  Journal  of  the  House  amply  testifies,  was  shown  in 
an  instance  somewhat  perilous  to  him  as  a  Presidential  as 
pirant.  By  a  speech  said  to  have  had  overpowering  effect, 
he  defeated  a  bill  to  pension  the  indigent  mother  of  Commo- 


1  This  jeu  tf  esprit  appeared  in  the  National  Intelligencer : 

"As  near  the  Potomac's  broad  stream,  t'other  day, 

Fair  Liberty  strolled  in  solicitous  mood, 
Deep  pondering  the  future — unheeding  her  way — 

She  met  goddess  Nature  beside  a  green  wood. 
*  Good  mother,'  she  cried,  '  deign  help  me  at  need ! 

I  must  make  for  my  guardians  a  Speaker  to  day : 
The  first  in  the  world  I  would  give  them.' — 'Indeed! 

When  I  made  the  first  Speaker,  I  made  him  of  Clay.' " 

2  The  growing  importance  of  the  House  and  the  increasing  amount  of 
business  it  transacted  are  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  number  of  standing 
committees  had  now  reached  twenty-five. 


CH.  III.]     CLAY   OPPOSES   THE   PERRY   PENSION  89 

dore  Perry,  as  proposing  an  expensive  and  dangerous  prec 
edent,  which,  besides  exalting  the  military  above  the  civil 
service,  was  against  the  policy  and  principle  of  the  pension 
system,  inasmuch  as  Perry  neither  fell  nor  was  wounded  in 
battle.  It  is  apparent,  however,  from  some  of  his  remarks 
on  military  glory,  that  the  spectre  of  General  Jackson's 
candidacy  was  before  his  eyes.  "If  you  wish,"  said  he, 
"to  make  your  country  illustrious  you  must  diffuse  your 
glory.  It  is  not  your  heroes  —  God  knows  we  have  had 
enough  of  them  within  the  last  twenty  years,  every  man 
is  now  a  hero — it  is  not  your  heroes,  but  the  body  of  the 
people,  the  men  who  fight  your  battles,  to  whom  you  are  in 
debted  for  your  safety  and  your  eminence  as  a  nation."  * 

The  subject  of  internal  improvements  was  again  re 
opened.  In  1822,  while  Clay  was  out  of  Congress,  Monroe 
had  vetoed  an  appropriation  for  the  Cumberland  road.  It 
was  the  only  considerable  work  the  government  had  ever 
undertaken ;  and  it  was  the  result  almost  entirely  of  Clay's 
exertions,  which,  indeed,  were  recognized  by  a  monument 
on  the  road,  inscribed  to  him.  But  it  had  at  length  en 
countered  opposition  in  Pennsylvania,  where  a  turnpike  from 
Philadelphia  to  Pittsburgh,  with  which  it  competed,  had 
been  constructed  by  private  capital.3  In  vetoing  the  appro 
priation,  Monroe  had  communicated  a  long  exposition  of 
his  Constitutional  opinions;  and  though  the  discussion  in 
which  Clay  participated  was  upon  a  bill  to  provide  for  the 
preliminary  plans  of  a  general  system — which,  being  harm- 


1  "Mr.  Hamilton  said  that  in  rising  to  reply  to  the  gentleman  from 
Kentucky,  lie  could  not  but  feel  a  foreboding  how  hopeless  the  attempt 
must  be  to  break  the  spell  of  that  eloquence  for  which,  if  he  might  so 
speak,  the  House  had  a  sort  of  habitual  deference  and  admiration." 

9  Curtis's  Buchanan,  vol.  i.  p.  32;  Madison's  Works,  vol.  iii.  p.  54. 


90  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1824 

less,  became  a  law — he  made  it  the  occasion  to  renew  his 
efforts  in  support  of  the  policy  and  in  hostility  to  Monroe. 

Shortly  after  this  he  warmly  advocated  Webster's  resolu 
tion,  modelled  after  his  own  previous  propositions  touching 
the  South  American  States,  to  provide  for  the  recognition  of 
Greece,  then  in  the  midst  of  her  revolution,  which  naturally 
challenged  very  general  a/nd  enthusiastic  interest.  He  also 
introduced  a  joint  resolution  asserting  the  principle  he  had 
before  repeatedly  declared,  and  which  was  announced  in  the 
President's  message  at  the  opening  of  the  session,  now  fa 
miliar  as  the  "  Monroe  Doctrine."  This  portion  of  the  mes 
sage  and  Clay's  resolution  were  both  provoked  by  the  designs 
imputed  to  the  so-called  "  Holy  Alliance  "  to  aid  Spain  to 
reconquer  the  revolted  provinces.  Neither  his  nor  Webster's 
resolution,  however,  was  acted  upon.  The  friends  of  Adams, 
Jackson,  and  Calhoun  were  not  disposed  to  allow  Clay  to 
gain  any  further  political  advantage  from  championing  the 
doctrine  Monroe  had  declared,  but  of  which  Clay  was  in  a 
large  degree  the  author.1 

The  engrossing  topic  of  the  session  was  the  tariff.  The 
act  of  1816  had  not  proven  satisfactory  to  the  manufacturers. 
With  the  exception  of  an  increase  of  the  duties  on  iron  in 
1818  and  a  reduction  of  those  on  wines  in  1819,  the  schedule 
remained  unchanged.  An  effort  was  made  in  1820  for  a 
general  increase,  but  it  was  defeated  in  the  Senate.  Since 
1819,  when  a  severe  financial  crisis  occurred  as  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  conditions  produced  by  the  war,  the 
country  had  been  suffering  a  period  of  extreme  and  general 
depression.  There  had  been  a  great  decrease  in  the  export 
trade,  and  hence  a  ruinous  decline  in  prices,  accompanied  by 


Von  Hoist's  Constitutional  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  i.  p. 412. 


CH.  III.]  CLAY  COMBATS   FREE-TRADE  91 

all  the  symptoms  that  flow  from  a  vicious  currency.  All 
this  had  created  a  strong  protection  movement,  notwith 
standing  the  natural  process  of  recuperation  had  already 
well  set  in,  and  if  left  to  itself  would  have  brought  a  slow 
but  steady  and  ultimately  complete  restoration  of  financial 
and  industrial  health.  The  manufacturing  interests  took 
advantage  of  the  situation  on  much  the  same  plea  that  pre 
vailed  at  the  close  of  the  war. 

Early  in  the  session  a  bill  more  thoroughly  and  syste 
matically  protective  than  any  ever  before  proposed  was  re 
ported  to  the  House.  In  the  middle  of  February  discussion 
of  it  began,  first  over  details,  then  developing  into  a  vigorous 
and  elaborate  debate  on  the  policy  and  principle  of  protec 
tion.  It  was  really  the  first  of  the  many  great  debates  on 
the  subject.  Clay  strongly  favored  the  bill  of  1820,  and 
made  an  elaborate  speech  which  may  be  taken  as  the  general 
introduction  to  the  series  of  disquisitions  pronounced  by  him 
in  behalf  of  what  he  denominated  with  singular  inaptness, 
but  efficient  popular  effect,  the  "American  system."  He 
took  the  lead  in  support  of  the  bill  of  1824.  Prompted  by  a 
truly  powerful  speech  in  favor  of  free-trade  by  Philip  P. 
Barbour,  one  of  the  ablest  members  of  Congress  during  that 
period,1  Clay  delivered  the  most  ambitious  and  exhaustive 


1  "James  Barbour  was  a  member  of  the  Senate  ;  Philip  P.  Barbour  of 
the  House.  They  were  brothers,  and  both  from  Virginia.  They  were 
both  men  of  great  abilities,  but  their  style  and  manner  were  very  different. 
James  was  a  verbose  and  ornate  declaimer ;  Philip  was  a  close,  cogent 
reasoner,  without  any  attempt  at  elegance  or  display.  He  labored  to  con 
vince  the  mind  ;  James  to  control  and  direct  the  feelings.  A  wag  wrote 
upon  the  wall  of  the  House  : 

"  '  Two  Barbours  to  shave  our  Congress  long  did  try. 
One  shaves  with  froth;  the  other  shaves  dry.'" 

— Sparks's  Memories  of  Fifty  Years,  p.  238.    See  also  Bentoii's  Thirty  Yean' 
View,  vol.  ii.  p.  202. 


92  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1824 

speech  he  had  thus  far  made  in  his  Congressional  career. 
This  speech  best  reflects  the  protection  arguments  then  cur 
rent,  and  it  is  also  marked  by  some  of  his  most  powerful 
rhetorical  effects.  After  defining  the  division  of  sentiment 
on  the  tariff  question,  he  described  a  state  of  the  most  stifling 
and  paralyzing  distress  that  he  asserted  to  prevail  through 
out  the  country.  Previous  to  the  delivery  of  this  speech  the 
debate  had  been  in  progress  over  a  month,  yet  nothing  in 
the  discussion  suggested  the  existence  of  any  such  direful 
condition  as  that  which  Clay  depicted.  As  "Webster  said, 
the  country  could  not  be  "  represented  in  gloom,  melancholy, 
and  distress,  but  by  the  effort  of  extraordinary  powers  of 
tragedy."  : 

The  speech  was  far  superior  to  any  other  on  his  side 
of  the  question  delivered  during  the  debate ;  but  it  cannot 
be  classed  as  a  valuable  contribution  to  economic  science. 
Even  extreme  protectionists  have  abandoned  most  of  the 
arguments  he  employed.  Despite  the  statesmanlike  cast  of 
his  mind,  he  was  not  a  profound  reasoner  on  purely  finan 
cial  and  economical  subjects.  In  this  respect  he  was  far 
inferior  to  Webster.2  In  1824  protection  was  not  deep- 


1  "The  paragraphs  devoted  to  distress  in  this  speech  are  more  likely 
than  any  others  Clay  ever  uttered  to  give  those  who  shall  deeply  ponder 
them  a  generation  or  two  hence  any  adequate  conception  of  the  orator's 
power.     In  fact,  it  is  well  remembered  still  how  hundreds,  not  of  mem 
bers  merely,  but  of  those  who  on  that  occasion  crowded  the  lobby,  were 
agonized  at  their  own  and  their  country's  distress,  themselves  having  for 
gotten  it  till  then." — Democratic  Review,  March,  1843,  vol.  xii.  p.  302. 

2  The  strongest  speech  in  reply  to  Clay  was  made  by  Webster — indeed, 
it  was  one  of  the  ablest  he  ever  pronounced,  although  he  subsequently 
abandoned  the  position  he  then  took.     In  1846  he  made  a  speech  on  the 
tariff  question  at  a  dinner  in  Philadelphia.     The  next  morning  one  of  the 
Democratic  newspapers  reprinted  his  great  speech  of  1824,  and  many  thou 
sand  copies  "  were  sold  before  the  joke  was  discovered.     The  Democrats 
were  delighted — the  Whigs  furious,  especially  Mr.  Greeley,  of  the  Tribune, 


CH.  III.]       THE   OPPOSITION   TO   PROTECTION  93 

ly  rooted  in  the  policy  of  the  country.  It  had  not  as 
yet  affected  the  sensitive  and  complex  tissue  of  society. 
Against  it  there  was  a  strong  drift  of  instinctive  disfavor, 
which  needed  only  popular  guidance  to  rule  the  national 
policy.  The  Wealth  of  Nations  had  been  written  half  a 
century.1  Clay  admitted  familiarity  with  its  commercial 
doctrines,  and  stated  them  with  exquisite  precision.  He 
had  stretched  his  opinions  far  beyond  their  original  scope. 
A  few  years  more  and  the  disorder  and  depression  fol 
lowing  in  the  train  of 'war  and  bad  finance  would  have 
disappeared,  and  national  health  would  have  been  restored 
by  natural  processes,  with  increased  vigor  and  vitality.  A 
Presidential  election  was  close  at  hand.  The  candidates 
were  numerous,  and  their  following  was  largely  personal.2 


who  had  come  over  to  hear  Mr.  Webster,  and  who  bought  several  copies 
of  the  old  speech,  thinking  it  the  new  one.  But  Mr.  Webster  enjoyed  it 
hugely ;  and  when  his  friend  Ashmun  handed  him  my  extra,  he  laughed 
heartily,  and  said,  •  I  think  Forney  has  printed  a  much  better  speech  than 
the  one  I  made  last  night.'  " — Forney's  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  p.  10. 

1  In  a  speech  during  this  debate,  Randolph  said:  "In  the  course  of 
this  discussion  I  have  heard,  I  will  not  say  with  surprise,  because  nil  ad- 
mirari  is  my  motto— no  doctrine  that  can  be  broached  on  this  floor  can 
ever  hereafter  excite  surprise  in  my  mind — I  have  heard  the  names  of  Say, 
Ganilh,  Adam  Smith,  and  Ricardo  pronounced  not  only  in  terms,  but  in 
tones,  of  sneering  contempt,  as  visionary  theorists,  destitute  of  practical 
wisdom,  and  the  clan  of  Scotch  and  Quarterly  Reviewers  lugged  in  to 
boot.     This,  sir,  is  a  sweeping  case  of  proscription.     With  the  names  of 
Say,  Smith,  and  Ganilh  I  profess  to  be  acquainted  ;  for  I,  too,  am  versed 
in  title-pages.     But  I  did  not  expect  to  hear  in  this  House  a  name  with 
which  I  am  a  little  further  acquainted  treated  with  so  little  ceremony,  and 
by  whom  ?     I  leave  Adam  Smith  to   the  simplicity  and  majesty  and 
strength  of  his  own  native  genius,  which  has  canonized  his  name — a  name 
which  will  be  pronounced  with  veneration,  when  not  a  man  in  this  House 
will  be  remembered." 

2  ''•  At  present  we  chiefly  know  the  names  of  those  who  are  said  to  be 
candidates  ;  and  none  of  them  stand  committed,  that  I  know  of,  to  any 
particular  policy  or  general  principle  as  to  national  affairs." — Niles's  Reg 
ister,  March,  1822,  vol.  xxii.  p.  1. 


94  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1825 

The  rivalry  was  intense.  Clay  seized  the  opportunity  that 
his  position  gave  him.  to  rally  and  organize  the  scattered 
forces  of  protection.  Without  his  support  the  bill  must 
have  failed.  As  it  was,  with  every  combination  of  interest 
and  politics  that  could  be  devised,  it  was  passed  only  by  the 
scant  majority  of  five  in  the  House '  and  four  in  the  Senate. 
Had  Clay  thrown  against  it  the  weight  of  his  great  influ 
ence  and  authority,  protection  in  the  United  States,  with 
all  its  attendant  and  lineal  evils,  would  have  met  a  signal 
and  probably  an  abiding  repulse.  To  aid  him  in  his  ef 
forts  to  attain  the  glittering  but  transient  distinction  of 
the  Presidency,  he  sacrificed  one  of  the  noblest  opportu 
nities  of  modern  times,  not  only  to  benefit  his  country, 
but  the  world,  and  to  earn  a  place  among  the  few  whose 
names  are  jewels  in  the  crown  of  statesmanship. 

The  dominating  influence  that  Clay  exerted  at  the  first 
session  of  the  Eighteenth  Congress  was  displayed  at  the 
next  in  relation  to  a  subject  which,  though  far  less  im 
portant  than  the  tariff,  was  far  more  spectacular — the  elec 
tion  of  President  by  the  House  of  Representatives.  Clay's 
course  was  destined  to  peculiar  historical  interest,  and  to 
produce  an  unpropitious  and  enduring  effect  upon  his  po 
litical  fortunes. 

The  prospect  at  the  beginning  of  Monroe's  Presidency 
had  been  realized.  Federalism,  so  far  as  concerned  party 


1  "After  the  passage  of  the  bill  on  Friday,  when  the  House  adjourned 
and  the  Speaker  was  stepping  down  from  his  seat,  a  gentleman  who  had 
voted  writh  the  majority,  said  to  him,  '  We  have  done  pretty  well  to-day.' 
'Yes,'  returned  Mr.  Clay.  'We  made  a  good  stand,  considering  that  we 
lost  both  our  Feet.'  Alluding  to  Mr.  Foot,  of  Connecticut,  and  Mr. 
Foote,  of  New  York,  who  both  voted  against  the  bill,  though  it  was 
thought  some  time  ago  that  they  would  both  support  it." — Niles's  Register, 
vol.  xxvi.  p.  143. 


CH.IH.]  CLAY   AND  THE   PRESIDENCY  95 

organization,  was  quite  extinct ;  and  the  reigning  party,  if 
party  it  could  be  called,  was  in  a  state  of  disintegration, 
which  caused  the  misnomer  of  the  period,  the  "  era  of  good 
feeling."  The  Congressional  caucus,  which  for  a  time 
hitherto  had  governed  the  Presidential  succession,  had  fall 
en  into  disrepute.  National  politics  had  lost  all  semblance 
of  system  or  control.  Four  candidates  for  the  Presidency, 
not  materially  differing  in  the  political  views  they  professed, 
had  entered  the  field,  and  no  one  had  secured  a  majority  of 
the  Electoral  College.  The  election  was  thus  devolved  upon 
the  House  of  Representatives,  the  choice  to  be  made  from 
the  three  candidates — Jackson,  Adams,  and  Crawford — who 
had  received  the  most  electoral  votes,  99,  84,  and  41,  respec 
tively.  This  debarred  Clay,  who  had  received  but  37.1  Had 
he  been  one  of  the  three  he  would  unquestionably  have 
been  elected  through  his  popularity  in  the  House.  As  it 
was,  his  preference  would  determine  the  result.  He  was 
accordingly  beset  by  the  friends  of  the  several  candidates. 

But  for  Crawford's  relation  to  the  election  of  1824  he 
would  now  be  quite  unrememberecl,  though  he  had  been 
prominent  in  public  life  for  a  long  period.  He  was  a  native 
of  Virginia,  whence  he  emigrated  to  Georgia  in  early  life. 
He  maintained  himself  by  teaching  school  while  preparing 
for  the  bar ;  and  upon  his  admission  he  settled  in  the  village 
of  Lexington.  He  soon  became  the  chief  personage  as  well 
as  the  first  lawyer  of  upper  Georgia.  His  rising  influence 
brought  him  into  collision  with  the  clique  which  had  long  con 
trolled  politics  in  that  part  of  the  State.  Out  of  this  arose 
between  him  and  one  of  the  old  faction  a  duel  in  which  he 


1  It  was  charged  that  Clay  was  unfairly  deprived  of  the  five  votes  of 
Louisiana.— Colton's  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  291.  For  Vice-President,  Calhoun  re 
ceived  132  of  the  261  votes. 


90  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1825 

killed  his  adversary,  and  thus  opened  a  feud  the  conse 
quences  of  which  influenced  the  political  history  of  Georgia 
for  more  than  forty  years.  In  1807  he  was  elected -to  the 
Senate.  He  there  exhibited  much  ability  and  wise  modera 
tion,  opposing  the  restrictive  measures,  but  finally,  along 
with  Madison,  supporting  the  war.  In  1813  he  succeeded 
Livingston  as  Minister  to  France.  Livingston  was  very  deaf, 
and  Crawford  could  not  speak  French.  This  led  Napoleon 
to  remark  that  the  United  States  had  sent  him  one  minister 
that  was  deaf  and  one  that  was  dumb.  Yet  Napoleon  was 
much  impressed  by  Crawford,  and  once  said  of  him,  "  No 
government  but  a  republic  could  foster  so  much  truth  and 
simplicity  of  character  as  I  find  in  Mr.  Crawford."  He 
would  have  been  a  formidable,  if  not  successful,  candidate 
for  the  Presidency  against  Monroe,  had  he  not  declined  to 
oppose  him.  He  served  in  Monroe's  cabinet  as  Secretary 
of  War  for  a  short  time  and  then  as  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury.  He  held  the  latter  post  at  the  time  of  the  election, 
with  full  control  of  what  was  left  of  the  party  machinery. 
He  possessed  an  exceptionally  fine  presence  and  a  profound 
mind ;  but  he  must  be  regarded  as  an  able  politician  rather 
than  a  statesman.  Save  the  reminiscences  of  his  political 
acumen,  his  long  continuance  in  public  affairs,  and  the  fact 
that  he  received  more  votes  than  Henry  Cla}r,  there  is  little 
to  distinguish  his  name  from  the  ordinary  obscurity  of  the 
civil  lists.  Nevertheless,  it  was  alone  the  loss  of  health  that 
prevented  him  from  attaining  the  Presidency.  In  the  latter 
part  of  1823  he  suffered  a  shock  of  paralysis  so  severe  that 
for  over  a  year  he  was  unable  to  sign  his  name.  Clay  much 
preferred  him,  with  good  reason,  to  either  of  the  other  can 
didates  ;  and  beyond  doubt  it  was  solely  Crawford's  shat 
tered  health  that  determined  Clay  not  to  support  him.  The 


CH.  III.]     CLAY   FAVORS  ADAMS   FOR  PRESIDENT         97 

circumstance  was  scarcely  a  greater  misfortune  to  Crawford 
than  it  proved  to  be  to  Clay.  Crawford  retired  from  public 
life.  He  afterward  partly  regained  his  health,  and  served 
as  a  circuit  judge  in  Georgia  from  1827  until  his  death,  in 


As  Clay  regarded  both  Jackson  and  Adams,  to  choose  be 
tween  them  was,  in  truth,  as  he  expressed  it,  a  choice  of 
evils.  But  he  at  once  decided  to  support  Adams  ;  he  could 
not  do  otherwise,  with  decent  respect  for  consistency.  When 
his  determination  became  known,  and  after  all  other  means 
to  change  it  had  been  exhausted,  some  of  Jackson's  friends 
attempted  to  drive  him  from  it  by  a  performance  quite 
characteristic  of  American  politics. 

Some  days  before  the  election  took  place  in  the  House  a 
letter  appeared  in  a  Philadelphia  newspaper  asserting  that 
Clay  had  agreed  to  support  Adams  on  the  condition  that 
Clay  be  made  Secretary  of  State.  It  was  further  alleged 
that  the  same  terms  had  been  offered  to  Jackson's  friends, 
but  that  none  of  them  would  "  descend  to  such  mean  barter 
and  sale."  Although  anonymous,  the  letter  purported  to 
be  written  by  a  member  of  the  House.  Clay  forthwith 
published  a  card.  He  pronounced  the  writer  "  a  base  and 
infamous  calumniator,  a  dastard  and  a  liar  ;  and,"  he  con 
tinued,  "  if  he  dare  unveil  himself  and  avow  his  name  I  will 
hold  him  responsible,  as  I  here  admit  myself  to  be,  to  all 
the  laws  which  govern  and  regulate  men  of  honor."  Two 
days  later,  in  the  same  paper  in  which  Clay's  card  appeared, 
the  letter  was  acknowledged  by  one  Kremer,  a  witless  mem 
ber  from  Pennsylvania,  chiefly  known  at  the  capital  by  a 


1  Sparks's  Memories  of  Fifty  Years,  pp.  40,  41,  60 ;  Adams's  Gallatin, 
p.  598  ;  Sumner's  Jackson,  p.  83. 

7 


98  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1825 

leopard-skin  overcoat  that  he  commonly  wore.  He  asserted 
that  the  statements  he  had  made  were  true,  and  that  he 
was  ready  to  prove  them.  A  duel  with  such  a  character 
would  have  been  ridiculous.  The  tragedy  had  turned  to 
farce.  Something,  however^  had  to  be  done.  Clay  im 
mediately  demanded  an  investigation  by  a  special  com 
mittee  of  the  House,  and  retracted  his  hasty  challenge  by 
stating  that  the  charges,  "  emanating  from  such  a  source, 
this  was  the  only  notice  he  could  take  of  them."  After 
two  days  of  discussion,  such  a  committee  was  elected.  It 
was  composed  of  seven  members,  none  of  whom  had  sup 
ported  Clay  for  the  Presidency.  Kremer  at  once  an 
nounced  his  willingness  to  meet  the  inquiry ;  but  on  the 
morning  of  the  day  of  the  election  in  the  House  the  com 
mittee  reported  that  Kremer  had  declined  to  appear  before 
it,  sending  a  communication  in  which  he  denied  the  Con 
stitutional  power  of  the  House  to  compel  him  to  testify. 
E~o  further  action  was  taken.  Adams  was  elected,  and 
Clay  became  Secretary  of  State. 

By  Kremer's  own  admissions  he  had  been  induced  by 
others  to  undertake  this  business.  At  one  time,  affrighted 
by  the  turmoil  he  had  created,  he  repented  and  disclaimed; 
but  again  stimulated  by  his  prompters,  he  returned  to  their 
bidding.  The  contemptible  outcome  of  the  scheme  gave 
Clay  reason  to  think  that  it  had  been  sufficiently  exposed 
and  could  safely  be  ignored.  His  mistake  was  soon  appar 
ent.  Never  was  a  groundless  political  scandal  more  effec 
tive.  It  was  at  once  revived  with  intensified  force  and  per 
sistence.  A  strong  effort  was  made  in  the  Senate  to  reject 
his  nomination;  fifteen  Senators,  including  Jackson  him 
self,  voted  against  it.  This  attempt  failing,  the  cry  of 
"  bargain  and  corruption "  was  industriously  started  to  in- 


CH.  III.]         CLAY   AS   SECRETARY   OF  STATE  99 

fluence  the  next  election.  The  extreme  propriety  of  the 
appointment  was  entirely  lost  sight  of,  as  was  also  the  fact 
— then  well  known  in  "Washington,  and  now  on  all  hands 
admitted — that  the  only  attempt  at  bargain  was  made  by 
Jackson's  friends.  However  plain  it  was  to  those  in  posi 
tion  to  know  the  facts,  it  was  natural  that  the  rank  and  file 
of  those  who  favored  Jackson  should  regard  Clay's  appoint 
ment  as  the  absolute  demonstration  of  a  deal.  By  accept 
ing  it  he  deliberately  made  himself  the  victim  of  circum 
stantial  evidence.  And  to  hostile  minds  the  unfortunate 
appearance  was  heightened  by  the  differences  between  him 
and  Adams  during  the  negotiations  at  Ghent,  his  subse 
quent  attitude  concerning  a  public  controversy  between 
Russell  and  Adams  as  to  what  took  place  there,  and  his 
severe  criticism  of  Adams  and  the  policy  of  Monroe's  ad 
ministration  toward  the  South  American  states. 

For  several  days  he  hesitated  to  accept  the  place,  which 
Adams  had  immediately  tendered.  His  friends  were  at  first 
divided  in  their  opinions  regarding  it,  but  they  finally  con 
curred  in  advising  its  acceptance.  Even  friends  of  Craw 
ford  and  Jackson  joined  in  this  advice,  although  Crawford 
himself  refused  Adams's  tender  of  the  Treasury  Department. 
For  the  position  itself  Clay  was  not  desirous,  and  he  as 
sumed  its  duties  with  reluctance.  "What  chiefly  determined 
him.  was  the  belief  that,  if  he  did  not  accept,  it  would  be 
argued  that  he  dared  not.  The  prospect  of  such  an  accusa 
tion  was  more  obnoxious  to  him  than  the  other  horn  of  the 
dilemma.  He,  therefore,  took  the  alternative  of  bold  de 
fiance. 

"With  one  exception,  Clay's  administration  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  State  was  not  marked  by  any  event  of  much  his 
torical  importance.  More  treaties,  principally  commercial 


100  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1827 

arrangements  with  the  lesser  powers,  were  concluded  dur 
ing  his  term  than  during  the  previous  existence  of  the 
government,  a  result  somewhat  due  to  Clay's  person 
al  popularity  with  the  foreign  ministers  at  Washington.1 
Urgent  efforts  were  also  made  to  perfect  a  mutually  satis 
factory  adjustment  of  our  commercial  relations  with  Great 
Britain  and  her  dependencies ;  but  the  efforts  were  unavail 
ing,  except  to  keep  palpably  alive  the  questions  involved.  As 
the  chief  exponent  of  protection,  Clay  shared  the  theory  that 
almost  universally  prevailed  in  commercial  diplomacy — an 
eye  for  an  eye  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth.  By  an  Order  in 
Council  in  1826  the  British  government  prohibited  all  com 
mercial  intercourse  between  the  West  Indies  and  the  United 
States,  our  government  having  failed  to  take  advantage  of 
an  opportunity  for  reciprocity  for  which  provision  had  been 
made  by  an  act  of  Parliament,  if  made  within  a  year  there 
after  ;  Clay,  and  also  Gallatin,  then  minister  to  England, 
were  unable  to  obtain  the  repeal  of  the  order,  despite  the  abil 
ity  with  which  they  presented  our  side  of  the  case.  In  1827, 
under  an  act  passed  four  years  previously,  the  President 
issued  a  retaliatory  proclamation.  One  difficulty  of  long 
standing  with  England,  however,  Clay  succeeded  in  settling : 
he  secured  an  indemnity  for  slaves  forcibly  taken  by  the 
British  during  the  War  of  1812.  In  another  instance,  also, 
the  interests  of  the  slave-holders,  which  had  now  begun  to 
appear  on  the  surface  of  most  of  our  public  affairs,  sought 
diplomatic  aid.  The  House  adopted  a  resolution  requesting 


1  "In his  intercourse  with  foreign  ministers  Mr.  Clay  had  an  opportunity 
to  display  all  the  charms  of  his  unequalled  courtesy  ;  they  remained  his 
friends  long  after  he  retired.  His  Wednesday  dinners  and  his  pleasant 
evening  receptions  were  remembered  for  many  years. " — Parton's  Famous 
Americans,  p.  39. 


CH.  III.]      CLAY  AND  THE  PANAMA  MISSION  101 

the  President  to  open  negotiations  for  the  recovery  of  slaves 
that  had  escaped  into  Canada,  in  return  for  deserters  from 
the  British  army  and  navy.  The  proposition  was  advanced, 
but  the  British  government  very  decently  declined  the  barter. 
With  Mexico  a  boundary  treaty  was  effected ;  but  with  Spain 
nothing  could  be  accomplished,  much  as  Clay  then  desired 
to  purchase  the  province  of  Texas.  He  also  endeavored  to 
procure  the  mediation  of  the  Emperor  of  Kussia  to  induce 
Spain  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  South  American 
republics,  on  condition  that  she  retain  her  sovereignty  over 
Cuba  and  Porto  Eico,  as  our  government  desired  that  they 
should  not  come  under  the  dominion  of  any  other  foreign 
naval  power,  because  of  their  command  of  the  Gulf. 

The  most  prominent  feature  of  his  diplomatic  administra 
tion  was  the  Panama  mission.  The  subject  was  opened  early. 
The  Spanish- American  republics  had  arranged  for  a  congress, 
which  was  to  meet  on  the  Isthmus.  The  principal  objects 
were  to  secure  co-operation  against  Spain,  which  had  not 
recognized  their  independence,  to  frame  a  system  for  the 
regulation  of  their  commercial  and  other  relations,  and  to 
counteract  the  operations  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  After  Clay 
had  been  sounded  in  regard  to  it  our  government  was  in 
vited  to  send  plenipotentiaries.  The  project  received  his 
cordial  approval.  Adams,  who,  as  Secretary  of  State,  had 
opposed  Clay's  early  manoeuvres  to  procure  the  recognition 
of  the  South  American  states,  now  readily  assented  to  his 
views  on  the  subject,  and  the  invitation  was  accepted.  The 
Congress  seemed  to  promise  great  possibilities,  despite  the 
hazard  of  European  embroilment.  If  guided  by  the  counsels 
of  our  government  it  would  combine  the  international  in 
terests  of  the  entire  American  hemisphere,  carrying  into 
practical  and  complete  effect  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  fur- 


102  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1826 

ther  the  principles  of  religious  liberty  and  the  extermination 
of  the  slave-trade.1 

The  nomination  of  the  envoys  was  at  length  confirmed  by 
the  Senate  and  an  appropriation  for  their  salaries  and  ex 
penses  passed  after  strenuous  opposition  on  every  available 
ground.  Yet,  to  Clay's  sincere  sorrow,  the  whole  project 
was  finally  frustrated.  The  delay  caused  by  the  prolonged 
debates  prevented  our  representatives  from  reaching  the 
Isthmus  in  time  for  the  congress.  "When  they  arrived  it 
had  adjourned  to  meet  at  a  later  time  in  Mexico ;  but  when 
the  time  came  the  renewed  dissensions  among  the  Southern 
republics  rendered  the  congress  impossible.  Thus  failed 
Clay's  darling  plan.  Nor  was  it  until  sixty-five  years  later 
that  it  was  revived,  by  Elaine,  when  the  conditions  had 
radically  changed.  The  reason  for  its  early  failure  and  the 
slow  progress  of  republican  institutions  in  the  Spanish- 
American  countries  lay  in  the  unschooled  character  of  the 
peoples  who  were  barbarously  struggling  to  adopt  them. 
Since  that  time  those  peoples  have  been  gradually  fused 
with  intelligent  enterprise  from  the  United  States,  which, 
like  the  influence  of  ancient  Greece  upon  all  her  surround 
ings,  has  been  slowly  transforming  the  general  character  of 
the  other  American  populations  from  Canada  to  Chili. 

It  was  the  President's  announcement  of  the  Panama  mis 
sion  to  Congress  that  occasioned  the  first  assault  on  his  ad 
ministration.  It  was  politically  necessary  for  his  eager 
adversaries  to  find  some  ground  of  attack,  and  this  was  the 


i  "My  Panama  instructions  were  the  most  elaborate,  and  (if  I  may  be 
allowed  to  speak  of  them)  the  ablest  state  paper  that  I  composed  while  in 
the  Department  of  State.  They  contain  an  exposition  of  liberal  principles 
regulating  maritime  war,  neutral  rights,  etc.,  which  will  command  the  ap 
probation  of  enlightened  men  of  posterity." — Clay  to  Ullman,  September 
26,  1851. 


CH.  III.]         CLAY'S  DUEL  WITH   RANDOLPH  103 

first  that  offered.  Besides,  the  whole  subject  was  distasteful 
to  the  slave-holders  generally,  as  there  were  many  negroes 
and  mulattoes  among  the  revolutionary  leaders  in  the  new 
republics.  There  was  also  some  possibility  of  the  scheme 
leading  to  a  movement  to  procure  the  independence  of  Cuba, 
Hayti,  and  Porto  Eico,  where  the  colored  population  was 
large.  A  negro  republic  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Gulf  States 
was  a  most  repulsive  prospect. 

In  the  course  of  one  of  the  several  debates  concerning  the 
Panama  mission,  John  Kandolph  delivered  against  the  ad 
ministration  in  general,  and  Clay  in  particular,  an  harangue 
of  such  unbridled  truculence  that  it  resulted  in  a  duel.  It 
was  the  climax  of  an  antipathy  which  had  existed  between 
them  since  Clay's  first  entrance  into  the  House.1 

Eandolph  is  the  most  unique  figure  in  our  political  history. 
So  long  as  the  period  with  which  his  life  is  mingled  retains 
its  interest  he  will  be  remembered  and  his  utterances  will  be 
quoted.  No  man  ever  had  a  more  curious  political  career, 
and  no  man  ever  used  the  English  tongue  with  more  pun 
gent  power.  He  came  into  the  House  in  1799,  and  re 
mained  in  Congress,  with  two  brief  interruptions,  until  1830. 
In  1801  he  became  the  administration  leader  in  the  House. 
His  opportunities  and  his  influence  for  a  time  were  very 
great.  He  then  fell  out  with  the  Jefferson  regime,  and  in 
1806  began  his  long  career  of  opposition.  His  party  had 
pushed  him  aside.  His  temper  and  eccentricities  had  much 
to  do  with  it,  yet  candor  must  admit  that  his  stanch  ad- 


1  "Mr.  Randolph  sat  near  Mr.  Seaton,  and  on  one  occasion  when  Mr. 
Clay,  speaking  in  his  not  unusual  personal  and  self-sufficient  strain,  said 
among  other  things  that  his  '  parents  had  left  him  nothing  but  indigence 
and  ignorance,'  Randolph,  turning  to  Mr.  Seaton,  said  in  a  stage  whisper 
to  be  heard  by  the  House  :  '  The  gentleman  might  continue  the  alliter 
ation  and  add  insolence.'1'" — Life  of  Seaton,  p.  152. 


104  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1826 

herence  to  his  original  principles  had  more.  The  exigen 
cies  of  politics  and  the  possession  of  power  had  gradually 
drawn  Jefferson  and  the  Virginian  school  from  their  pris 
tine  faith.  Kandolph  was  never  again  to  represent  author 
ity,  but  he  remained  to  the  end  of  his  days  the  most  con 
sistent  advocate,  barring  his  occasional  extravagancies  and 
aberrations,  of  the  true  theory  of  government.  It  is  one  of 
the  seeming  paradoxes  of  politics  that  the  ablest  early  ex 
ponents  of  democracy  were  slave-holders.1 

Some  notion  of  Eandolph's  quaint  appearance  and  strange 
personality  may  be  derived  from  nearly  every  political  his 
tory  and  biography  relating  to  his  times.  Many  a  stretch 
of  otherwise  barren  and  dreary  annals  is  enlivened  by  the 
magic  of  his  wonderful,  but  eccentric  and  at  times  mani 
acal,  genius.  His  touch  usually  left  a  gleam  of  light  or  a 
dash  of  color.3  It  was,  however,  seldom  the  radiance  of 
poetic  imagination,  but  rather  the  flash  of  almost  super 
natural  insight,  the  glare  of  satirical  wit,  or  too  often  the 
stain  of  cruel  and  malignant  invective,  like  the  trail  of  the 
knout  upon  human  flesh.  There  is  no  more  stupid  read 
ing  in  all  the  wide  range  of  ambitious  print  than  is  con- 


1  ' '  Jefferson  was  a  States-rights  man  and  a  strict  constructionist  be 
cause  he  was  a  Republican,  Randolph  because  he  was  a  Virginian  ;  Jeffer 
son  thought  that  government  should  be  small  that  the  people  might  be 
great,  Randolph  thought  that  government  should  be  small  that  Virginia 
might  be  great.  .  .  .  Here  we  have  the  explanation  of  the  great  puzzle 
of  American  politics— the  unnatural  alliance,  for  sixty  years,  between  the 
plantation  lords  of  the  South  and  the  democracy  of  the  North,  both  vener 
ating  the  name  of  Jefferson,  and  both  professing  his  principles." — Parton's 
Famous  Americans,  p.  191.    Edmund  Burke's  explanation  is  more  profound. 
In  speaking  of  the  Southern  colonies,  he  said  :  "Freedom  is  to  them  not 
only  an  enjoyment,  but  a  kind  of  rank  and  privilege.  ...  In  such  a  peo 
ple  the  haughtiness  of  domination  combines  with  the  spirit  of  freedom, 
fortifies  it,  and  renders  it  invincible." 

2  See  Garland's  Randolph,  vol.  ii.  p.  300  ;  Life  of  Quincy,  p.  343. 


CH.  III.]       RANDOLPH'S  BRILLIANT  ORATORY  105 

tained  in  the  Congressional  debates.  A  truly  good  speech 
is  such  a  rarity  that  it  fairly  shines  from  the  dingy,  double- 
columned  pages.  But  Kandolph's  speeches,  rambling  and 
disjointed  as  they  are,  seem  like  glittering  nuggets  amid 
the  arid  sands.  From  his  letters  and  speeches  could  be  col 
lected  a  volume  of  passages  equal  in  style  and  force  to  any 
thing  in  the  language.  When  at  his  best,  however  dis 
cursive,  he  was  terse,  simple,  and  direct,  epigrammatic  and 
scintillating.  His  delicate  idiom  and  the  range  of  his  illus 
tration  betoken  a  critical  acquaintance  with  the  classics  and 
avast  variety  of  reading.  The  first  book  he  read  was  Vol 
taire's  diaries  XII. ;  the  next  was  the  Spectator.  So  re 
markable  was  his  precocity  that  he  was  familiar  with  Shake 
speare,  Plutarch,  Fielding,  and  Cervantes  before  he  was  eleven 
years  of  age. 

On  no  occasion  did  he  make  much  preparation  for  his 
speeches,  usually  none  at  all.  He  would  leisurely  enter  the 
chamber  and  then  give  close  attention  to  the  business  in 
progress.  If  it  attracted  his  interest  he  would  rise  at  the 
first  opportunity  and  speak  perhaps  for  three  or  four  hours, 
with  absolute  ease,  in  tones  that  were  silver  except  when 
emphasis  or  passion  made  them  shrill.  Yet  the  greater 
part  of  what  he  said  in  his  later  years  had  little  or  no  con 
nection  with  the  subject  that  called  him  up.1 

He  was  essentially  dramatic.     His  interested  presence 


1<(I  heard  him  between  three  and  four  hours.  His  speech,  as  usual, 
had  neither  beginning,  middle,  nor  end.  Egotism,  Virginian  aristocracy, 
slave-scourging  liberty,  religion,  literature,  science,  wit,  fancy,  generous 
feelings,  and  malignant  passions  constitute  a  chaos  in  his  mind  from  which 
nothing  orderly  can  ever  flow." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  iv.  p.  532.  An  ac 
curate  idea  of  his  style  and  manner,  its  piquancy,  desultoriness,  and  irrele 
vancy  to  the  subject  of  debate  may  be  obtained  from  Niks's  Register,  vol. 
xxx.  pp.  186,  451. 


106  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1806 

could  transform  routine  into  a  spectacular  episode.1  ISTor 
were  his  most  peculiar  effects  always  produced  by  a  speech ; 
his  acting  was  sometimes  even  more  efficient.  A  striking 
instance  of  it  took  place  in  1806.  A  new  member,  Barnabas 
Bid  well,  of  Massachusetts,  had  come  into  the  House;  and 
from  his  high  reputation  at  home  he  was  supposed  to  be  a 
potent  acquisition  to  the  administration  forces.  On  the  oc 
casion  of  his  first  speech,  which  had  been  duly  advertised, 
Eandolph  was  present.  He  always  rode  to  the  Capitol  fol 
lowed  by  a  black  servant,  both  being  finely  mounted.  "  He 
was  dressed,"  says  Quincy,  "in  his  usual  morning  costume — 
his  skeleton  legs  cased  in  tight-fitting  leather  breeches  and 
top-boots,  with  a  blue  riding-coat,  and  the  thick  buckskin 
gloves  from  which  he  was  never  parted,  and  a  heavily  loaded 
riding -whip  in  his  hand.  After  listening  attentively  for 
about  a  quarter  of  an  hour  he  rose  deliberately,  settled  his 
hat  on  his  head,  and  walked  slowly  out  of  the  House,  strik 
ing  the  handle  of  his  whip  emphatically  upon  the  palm  of 
his  left  hand,  and  regarding  poor  Bidwell,  as  he  passed  him, 
with  a  look  of  insolent  contempt,  as  much  as  to  say,  4I  have 
taken  your  measure,  sir,  and  shall  give  myself  no  further 
concern  about  you  !'  It  helped  to  extinguish  effectually  the 
new  light  from  whom  the  administration  had  hoped  so 
much.  Mr.  Bidwell  acquired  no  weight  in  the  House,  and 
left  Congress  at  the  end  of  his  term." 2 

Kandolph's  family  was  one  of  the  oldest,  most  numerous, 
and  wealthy  of  Virginia.  It  was  always  a  source  of  pride 
with  him  that  he  was  a  descendant  of  Pocahontas.  There 
is  a  touch  of,  perhaps,  fanciful  suggestiveness  in  the  fact 
that  until  1810  he  resided  on  one  of  his  plantations  called, 


1  Recollections  of  John  Binns,  p.  240.  8  Life  of  Quincy,  p.  95, 


CH.  III.]  SOME  OF  RANDOLPH'S   CHARACTERISTICS    107 

and  before  his  birth,  Bizarre.1  He  must  have  been  without 
strong  ambition  for  preferment;  for,  by  separating  from 
the  only  party  he  could  ever  expect  to  co-operate  with  for 
any  length  of  time,  he  deliberately  flung  away  every  future 
chance.  Throughout  his  career  a  faithful  constituency, 
which  revolted  but  once,  made  him  without  effort  secure  of 
a  seat  in  the  House.  Thus  the  extreme  independence  of  his 
position,  with  the  increasing  plague  of  bodily  infirmity  and 
an  uncontrollable  tendency  to  morbidness  of  mind,  produced 
what  appeared  like  arrogance,  but  was,  in  truth,  despairing 
discontent  and  total  indifference  to  the  ordinary  considera 
tions  of  policy.2  In  a  speech  in  1824  he  casually  remarked, 
"  I  have  not  the  honor  to  know  personally,  or  even  by  name, 
a  large  portion  of  the  members  of  this  House."  There  is  no 
reasonable  doubt  that  the  extreme  eccentricities  and  corrosive 
malignities  that  began  early  to  characterize  him  were  the 


1  "In  1810  he  removed  to  Roanoke.  ...  On  Sunday,  Marcli  21,  1813, 
the  house  at  Bizarre  took  fire.     '  I  lost,'  says  he,  'a  valuable  collection  of 
books.     In  it  was  a  whole  body  of  infidelity  ;  the  Encyclopaedia  of  Diderot 
and  D'Alembert,  Voltaire's  works,  seventy  volumes  ;  Rousseau,  thirteen 
quartos  ;  Hume,  etc.,  etc.'  " — Garland's  Randolph,  vol.  ii.  p.  9. 

2  "My  powers,  such  as  they  are,  have  not  been  improved  by  culture. 
The  first  time  I  ever  dreamed  of  speaking  in  public  was  on  the  eve  of  my 
election,  in  March,  1799,  when  I  opposed  myself  (fearful  odds)  to  Patrick 
Henry.     My  manner  is  spontaneous,  like  my  matter,  from  the  impulse  of 
the  moment ;  and  when  I  do  not  feel  strongly  I  cannot  speak  to  any  pur 
pose.     These  fits  are  independent  of  my  volition.  .  .  .  During  the  last  four 
or  five  years  I  have  perceived  a  sensible  decline  of  my  powers,  which  I 
estimate  with  as  much  impartiality  as  you  would  ;  in  a  word,  as  if  they  be 
longed  to  another.     I  am  not  better  persuaded  of  the  loss  of  my  grinders 
or  of  the  wrinkles  in  my  face— and  care  as  much  for  the  one  as  the  other." — 
Randolph  to  Key,  February  17,  1814.     "  This  letter  is  written  as  children 
whistle  in  the  dark,  to  keep  themselves  from  being  afraid.     I  dare  not  look 
upon  that  '  blank  and  waste  of  the  heart'  within.     Dreary,  desolate,  dis 
mal — there  is  no  word  in  our  language,  or  any  other,  that  can  express  the 
misery  of  my  life.  I  drag  on  like  a  tired  captive  at  the  end  of  a  slave-chain 
in  an  African  coffle."— June  12, 1821. 


108  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1826 

brood  of  partial  and  increasing  insanity,  despite  the  common 
assertion,  a  relic  of  the  antislavery  struggles,  that  he  was 
an  instance  of  total  depravity,  a  demon  in  human  form. 
Whatever  may  be  said  of  his  errors  and  his  faults,  while  he 
sat  in  Congress  buncombe  and  dishonesty  stood  in  whole 
some  terror  of  his  scathing  and  merciless  tongue. 

With  the  events  that  caused  the  strife  over  the  admission 
of  Missouri,  Randolph  had  begun  to  recover  a  degree  of  per 
sonal  influence.  He  soon  became  the  recognized  leader  of 
the  slave-holding  interest,  which  was  rapidly  growing  in 
purpose  and  power  as  a  political  factor.1  He  was  organiz 
ing  the  South  to  a  systematic  defence  of  that  interest  and 
formulating  the  political  theory  by  which  it  was  to  be  main 
tained.  It  was  wholly  derived  from  the  political  doctrines 
with  which  he  had  begun  his  public  life,  but  which  were  to 
be  shorn  of  their  noble  virtue  by  being  cramped  and  dis 
torted  in  the  service  of  slavery.  Clay  was  the  chief  obstacle 
to  the  political  union  of  the  slave  power.  His  efforts  in 
bringing  about  the  Missouri  Compromise,  against  Randolph's 
untiring  opposition,  fanned  the  slumbering  flame  of  his  old 
hatred  into  a  frenzy  that  burst  forth  with  every  opportu 
nity,  and  an  opportunity  presented  itself  with  every  general 
subject  that  came  before  Congress.  During  the  debates  on 
internal  improvements  and  the  tariff  he  assailed  Clay  with 
vehemence  and  venom ;  but  when  the  discussion  of  the 
Panama  mission  opened  the  way  he  gave  full  vent  to  his 
unparalleled  power  of  invective.  He  repeated  in  his  charac 
teristic  style  all  the  motley  aspersions  against  Adams  and 


1  "The  two  words,  'dough  faces,'  "  said  Clay,  in  1838,  in  reference  to 
Randolph's  hostility  to  the  Missouri  Compromise,  "with  which  that  gentle 
man  rated  and  taunted  our  Northern  friends,  did  more  injury  than  any  two 
words  I  have  ever  known." 


CH.  III.]    RESULT   OF  RANDOLPH'S   VITUPERATION    109 

Clay.  Among  them  he  insinuated  that  the  invitations  to 
participate  in  the  congress  were  practically  a  fraud  because 
they  had  been  written  or  inspired  by  the  State  Department. 
Later  on,  in  reference  to  another  affair,  he  uttered  a  sen 
tence  that  is  one  of  the  most  famous  ever  spoken  in  Con 
gress:  "I  was  defeated,  horse,  foot,  and  dragoons — cut  up 
and  clean  broke  down  by  a  coalition  of  Blifil  and  Black 
George  —  by  a  combination,  unheard  of  till  then,  of  the 
Puritan  with  the  blackleg."  He  then  descended  into  such 
malevolence  as  to  berate  Clay's  parents  for  bringing  into  the 
world  "  this  being,  so  brilliant  yet  so  corrupt,  which,  like  a 
rotten  mackerel  by  moonlight,  shines  and  stinks." 

The  more  vicious  bits  of  this  flagrant  diatribe  were  soon 
retailed  through  "Washington.  Clay  was  enraged,  and  forth 
with  challenged  Randolph  to  a  duel.  An  effort  was  made 
by  friends  to  effect  a  reconciliation,  but  it  failed:  Ran 
dolph's  language  was  never  of  doubtful  meaning.  The  duel, 
however,  which  came  off  in  the  most  high-toned  fashion, 
proved  harmless.  Randolph  had  determined  not  to  fire  at 
Clay,  and  Clay  was  inexpert  with  the  pistol.  Two  shots 
were  fired.  Before  the  first  one,  Randolph  changed  his  mind 
and  tried  to  disable  Clay;  with  the  second  shot  he  recov 
ered  his  original  purpose  and  fired  in  the  air.  Fortunately, 
Clay  did  nothing  worse  than  to  spoil  Randolph's  coat  by 
sending  two  bullets  through  it.  Then,  in  an  affecting  scene, 
the  men  made  up.1  This  was  Clay's  last  experience  as  a 
duellist. 

Although  Clay's  efforts  while  Secretary  of  State  in  be- 

1  Benton's  Thirty  Years'  View,  vol.  i.  p.  77 ;  Prentice's  Life  of  Clay, 
p.  299.  For  a  curious  parallel  between  this  duel  and  a  contemporaneous 
one  between  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  Lord  Winchelsea,  see  Life  of 
Quincy,  p.  169.  Randolph  was  Minister  to  Russia  in  1830.  He  died  in 
1833. 


110  THE  JACKSONIAN    EPOCH  [1826 

half  of  the  South  American  republics  did  not  attain  im 
mediate  results,  they  were  not  in  vain.  His  zeal  in  that 
office  was  the  culmination  of  his  long-sustained  interest  in 
the  subject ;  and  time  alone  could  produce  the  full  fruition 
of  his  labors.  It  was  the  impulse  he  originated  which 
matured  into  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  must  eventually 
render  the  influence  of  the  United  States  dominant  in  the 
western  hemisphere.  To  him  more  than  to  any  one  else 
belongs  the  credit  of  this  result.  "With  egregious  vanity, 
but  in  brilliant  phrase,  Canning  claimed  this  distinction. 
In  the  House  of  Commons  in  1826  he  asserted  that  he 
"called  the  New  World  into  existence  to  redress  the  bal 
ance  of  the  Old."  As  Premier  of  the  British  government 
he  did  indeed  materially  aid  the  South  American  cause; 
but  Clay  was  the  first  to  espouse  and  elevate  it,  and  it  was 
he  that  contributed  most  to  make  it  popular  and  powerful.1 
Like  that  phase  which  came  within  the  compass  of  the 
State  Department,  Adams's  entire  administration  was  quite 
unsignalized  except  by  its  general  excellence.  It  yields  but 
little  to  animate  the  interest  of  the  curious  reader.  Kush, 
of  Pennsylvania,  was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury ;  Barbour, 
of  Virginia,  Secretary  of  War;  McLean,  of  Ohio,  Post 
master-General  ;  and  Wirt,  of  Maryland,  Attorney-General. 
Nothing  disturbed  the  tranquillity  and  steadily  advancing 
prosperity  of  the  country.  In  this  respect  no  administra 
tion  has  ever  been  more  colorless.  The  affairs  to  which  the 
turbulent  condition  of  politics  gave  rise  were  small  and 


1  Rush,  to  Clay,  June  27,  1827.  In  1827  Bolivar  wrote  to  Clay  a  letter 
expressing  his  appreciation  of  Clay's  services  to  South  American  inde 
pendence.  In  his  reply,  Clay  took  occasion  to  admonish  Bolivar  that 
"ambitious  designs"  had  been  imputed  to  him,  but  with  delicate  earnest 
ness  affirming  his  confidence  in  Bolivar's  patriotic  purposes. 


CH.  III.]      ADAMS   ASSUMES   THE  PRESIDENCY  111 

transient,  and  mostly  confined  to  Washington :  there  were 
no  railroads  or  telegraphs  to  distribute  the  daily  guess 
work  and  piecemeal  that  mainly  fill  the  columns  of  the 
modern  newspaper.  The  principal  topic  that  engrossed  the 
public  mind  was  the  next  Presidential  election ;  but  the 
general  discussion  was  conducted  upon  the  same  lines  as  it 
was  on  the  day  of  Adams's  election  by  the  House.  There 
being  nothing  in  his  administration  to  excite  popular  disap 
proval,  the  only  contributions  to  the  discussion  were  new 
personal  scandals  and  fresh  versions  of  the  old  ones. 

Adams  came  into  office  exempt  from  party  or  personal 
pledges,  yet  in  a  manner  very  unsatisfying  to  his  pride  and 
ambition.  He  entered  upon  the  discharge  of  his  duties  with 
an  ideal  appreciation  of  his  responsibilities ;  and  no  Chief 
Magistrate,  here  or  elsewhere,  has  ever  surpassed  his  austere 
and  unswerving  efforts  to  banish  politics  from  the  perform 
ance  of  his  public  duties.  He  has  often  been  denomi 
nated  one  of  the  few  statesmen  who  have  held  the  Presi 
dency.  Most  of  his  life  had  been  devoted  to  the  public 
service  in  distinguished  positions  —  diplomatic,  legislative, 
and  executive.  He  may  be  said  to  have  begun  his  public 
career  at  the  age  of  fourteen,  as  secretary  to  the  American 
envoy  to  Russia.  Then,  in  a  like  capacity,  he  served  his 
father  and  Franklin  when  they  negotiated  the  Treaty  of 
1783,  by  which  England  formally  recognized  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  United  States.  Instead  of  continuing  as  secre 
tary  to  his  father,  who  was  then  appointed  Minister  to  the 
Court  of  St.  James,  he  wisely  decided  to  return  home  and 
finish  his  education. 

Although  his  reading  was  extensive  and  thorough,  and 
he  had  enjoyed  the  invaluable  advantage  of  mingling  with 
some  of  the  greatest  men  of  both  Europe  and  America,  his 


112  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1825 

schooling  had  been  confined  to  such  snatches  as  he  could 
get  while  sojourning  at  Paris,  Amsterdam,  and  Leyden.  He 
prepared  himself  as  quickly  as  possible  and  entered  the 
junior  class  at  Harvard.  Graduating,  he  qualified  for  the 
bar  and  began  practice  at  Boston.  But  he  soon  acquired 
more  reputation  for  his  contributions  to  the  press  on  in 
ternational  topics  than  he  gained  in  the  profession.  He 
was  then  sent  as  Minister  to  The  Hague,  whence  he  was 
transferred  to  London,  and  thence  to  Berlin.  On  Jefferson's 
election  he  again  returned  to  Massachusetts  and  was  suc 
cessively  elected  to  the  State  Senate  and  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States. 

Thus  far  he  had  been  a  stanch  Federalist ;  but  he  now 
entered  upon  a  course  that  soon  identified  him  completely 
with  the  Eepublicans.  To  the  astonishment  of  the  New 
England  Federalists,  he  approved  the  Louisiana  purchase. 
This  departure  from  party  fealty,  although  it  involved  no 
change  of  principles,  was  followed  by  his  supporting  Jeffer 
son's  restrictive  measures.  The  intense  anger  and  disgust  of 
the  Federalists,  who  stigmatized  his  conduct  with  all  the 
epithets  that  can  be  applied  to  apostasy  and  treason,  led 
him  to  resign  before  his  term  expired.  Bat  he  was  not 
abandoned  by  the  Eepublicans.  Madison  straightway  ap 
pointed  him  Minister  to  Russia,  where  he  remained  over 
four  years,  thence  going  to  Ghent  and  to  London,  and  then 
entering  Monroe's  cabinet  as  Secretary  of  State. 

Had  he  joined  the  Republican  party  because  of  the  better 
prospects  it  afforded  him,  he  could  not  have  done  so  at  a 
more  propitious  time  and  with  better  results ;  and  to  minds 
inclined  to  be  cynical,  his  immediate  preferment,  under  the 
circumstances,  is  convincing  proof  that  he  was  actuated  by 
material  motives.  This  fact  led  a  great  number  to  believe 


CH.  III.]      ADAMS'S   UNBENDING   CHARACTER  113 

him  to  the  end  of  his  days  entirely  capable  of  doing  anything 
necessary  to  further  his  designs.  Nevertheless,  from  the 
ample  evidence  by  which  to  judge  him,  most  critics,  how 
ever  hostile,  unite  in  imputing  to  him  no  unworthy  motives. 
And  besides  this,  to  those  practically  conversant  with  the 
ways  of  politics,  the  conduct  he  pursued  while  President 
demonstrates  that  he  was  entirely  without  political  art.  It 
may  be  safely  asserted  that,  without  his  hereditary  advan 
tages,  he  would  not  have  achieved  a  distinguished  public 
career.  He  possessed  extraordinary  powers  of  mind  in  some 
respects,  yet  he  was  curiously  limited  in  others.  In  a  large 
and  practical  sense  he  was  not  a  statesman.  He  had  no 
faculty  whatever  for  political  leadership ;  and  in  the  world 
as  it  is  the  statesman  must  in  a  large  degree  possess  it.  His 
long  and  varied  experience  seemed  only  to  intensify  his 
narrow  and  unbending  Puritanism.  He  was  so  rigidly  and 
minutely  true  to  his  convictions  that  his  marvellous  honesty 
was  incredible  to  the  strifes  and  passions  of  his  time.  It  was 
inevitable  that  such  a  rare  man  should  be  thought  by  many 
to  be  a  knave  and  hypocrite.  His  main  fault  was  that  he 
was  not  callous  enough  to  the  minor  defects  in  the  minds 
and  characters  of  those  about  him,  and  to  the  petty  evils  of 
one  kind  and  another,  always  present  and  unavoidable,  and 
which  must  be  philosophically  recognized  and  utilized  to 
accomplish  any  considerable  results  in  public  life. 

As  much  as  Adams  desired  and  deserved  a  second  term 
at  the  hands  of  the  people,  he  not  only  abstained  rigorously 
from  doing  aught  to  aid  his  chances,  but  acted  with  such 
apparent  indifference  to  them  that  he  ruined  any  possibility 
he  might  have  had.1  He  flatly  refused  to  make  any  removals 

1  "Mr.  Adams,  during  his  administration,  failed  to  cherish,  strengthen, 
or  even  recognize  the  party  to  which  he  owed  his  election  ;  nor,  so  far  as 
8 


114  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1828 

from  office  except  for  breach  of  duty.  He  thus,  and  against 
the  urgent  protests  of  Clay  and  others,  wholly  deprived 
himself  of  any  assistance  that  might  be  gained  from  the 
bestowal  of  patronage.  He  went  so  absurdly  far  in  this 
course  as  to  allow  to  remain  in  office  even  those  who  had 
passed  the  bounds  of  decency  in  reviling  him  and  his 
administration.  This  lost  to  him  the  support  of  a  large 
body  that  would  have  stood  by  him  had  he  offered  any 
prospect  of  advantage,  fie  offered  none.  He  put  himself 
without  the  pale  of  politics.  He  seemed  barren  of  any 
sentiment  of  appreciation  for  personal  servicesv  His  tem 
perament  was  cold  and  acrid ;  his  manner  abstracted  and 
ungracious.1  In  his  opinion  whatever  ought  to  be  granted 
required  no  other  reason ;  and  whatever  ought  not  to  be  de 
served  no  civility.  His  refusal  was  like  a  blow  in  the  face,  and 
no  one  receiving  it  forgot  or  forgave.  His  entire  conduct 
partook  of  his  character — it  was  devoid  of  policy.  He  was 
the  complete  obverse  of  the  popular  politician.  In  whatever 


I  am  informed,  with  the  great  power  which  he  possessed  did  he  make  a 
single  influential  political  friend." — Thurlow  Weed's  Autobiography,  vol.  i. 
p.  180. 

1  "I  was  told  that  when  he  was  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency  his 
friends  persuaded  him  to  go  to  a  cattle  show.  Ampng  the  persons  who 
addressed  him  was  a  respectable  farmer  who  impulsively  exclaimed,  '  Mr. 
Adams,  I  am  very  glad  to  see  you.  My  wife,  when  she  was  a  gal,  lived  in 
your  father's  house  ;  you  were  then  a  little  boy,  and  she  has  often  combed 
your  head.'  'Well, 'said  Mr.  Adams,  in  a  harsh  voice,  'I  suppose  she 
combs  yours  now  !'" — Ames's  Ten  Tears  in  WasJiington,  p.  210.  "The two 
candidates,  Mr.  Adams,  the  elect,  and  General  Jackson,  the  defeated,  acciden 
tally  met  in  the  East  Room.  General  Jackson,  who  was  escorting  a  lady, 
promptly  extended  his  hand,  saying,  pleasantly,  'How  do  you  do,  Mr. 
Adams  ?  I  give  you  my  left  hand,  for  the  right,  as  you  see,  is  devoted  to 
the  fair.  I  hope  you  are  very  well,  sir.'  All  this  was  gallantly  and 
heartily  said  and  done.  Mr.  Adams  took  the  General's  hand,  and  said, 
with  chilling  coolness,  '  Very  well,  sir  ;  I  hope  General  Jackson  is  well.' " — 
Reminiscences  of  B.  P.  Poore,  vol.  i.  p.  26. 


CH.  III.]     A   VENOMOUS   PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGN    115 

policy  he  advocated — as,  for  instance,  his  scheme  of  internal 
improvements — he  went  to  the  uttermost  of  his  convictions, 
apparently  indifferent  to  the  prospect  of  success  and  without 
effort  to  qualify  or  accommodate,  thus  driving  into  the  swell 
ing  ranks  of  his  adversaries  all  those  whose  views  were  not 
as  radical  and  uncompromising  as  his  own.  But,  with  the 
most  popular  genius  and  politic  judgment,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  for  him  to  obtain  a  second  term.  From  the  hour  of 
his  election,  war  without  scruple  was  waged  against  him. 
With  the  first  general  election  after  his  term  began,  and  for 
the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  government,  a  majority 
of  both  Houses  of  Congress  came  in  against  the  administra 
tion.  The  opposition  grew  constantly  in  strength  and  vio 
lence.  There  being  no  important  policy  or  principle  in  party 
controversy,  the  sole  issue  was  Adams  or  Jackson  in  1828. 
The  campaign  was  the  longest  and  the  most  scandalous 
American  politics  has  ever  known.  Everything  that  ran 
corous  and  conscienceless  partisan  invention  could  concoct 
was  fused  into  the  noisome  atmosphere.1  Nor  were  Adams 
and  Clay  the  sole  objects  of  this  pestilence  of  slander. 
Charges  of  the  most  infamous  character  were  made  against 
Jackson ;  and  his  variegated  career  was  full  of  unique 
and  serviceable  material  upon  which  to  found  campaign 
calumny.  So  serious  were  some  of  the  charges  that  it  was 
deemed  needful  formally  to  refute  them  by  means  of  a  "  white 
washing  committee,"  as  it  was  dubbed,  composed  of  several 
eminent  citizens  of  Tennessee.  Even  Jackson's  wife,  a  plain 
and  inoffensive  woman  whom  he  in  early  life  had  married, 


1  "I  am  alternately  diverted  and  disgusted  with  the  scenes  which  are 
passing  around  me.  Such  working,  toiling,  and  sweating  ;  such  mining 
and  countermining;  such  lying,  abusing,  quarrelling,  and  almost  fighting 
for  a  little  short-lived  distinction."—  Wirt,  to  Pope,  March  23, 1828. 


116  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

and  had  been  obliged  to  remarry  because  she  had  not  been 
fully  divorced  from  her  former  husband,  was  not  exempt 
from  attack ;  soon  after  the  election  she  died  of  the  grief 
occasioned  by  the  abuse  to  which  she  had  been  subjected 
during  this  shameless  canvass.  This  rankled  in  Jackson's 
mind  to  the  close  of  his  life  and  inflamed  his  animosity 
against  his  opponents  in  that  campaign  to  a  degree  that  ap 
proached  insanity. 

His  hatred  of  Clay  was  fierce  and  implacable.  He  fully 
believed  him  capable  of  any  thing  of  which  he  could  be  accused, 
and  he  himself  gave  currency  to  the  "  bargain  and  corruption  " 
cry.  Nothing  could  quell  it.  It  was  printed,  placarded,  and 
harped  upon  throughout  the  land.1  It  was  disproved  time 
and  time  again  as  effectually  as  any  such  charge  can  be 
disproved.  Every  person  ever  named  as  having  any  actual 
knowledge  concerning  it,  even  those  nearest  Jackson  and 
the  most  ardent  in  his  support,  admitted  their  inability  to 
substantiate  a  single  particular.2  Clay  wrote  elaborate 
addresses  and  made  exhaustive  speeches  in  which  he  demon 
strated  the  utter  groundlessness  of  the  accusation.  Several 
times  it  was  thought  to  be  annihilated ;  but  that  was  a 
mistaken  notion;  it  still  thrived,  in  company  with  a  varie 
ty  of  congenial  aspersions  against  his  personal  habits  and 
character.8  Argument  had  little  force  against  the  potent 


1  Baldwin's  Party  Leaders,  p.  309. 

2  Benton  furnished  conclusive  evidence  of  Clay's  innocence.— Tldrty 
Years'  View,  vol.  i.  p.  48.  Even  Buchanan,  to  whom  Jackson  referred  as  his 
only  source  of  information,  disclaimed  all  knowledge.— Colton's  Life  of 
Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  352.     See  also  a  letter  from  Lafayette  in  Clay's  Correspond 
ence,  p.  180. 

3  Among  the  many  slanders  against  him  was  the  misrepresentation  of 
his  financial  condition.    "  I  am  not  free,  absolutely,  from  debt,"  he  wrote  to 
a  friend.     "  I  am  not  rich.     I  never  coveted  riches.     But  my  estate  would 
even  now  be  estimated  at  not  much  less  than  $100,000." 


CH.  III.]          JACKSON  ELECTED   PRESIDENT  117 

fact  that  he  had  elected  Adams  and  was  Secretary  of  State. 
On  the  Kentucky  stump  he  was  unable  to  pursue  the  line  of 
dignified  refutation ;  his  language  lost  all  moderation  and 
restraint  and  became  the  vehicle  of  raving  wrath.1  The 
complete  history  of  that  lie  would  form  many  volumes. 
What  Clay  alone  wrote  and  spoke  about  it  would  fill  several. 
For  a  generation  a  large  portion  of  the  people  believed  the 
charge ;  and  many  thought  that,  although  it  might  not  be 
true,  Clay's  support  of  Adams,  after  Jackson  had  received  a 
plurality  of  the  electoral  votes,  was  a  political  crime — a  con 
clusion  that  will  not  bear  analysis. 

The  result  of  the  contest  was  Jackson's  signal  triumph. 
Even  Kentucky  went  for  him.  Adams  retired  in  the  shadow 
of  deep  humiliation;  and  Clay,  with  broken  health  and 
spirits.2  Yet  before  both  of  them  lay  the  most  arduous,  yet 
the  most  brilliant  part  of  their  careers. 

Clay  at  once  returned  to  Ashland,  his  home.  It  was 
neither  his  desire  nor  intention  to  resume  the  practice  of  law, 
and  after  this  period  his  appearance  in  court  was  only  occa 
sional.  His  chief  interest,  aside  from  politics,  was  in  agri 
cultural  pursuits,  which  he  enjoyed  as  an  expert,  with  all 
the  means  to  indulge  his  skill  and  inclinations.  His  estate 
was  one  of  the  best  in  Kentucky.  It  contained  some  six 
hundred  acres  of  land  near  Lexington.  It  was  originally 
owned  by  Daniel  Boone,  and  finally  came  by  descent  into 
the  possession  of  Lucretia  Hart,  whom  Clay  married  in 
1799.  Here,  ten  years  later,  he  erected  the  mansion  that 
became  one  of  the  historic  homes  of  America.  Mount  Yer- 
non  and  Monticello  are  scarcely  more  famous.  The 


1  Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii.  p.  180. 

-  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  vii.  pp.  439,  517  ;  Life  of  George  Ticknor,  vol.  i. 
p.  381. 


118  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1829 

site  is  on  a  slight  eminence  overlooking  the  city  two  miles 
distant.  The  house  was  built  of  brick,  in  a  plain  style  of 
architecture,  staid  and  comfortable  in  appearance  rather  than 
imposing.  At  either  end  of  the  oblong  and  spacious  main 
building,  two  stories  and  a  half  in  height,  is  an  ample  one- 
story  wing;  and  all  are  topped  with  tall,  substantial  chim 
neys.  The  interior,  somewhat  peculiar  in  arrangement,  was 
finished  and  furnished  with  admirable  effect.  The  grounds 
and  surroundings  were  in  picturesque  harmony  with  the 
house.  Thus  Ashland  was  in  all  respects  worthy  of  the  dis 
tinction  it  was  soon  to  acquire  as  the  Mecca  of  the  Whigs 
and  a  point  of  attraction  to  notable  visitors  from  abroad.1 

Clay's  success  as  a  farmer  was  quite  equal  to  that  as  an 
advocate.  He  was  a  judge  of  fine-bred  horses  and  stock,2 
and  in  the  Blue-Grass  Kegion  of  Kentucky  this  means  much. 
Though  he  was  chiefly  interested  in  stock-raising,  agricult 
ure  was  not  slighted.  The  products  of  the  garden  and  dairy 
were  sufficient  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  farm.  He 
conducted  many  experiments  of  various  kinds,  and  made 
fertilization  and  hemp  the  subjects  of  considerable  study. 
He  wrote  a  pamphlet  on  the  cultivation  of  hemp,  an  article 
which  he  always  sedulously  protected  by  his  tariff  policy. 
The  labor  on  the  estate  was  performed  by  slaves,  of  whom  he 
had  about  fifty.  His  chief  assistant  was  his  wife,  who  was 
accounted  as  good  a  farmer  as  any  in  the  neighborhood.3 
She  was  thoroughly  domestic,  seldom  accompanying  her 
husband  to  Washington  to  participate  in  the  society  of  the 
capital.  During  his  protracted  absences  she  competently  ad 
ministered  the  affairs  of  Ashland.  Indeed,  we  may  well  sur- 


1  Century  Magazine,  vol.  xxxiii.  pp.  163, 169. 

*Niles's  Register,  vol.  xlviii.  p.  362.  'Cotton's  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  34. 


CH.  III.]    PHYSICAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  CLAY       119 

mise  that  the  success  of  the  establishment  was  largely  due 
to  the  intelligence  and  skill  with  which  she  executed  Clay's 
agricultural  policy.  She  was  the  mother  of  eleven  children — 
five  boys  and  six  girls.1  Her  last  child  was  born  in  1821. 
In  1845  she  had  fifteen  grandchildren.  She  survived  her 
husband  and  most  of  her  children. 

Clay's  personal  appearance  and  bearing  were  not  espe 
cially  distinguished.  He  did  not  arrest  the  attention  of 
strangers  by  any  unwonted  cast  of  countenance  or  peculiar 
ity  of  manner.  He  was  tall,  rather  thin,  with  somewhat 
narrow  and  sloping  shoulders.  He  was  seldom  entirely 
robust,  having  a  tendency  to  consumption,  that  betrayed 
itself  at  intervals  through  his  life,  and  of  which  he  finally 
died.  His  head  was  not  large,  but  symmetrical  and  well 
poised,  the  forehead  full  and  slightly  retreating.2  In  early 
life  his  hair  was  quite  flaxen,  and  though  in  later  years 
when  hoary  it  grew  sparsely  in  front,  it  was  abundant 
enough  to  prevent  all  appearance  of  baldness.  He  had  the 
gray  eyes  so  common  to  genius  and  fine  intelligence.  In 
repose  they  were  not  markedly  expressive,  but  with  excite 
ment  or  emotion  they  flamed  with  various  lights.  His 
features  were  plain,  even  homely.  They  were  nowise  pe 
culiar  or  striking,  with  the  exception  of  the  mouth,  which 
was  unusually  large,  with  thinnish,  straight,  and  closely  set 
lips.  His  complexion  to  the  last  was  very  fair  and  smooth. 
The  facial  muscles  were  extremely  flexile  and  in  the  highest 
degree  responsive  to  his  thoughts  and  feelings.  This  latter 


1  Amos  Kendall's  Autobiography,  p.  115. 

2  "  Considering  the  volume  of  the  brain,  or  size  of  the  head,  it  has  the 
best  adjusted  faculties  I  have  ever  seen.     The  skull,  after  death,  will  give 
no  idea  of  his  power,  as  he  derives  the  whole  of  it  from  his  temperament." 
—Life  of  Horace  Mann,  p.  282. 


120  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

was  the  one  physical  attribute,  besides  his  voice,  that  gave 
distinction  to  his  presence  when  he  spoke  or  was  moved. 
It  was  this  harmony  of  movement  and  expression,  in  combi 
nation  with  a  voice  marvellous  in  its  richness,  variety,  and 
power,  that  produced  the  singular  spell  he  exerted.  His 
entire  composition  seemed  plain  and  neutral,  that  his  highly 
emotional  nature  might  have  a  perfect  instrument  of  mani 
festation. 

As  might  be  supposed  from  these  characteristics,  his  man 
ner  had  great  charm.  It  gave  the  impression  of  frankness, 
freedom,  and  generosity,  and  was  ordinarily  coupled  with  a 
contagious  buoyancy  and  sanguineness  of  spirits.  He  was 
extremely  convivial,  keenly  enjoying  the  society  of  his 
friends.  He  was  far  from  being  an  epicure,  yet  he  was 
fastidious  in  his  tastes.  He  indulged  moderately  in  wine, 
took  snuff,  after  the  fashion  of  the  period,  and  used  tobacco 
freely.  In  earlier  d&ys  he  lost  and  won  large  sums  at  play; 
but  in  consequence  of  the  censure  he  encountered,  he  ceased 
the  practice  of  gaming,  though  he  always  remained  inveter- 
ately  fond  of  whist.  In  most  respects,  so  far  as  manners  and 
habits  were  concerned,  he  was  a  typical  Southern  gentle 
man.1  Placed  in  elevated  positions  and  thrown  among  able 
men  at  an  early  age,  he  soon  acquired  that  ease  and  grace 
which  follow  capacity  and  experience  of  the  world.  This 

1  "  His  sentiments  were  always  fine,  and  his  animal  passions  weak.  In 
all  the  animal  proclivities,  Webster  and  Clay  were  wide  apart.  Webster 
was  like  a  catfish — gross  and  omnivorous  ;  Clay  like  a  brook-trout — fas 
tidious  even  in  taking  the  gilded  fly.  ...  I  have  never  seen  him  perform 
a  disrespectful  action,  or  heard  from  his  lips  a  sensual  word  in  regard 
to  women  in  my  life  ;  yet  his  sympathy  with  intellectual,  virtuous  women 
was  intense  and  his  magnetism  pre-eminent.  With  homely  features,  he 
had  the  plastic  radiation  of  countenance  which  at  times  seemed  like  inspi 
ration.  Women  were  crazy  in  his  presence,  and  grave  men  filled  with  un 
usual  enthusiasm."— Life  of  Cassius  M.  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  96. 


CH.  III.]  MENTAL   QUALITIES   OF  CLAY  121 

may  be  almost  necessarily  implied  from  his  elocution ;  for 
great  power  and  smoothness  of  speech  are  quite  incom 
patible  with  angularity  of  mind  or  manner.  "While  he  had 
superiors  in  various  departments  and  particulars,  in  his 
generation  there  lived  no  man  who  rivalled  his  peculiar 
combination  of  heart,  mind,  and  address.  There  were  many 
who  surpassed  him  in  range,  variety,  and  solidity  of  learn 
ing;  many,  in  closeness  and  severity  of  logic;  many,  in 
calculation  and  shrewdness  of  judgment;  many,  in  purity 
and  finish  of  diction:  but  in  that  general  excellence  and 
complete  harmony  of  faculties  which  unify  body  and  mind, 
on  a  lofty  scale,  he  had  no  peer.  It  is  that  balance,  allow 
ing  the  most  free  and  perfect  play  of  the  faculties,  which 
produces  the  subtle  attribute  of  personal  magnetism ;  and 
no  more  striking  instance  of  it  is  found  in  history  than 
that  exhibited  by  Henry  Clay.  He  was  entirely  devoid  of 
pettiness  and  vanity;  he  was  of  too  large  and  strong  a 
mould  to  be  in  any  way  cheap.  Long  before  the  age  of 
fifty,  and  when  the  most  brilliant  part  of  his  career  was  yet 
to  come,  his  experience  in  the  highest  realm,  of  public  af 
fairs  had  destroyed  all  sense  of  novelty  in  his  situation  and 
that  self -consciousness  which  attends  the  assumption  of 
power;  his  habit  of  mind  had  become  that  of  the  states 
man  and  party  chieftain.  His  greatest  defect  of  manner  was 
his  involuntary  assumption  of  authority  when  his  views  met 
with  opposition ;  at  such  times  he  inclined  to  be  dictatorial, 
not  with  coarse  arrogance,  but  with  lofty  and  courtly  assur 
ance.1  Yet  he  would  have  been  more  than  human  if,  with 


1  From  the  many  sources  whence  this  description  is  derived,  the  follow 
ing  should  be  cited  :  Martineau's  Retrospect  of  Western  Travel,  vol.  i.  pp. 
172, 176;  Hilliard's  Politics  and  Pen  Pictures,  p.  3;  Greeley's  Recollections 
of  a  Busy  Life,  p.  250  ;  Parton's  Greeley,  p.  166  ;  Parton's  Famous  Ameri- 


122  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

his  peculiar  and  wonderful  abilities  and  fascinating  hold  on 
his  adherents,  he  had  been  otherwise  in  this  regard.  The 
growth  of  his  personal  influence  doubtless  had  much  to  do 
with  developing  this  temper  of  mind,  and  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  it  tended  to  his  gradual  adoption  of  the  Federalist 
creed,  which  was  soon  to  become  the  basis  of  the  Whig 
party,  of  which  Clay,  from  its  origin  to  his  death,  was  the 
foremost  figure  and  lawgiver.  It  was  to  the  formation  of 
this  new  party  that  his  efforts  were  at  once  devoted  after 
the  election  of  Jackson.  At  the  head  of  it  he  designed  to 
contest  the  field  with  Jackson  in  1832. 


cans,  p. 11 ;  Pierce's  Sumner,  vol.  i.  p.  316;  Wiiithrop's  Addresses,  vol.  iv.  pp. 
59, 60  ;  Thurlf  w  Weed's  Autobiography,  vol.  i.  pp.  181,  207  ;  Reminiscences 
of  B.  P.  Poore,  vol.  i.  p.  85;  Appleton's  Encyclopedia  of  American  Biography, 
article  "O.  E.  Dodge,"  vol.  ii.  p.  194;  Democratic  Review,  vol.  xii.  p.  302; 
Century  Magazine,  vol.  xxxiii.  p.  179. 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  New  Development  and  Arrangement  of  Political  Forces — Andrew 
Jackson,  and  the  Significance  of  his  Political  Rise — His  First  Adminis 
tration—The  Spoils  System— The  "Kitchen  Cabinet  "—Party  Dissen 
sion  and  Reorganization  of  the  Cabinet — The  Political  Issues — Clay 
Nominated  for  President  and  Re-Elected  to  the  Senate — The  Political 
Activity  of  the  Period — The  Whig  Programme — The  Rejection  of  Van 
Buren's  Nomination  for  Minister  to  England— Clay's  Plan  of  Tariff 
Revision— His  Defence  of  the  American  System— The  Tariff  of  1832— 
The  Public  Lands— The  Effort  to  Compromise  Clay  on  the  Subject— 
His  Land  Bill 

THE  time  had  at  length  arrived  for  a  regular  and  militant 
arrangement  of  political  forces.  The  chaos  of  politics  had 
reached  the  stage  of  crystallization.  The  preceding  con 
ditions  had  naturally  led  to  it.  It  is  easy  to  discern  from 
the  literature  and  characteristics  of  the  period  the  changes 
that  were  coming  over  the  public  mind.  The  effects  of  the 
war  and  of  the  causes  that  produced  it  were  becoming  dis 
tinctly  visible.  The  steady  expansion  of  wealth  and  popu 
lation  had  begun  strongly  to  manifest  itself  in  the  political 
thought  and  movement  of  the  time.  The  disseminations 
of  the  press  were  constantly  increasing  in  variety  and  vol 
ume.  The  stream  of  politics  was  rapidly  gathering  in  ex 
panse  and  momentum  from  the  new  and  numerous  tribu 
taries  of  private  interest ;  it  was  becoming  a  wide  and 
turbulent  current,  and  even  to  many  thoughtful  observers 
who  did  not  perceive  the  true  meaning  of  the  phenomena, 
it  threatened  calamity  to  our  national  character  and  insti 
tutions. 


124  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1829 

In  all  nations  and  all  times,  politics,  whatever  the  kind  or 
quality,  is  primarily  the  avenue  to  personal  advantage. 
Whether  it  be  in  the  seemingly  petty  strifes  for  court  fa 
vors  or  the  greater  struggles  of  able  statesmen  over  policies 
that  affect  the  world,  personal  ambition  for  power  and 
position  is  the  ruling  motive ;  desire  for  the  national  weal, 
how  deep  and  genuine  soever,  is  seldom  paramount.  But 
in  nations  whose  concerns  have  weight  and  whose  peoples 
have  power,  personal  rivalries  are  forced  to  conform  to  the 
processes  of  party  organization,  which  alone  can  press  the 
discordant  interests  and  elements  that  inevitably  exist  into 
orderly  and  efficient  union.  If  adequate  issues  do  not  exist 
they  are  created ;  for  without  them  there  can  be  no  system 
atic  and  seemly  operations.  All  this  is  plain  enough  now ; 
but  in  1828  party  warfare,  in  the  full  modern  sense,  was  un 
known  in  the  United  States.  Necessity  is  the  mother  of 
political  invention  and  progress.  After  1828,  system  and 
intricacy  speedily  developed  in  our  politics.  The  ensuing 
thirty  years  form  the  most  interesting  and  remarkable 
period  of  our  political  annals.  From  a  superficial  and 
cynical  point  of  view  it  was  the  struggle  of  ambitious 
ability,  supported  by  the  wealth  and  conservatism  of  the 
country,  with  pushing  mediocrity,  supported  by  the  multi 
tude  and  lighted  up  toward  the  last  by  the  lurid  glow  of 
the  antislavery  agitation.1  The  most  significant  indication 
of  the  changing  political  temper  of  the  times  was  the  rise 
of  Andrew  Jackson. 


1  "In  these  Jacksorrian  contests  we  find  nearly  all  the  learning,  nearly 
all  the  ancient  wealth,  nearly  all  the  book-nourished  intelligence,  nearly  all 
the  silver-forked  civilization,  united  in  opposition  to  General  Jackson,  who 
represented  the  country's  untutored  instincts." — Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii. 
p.  150. 


CH.  IV.]  THE   COMING   OF  JACKSON  125 

Concerning  Jackson  there  is  an  antipodal  difference  of 
opinion,  both  extremes  being  equally  wrong,  owing  to  par 
tisan  prejudices,  without  critical  understanding  of  his  career 
and  the  general  causes  that  made  it  possible.  There  should, 
however,  be  little  disagreement  as  to  either,  for  the  histori 
cal  quality  of  both  is  easily  ascertained. 

To  say  that  Jackson's  political  career  was  the  product  of 
circumstances  would  not  be  strictly  accurate,  yet  it  is  more 
nearly  so  than  is  usually  supposed.  It  is  of  course  true,  in 
a  general  sense,  that  every  distinguished  career  is  prox- 
imately  due  to  circumstances  ;  but  in  most  cases  the  reputa 
tions  acquired  by  men  of  superior  ability  are  only  modified 
or  colored  by  their  surroundings.  It  is  altogether  probable 
that  had  Shakespeare,  Newton,  and  Burke  lived  in  other  * 
ages  than  those  which  they  adorn,  their  great  powers  would 
in  some  way  have  been  conspicuously  displayed.  So  also 
would  it  have  been  with  Franklin,  Hamilton,  and  Clay ; 
but  not  with  Jackson.  His  eminence  was  the  consequence 
of  his  being  the  chance  instrument  by  which  the  forces 
that  had  been  long  in  gathering  were  to  assert  themselves. 
Undoubtedly  no  other  man  would  have  done  exactly,  or 
perhaps  even  approximately,  as  he  did;  yet  certainly  the 
general  results  of  the  period  would  have  been  practically 
the  same.  His  potent  personality,  indeed,  singularly  adapt 
ed  him  to  the  conditions,  but  he  affected  rather  the  hue  than 
the  texture  of  the  political  fabric. 

Most  of  the  men  who  attained  authority  in  the  early 
settlement  of  the  West  were  untutored,  restless,  and  dar 
ing.  The  new  communities  were  chiefly  composed  of  these 
semi  -  barbarians,  who  naturally  gravitated  to  the  pioneer 
regions,  which  were  constant  scenes  of  Indian  depreda 
tions  and  ruffianly  m&lees.  One  of  the  incentives  to  this 


126  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

early  immigration  was  the  conditions  that  always  exist 
where  the  restraint  of  law  is  lax.  The  populations  being 
small  and  scattered,  the  man  who  possessed  the  common 
character,  along  with  pronounced  capacity,  at  once  became 
prominent.  If  Jackson  was  not  precisely  of  this  class,  it 
was  thoroughly  congenial  to  him. 

His  parents — who  were  of  the  humblest  station  of  life — 
came  to  this  country  from  the  North  of  Ireland  in  1765. 
Andrew  was  born  two  years  later.  His  father  died  at  about 
the  same  time,  in  poverty.  Until  his  mother's  death,  when 
he  was  fourteen,  he  lived  most  of  the  time  with  an  uncle. 
He  worked  for  some  three  or  four  years  at  the  saddlery 
trade,  and  then  began  to  read  law  at  Salisbury,  North  Car 
olina,  not  far  from  the  place  in  which  he  had  always  lived. 
But  he  was  neither  by  turn  of  mind  nor  application  a 
student,  and  much  of  the  time  that  should  have  been  de 
voted  to  preparation  for  the  bar  was  given  up  to  the  ex 
citing  and  boisterous  sports  of  the  neighborhood.  Accord 
ing  to  an  old  resident  of  the  place,  who  informed  Parton, 
young  Jackson  "  was  the  most  roaring,  rollicking,  game- 
cocking,  horse-racing,  card-playing,  mischievous  fellow  that 
ever  lived  in  Salisbury."  From  the  scanty  accounts  of 
this  period  of  his  life,  we  learn  that  the  most  marked  tal 
ent  he  exhibited  was  his  power  of  profanity,  which  for 
originality,  variety,  and  violence  was  unsurpassed  by  any 
of  his  contemporaries.  He  developed  the  faculty  of  fe 
rocity  to  such  a  degree  that  it  became  with  him  an  art 
which  he  employed  as  one  of  his  principal  weapons,  albeit, 
on  most  occasions,  he  had  little  need  of  simulation — for  his 
natural  temper  was  terrible  and  overpowering.1 


Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  i.  pp.  64,  463. 


CH.  IV.]        JACKSON'S  POLITICAL  PROGRESS  127 

In  1788  one  of  his  friends  was  appointed  Superior  Court 
judge  of  the  district  of  Tennessee,  and  Jackson,  then  twenty- 
one,  was  appointed  prosecuting  attorney.  There  was  no 
difficulty  in  procuring  the  post,  for  its  functions  were  ex 
tremely  dangerous  and  undesirable.  If  knowledge  of  the 
law  had  been  the  first  requisite,  Jackson  probably  would 
not  have  presumed  to  seek  the  place.  The  qualifications 
demanded  were  fierce  resolution,  dauntless  courage,  and 
the  power  of  terrorizing  the  lawless  elements  of  the  border. 
An  idea  of  Jackson's  native  spirit  of  fearless  independence 
may  be  drawn  from  an  incident  that  happened  when  he 
was  a  lad.  He  boldly,  and  doubtless  insolently,  refused  to 
clean  the  boots  of  one  of  Tarleton's  troopers,  who  several 
times  raided  the  region,  and  for  his  refusal  received  a  sabre- 
cut  on  the  head  that  left  for  life  an  ugly  scar.  The 
promise  of  the  youth  was  amply  fulfilled  by  the  man.  It 
sufficiently  illustrates  his  character  to  say,  without  recount 
ing  the  many  belligerent  and  bloody  affairs  during  his 
service,  that  he  proved  himself  the  man  for  the  place ;  he 
used  process  and  pistols  with  equal  readiness  and  facility. 
Nor  was  he  long  in  acquiring  the  lion's  share  of  such  civil 
business  as  there  was  in  the  primitive  town  of  Nashville 
and  the  neighboring  country. 

After  eight  years  of  this  sort  of  life  he  had  gained  an 
influential  standing.  He  was  a  member  of  the  convention 
in  1796  that  framed  the  original  constitution  for  the  new 
commonwealth,  and  was  elected  its  first  Eepresentative  in 
Congress.  He  served  in  that  capacity  for  a  year,  and  was 
then  appointed  to  fill  a  vacancy  caused  by  the  expulsion 
from  the  Senate  of  one  of  the  Tennessee  members.  His 
appearance,  dress,  and  deportment  were  uncouth.  Gallatin 
described  him  as  a  "rough  backwoodsman";  and  Jeffer- 


128  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

son  said  of  him  that  "  he  could  never  speak  on  account  of 
the  rashness  of  his  feelings ;  that  he  had  seen  him  attempt 
it  repeatedly  and  as  often  choke  with  rage." 1  His  appoint 
ment  to  the  Senate  was  largely  in  recognition  of  his  suc 
cess  in  securing  the  passage  of  a  bill  to  reimburse  his  State 
for  expenses  it  had  incurred  in  warfare  with  the  savages,  a 
subject  of  much  complaint  on  the  frontier  because  of  the  in 
difference  of  the  federal  government.  His  legislative  ser 
vice  was  subsequently  remembered  only  by  his  having  voted 
with  eleven  others  against  the  laudatory  address  to  Wash 
ington  at  the  close  of  his  Presidency.  Jackson  shared  in 
tensely  in  the  prevailing  Western  friendliness  for  French 
democracy  and  hostility  to  Federalism,  and  the  small  part 
lie  took  in  the  proceedings  of  Congress  was  governed  by 
these  sentiments.  He  remained  in  the  Senate  only  a  year, 
withdrawing  in  1798,  to  become  a  Supreme  Court  judge  in 
Tennessee. 

It  is  evident  that  during  this  period  he  was  quite  without 
political  ambition  and  wholly  without  the  qualifications  to 
rise  in  politics  in  the  ordinary  way.  His  service  as  judge 
suggests  the  conclusion  that  he  was  equally  without  jurid 
ical  ambition.  He  held  the  judgeship  six  years,  and  then 
resigned.  Beyond  this  nothing  is  known  about  his  judicial 


1  Jefferson  further  said  of  him:  "I  feel  very  much  alarmed  at  the 
prospect  of  seeing  General  Jackson  President.  He  is  one  of  the  most  unfit 
men  I  know  for  the  place.  He  has  had  very  little  respect  for  laws  or 
constitutions,  and  is,  in  fact,  an  able  military  chief.  His  passions  are 
terrible.  ...  He  has  been  much  tried  since  I  knew  him,  but  he  is  a 
dangerous  man." — Webster's  Correspondence,  vol.  i.  p.  346.  When,  in 
1818,  Monroe  asked  Jefferson  whether  it  would  be  wise  to  give  Jackson 
the  mission  to  Russia  Jefferson  exclaimed  :  "Why,  good  God,  he  would 
breed  you  a  quarrel  before  he  had  been  there  a  month  !" — Niles's  Register, 
vol.  xxiv.  p.  280.  Jackson  was  offered  and  declined  the  mission  to 
Mexico  in  1823. 


CH.  IV.]     QUALIFICATIONS  OF  FRONTIER  JUDGES     129 

service,  either  as  to  the  amount  and  kind  of  business  in 
his  court  or  the  manner  in  which  he  despatched  it.  None 
of  his  decisions,  if  he  wrote  any,  were  preserved ;  but  it  is 
probable  that  he  wrote  none,  for  his  letters  during  this 
time  were  crudely  composed,  and  it  would  have  been  char 
acteristic  of  him  to  dispose  of  all  questions  before  him 
summarily,  according  to  the  view  he  took  of  them  at  the 
time.  His  mind  was  so  unjudicial  that  the  incongruity  of 
his  being  a  judge  would  be  amusing  were  it  not  for  the 
probability  that,  however  else  his  conduct  may  have  ap 
peared,  it  was  never  amusing  to  suitors  and  criminals  in 
his  court.  Still,  there  was  not  much  need  of  learning  and 
refinement  in  the  tribunals  of  the  frontier,  and  it  may  fairly 
be  presumed  that  Jackson's  directness  and  knowledge  of 
the  people  rendered  his  service  efficient.  Under  the  con 
ditions  of  the  time  and  place  judicial  fitness,  in  the  proper 
sense,  had  little  to  do  with  judicial  appointments.  The 
idea  was  not  present.  This  is  strikingly  shown  by  the  cir 
cumstance  that  while  Jackson  was  judge  he  was  elected 
major-general  of  the  militia  after  a  sharp  and  close  contest 
with  ex-Governor  Sevier,  the  most  prominent  man  in  the 
State.  No  doubt  the  pecuniary  compensation — six  hundred 
dollars  per  year — was  the  controlling  motive  for  Jackson's 
going  upon  the  bench;  and  that  he  desired  the  position 
was  sufficient  reason  for  his  obtaining  it. 

He  retired  from  the  bench  in  1804.  He  was  in  embar 
rassed  circumstances.  He  had  been  concerned  in  trade  and 
land  speculations  wrhich  had  proven  unsuccessful.  To  re 
pair  his  misfortunes,  he  abandoned  the  law  and  devoted 
several  years  to  various  business  enterprises,1  but  at  length 

1  Jackson  was  charged  with  having  been  in  early  life  a  dealer  in  slaves. 
"  This  charge  was  strictly  true,  though  abundantly  disproved  by  the  oaths 
9 


130  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

confined  his  attention  to  planting.  During  this  interval 
of  private  occupation  he  evinced  the  same  violent  and 
undisciplined  traits  which  had  characterized  his  previous 
course.  He  was  usually  involved  in  quarrels  and  personal 
difficulties.  In  1806  he  fought  a  duel  in  which  he  killed 
his  opponent  and  barely  escaped  death  himself;  the  ball 
that  struck  him  broke  two  ribs,  and  was  thus  deflected 
from  its  mortal  errand.  For  a  time  he  was  engaged  in 
boat-building ;  and  in  1805  he  contracted  to  provide  Burr 
with  boats  for  his  uncertain  project.  He  took  a  conspicu 
ous  share  in  lionizing  Burr  at  the  outset,  and  was  loath  to 
believe  him  guilty  of  any  unlawful  design.  He  vacillated 
somewhat,  but  finally  appeared  during  the  trial  at  Rich 
mond  as  one  of  Burr's  most  zealous  champions.  He  went 
so  far  as  to  deliver  a  foaming  harangue  against  Jefferson. 
Spleen  was  the  principal  cause  of  his  conduct.  He  disliked 
Jefferson  because  he  had  refused  to  appoint  him  governor 
of  the  Orleans  territory;  and  Burrs  chief  accuser,  the 
shallow  and  unprincipled  Wilkinson,  who  commanded  there, 
he  loathed. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  England,  Jackson  had 
passed  his  forty-fifth  year.  He  had  withdrawn  from  poli 
tics,  if  his  brief  Congressional  experience  could  be  called 
political;  he  had  tired  of  the  judgeship,  if  his  position  could 
be  called  judicial;  he  had  forsaken  his  profession,  if  his 
practice  could  be  called  professional.  His  business  vent 
ures  had  been  futile.  "Nothing  really  prospered  with 


of  some,  and  even  by  the  certificate  of  his  principal  partner.  Jackson  had 
a  small  store  or  trading  establishment  at  Bruinsburgh,  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Bayou  Pierre,  in  Claiborne  county,  Mississippi.  It  was  at  this  point 
he  received  the  negroes,  purchased  by  his  partner  at  Nashville,  and  sold 
them  to  the  planters  of  the  neighborhood."— Sparks's  Memories  of  Fifty 
Tears,  p.  149. 


CH.  IV.]  JACKSON  AND  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT   131 

him/'  says  Parton,  "but  his  farm  and  his  horses,  both  of 
which  he  loved,  and  therefore  understood."  He  was  merely 
a  planter  and  a  militia  general.  He  had  achieved  nothing  to 
distinguish  him  from  the  numberless  and  forgotten  legion  of 
the  sometime  prominent ;  or,  if  he  escaped  oblivion,  it  would 
be  in  consequence  of  his  connection  with  Burr.  If  he  had 
ever  had  any  but  military  ambition,  which  is  doubtful,  it 
must  have  subsided.  His  hopes,  whatever  they  had  been,  had 
reached  their  compass  of  satisfaction.  His  character  had 
hardened  in  its  original  mould.  Beyond  question,  without 
war  he  would  have  continued  in  the  same  course  as  that 
which  he  had  pursued  during  the  six  years  preceding.  But 
the  war  came,  and  he  instinctively  embraced  the  belated 
opportunity  of  his  life.  He  forthwith  offered  himself  and 
his  division  of  the  Tennessee  militia  to  the  service  of  the 
government. 

It  was  supposed  that  the  British  would  at  once  attack 
New  Orleans.  In  due  time  Jackson  assembled  his  forces  at 
Natchez.  But  when  it  appeared  that  no  attempt  would  be 
made  against  New  Orleans  he  was  ordered  by  the  "War  De 
partment  to  disband,  without  any  provision  being  made  to 
pay,  ration,  and  return  his  men,  who  were  five  hundred  miles 
from  home.  Jackson  was  furious.  Instead  of  obeying  his 
orders,  he  marched  the  division  in  regular  form  back  to  Ten 
nessee,  pledging  his  own  credit  to  secure  the  auxiliary  trans 
portation.  His  drafts  went  to  protest,  and  he  would  have 
been  financially  ruined  had  not  the  great  popularity  of  his 
conduct  compelled  the  administration,  as  a  matter  of  politics, 
to  rectify  the  wrong  or  oversight  it  had  committed.  Still 
full  of  warlike  ardor,  he  again  tendered  his  forces  to  the 
government  for  an  invasion  of  Canada ;  for  "  Old  Hickory," 
as  he  was  now  familiarly  styled,  was  idolized  by  his  men 


132  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

for  his  fierce  and  soldierly  devotion  to  their  interests.  His 
offer  was  ignored,  and  he  dismissed  the  troops.  During 
this  episode  his  pugnacious  propensity  was  not  diverted 
from  his  private  affairs.  While  at  Natchez  he  had  a  violent 
dissension  with  General  Wilkinson  over  a  question  of  rank, 
and  after  returning  to  Nashville  he  started  a  barbarous 
affray  with  Colonel  Coffee  and  the  Bentons  that  almost  cost 
him  his  life.  Weapons  were  freely  used,  and  in  the  meUe 
Jackson  received  a  terrible  wound  in  the  shoulder  from 
which  he  never  fully  recovered.1 

Meantime  the  Creek  war  had  broken  out  in  the  Mississippi 
territory.  To  Jackson  this  was  a  most  fortunate  circum 
stance  :  it  continued  his  military  career.  While  yet  unable 
to  quit  his  bed  on  account  of  his  wound,  he  recalled  his  dis 
banded  volunteers  to  service,  and  obtained  authority  from 
the  legislature  to  proceed.  As  soon  as  he  was  able,  he  ad 
vanced,  though  with  great  physical  suffering,  into  the  Indian 
country.  The  ensuing  campaign  was  thoroughly  Jackson- 
esque.  The  hinderances  he  encountered  were  numerous  and 
embarrassing.  He  was  not  in  supreme  command,  and  was 
therefore  impeded  by  other  officers  until  he  acquired  the 
ascendency  to  guide  the  operations  to  suit  himself.  The 
troops  were  ill  provided  with  food  and  munitions,  and  most 
of  them  were  on  short  enlistments.  Several  times  some  of 
them  were  in  open  mutiny.  On  one  occasion,  when  some  of 
the  men  proposed  to  march  homeward,  Jackson  seized  a 
musket  and,  standing  before  them,  said  he  would  shoot  the 


1  "  It  was  quite  a  curious  coincidence  that  on  one  of  these  fine  mornings 
when  Colonel  Benton  was  so  fiercely  battling  for  the  President  in  the 
Senate  Chamber  the  President  had  to  submit  to  a  surgical  operation  for 
the  extraction  of  the  bullet  he  had  carried  in  his  left  arm  ever  since  the 
time  of  the  Benton  affray  in  Nashville,  twenty  years  before." — Parton's 
Jackson,  vol.  iii.  p.  415. 


CH.  IV.]      THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  SEMINOLE  WAR        133 

first  man  who  refused  to  perform  his  duty.  During  these 
troubles  he  committed  acts  that  subsequently  received  severe 
criticism.  Among  them  was  the  arrest  of  General  Cocke, 
professedly  for  inciting  his  division  to  mutiny,  but  really  to 
remove  a  jealous  and  inefficient  officer.  He  also  caused  a 
private  to  be  shot  for  insubordination,  not  so  much  that  the 
man  deserved  it  as  to  make  an  example  of  him.  But  with 
appalling  energy  and  celerity,  as  well  as  skilful  management 
of  his  wayward  troops,  which  showed  a  truly  high  order  of 
combative  military  genius,  he  surmounted  all  obstacles  and 
forever  broke  the  warlike  power  of  the  Creeks.  He  afterward 
wrested  from  the  friendly  part  of  the  tribe — for  the  hostiles 
had  fled — the  treaty  that  Clay  stigmatized  as  the  real  origin 
of  the  Seminole  war.  However  this  may  be,  the  so-called 
treaty  was  a  cruel  extortion ;  and,  strictly  considered,  it  was 
illegal,  as  not  more  than  one-third  of  the  entire  tribe  was 
represented  by  the  signers.  It  compelled  them  to  surrender 
two-thirds  of  their  lands  as  an  indemnity  for  the  expense  of 
the  war ;  and,  besides  other  severe  exactions,  it  required  them 
to  retire  to  the  unrelinquished  tract,  which  was  so  located 
as  to  isolate  them  from  all  external  influences  that  might 
incite  them  to  future  war. 

The  campaign  was  finished  in  April,  1814,  and  the  militia 
discharged ;  but  so  considerable  was  the  service  Jackson  had 
performed  that  in  May  he  was  commissioned  a  major-general 
in  the  regular  army  and  placed  in  command  of  the  Southern 
Department.  He  fixed  his  headquarters  at  Mobile,  whither 
he  proceeded  in  August.  Until  a  short  time  before  this  no 
British  force  had  appeared  during  the  year  in  the  Gulf 
region.  A  small  number  had  then  arrived  at  Pensacola  in 
several  sloops-of-war.  The  purpose  was  to  stir  up  the  Flor 
ida  Indians  and  divert  attention  from  New  Orleans,  against 


134  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

which  the  long-delayed  expedition  was  now  being  prepared. 
Of  this,  however,  Jackson  then  had  no  intimation,  nor  did 
he  even  surmise  it. 

The  Spanish  occupation  of  Florida  was  obnoxious  to  the 
people  of  the  Southwest,  whose  old  hatred  of  Spain,  occa 
sioned  by  the  troubles  over  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
was  intensified  through  the  unhindered  use  of  Florida  by 
the  savages  and  the  English.  Thus  the  principal  and  popu 
lar  object  that  Jackson  desired  to  achieve  was  to  take  forci 
ble  possession  of  the  territory.  This  was  his  prime  motive 
at  the  outset  of  his  military  career,  and  it  continued  to  be 
until  he  finally  succeeded  in  his  purpose  during  the  Seminole 
war.  "When  he  first  offered  himself  and  his  volunteers  for 
service,  in  1813,  he  assured  the  Secretary  Of  "War  that  they 
were  "  the  choicest  of  our  citizens,  .  .  .  who  have  no  con 
stitutional  scruples,  and,  if  the  government  orders,  will  re 
joice  at  the  opportunity  of  placing  the  American  eagle  on 
the  ramparts  of  Mobile,  Pensacola,  and  St.  Augustine." 
Just  before  the  British  appeared  at  Pensacola  Jackson 
wrote  for  leave  to  seize  the  place.  For  some  reason  the 
despatch  denying  his  request  did  not  reach  him  until  long 
afterward.  Meanwhile  a  naval  attack  was  made  on  Fort 
Bowyer,  at  Mobile  Point.  This  was  thoroughly  repulsed,  if, 
indeed,  it  was  intended  to  be  more  than  a  demonstration, 
and  the  enemy  returned  to  Pensacola.  In  the  absence  of 
orders,  Jackson  pursued  his  own  course.  Two  weeks  later 
he  marched  over  the  border  with  4100  men,  nearly  all  his 
forces.  November  7  he  took  Pensacola  without  resistance. 
The  British  had  retired  to  the  Appalachicola :  their  main 
function  was  performed.  Jackson  left  one  thousand  men  in 
Florida  and  returned  to  Mobile,  where  he  remained  several 
days.  He  then  proceeded  leisurely  to  New  Orleans  with 


CH.  IV.]      JACKSON  AT  NEW  ORLEANS        135 

only  part  of  his  army.  He  was  regardless  of  the  impending 
danger,  of  which  he  had  now  been  warned  from  Wash 
ington. 

He  reached  the  city  December  2.  Already  the  British 
expedition,  fifty  sail,  had  been  for  a  week  under  way  from 
its  rendezvous  at  Jamaica.  Before  Jackson  arrived  nothing 
had  been  done  for  the  defence  of  the  city ;  and  after  he 
came  he  made  no  haste  to  improve  its  condition.  He  was 
ill.  His  forces  were  scattered.  The  authorities  were  heed 
less.  In  the  place  there  were  no  arms  and  no  military 
stores.  Jackson's  conduct  thus  far  betrays  an  astonishing 
ignorance  of  the  science  of  war.  Mobile,  in  any  case,  was 
not  worth  the  trouble  he  had  taken  ;  without  New  Orleans 
it  was  totally  worthless.  In  fact,  it  would  have  been  stra 
tegic  so  to  fortify  New  Orleans  and  its  approaches  that  the 
British  would  be  induced  to  land  at  Mobile  and  then  ad 
vance  through  the  wilderness.  Had  this  been  done  the  in 
vading  army  might  have  suffered  the  experience  of  Brad- 
dock  sixty  years  before.  December  10  the  fleet  was  sighted ; 
within  a  week  our  gunboats  had  been  taken;  by  another 
week,  the  enemy  had  approached  within  seven  miles  of  the 
city.  Jackson's  remissness  was  more  glaring  than  that  of 
any  other  of  the  generals  whose  inefficiency  had  rendered  the 
war  inglorious  and  abortive.  His  whole  power  was  in  his 
genius  for  combat.  It  was  only  when  an  enemy  or  an  op 
position  was  visible  that  his  unquestioning  and  tremendous 
energy  appeared.  So  abnormal  was  this  attribute  that  it 
diminished  prudence,  calculation,  and  judgment.  His  po 
tent  characteristic  now  came  to  the  rescue.  He  assumed 
military  dictatorship,  made  resounding  proclamations,  and 
filled  the  torpid  populace  with  enthusiastic  vigor.  Aided 
by  Packenham's  bad  generalship,  he  was  victorious.  The 


136  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

treaty  of  Ghent,  signed  fifteen  days  before  the  final  assault, 
prevented  further  hostilities,  except  the  capture  of  Mobile 
Point.  How  Jackson  would  have  fared  in  the  field  had  the 
\var  continued  can  only  be  conjectured.  As  it  was,  he  was 
the  "  Hero  of  New  Orleans."  His  success,  even  less  brilliant 
than  it  was  surprising  to  the  nation,  which  expected  his 
overthrow,  gave  him  that  prestige  which  was  soon  to  be 
exploited  in  the  service  of  politics.  It  was  this  alone  that 
saved  him  from  condemnation  for  his  rash  conduct  in  the 
Seminole  war  and  his  short  governorship  of  Florida,  to  say 
naught  of  the  many  violent  acts  and  quarrels  that  would 
have  disgraced  and  destroyed  any  other  man. 

Such  are  the  outlines  of  Jackson's  history  before  he  be 
came  a  Presidential  candidate.  About  it  there  is  no  room 
for  material  disagreement.  The  leading  facts  depict  his 
character  as  clearly  as  a  few  skilful  strokes  portray  a  visage. 
His  military  career  was  the  compound  of  that  character  and 
remarkable  chance.  It  was  his  good  fortune  that  the  Creek 
war  broke  out  just  at  the  time  it  did ;  that  New  Orleans 
was  not  taken  before  he  could  defend  it ;  that  the  war  had 
been  a  disheartening  failure  nearly  everywhere  else  and 
ended  with  his  victory.  That  he  should  attain  political 
popularity  and  power  invincible  against  an  opposition  un 
paralleled  in  our  history  for  the  elements  it  included  and 
the  ability  of  its  leaders,  would  be  inconceivable  apart  from 
a  political  movement  so  deep  and  general  as  to  make  it  a 
matter  of  minor  consequence  who  its  representative  might 
be.  But  Jackson's  peculiar  character  and  achievements 
doubtless  hastened  the  supremacy  of  that  democratic  sen 
timent  which  was  to  overwhelm  all  barriers  and  carry  him 
on  its  crest. 

Broadly  speaking,  the  political  institutions  of  a  country 


CH.  IV.]        THE  GENESIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  137 

are  the  reflection  of  the  theory  prevailing  among  its  people. 
That  theory  is  necessarily  influenced  by  old  associations  and 
the  degree  of  intelligence  and  independence  diffused  among 
the  masses.  In  a  general  sense,  the  form  of  any  government 
has  but  little  to  do  intrinsically  for  a  long  period  with  the 
larger  popular  rights.  The  same  principle  is  discovered  in 
the  vicissitudes  of  political  parties  under  the  freest  republi 
can  constitutions.  In  the  nature  of  things,  the  long  reten 
tion  of  power  by  a  party  tends  to  develop  an  increasing  dis 
regard  of  the  views  of  the  minority  touching  particular 
questions.  But  the  fundamental  character  of  a  government 
is  not  radically  affected  by  mere  politics ;  in  legislation  and 
administration,  errors  and  excesses  are  quite  certain  to  be 
eventually  rebuked  and  corrected  by  popular  revulsion. 
This  causes  that  oscillation  from  and  to  its  fundamental 
tenets  which  has  marked  the  history  of  every  political  party 
that  has  survived  a  decisive  defeat.  Every  sustained  de 
parture  from  the  true  theory  of  republics — non-interference 
with  private  rights — sooner  or  later  begets  a  popular  revolt 
and  a  return  to  democratic  principles.  To  understand  the 
events  of  our  political  history,  these  elementary  truths  must 
be  applied  in  the  same  manner  as  the  first  rules  of  arith 
metic  to  all  mathematical  calculations. 

Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the  United 
States  could  scarcely  be  called  a  nation.  Each  of  the  States 
in  the  fragile  confederation  was  but  a  fragment  of  a  pro 
spective  nation  ;  for  had  not  the  general  Union  been  formed, 
it  is  quite  certain  that  sectional  ones  would.  The  confeder 
ation  was  vitally  incompetent  to  produce  nationality  either 
in  sentiment  or  in  power,  although  it  performed  a  momen 
tous  service  in  staying  the  centrifugal  jealousies  that  must 
otherwise  have  resulted  in  several  republics,  or,  what  was 


138  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

not  altogether  improbable,  a  consolidated  monarchy.  Dur 
ing  this  stage  the  "rights  of  man"  were  freely  proclaimed  ; 
yet  the  idea  of  democracy  was  singularly  incomplete. 
The  generation  that  achieved  our  independence  had  been 
subjects  of  a  king  of  whom  they  had  once  spoken  with  re 
gard  as  "His  Majesty."  In  dress,  customs,  respect  for 
class  and  government,  they  were  still  Englishmen.  It  mat 
tered  not  that  political  relations  were  severed ;  the  old 
habits  of  thought  and  feeling  continued  of  their  own  mo 
mentum.  Thus  comparatively  but  a  small  number  of  the 
people  were  immediately  affected  in  any  marked  degree,  so 
far  as  political  ideas  were  concerned,  by  the  success  of  the 
Revolution ;  nor  could  they  be  materially  changed  except 
by  a  gradual  and  necessary  adaptation  to  the  new  condi 
tions  arising  from  the  practice  of  self-government.  It  is 
well  known  that  after  the  confederation  had  proven  a  fail 
ure  there  was  a  strong  monarchical  sentiment — not  that 
monarchy  was  deliberately  preferred  by  many  to  a  republic, 
but  that  the  latter  was  a  hazardous  experiment,  while 
limited  monarchy  was  understood  and  familiar.  It  is 
equally  well  known  that  Hamilton,  the  chief  founder  of 
the  Federalist  creed,  earnestly  favored  monarchy  before  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  afterward  bent  his  great 
abilities  to  make  the  government  so  powerful  as  to  be  re 
garded  for  itself  alone  instead  of  being  merely  the  organ 
of  administering  the  will  of  the  people  in  affairs  strictly 
national. 

It  has  been  said  with  much  wit  and  some  truth  that  at 
Washington's  inauguration  the  government  consisted  of 
himself  and  a  roll  of  parchment.  To  distend  the  implied 
powers  granted  by  that  instrument  until  they  were  practical 
ly  commensurate  with  the  discretion  of  Congress  was  the 


CH.  IV.]    THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  DEMOCRACY      139 

policy  of  the  Federalists;  and  it  was  enforced  with  such 
vigor,  as  we  have  seen,  that  it  brought  about  the  demo 
cratic  reaction  which  overthrew  that  party.  Nevertheless, 
after  the  popular  success  of  Jefferson's  principles  the  earlier 
ideas  and  impulses  still  continued.  "  No  person,"  says  Mac- 
Master,  "could,  in  1803,  look  over  our  country  without  be 
holding  on  every  hand  the  lingering  remains  of  monarchy,  of 
aristocracy,  of  class  rule."  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
Eevolution  was  principally  caused  by  the  imposition  of  taxa 
tion  without  representation,  for  a  long  time  subsequently,  in 
nearly  every  State,  the  right  of  suffrage  was  dependent  upon 
property  qualifications.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that 
Jefferson's  principles  proved  to  be  in  the  main  merely  ab 
stractions,  and  that  the  Republican  party  soon  applied  the 
Federalist  theory  with  far  greater  effect  than  the  Federalists 
had  ever  presumed  to  do.  Still,  the  democratic  doctrine 
was  promulgated  as  a  general  creed,  and  the  people  began 
to  appreciate  and  exert  their  power,  though  it  was  not  until 
1824  that  popular  sentiment  gave  promise  of  becoming  the 
controlling  factor  in  political  affairs.  The  elections  of 
Madison  and  Monroe  were  not  the  results  of  popular  move 
ments  for  their  elevation,  but  chiefly  of  a  custom  that  alone 
almost  dominated  the  succession.  The  war  and  the  events 
that  gave  rise  to  it  arrested  the  progress  of  the  democratic 
sentimenty  For  the  same  reasons  the  necessities  that  fol 
lowed  had  much  the  same,  though  steadily  diminishing 
effect.  But  by  the  time  of  the  Presidential  election  of  1824 
that  influence  had  gained  sufficient  force  to  prevent  mere 
precedent  or  political  machinery  from  determining  the  re 
sult.  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  natural  that  the 
popular  movement  should  gather  about  some  personage 
who  aroused  popular  admiration,  and  without  much  re- 


140  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

gard  to  mere  politics.  Such  a  personage  was  General 
Jackson. 

But  the  underlying  cause  of  Jackson's  political  success 
was  not  recognized  by  his  opponents.  To  such  men  as 
Clay,  Calhoun,  Webster,  and  their  admirers  and  adherents, 
Jackson's  candidacy  was  at  first  absurd  and  then  outra 
geous.  In  their  view  his  election  was  contrary  to  the  best 
traditions  of  the  republic,  inconsistent  with  respectable 
government,  and  boded  social  and  political  calamity.  They 
ascribed  his  elevation  solely  to  his  military  exploits,  and  de 
plored  it  as  the  dangerous  ascendency  of  a  military  chief 
tain  destitute  of  civic  qualifications.  They  seemed  not  to 
consider  the  fact  fully  that  his  rise  was  not  due  to  a  sudden 
and  spontaneous  popular  desire  to  reward  a  military  hero,  but 
was  slowly  compassed  by  dexterous  management  operating 
on  the  new  conditions ;  and  that  his  chief  counsellors  were 
men  of  sagacity  and  ability.  Their  want  of  insight  into 
the  true  meaning  of  his  success  led  them  into  fatal  errors 
of  judgment  in  their  policy  of  opposition.  They  did  not 
wait  for  Jackson  to  exhibit  the  alarming  unfitness  they 
proclaimed,  but  forthwith  imitated  the  example  that  Jack 
son's  promoters  had  set  when  Adams  was  elected.  They 
augured  evil  and  disaster  before  any  threatened,  and  ulti 
mately  adopted  the  tactics  of  forcing  Jackson  into  the 
course  they  regarded  as  the  most  advantageous  to  them 
selves  to  condemn.  Nearly  every  cause  he  gave  for  censure 
during  his  Presidency  was  thus  induced ;  yet  for  the  most 
part  the  policy  he  was  compelled  to  pursue  deserves  greater 
credit  than  belongs  to  that  of  the  opposition. 

The  general  condition  of  the  country  was  prosperous. 
The  Southern  and  Western  States  were  being  developed 
with  marvellous  rapidity,  to  the  corresponding  benefit  of 


CH.  IV.]      THE  POPULAR  ESTIMATE   OF  JACKSON       141 

the  other  sections.  At  no  period  of  our  history  have  the 
people  been  so  individualized  as  during  that  which  had 
now  begun.  The  democratic  awakening  was  as  thorough  as 
it  had  finally  been  rapid.  In  the  popular  mind  Jackson's 
mission  was  to  infuse  the  democratic  spirit  into  the  admin 
istration  of  the  government.  The  prevailing  and  potential 
idea  of  Jackson  was  that  he  was  "  of  and  for  the  people," 
and  it  was  prodigiously  aided  by  the  criticism  that  he  was 
without  training,  and  on  that  account  barbarously  unfit  for 
President.  Nor  was  the  popular  notion  of  him  wrong.  He 
was  thoroughly  homespun.  Despite  his  martial  bearing 
and  the  belligerent  vigor  of  his  administration,  he  was  ac 
cessible  and  unaffected.  To  all  but  his  declared  enemies  he 
was  sincerely  cordial  and  winning.1  His  advanced  age  and 
later  experience  had  subdued  and  improved  his  manner. 
He  was  in  all  things  entirely  direct ;  and  such  a  man  is 
necessarily  free  from  cant  and  pretension.  As  during  his 
previous  career,  he  seemed  without  strong  personal  am 
bition,  and  his  ferocious  energy  after  he  entered  the  contest 
was  far  more  the  consequence  of  his  pugnacious  tempera 
ment  than  of  his  desire  for  the  honor  of  being  elected. 
During  his  Presidency  the  same  assertive  self-reliance 
which  had  always  characterized  him  still  governed  his  con 
duct.  In  this  he  displayed  one  of  the  prime  elements  of 


1  "After  dinner  we  went  to  the  President's  ;  the  rooms  were  all  filled, 
and  the  company  consisted,  as  usual,  of  all  varieties  of  rank  and  station — 
foreign  ministers  and  shopkeepers,  heads  of  departments  and  dressers  of 
heads,  Senators  and  office -hunters.  The  President  was  sociable  and 
courteous,  and  the  ladies  of  his  family  performed  their  parts  with  great 
propriety;  on  the  whole,  it  was  an  affair  not  to  be  missed." — Hone's  Diary, 
March  15,  1832,  vol.  i.  p.  48.  Webster  wrote  in  1824:  "  GeneraLJack- 
son's  manners  are  more  Presidential  than  those  of  any  of  the  candidates. 
He  is  grave,  mild,  and  subdued.  Mj_wjie_is_for_him  decidedly." — Webster's 
Correspondence,  p.  346. 


142  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

superiority.  Intrinsically  there  is  little  difference  between 
a  so-called  great  question  and  a  small  one.  What  renders 
the  one  more  onerous  and  apparently  more  difficult  is  usual 
ly  the  wider  and  weightier  importance  of  its  consequences. 
Generally  an  imposing  public  question  admits  of  an  easier 
solution  than  a  private  one,  because  it  is  amenable  to  the 
science  of  political  economy.  A  strong  mind  operates  un- 
awed  by  the  magnitude  of  results.  Jackson,  with  the  same 
freedom  as  though  he  were  deciding  which  fields  of  his 
farm  should  be  ploughed,  simply  applied  his  common-sense, 
so  far  as  he  could,  with  his  acute  personal  prejudices,  to  the 
various  subjects  that  arose  or  were  forced  upon  him.  No 
one  thought  him  venal,  and  few  thought  he  had  any  moral 
obliquity.  Hence,  however  violent  and  vindictive  he  might 
be,  a  large  majority  of  the  people  believed  him  honest  and 
well  meaning ;  and  his  dreadful  independence,  directness, 
and  force  prompted  them  equally  to  believe  that  he  fully 
understood  wrhat  he  was  about  and  was  sufficiently  right  in 
his  course. 

The  first  feature  that  signalized  his  administration  was 
the  establishment  of  what  is  familiarly  known  as  the 
"spoils  system."  As  this  subject  is  still  one  of  living  in 
terest,  Jackson  is  persistently  and  vehemently  criticised  for 
his  course ;  and  any  approval  or  disapproval  of  it  is  taking 
side  in  a  present  and  pressing  controversy.  Nevertheless, 
an  accurate  estimate  of  Jackson  and  his  period  is  quite  im 
possible  without  a  critical  consideration  of  the  causes  that 
led  to  the  introduction  of  the  practice  of  removals  from  the 
inferior  public  offices  for  political  reasons. 

Most  of  the  evils  that  afflict  republics  are  caused  by  the 
lack  of  sustained  interest  in  political  affairs  among  the 
larger  part  of  the  people.  The  vicious  and  incompetent 


CH.  IV.]  THE   SPOILS   SYSTEM  143 

would  seldom  be  elected  to  office  if  the  intelligent  and 
right-minded  had  a  proper  sense  of  citizenship  and  duty 
toward  their  political  institutions.  Their  sins  of  omission 
surpass  those  of  commission  by  the  ignorant  and  unfit,  who 
are  thus  permitted  to  work  themselves  into  public  posi 
tions.  If  the  mooted  topic  of  "  civil  service  reform  "  were 
a  legal  one.  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  would  to  some  extent 
apply.  But,  as  it  is,  the  public  administrative  business  is 
performed,  with  comparatively  few  exceptions,  with  hon 
esty  and  reasonable  competency.  Those  who  have  most 
occasion  to  transact  business,  or  to  observe  the  manner  of 
its  transaction  in  the  public  offices,  find  the  least  substantial 
cause  for  criticism.  The  man  is  rare,  in  all  the  grades  of 
the  public  service  which  it  is  contended  should  be  placed 
beyond  the  reach  of  partisan  appointment,  who  is  not  actu 
ated  by  a  decent  desire  to  perform  his  duties  properly.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  there  is  more  proud  loyalty  to  duty  on 
the  part  of  the  mass  of  such  office-holders  than  there  is  to 
their  employers  among  the  mass  of  men  in  private  occupa 
tions.  In  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  impossible  that  the 
immense  and  diversified  public  business  should  be  conducted 
with  the  same  economy  as  an  ordinary  private  business.  Its 
orderly  and  systematic  despatch  necessitates  division  and 
subdivision  of  functions.  But  this  enables  clerks  and  other 
similar  subordinates  to  become  quickly  familiar  with  their 
narrow  scope  of  duty.  And  the  fact  that  the  integrity  of 
those  classes  is,  as  a  rule,  entirely  untempted  by  opportunity 
goes  far  to  insure  the  efficiency  of  the  service.  "  Civil  service 
reform,"  therefore,  has  no  financial  aspect  aside  from  ob 
taining  an  adequate  return  of  work  for  the  salaries  paid ; 
and  even  if  it  could  effect  any  substantial  result  in  this  re 
spect,  which  is  doubtful,  the  cost  of  attaining  it  would  more 


144  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

than  offset  the  saving.  The  serious  injury  to  the  public  is 
not  perpetrated  by  the  dishonesty  and  incorapetency  of  the 
lesser  servants,  but  by  those  whose  opportunity  is  be 
stowed,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  ballot.  One  year  of 
vicious  financial  or  economic  policy  instituted  by  an  igno 
rant  or  wilful  majority  of  Congress  exceeds,  as  a  plague  ex 
ceeds  the  common  ills,  a  century  of  petty  evils  in  subordi 
nate  administration.  Besides  these  considerations,  a  force 
which  is  not  subject  to  removal  almost  inevitably  becomes 
more  or  less  self-sufficient  and  insubordinate.  And  the 
same  principle  supplies,  in  a  wider  application,  the  para 
mount  argument  why  there  should  not  be  established  under 
our  institutions  a  great  class  practically  secure  for  life  of 
official  position  and  dependency  on  the  government.  The 
genius  of  our  institutions  is  the  equality  of  opportunity  to 
all  the  people.  So  long  as  the  routine  business  of  govern 
ment  can  be  performed  with  reasonable  efficiency  without 
special  training  or  prolonged  experience,  the  greater  the 
number  of  those  who  gain,  if  only  a  brief,  acquaintance 
with  official  duties  the  better;  for  it  is  in  some  sense  a 
means  of  education  in  popular  government,  which  in  the 
largest  degree  possible  should  be  of  the  people,  by  the  peo 
ple,  and  for  the  people. 

Such  is  the  true  argument  in  behalf  of  the  spoils  system. 
That  it  is  inherently  susceptible  of  abuses  is  undeniable ;  yet 
bad  appointments  in  consequence  of  the  practice  in  this 
country  have  never  been  alone  sufficient  to  warrant  its  over 
throw.  The  most  serious  evil  it  produces  is  its  effect  on 
political  activity.  It  renders  partisan  service  subordinate 
to  the  public  welfare,  and  thus  tends  to  make  party  contest 
a  venal  quest  for  office  instead  of  a  sincere  and  elevated  con 
tention  over  large  questions  of  political  principle  and  pub- 


CH.  IV.]        SPREAD  OF  THE   SPOILS   SYSTEM  145 

lie  policy,  with  the  effect  of  aiding  mediocre  and  unfit  men 
to  push  themselves  into  public  life.  Doubtless  the  better 
opinion  on  the  whole  case  is  that  the  competitive  system 
with  fixed  tenure — treating  the  civil  service  as  merely  the 
mechanical  means  of  administration — is  wiser  and  more  pro 
ductive,  in  a  large  sense,  of  the  best  results.  Yet  the  rise 
and  long  continuance  of  the  opposite  practice  was  inevi 
table,  and  must  be  regarded  as  a  natural  outgrowth  of  our 
political  system.  This  view  reconciles  theory  and  fact,  and 
tempers  acute  prejudices  that  are  detrimental  to  just  histori 
cal  judgment. 

For  many  years  the  total  number  of  appointees  to  the 
minor  offices  under  the  government  of  the  United  States 
was  less  than  the  number  now  appointed  under  that  of  New 
York  or  Pennsylvania.  There  was  no  urgent  and  general 
rivalry  for  such  positions.  But  at  length  the  increase  of  the 
population,  with  all  that  it  signifies,  and  the  correspond 
ing  expansion  of  the  business  of  the  government,  naturally 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  constantly  increasing  class 
desiring  employment  that  was  not  manual.  Politics  was 
inevitably  aifected  by  its  influence.  But  it  was  first  felt 
in  State  politics,  especially  in  the  two  States  mentioned 
and  in  Massachusetts,  where  the  " spoils  system"  speedily 
'  developed,  not  indeed  through  the  instrumentality  of  party, 
but  as  the  consequence  of  changing  conditions. 

From  the  time  of  the  administration  of  Jefferson  to  that 
of  Adams  there  had  been  little  occasion  to  make  removals 
for  political  reasons.  For  twenty-four  years  there  had  been 
but  one  Presidential  dynasty.  The  opposition  being  at  no 
time  sufficiently  strong  and  coherent  to  deserve  the  title  of 
party,  there  was  no  opportunity  for  the  office-seeking  class 
to  develop  in  the  national  arena ;  there  was  nothing  upon 
10 


146  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1829 

which  to  found  claims  as  the  reward  for  services,  and,  if 
there  had  been,  those  installed  were  mainly  the  faithful. 
Moreover,  it  necessarily  required  some  time  for  the  system 
being  rapidly  established  in  the  several  States  to  appear  in 
national  politics ;  but  in  those  States  eventually  the  number 
less  influences  that  produced  a  new  political  epoch  operated 
perforce  to  evoke  efforts  that  would  secure  the  minor  ap 
pointments  as  the  reward  for  partisan  zeal.  While  Jackson's 
administration  marked  the  beginning  of  this  element  of  party 
organization  in  national  politics,  any  other  man  at  that  time 
representing  the  Democratic  party  would  have  pursued  sub 
stantially  the  same  course.  In  truth,  it  would  be  more  ac 
curate  to  say  that  John  Quincy  Adams  was  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  system  ;  for  his  absolute  refusal  to  allo\v  polit 
ical  considerations  to  influence  the  retention  or  selection 
of  appointees  stimulated  the  clamor  and  the  efforts  of  the 
multiplying  "  outs."  But  though  the  situation  had  rendered 
proscription  inevitable,  Jackson  was  not  reluctant  to  en 
force  it.  In  this,  as  in  all  he  did,  he  proceeded  with  vigor 
and  celerity.  During  the  first  year  of  his  Presidency  he 
made  as  many  removals  for  political  reasons  as  had  been  ef 
fected  by  all  his  predecessors,  mostly  for  cause ;  and,  besides, 
there  was  the  still  greater  number  made  by  heads  of  depart 
ments  and  the  like.1  This  policy  was  greeted  by  a  loud 


1  " 'The  gloom  of  suspicion,'  says  Mr.  Stansbury,  himself  an  office 
holder,  '  pervaded  the  face  of  society.  No  man  deemed  it  safe  or  prudent 
to  trust  his  neighbor,  and  the  interior  of  the  Department  presented  a  fearful 
scene  of  guarded  silence,  secret  intrigue,  espionage,  and  tale-bearing.  A 
casual  remark  dropped  on  the  street  would  within  an  hour  be  repeated  at 
headquarters  ;  and  many  a  man  received  unceremonious  dismission  who 
could  not  for  his  life  conceive  or  conjecture  wherein  he  had  offended.'" 
"So  numerous  were  the  removals  in  the  city  of  Washington  that  the  busi 
ness  of  the  place  seemed  paralyzed."— Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii.  pp.  212, 
214.  See  also  Shepard's  Van  Buren,  p.  180. 


CH.  IV.]  THE   "KITCHEN  CABINET"  147 

chorus  of  denunciation  and  direful  prophecy ;  and  by  no  one 
with  such  latitude  of  indignant  phrase  as  by  Clay,  notwith 
standing  he  had  been  much  disappointed  by  the  attitude 
Adams  had  taken  in  regard  to  the  subject. 

Jackson  took  a  novel  view  of  the  functions  of  the  cabinet. 
In  his  hands  it  was  shorn  of  much  of  the  dignity  it  had 
before  possessed.  During  previous  administrations  it  was 
composed  principally  of  distinguished  men  who  influenced 
the  policy  of  the  government.  Under  Jackson  the  cabinet 
officers  were  no  longer  the  "  Constitutional  advisers "  of 
the  President.  He  held  no  cabinet  councils.  The  members 
practically  resembled  military  staff-officers.  With  the  ex 
ception  of  Yan  Buren,  they  were  not  men  of  conspicuous 
ability,  #lthough  possessing  much  political  experience. 
Jackson's  actual  advisers  were  confined  to  a  small  coterie  of 
friends  who,  with  one  subsequent  exception,  were  not  in 
the  cabinet.  During  the  first  years  these  advisers  were 
William  B.  Lewis,1  Amos  Kendall,2  Isaac  Hill,  and  Duff 
Green.  Green,  however,  because  of  his  devotion  to  Cal- 
houn,  was  soon  replaced  by  Francis  P.  Blair,  one  of  Clay's 


1  "  Among  all  the  remarkable  accidents  which  opened  his  way  to  the 
first  position  in  the  country  it  was  not  the  least  that  he  had  William  B. 
Lewis  for  a  neighbor  and  friend.  Lewis  was  the  great  father  of  wire-pull 
ers."—  Sumner's  Jackson,  p.  77. 

2 "  He  is  supposed  to  be  the  moving  spring  of  the  whole  administration — 
the  thinker,  planner,  and  doer  ;  but  it  is  all  in  the  dark.  Documents  are 
issued  of  an  excellence  which  prevents  their  being  attributed  to  the  persons 
who  take  the  responsibility  of  them  ;  a  correspondence  is  kept  up  all  over 
the  country  for  which  no  one  seems  answerable  ;  work  is  done,  of  goblin 
extent  and  goblin  speed,  which  makes  men  wonder  ;  and  the  invisible  Amos 
Kendall  has  the  credit  of  it  all.  ...  He  is  undoubtedly  a  great  genius.  He 
unites  with  his  'great  talent  for  silence' a  splendid  audacity.  .  .  .  The  ex 
treme  sallowness  of  his  complexion,  and  hair  of  such  perfect  whiteness  as 
is  rarely  seen  in  a  man  of  middle  age,  testify  to  disease.  His  countenance 
does  not  help  the  superstitious  to  throw  off  their  dread  of  him." — Mar- 
tineau's  Retrospect  of  Western  Travel,  vol.  i.  p.  155. 


148  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1831 

former  friends,  who  established  the  Globe,  the  organ  of  the 
administration.  They  had  all  been  obscure  men,  but  were 
clever  writers  and  consummate  politicians  of  the  new  school. 
They  constituted  the  famous  "  Kitchen  Cabinet."  ' 

It  was  not  until  toward  the  close  of  his  first  term  that 
Jackson  furnished  solid  ground  for  the  opposition.  Soon 
after  the  beginning  of  his  administration  a  violent  dissen 
sion  arose  in  his  own  party.  It  was  occasioned  by  a  ri 
valry  between  Calhoun,  Vice  -  President,  and  Yan  Buren, 
Secretary  of  State,  each  of  whom  sought  to  succeed  Jackson 
in  the  Presidency.  It  began  by  a  contest  between  them 
to  strengthen  their  positions  by  means  of  patronage,  and 
speedily  reached  a  pass  that  wanted  only  small  provoca 
tion  to  cause  open  disruption.  The  provocation  was  soon 
supplied. 

John  II.  Eaton,  Secretary  of  War,  and  previously  for  ten 
years  a  Senator  from  Tennessee,  had  recently  married  Mrs. 
Timberlake,  the  widow  of  a  purser  in  the  navy  who  had 
committed  suicide.  She  was  the  comely  daughter  of  a 
Washington  tavern-keeper,  and,  as  "Peggy  O'Neil,"  had  at 
one  time  enjoyed  much  popularity  among  the  gallant  fre 
quenters  of  the  capital.  Before  her  husband's  death  Eaton 
had  been  more  attentive  to  her  than  was  good  for  her  rep 
utation.  Under  these  circumstances  the  wives  of  the  Vice- 
President  and  the  cabinet  officers  refused  to  recognize  her 
socially.  Jackson,  smarting  under  the  recollection  of  the 
charges  that  his  own  matrimonial  experience  had  occa- 


1  ' '  The  General's  misfortune  is  that  his  confidence  is  reposed  in  men  in  no 
degree  equal  to  him  in  natural  parts,  but  who  have  been  of  use  to  him  here 
tofore  in  covering  his  very  lamentable  defects  of  education ;  and  as  he  is 
very  unwilling  to  make  these  defects  known  to  any  others,  he  is  compelled 
to  keep  these  gentlemen  about  him." — Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Hamilton, 
p.  104.  Concerning  (he  "Kitchen  Cabinet,"  see  Sumner's  Jackson,  p.  142. 


CH.  IV.]   REORGANIZATION  OF  JACKSON'S  CABINET   149 

sioned,  strove  to  coerce  the  recognition  of  Mrs.  Eaton.  Even 
his  own  niece,  who  was  mistress  of  the  White  House,  re 
fused  to  comply,  and  was  sent  back  to  Tennessee  in  conse 
quence.  As  Van  Buren  was  a  widower  he  profited  by  the 
affair. 

This  hastened  the  impending  breach  that  other  events 
served  to  increase.  A  circumstance  hitherto  concealed  now 
came  to  light.  It  will  be  remembered  that  after  the  Florida 
campaign,  Calhoun,  then  Secretary  of  War,  favored  the  pro 
posed  censure  of  General  Jackson,  who  was  now  apprised 
of  the  fact  by  a  letter  written  by  Crawford  to  one  of  Jack 
son's  friends.  Jackson  at  once  enclosed  a  copy  of  it  to  Cal 
houn,  with  a  request  for  an  explanation ;  but  as  there  could 
be  no  explanation  satisfactory  to  Jackson,  open  war  between 
them  was  declared.  Three  members  of  the  cabinet  were 
partisans  of  Calhoun.  A  reorganization  of  it  was,  therefore, 
decided  upon.  To  bring  this  about,  Eaton  set  the  example 
which  it  was  desired  the  others  should  follow.  He  resigned, 
and  was  appointed  governor  of  Florida.  Van  Buren  imme 
diately  did  likewise,  and  was  sent  as  Minister  to  England. 
The  obnoxious  members  were  then  disposed  of,  and  a  new 
cabinet  was  constructed.  Such  was  the  internal  condition 
of  the  Democratic  party  on  the  eve  of  the  campaign  of  1832, 
in  which  it  had  been  determined  that  Jackson  was  to  be  a 
candidate  for  re-election. 

By  this  time  Jackson's  policy  had  developed  distinct  out 
lines.  It  gave  Clay  precisely  the  opportunity  he  most  de 
sired.  Jackson  was  now  hostile  to  the  system  of  internal 
improvements,  and  to  every  sort  of  special  legislation. 
While  he  was  not  strongly  opposed  to  the  policy  of  protec 
tion,  his  inclinations  were  that  way ;  he  assumed  a  neutral 
attitude  that  encouraged  the  South  without  alarming  the 


150  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

North.1  Inasmuch  as  the  public  debt  was  nearly  paid, 
he  favored  such  a  revision  of  the  tariff  as  would  reduce 
the  revenue  without  radically  disturbing  protected  interests. 
Clay  was  thus  driven  to  a  policy  far  more  extreme  than  he 
had  ever  before  advocated.  Rather  than  to  impair  protec 
tion,  he  preferred  to  maintain  the  debt,  and  favored  an  elab 
orate  system  of  internal  improvements,  or,  as  an  alterna 
tive,  to  diminish  the  revenue  by  making  many  of  the  duties 
prohibitive,  and  entirely  removing  the  duties  on  many  arti 
cles  not  competing  with  those  produced  here. 

Besides  these  questions,  another  had  made  its  appearance. 
In  his  first  message  to  Congress,  Jackson  intimated  his  dis 
favor  of  renewing  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  which  was  to  expire  in  1836.3  "With  the  bank,  Jack 
son's  opponents  were  indissolubly  allied.  It  was  the  em 
bodiment  of  their  Constitutional  doctrine  and  the  represent 
ative  of  the  moneyed  interests  of  the  country.  The  issue, 
however,  did  not  become  formidable  until  just  before  the 
election  of  1832,  although  the  threatening  attitude  of  Jack 
son  and  some  of  his  supporters,  notably  Benton,  had  pro 
voked  discussion  and  caused  the  bank  and  the  anti-adminis 
tration  party  to  do  all  that  could  be  done  to  insure  the 
recharter. 


1  Bolles's  Financial  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  ii.  p.  394  ;  Greeley's 
Recollections  of  a  Busy  Life,  p.  67. 

2  This  message  was  the  work  of  several  hands.     It  was  revised  by  Ham 
ilton,  who  abridged  and  rewrote  the  part  relating  to  the  bank.     "  When  I 
stopped  here,  he  [Jackson]  said,  '  Do  you  think  that  is  all  I  ought  to  say  ?' 
I  answered,  '  I  think  you  ought  to  say  nothing  at  present  about  the  bank.' 
He  replied,   '  Oh  !  my  friend,  I  am  pledged  against  the  bank,  but  if  you 
think  that  is  enough,  so  let  it  be.' "    Van  Buren  expressed  himself  as  agree 
ing  with  Madison,  that  the  Constitutional  power  to  establish  a  national  bank 
had  been  settled  by  practical  construction. — Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Hamil 
ton,  p.  150. 


CH.  IV.]  CLAY  THE  WHIG  NOMINEE  FOR  PRESIDENT  151 

By  common  consent  of  that  party — then  called  the  Na 
tional  ^Republican  party,  for  it  did  not  take  the  name  of 
Whig  until  1S341 — Clay  was  to  be  its  candidate  for  the 
Presidency.  This  was  generally  understood  after  the  elec 
tion  of  1828.  He  was  formally  nominated  by  the  national 
convention  held  at  Baltimore  in  December,  1831 ;  the  nomi 
nee  for  Yice- President  was  John  Sergeant,  one  of  those 
who  had  advocated  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  Missouri. 
After  Clay  retired  from  the  Department  of  State  he  made 
several  tours  in  Kentucky  and  the  neighboring  States.  In 
the  larger  towns  he  usually  made  speeches,  sometimes  of 
considerable  length,  on  political  topics.  The  demonstra 
tions  with  which  he  was  everywhere  greeted  made  him 
confident  of  success.  But  he  received  a  very  distinct  warn 
ing  of  disaster  in  the  results  of  the  Kentucky  election  in 
the  early  part  of  1831;  Jackson's  popularity  in  the  State 
showed  no  decline.  Clay's  adherents  obtained  only  a  nar 
row  majority  in  the  State  legislature,  which  was  to  elect 
a  Senator.  Clay  was  prevailed  upon  to  accept  the  post.2 


1  "The  terra  'Whig'  was  a  nickname  applied  to  the  Scotch  Presby 
terians.     It  began  at  the  time  when  the  Cameronians  took  up  arms  for 
their  religion,  and  was  derived  from  'whey,'  refuse  milk,  which  their 
poverty  obliged  them  to  use  ;  or,  according  to  another  version,  from 
'  whiggam,'  a  word  employed  by  Scotch  cattle-drovers  of  the  West  in  driv 
ing  their  horses." — Lecky's  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  i.  p.  19. 
It  is  stated  in  Barnes's  Life  of  Weed  (vol.  ii.  p.  48)  that  the  name  was  first 
suggested  at  a  public  meeting  of  the  anti- Jackson  men  by  James  Watson 
Webb  ;  Philip  Hone,  however,  says  in  his  Diary  (vol.  ii.  p.  34),  that  to  the 
name  "I  stand  godfather,  having  been  the  first  to  use  it  at  a  political 
meeting  of  which  I  was  president,  at  Washington  Hall."    See  also  Niles's 
Register,  vol.  xlvi.  p.  101 ;  Seward's  Autobiography,  p.  237. 

2  "  There  is  much  anxiety,  too,  for  the  election  in  Kentucky,  which  was 
fixed  for  yesterday.    Mr.  Clay  wished  J.  J.  Crittenden  to  be  elected  ;  but 
he  cannot  be  chosen  but  by  voting  for  himself.     The  election  will  fall, 
therefore,  upon  a  Jackson  man,  or  Clay  himself  must  be  elected  by  Critten- 
den's  vote,  even  this  being  of  so  doubtful  issue  that  Clay  is  unwilling  to 


152  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

There  was  urgent  reason.  The  mutter  of  the  coming  storm 
was  growing  more  ominous.  It  was  evident  that  Congress 
was  to  be  the  scene  of  a  fierce  and  protracted  struggle. 
However  autocratic  Jackson's  behests,  and  however  com 
pliant  the  fealty  of  his  party,  Congress,  which  had  now 
attained  the  full  measure  of  its  importance,  was  to  be  the 
seat  of  war.  There  the  opposition  was  to  show  its  boldest 
front.  Clay  had  refused  a  seat  in  the  House,  and  wras  re 
luctant,  as  a  Presidential  candidate,  to  make  himself  the 
needless  target  of  his  foes.  But  it  was  the  general  d'esire  of 
his  party  that  he  should  command  in  person.  Under  these 
circumstances  he  returned,  at  the  opening  of  the  Twenty- 
second  Congress,  to  the  body  in  which  he  had  won  his  first 
national  distinction. 

That  the  new  epoch  which  Jackson's  elevation  indicated 
had  begun  was  everywhere  visible.  Everything  that  tells 
the  history  of  the  time  bespeaks  a  transition  so  distinct  as 
to  seem  almost  abrupt.  Events  assumed  a  new  mould  and 
complexion. 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  country  has  public  life  ab 
sorbed  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  talent  adapted  to  it  as 
during  the  twenty  years  beginning  with  the  Twenty-second 
Congress.  Much  of  the  talent  that  afterward  sought  the 
channels  then  newly  opening — journalism,  literature,  corpo 
rate  enterprise,  and  the  like — was  devoted  to  the  profes 
sion  of  the  law,  and  thence  to  politics.  As  a  result,  political 
activity  became  so  intense  that  many  of  the  performances 


take  the  chance."— Adams's  Diary,  January  5,  1831,  vol.  viii.  p.  263. 
Clay  was  elected,  however,  by  a  majority  of  eight.  Crittenden  wrote  to 
his  daughter  :  "  I  could  have  gone  to  the  Senate ;  it  was  but  for  me  to  ex 
press  the  wish  and  Mr.  Clay  would  not  have  been  the  candidate.  There 
was  no  collision,  no  rivalry  between  us.  All  that  was  done  was  with  my 
perfect  accordance." — Coleman's  Crittenden,  vol.  i.  p.  81. 


Cn.  IV.]     THE    POLICY   OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY  153 

enacted  in  the  public  arena  only  escaped  being  ridiculous 
by  the  great  ability  displayed  and  by  their  harmful  con 
sequences  to  the  country ;  for  the  people  were  hardly  less 
frenzied  in  their  partisanship  than  were  their  representa 
tives. 

Clay's  presence  in  Congress  was  necessarily  the  signal  for 
energetic  warfare  against  the  administration.  The  qualities 
he  had  exhibited  in  his  previous  course  of  opposition  not 
only  reappeared  in  all  their  vigor,  but  were  enhanced  by 
his  commanding  position  and  the  confidence  he  felt  and  in 
spired.  The  principal  features  of  the  party  policy  were  to 
procure  the  recharter  of  the  bank  and  to  perpetuate  pro 
tection.  As  to  the  latter,  Clay  asserted  in  a  conclave  of 
his  friends  that  "  to  preserve,  maintain,  and  strengthen  the 
American  System,  he  would  defy  the  South,  the  President, 
and  the  devil."  *  The  other  features  of  the  party  policy 
were  to  conform  to  exigencies.  Whatever  opportunity  of 
fered  was  to  be  vigorously  utilized. 

The  session  began  December  5.  January  9  Clay  sub 
mitted  a  resolution  declaring  his  plan  of  tariff  revision — to 
abolish  all  duties  on  articles  not  competing  with  domestic 
productions,  except  duties  on  wines  and  silks,  which  were  to 
be  reduced.  This  would  permit  the  maintenance  of  the  ex 
isting  or  increased  duties  on  other  articles.  The  Committee 
on  Finance  was  to  report  a  bill  framed  on  that  basis.  On 
the  same  day  the  memorial  of  the  bank  for  the  renewal  of 
its  charter  was  presented.  This  was  to  be  the  occasion  of  a 
bill  for  that  purpose.  But  before  the  discussion  of  these 
paramount  subjects  had  well  begun  the  Senate  carried  out  a 
preliminary  detail  of  the  Whig  programme — the  rejection 

1  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  viii.  p.  447  ;  McCulloch's  Men  and  Measures  of 
Haifa  Century,  p.  506. 


154  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

of  Van  Buren's  nomination  as  Minister  to  England.     It  was 
the  first  of  a  series  of  calamitous  mistakes. 

Inasmuch  as  it  was  settled  that  Yan  Buren  was  to  be  the 
Democratic  candidate  for  successor  to  Jackson,  it  was  sup 
posed  by  the  "Whig  leaders  that  the  rejection  of  his  nomi 
nation  as  minister  would  injure  him  politically.  To  make 
it  appear  proper  and  just,  however,  was  a  troublesome 
task.  Having  been  a  Senator,  he  was  entitled  to  the  ben 
efit  of  the  "  Senatorial  courtesy."  There  was  absolutely 
no  personal  ground  on  which  to  justify  the  action,  for 
his  character  was  irreproachable  and  his  deportment  ineffa 
bly  amiable.  Moreover,  the  indignity  would  be  poignantly 
severe,  as  he  was  sent  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress, 
and  had  already  been  at  his  post  several  months.  But 
after  a  painstaking  delay  the  votes  were  procured  and 
the  modus  operandi  arranged.  Twelve  set  speeches  against 
the  nomination  were  pronounced  with  dramatic  solemnity. 
Had  the  occasion  been  the  impeachment  of  the  President 
the  oratory  would  have  displayed  about  the  same  quality,  if 
not  quantity,  of  patriotic  bathos.  Clay,  "Webster,  Hayne, 
and  the  rest  of  the  dozen  all  asseverated  their  painful  re 
luctance,  which  a  profound  sense  of  public  duty  alone  could 
constrain  them  to  overcome.  Yan  Buren  was  guilty  of 
political  misdeeds  that  rendered  him  unfit  to  represent 
the  nation  at  a  foreign  court.  To  advance  himself,  he 
had  embroiled  the  President  and  Yice-President  and  caused 
the  disruption  of  the  cabinet.  He  was  chiefly  responsible 
for  introducing  the  system  of  political  proscription.  And, 
worst  of  all,  he  had  stultified  the  nation  by  the  instructions 
he  had  given  as  Secretary  of  State  to  McLane,  Minister  to 
England,  to  govern  his  negotiations  touching  the  "West 
Indian  trade,  which  had  long  been  interrupted  through 


CH.  IV.]    THE  JACKSON  AND  CALHOUN  QUAEREL    155 

needless  differences  between  the  two  governments.  The 
fact  is  that  he,  or  rather  the  President  through  him,  had 
directed  a  frank  avowal  of  the  errors  on  our  part  that  had 
impeded  the  adjustment  of  the  subject,  in  order  to  "  obviate 
as  far  as  practicable  the  unfavorable  impression  they  had 
produced."  These  were  the  charges  preferred.  They  were 
variously  treated,  according  to  the  histrionic  powers  of  the 
different  speakers.  The  two  latter  were  made  most  of  by 
the  Whigs,  and  the  other,  by  the  adherents  of  Calhoun,  who 
had  zealously  joined  the  cabal. 

Had  it  been  true  that  Yan  Buren  fomented  the  breach 
between  Jackson  and  Calhoun,  no  dishonorable  means  being 
used,  it  would  not  justify  the  rejection  of  his  nomination. 
But  it  is  obvious  from  the  facts  already  narrated,  and  with 
out  regard  to  Jackson's  express  declaration,  that  Yan  Buren 
was  not  the  cause  of  the  trouble,  which  originated  in  Craw 
ford's  disclosure  of  Calhoun's  course  concerning  the  Seminole 
campaign.  That  Yan  Buren  profited  by  it  was  immaterial 
to  the  question ;  some  one  necessarily  would.  Indeed,  it  is 
probable  that  in  any  event  he  would  have  received  Jack 
son's  preference.  He  was  at  the  head  of  the  dominant 
power  in  New  York  State,  not  by  accident  or  mere  force  of 
circumstances,  but  in  consequence  of  his  capacity,  political 
sagacity,  and  singularly  attractive  personal  qualities.  He 
had  begun  at  the  bottom.  Before  attaining  his  majority  he 
was  conspicuous  in  local  politics,  and  at  an  early  age  was 
a  commanding  personage  in  the  councils  of  his  party.  At 
the  same  time  his  learning  and  skill  as  a  lawyer  won  him  at 
the  bar  a  reputation  equally  wide  and  solid.  The  bare  list 
of  the  successive  steps  of  his  rise  to  eminence  and  influence 
in  the  midst  of  politicians  of  remarkable  ability — for  in  this 
respect  the  political  history  of  New  York  during  this  period 


156  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

is  altogether  unrivalled — is  sufficient  proof  of  his  powers. 
In  1808,  at  the  age  of  twenty-six,  he  became  surrogate  of 
his  county.  In  1812  he  was  elected  to  the  State  Senate, 
which  was  then  also  the  court  of  last  resort.  Two  years 
later  he  was  made  Attorney- General  of  the  State,  at  that 
time  a  very  high  professional  distinction.  In  1820  he  was 
elected  to  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  In  1828  he  was 
nominated  for  Governor  and  was  elected,  carrying  the  State 
for  Jackson.  This  made  his  entrance  into  Jackson's  cabi 
net  inevitable  ;  and  once  there,  it  would  have  been  singular 
had  he  not  won  Jackson's  cordial  respect  and  friendship.1 
In  any  case,  therefore,  to  oppose  his  nomination  as  minister 
because  of  Jackson's  attitude  toward  Calhoun  was  unjust 
and  unseemly. 

It  was  scarcely  less  improper  to  charge  upon  him,  for 
such  a  purpose,  Jackson's  policy  of  political  appointments. 
"Whatever  the  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  propriety  of 
that  course,  it  had  no  relation  to  Yan  Buren's  nomination, 
and  hence  it  was  not  a  legitimate  ground  of  opposition  to  it. 
But,  as  before  shown,  that  policy  was  not  the  result  of  the 
advice  or  efforts  of  any  individual,  even  assuming  the  im 
possible  theory  that  Jackson  could  have  been  governed  in 
that  regard  by  Yan  Buren  or  any  one  else ;  Jackson  need 
ed  no  stimulation,  and,  if  he  did,  it  was  supplied  by  the 
general  political  situation  in  which  he  found  himself,  and 
the  demands  upon  him  from  every  quarter.  Merely  po 
litical  differences  between  the  President  and  a  majority  of 
the  Senate  have  never  been  urged  as  a  reason  for  reject- 


1  Hamilton  asserts  that  at  this  period  Van  Buren's  historical  informa 
tion  was  meagre,  and  that  in  the  composition  of  his  state  papers  he  de 
pended  on  his  son  John  and  B.  F.  Butler,  his  law  partner  and  subsequent 
ly  Attorney-General.— Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Hamilton,  pp.  68,  97,  216. 


CH.  IV.]      THE  CHARGES  AGAINST  VAN  BUREN        157 

ing  the  President's  nominations ;  if  they  were,  he  would 
often  be  unable  to  form  a  cabinet.  JSTo  doubt  Clay  was  not 
a  little  actuated  by  the  fact  that  Jackson  and  some  of  his 
friends  had  voted  against  his  nomination  for  Secretary  of 
State ;  but  it  would  have  been  more  worthy  of  him  to  re 
member  that  Yan  Buren  was  then  in  the  Senate  and  had 
not  opposed  him. 

The  last  charge — that  directing  the  acknowledgment  of 
undeniable  error  was  in  derogation  of  national  honor,  re 
quiring  the  minister  to  uphold  his  country  right  or  wrong 
— does  not  deserve  refutation.  It  was  a  noble,  as  it  was  a 
very  successful,  departure  from  the  common  course  of  diplo 
macy,  which  has  always  been  to  obtain  advantage  rather 
than  justice.  The  fault  that  Yan  Buren  committed  was  in 
supporting  this  consideration  by  the  far-fetched  and  super 
fluous  suggestion  that  the  question  had  been  virtually  deter 
mined  by  the  people,  whose  judgment  was  unfavorable  to 
the  policy  of  the  last  administration.  This,  it  was  contend 
ed,  made  the  minister  the  representative  of  his  party,  not  of 
the  country.  And  there  was  much  force  in  the  criticism ; 
still,  if  the  instructions  were  otherwise  proper,  this  error 
was  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  rejection. 

The  defence  was  not  conducted  with  the  thoroughness 
and  vigor  that  the  opposition  warranted.  But  four  Senators 
spoke  in  Yan  Buren's  behalf,  and  they  failed  to  take  due 
advantage  of  the  merits  of  the  case,  allowing  them  to  be 
obscured  by  debating  irrelevant  considerations.  Some  of 
the  most  ardent  supporters  of  the  administration  shared 
Benton's  view  of  the  matter.  They  voted  to  confirm,  but 
said  nothing,  preferring  that  the  nomination  be  rejected,  on 
the  assumption  that  instead  of  Yan  Buren  being  injured  he 
would  be  materially  strengthened,  as  the  people  would  attrib- 


158  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1832 

ute  the  affair  entirely  to  personal  rivalry.1     And  the  sequel 
proved  this  view  to  be  correct. 

This  electioneering  episode  finished,  the  Senate  recurred 
to  Clay's  tariff  resolution.  Two  days  after  offering  it  he 
called  it  up  and  delivered  a  speech  in  its  support.  As  it 
was  announced  that  he  would  speak,  the  floor  and  galleries 
were  thronged.  It  was  six  years  since  he  had  been  heard 
in  Congress  by  the  public ;  for  the  debate  on  Yan  Buren's 
nomination  was  in  secret  session,  though  the  speeches 
were  immediately  published,  having  been  made  for  that 
purpose.  But  the  speech  on  the  tariff  resolution  was  nei 
ther  long  nor  showy.2  His  manner  of  introducing  it,  how 
ever,  betrayed  an  affectation,  despite  his  disclaimer,  that 
provoked  comment.  "  I  have  a  few  observations,  Mr.  Pres 
ident,"  he  began,  "  and  only  a  few,  to  submit  to  the  Sen 
ate  on  the  measure  before  you,  in  doing  which  I  have  to 
ask  all  your  indulgence.  I  am  getting  old  ;  I  feel  too  sen 
sibly  and  unaffectedly  the  effects  of  approaching  age,  and 
have  been  for  some  years  very  little  in  the  habit  of  address 
ing  deliberative  assemblies.  I  am  told  that  I  have  been  the 


1  "Mr.  Calhoun,  as  Vice -President,  presiding  in  the  Senate,  could  not 
speak  ;  but  he  was  understood  to  be  personated  by  his  friends,  and  twice 
gave  the  casting  vote,  one  interlocutory,  against  the  nominee — a  tie  being 
contrived  for  that  purpose,  and  the  combined  plan  requiring  him  to  be 
upon  the  record."     "I  heard  Mr.  CalLoun  say  to  one  of  his  doubting 
friends :  '  It  will  kill  him,  sir,  kill  him  dead.    He  will  never  kick,  sir,  never 
kick/" — Benton's  Thirty  Years'  View,  vol.  i.  pp.  215,  219. 

2  "Clay's  presence  in  the  Senate  this  winter  is  providential.    Surely  he 
is  needed  more  than  in  1824,  if  possible,  and  he  has  a  cordial,  most  able, 
and  sufficient  support  in  the  Senate.    His  speech  was  not  showy,  nor  vehe 
ment,  but  cool,  plain,  paternal,  grave,  conciliatory .": — Choate  to  Nichols, 
January  14, 1832.   Yet  Adams  recorded :  "  I  found  much  excitement  among 
the  Senators  from  the  South  upon  the  doctrines  of  Mr.  Clay's  speech  yes 
terday.    Mr.  Tyler,  of  Virginia,  and  General  Smith,  of  Maryland,  spoke 
of  dividing  the  Union  by  the  Potomac." — Diary,  January  12,  vol.  viii. 
p.  455. 


CH.  IV.]     CLAY'S   ARGUMENT   FOR  PROTECTION  159 

cause — the  most  unwilling  cause,  if  I  have  been — of  exciting 
expectations,  the  evidence  of  which  is  around  us.  I  regret 
it;  for  however  the  subject  on  which  I  am  to  speak  in  other 
hands  might  be  treated,  to  gratify  the  presence  and  atten 
tion  now  given,  in  mine  I  have  nothing  but  a  plain,  unvar 
nished,  and  unambitious  exposition  to  make."  The  comments 
on  this  exordium  were  mostly  in  line  of  compliment,  though 
with  covert  humor.  One  Senator,  however — Smith,  of  Mary 
land — made  the  rather  tart  observation  that  he  could  not 
complain  of  the  infirmities  of  age,  though  older  than  the 
Senator  from  Kentucky,  nor  could  he  find  in  his  years  any 
apology  for  the  insufficiency  of  his  speech.  This  gave  Clay 
some  offence ;  and  to  his  retort  Smith  made  this  amusing 
reply:  "The  gentleman  from  Kentucky  is  the  last  who 
should  take  the  remark  as  disparaging  to  his  vigor  and  per 
sonal  appearance ;  for  when  that  gentleman  spoke  to  us  of 
his  age  I  heard  a  young  lady  near  me  exclaim,  c  Old!  why,  I 
think  he  is  mighty  pretty !' ;: 

In  his  speech  Clay  assumed  the  "established  policy  of 
protection,"  contenting  himself  with  some  reference  to  the 
history  of  it,  and  the  benefits  he  alleged  to  be  its  fruits. 
He  adverted  to  the  suggestions  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  which  pointed  to  a  general  reduction  of  the  tariff, 
and  explained  his  own  plan  to  the  contrary,  touching  inci 
dentally  the  subjects  of  internal  improvements  and  the  pub 
lic  lands.  He  opposed  a  rapid  reduction  of  the  public  debt, 
and  urged  the  adoption  of  the  system  of  home  valuation  of 
goods  subject  to  ad  valorem  duties.  He  also  spoke  of  the 
Southern  hostility  to  the  protective  policy,  but  held  that 
the  importance  of  the  system  to  the  rest  of  the  Union 
required  its  maintenance.  Yet  he  professed  to  act  "in  a 
spirit  of  warm  attachment  to  all  parts  of  our  beloved  coun- 


160  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

try,  with  a  lively  solicitude  to  restore  and  preserve  its 
harmony,  and  with  a  firm  determination  to  pour  oil  and 
balm  into  existing  wounds  rather  than  further  to  lacerate 
them." 

He  was  much  mistaken  if  he  supposed  that  protection 
was  so  firmly  established  as  to  be  secure  from  serious  assault. 
While  he  was  Secretary  of  State  the  tariff  of  1828  was  en 
acted.  It  has  always  been  known  as  the  "  tariff  of  abomina 
tions."  In  its  day  it  was  also  styled  the  "  black  tariff."  It 
flagrantly  betrayed  the  most  pernicious  tendencies  of  protec 
tive  legislation.  It  was  the  motley  and  undisguised  product 
of  politics  and  sectional  and  private  interests.  The  tariff  of 
1824  had  hardly  gone  into  effect  before  the  woollen  interests 
began  to  clamor  and  strive  for  more  protection.  On  the 
eve  of  the  ensuing  Presidential  election  a  tariff  bill  was  in 
troduced  as  an  administration  measure.  Its  main  object 
was  to  increase  the  duties  on  wool  and  woollen  goods ;  but 
as  that  object  could  not  be  attained  without  bartering  with 
various  other  interests,  these  interests  also  were  admitted 
to  the  benefits  of  the  bill.  Even  Webster,  who  previously 
figured  among  the  ablest  advocates  of  commercial  freedom, 
changed  his  ground.  To  win  favor  with  the  East,  he  sup 
ported  the  bill,  though  a  majority  of  the  Eastern  Repre 
sentatives  opposed  it.  His  plea  was  that  inasmuch  as  pro 
tection  had  apparently  become  a  settled  policy,  and  New 
England  capital  had  been  invested  on  the  strength  of  it,  he 
was  bound  to  support  it.  Yet  he  hesitated  for  some  time 
before  he  decided  to  vote  for  the  bill.  He  then  accepted 
the  admittedly  vicious  provisions  in  order  to  save  those 
that  were  satisfactory  to  him.  The  tariff  of  1828  thus 
became  a  conglomeration  of  monstrosities,  some  of  which 
were  unwisely  introduced  by  the  opponents  of  the  bill  in 


CH.  IV.]     TRACTS   ON  THE   PROTECTIVE  POLICY        161 

the  expectation  that  they  would  prevent  its  passage.1  Even 
Van  Buren,  who  was  then  in  the  Senate,  voted  for  it.  It 
was  extremely  obnoxious  in  the  South,  upon  which  it  bore 
with  uncompensated  and  defiant  injustice.  Hence  the  prop 
osition  to  make  the  entire  revenue  system  subservient  to 
protection  and  perpetuate  and  increase  the  heaviest  and 
most  irksome  burdens  upon  the  South  was  very  far  from 
pouring  "  oil  and  balm  into  existing  wounds ":  it  added 
insult  to  injury.  Strenuous  resistance  was  at  once  re 
solved  on. 

January  16,  five  days  after  Clay's  speech,  Hayne  offered 
an  amendment  to  the  resolution,  by  which  he  proposed  the 
immediate  reduction  of  the  import  revenue,  according  to  the 
existing  scale,  to  an  amount  sufficient  to  defray  the  expenses 
of  the  government  after  paying  the  public  debt,  and  the 
gradual  adoption  of  a  general  average  of  duties.  He  sup 
ported  his  proposition  in  a  speech  of  great  ability.  The  pro 
found  impression  it  produced  impelled  Clay  to  reply.  The 
result  was  his  notable  "  Defence  of  the  American  System." 
It  ranks  among  the  most  conspicuous  contributions  to  the 
literature  of  protection  in  this  country.  For  years  this 
speech  and  Hamilton's  celebrated  Eeport  were  regarded  as 
the  most  authoritative  expositions  of  the  protective  policy. 
After  much  further  debate,  Clay's  resolution  was  adopted 
and  a  bill  modelled  on  the  plan  it  proposed  became  a  law. 
But  it  was  soon  to  bear  bitter  fruit. 

The  next  subject  of  debate  was  that  of  the  public  lands. 


1  Clay  wrote  to  Crittenden,  February  14,  1828  :  "  We  shall  have  the 
tariff  up  in  Congress  next  week.  I  anticipate  a  tremendous  discussion. 
The  Jackson  party  are  playing  a  game  of  brag  on  the  subject.  They  do 
not  really  desire  the  passage  of  their  own  measure,  and  it  may  happen  in 
the  sequel  that  what  is  desired  by  neithei  party  commands  the  support  of 
both." — Coleman's  Crittenden,  vol.  i.  p.  67. 
11 


162  THE  JACKSONIAN    EPOCH  [1832 

Like  the  tariff,  it  was  perennial.  Though  a  large  portion  of 
the  public  domain  had  been  slowly  disposed  of  by  gift  and 
sale,  vast  areas,  amounting  at  that  time  to  1,090,000,000 
acres,  still  remained,  chiefly  in  the  Southern  and  Western 
States.  They  had  always  been  a  source  of  scheming,  which 
constantly  increased  with  the  development  of  the  country : 
public  property  is  always  viewed  with  eager  and  ingenious 
eyes.  For  some  years  this  growing  interest  in  the  subject 
had  prompted  a  variety  of  plans  for  dealing  with  it.  Pro 
tectionists  wanted  the  government  to  retain  control  of  the 
lands  and  maintain  prices  sufficiently  high  to  impede  the 
rapid  occupation  of  them.  This  would  "  protect  agriculture  " 
and  not  divert  attention  from  manufacturing.  It  would 
hinder  any  material  increase  in  the  wages  of  labor  by  con 
fining  the  working  classes  to  the  East,  as  the  new  lands 
would  be  rendered  less  alluring.  Thus  free  lands  and  free 
trade  became  allied  policies,  and  as  such  were  denounced  by 
the  protectionists.  But  the  subject  was  now  introduced 
mainly  to  embarrass  Clay. 

The  principal  champion  of  the  free-lands  policy  was  Ben- 
ton,  who  began  his  crusade  in  its  behalf  in  1824  His  plan 
was  that  of  graduated  prices  and  gratuitous  grants  to  actual 
settlers — the  system  of  pre-emption.  In  1826,  he  says,  he 
first  read  Edmund  Burke's  great  plea  for  the  disposition  of 
the  crown  lands,  in  which  he  argued  that  the  principal  rev 
enue  to  be  derived  from  these  uncultivated  wastes  would 
"  spring  from  the  improvement  and  population  of  the  king 
dom."  This  furnished  Benton  with  a  broader  reason  for  his 
plan  than  he  had  before  conceived,  as  well  as  an  imposing 
authority  which  won  Jackson's  approval  when  brought  to  his 
attention.  Benton  labored  zealously  from  year  to  year  in 
furtherance  of  his  policy,  and  his  bills  and  speeches  were  at 


CH.  IV.]  THE  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  PUBLIC  LANDS  163 

length  instrumental  in  making  it  a  part  of  the  Democratic 
creed. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  McLane,  proposed  in  his 
a'inual  report  for  1831  that  the  public  lands  within  any  of  the 
States  should  be  sold  to  those  States  and  the  proceeds  be 
apportioned  among  all  the  States.  Six  of  the  new  States 
petitioned  Congress  for  the  cession  of  the  lands  so  situated. 
In  March,  1832,  one  Senator  moved  an  inquiry  into  the  ex 
pediency  of  reducing  the  price  of  the  lands,  and  another, 
into  that  of  McLane's  proposition.  The  whole  subject  was 
then  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Manufactures,  of  which 
Clay  was  chairman.  As  there  was  a  standing  Committee  on 
Pub  I  Lands,  this  course  was  manifestly  improper  and 
fraught  with  great  danger  to  Clay  as  a  Presidential  candi 
date  As  he  himself  put  it :  "  Although  any  other  member 
of  that  committee  could  have  rendered  himself,  with  appro 
priate  researches  and  proper  time,  more  competent  than  I 
was  to  understand  the  subject  of  the  public  lands,  it  was 
known  that  from  my  local  position  I  alone  was  supposed 
to  have  any  particular  knowledge  of  them.  Whatever 
emanated  from  the  committee  was  likely,  therefore,  to  be 
ascribed  to  me.  If  the  committee  should  propose  a  measure 
of  great  liberality  toward  the  new  States,  the  old  States 
might  complain.  If  the  measure  should  seem  to  lean  tow 
ard  the  old  States,  the  new  might  be  dissatisfied.  And  if 
it  included  neither  class  of  States,  but  recommended  a  plan 
according  to  which  there  would  be  distributed  impartial 
justice  among  all  the  States,  it  was  far  from  certain  that 
any  would  be  pleased." 

The  proceeding  long  rankled  in  his  mind.  "  I  strenuously 
opposed  the  reference,"  said  he  in  a  speech  in  1835.  "  I  re 
monstrated,  I  protested,  I  entreated,  I  implored.  It  was  in 


164  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1332 

vain  that  I  insisted  that  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands 
was  the  regular  standing  committee  to  which  such  refer 
ence  should  be  made.  It  was  in  vain  that  I  contended  that 
the  public  lands  and  domestic  manufactures  were  subjects 
absolutely  incongruous.  The  unnatural  alliance  was  order 
ed  by  the  vote  of  a  majority  of  the  Senate.  I  felt  that  a 
personal  embarrassment  was  intended  me.  I  felt  that  the 
design  was  to  place  in  my  hands  a  many-edged  instrument 
which  I  could  not  touch  without  being  wounded.  Never 
theless,  I  subdued  all  my  repugnance  and  I  engaged  assidu 
ously  in  the  task  which  had  been  so  unkindly  assigned 
me."  In  a  speech  in  1841  he  expressed  himself  in  the  same 
strain. 

The  report  of  the  committee  was  soon  forthcoming.  It 
was  a  long  document,  giving  the  devious  history  and  the 
status  of  the  subject,  together  with  the  argument  for  the 
plan  proposed.  The  plan  was  embodied  in  an  accompany 
ing  bill.  It  was  against  reducing  the  price  of  the  lands  or 
ceding  them  to  the  States.  But  as  the  political  exigencies 
of  the  situation  required  some  new  departure  which  would 
at  least  tend  to  neutralize  conflicting  views  and  interests,  it 
was  proposed  that  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Alabama,  Mis 
souri,  and  Mississippi  should  receive  twelve  and  a  half  per 
centum  of  the  proceeds  of  the  lands  sold  within  their  limits, 
to  be  applied  to  schools  and  internal  improvements.  The 
remainder  of  the  proceeds  was  to  be  distributed  among  all 
the  States  according  to  their  population,  for  the  same  pur 
poses  and  for  colonization,  as  their  legislatures  should  di 
rect.  The  act  was  to  remain  in  force  five  years.  There 
were  other  details,  but  these  were  the  principal  features  of 
the  scheme.  It  would  leave  the  existing  relations  of  the 
public  lands  to  the  economic  conditions  of  the  country  sub- 


CH.  IV.]    THE  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  LAND  SCHEME    165 

stantially  unaltered,  yet  it  would  satisfy  the  East,  yield 
something  to  the  West,  and  effectively  further  the  policy  of 
internal  improvements. 

It  encountered  determined  resistance.  The  process  that 
begot  it  necessarily  made  it  an  important  part  of  the  Whig 
policy,  and  a  prominent  issue  between  the  parties.  The  re 
port  and  bill  were  immediately  referred  to  the  committee  to 
which  the  subject  should  have  gone  originally,  the  Com 
mittee  on  Public  Lands.  A  few  days  afterward  that  com 
mittee  made  a  voluminous  report  sharply  combating  all 
phases  of  Clay's  plan.  It  was  for  the  most  part  Benton's 
production.  It  proposed  the  reduction  of  the  minimum 
price  to  one  dollar  per  acre,  and  after  five  years  to  fifty 
cents,  fifteen  per  centum  of  the  proceeds  to  be  divided  among 
all  the  States.  There  were  also  to  be  provisions  for  pre-emp 
tion.  The  whole  subject  had  become  so  involved  through 
the  various  and  unequal  benefits  which  the  different  States, 
old  and  new,  had  derived  from  the  public  domain  that  no 
general  plan  could  be  adopted  that  would  accomplish  a  per 
fectly  equitable  adjustment  among  all  the  States.  But, 
looking  at  the  subject  broadly,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
Benton's  plan,  while  open  to  some  criticism,  would  have 
produced  a  more  just  and  beneficial  result.  Whatever 
its  minor  consequences,  it  would  throw  open  the  wilder 
ness  to  population  and  development,  and  thus  prove  of 
much  greater,  though  indirect,  benefit  to  the  nation  than 
would  follow  treating  the  subject  as  a  matter  of  rev 
enue. 

A  spirited  debate  ensued.  Clay's  bill  was  finally  passed 
by  the  Senate,  but  it  failed  in  the  House.  The  subject,  how 
ever,  was  now  placed  in  a  position  of  political  importance  it 
had  never  before  occupied.  The  immediate  purpose  of  brin^- 


166  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

ing  it  forward  was  accomplished — Clay  was  irretrievably  in 
jured  in  the  West. 

Meanwhile,  the  great  topic  of  the  session  had  reached  its 
climax.  July  4,  the  President  received  the  bill  to  recharter 
the  bank  ;  on  the  10th  he  returned  it  with  his  veto. 


CHAPTER   V 

The  Controversy  over  the  Bank  of  the  United  States— Thomas  H.  Benton 
— The  Whig  Leaders  Refuse  to  Compromise  with  Jackson  on  the 
Question  of  Rechartering  the  Bank — The  Bank  as  a  Political  Issue — 
The  Veto  of  the  Bill  to  Recharter— The  Error  of  the  Whig  Policy— 
The  Debate  on  the  Veto— The  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832— Jack 
son's  Triumph — Nullification — The  Force  Bill  and  the  Verplanck  Tariff 
Bill— John  C.  Calhoun— Clay's  Compromise  Bill— It  is  Substituted  for 
the  Verplanck  Bill  in  the  House  and  Passed  by  the  Senate— The  Com 
promise  Bill  and  the  Force  Bill  become  Laws,  and  South  Carolina 
Repeals  the  Nullification  Ordinance — The  Wisdom  of  the  Compromise 
and  Clay's  Responsibility  for  it  — His  Land  Bill  is  Passed  by  both 
Houses,  but  Vetoed  by  the  President 

No  topic  in  our  political  history,  except  slavery  and  the 
tariff,  has  been  the  subject  of  so  much  controversy  as  the 
subversion  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  It  was  the 
chief  exploit  of  Jackson's  Presidency,  and,  like  most  of  his 
political  acts,  it  has  been  glorified  or  denounced  according 
to  the  political  bias  of  the  critic.  The  literature  of  the 
subject  is  almost  endless.  For  several  years  the  bank  was 
the  source  of  frequently  recurring  investigation,  report,  and 
debate  in  Congress,  and  discussion  outside.  Nor  did  the 
struggle  cease  after  the  bank  was  gone ;  it  was  even  more 
violent  over  the  efforts  to  establish  the  Independent  Treas 
ury  to  meet  the  public  functions  which  the  bank  had  per 
formed.  Besides  the  records,  the  multitude  of  government 
documents,  and  the  current  literature  bearing  on  the  sub 
ject,  every  historical  and  biographical  work  relating  to  the 
political  and  economic  history  of  the  period  treats  of  it 


168  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

more  or  less.  To  examine  it  in  detail,  however,  is  needless 
to  the  present  survey  ;  the  principal  facts  and  general  con 
siderations  will  afford  a  sufficiently  clear  and  satisfactory 
view  of  the  question. 

Jackson's  prejudice  against  a  national  bank  was  of  long 
standing.  It  is  said  that  Clay's  speech  in  1811,  in  opposi 
tion  to  the  recharter  of  the  original  bank,  fixed  Jackson's 
.  opinions  on  the  subject.1  Certainly  the  main  grounds  of  his 
objection  to  the  recharter  in  these  later  years  were  substan 
tially  the  same  as  Clay  advanced  in  that  speech. 

The  new  bank,  chartered  in  1816,  after  some  years  of  bad 
administration,  which  precipitated  the  crisis  of  1819  and  the 
ensuing  period  of  general  liquidation,  partly  accomplished 
the  objects  for  which  it  was  established.  Had  it  been 
well  conducted  at  the  outset  it  would  soon  have  materi 
ally  aided  in  restoring  the  government  and  the  country 
from  the  decrepit  financial  condition  into  which  they  had 
fallen  during  the  war.  It  did  finally  effect  the  resumption 
of  specie  payments,  against  the  opposition  of  the  State 
banks,  and  supplied  a  currency  that  was  uniform  and  ac 
ceptable,  though  far  from  perfect.  After  the  first  years 
it  was  not  open  to  any  just  charge  of  insolvency  or  of  not 
properly  performing  all  its  business  with  the  government 
according  to  the  terms  of  its  charter.  In  all  this  it  was 
powerfully  aided  by  the  general  recuperation  of  the  times ; 
yet  it  was  fairly  entitled  to  the  credit  of  performing  some 
valuable  service.  The  latent  evil  in  the  character  of  the 
institution  did  not  appear  until  1829. 

Jeremiah  Mason,  a  noted  and  able  New  England  lawyer 
and  a  close  political  friend  of  Daniel  Webster,  had  been 


Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  ii.  p.  654. 


CH.  V.]     BENTON'S    CONGRESSIONAL  PROMINENCE     169 

previously  appointed  president  of  the  Portsmouth  branch. 
In  the  extremely  rigorous,  but  probably  faithful,  perform 
ance  of  his  duties  he  had  incurred  the  ill-will  of  some  of  the 
patrons  of  the  bank,  by  compelling — in  an  unnecessarily 
austere  manner,  it  was  charged — the  payment  of  certain 
protested  paper,  presumably  held  against  Democrats.  This 
led  to  an  effort  on  the  part  of  Isaac  Hill — who,  it  will  be  re 
membered,  was  one  of  Jackson's  "  Kitchen  Cabinet " — and 
other  New  Hampshire  adherents  of  the  administration  to 
cause  Mason's  removal.  Then  followed  a  protracted  cor 
respondence  over  the  matter  between  Nicholas  Biddle,  the 
doughty  and  over-fluent  president  of  the  bank,  and  Ingham, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  The  discussion  at  length  de 
veloped  into  a  severe  and  general  encounter.  But  the  bank 
pursued  its  own  course  in  all  respects  notwithstanding. 
Jackson  had  immediately  and  very  characteristically  taken 
up  the  quarrel,  and  in  his  message  to  Congress  soon  af 
terward  gave  the  ominous  announcement  of  his  hostility  to 
the  renewal  of  the  charter.1  But  to  prevent  the  recharter 
was  a  difficult  undertaking.  As  it  was  several  years  since 
the  bank  had  been  seriously  challenged  from  any  quarter, 
many  of  Jackson's  chief  supporters  were  friends  of  the  in 
stitution  ;  and  many  others  of  his  party  were  interested  in 
one  way  and  another  in  its  continuance.  It  was  at  thii 
juncture  that  Benton  earned  his  first  promotion  toward  the| 
leadership  of  the  administration  forces  in  Congress  whicl 
he  soon  attained. 


1  "In  the  Presidential  campaign  of  1824  the  bank  was  not  so  much  as 
mentioned,  nor  was  it  mentioned  in  that  of  1828.  In  all  the  political  pam 
phlets,  volumes,  newspapers,  campaign  papers,  burlesques,  and  carica 
tures  of  those  years  there  is  not  the  most  distant  allusion  to  the  bank  as 
a  political  issue." — Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii.  p.  257. 


170  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

At  the  beginning  of  Jackson's  administration,  March  4, 
1829,  Ben  ton  lacked  but  ten  days  of  being  forty-seven  years 
of  age  ;  he  was  in  the  prime  of  his  powers,  with  eight  years 
of  experience  in  the  Senate.  While  he  had  not  yet  risen  to 
a  position  of  imposing  influence,  he  had  laid  the  foundation 
for  it.  The  Senate  never  contained  a  more  robust  personage. 
He  was  neither  unique  nor  brilliant.  His  moral  and  mental 
integrity  were  sterling.  His  large,  solid  frame  was  in  har 
mony  with  his  intellectual  qualities.  He  was  a  man  of 
momentum.  He  served  in  the  Senate  thirty  years  contin 
uously,  during  the  most  variousty  exciting  political  period 
the  country  has  ever  seen ;  and  by  his  straightforward  and 
energetic  devotion  to  the  principles  he  had  early  imbibed, 
he  obtained  a  respect  that  the  more  brilliant  but  vacillating 
talents  of  his  most  distinguished  compeers  in  public  life 
could  not  command. 

His  father  was  a  North  Carolina  lawyer  of  standing.  He 
died  in  the  boy's  early  youth,  leaving  as  part  of  his  estate 
a  tract  of  forty  thousand  acres  near  Nashville,  Tennessee, 
whither  the  widow  with  her  several  children  soon  afterward 
removed.  The  land  was  well  located,  and  about  the  settle 
ment  begun  by  her  grew  up  in  the  course  of  a  few  years 
the  village  of  Bentonville.  Before  the  family  went  West, 
Thomas  had  attended  good  schools  and  developed  a  strong 
and  abiding  love  of  learning.  His  mother  had  education, 
strength  of  character,  and  a  refined  moral  sense.  She  ex 
erted  much  influence  over  him  and  effectually  fostered  his 
intellectual  tastes.  Though  he  did  not  attend  school  after 
leaving  North  Carolina,  he  acquired  by  assiduous  reading 
and  study  at  home  an  extensive  and  available  knowledge  of 
history  and  literature.  Barring  his  defects  in  the  niceties 
of  the  classics,  he  subsequently  ranked  with  the  most  ac- 


CH.  V.]       BENTON'S  EARLY  CAREER         171 

complished  statesmen  of  the  East.  In  due  time,  after  serv 
ing  a  successful  apprenticeship  as  a  planter,  he  took  up  the 
study  of  the  law  and  was  admitted  to  practice.  In  1811 
he  served  a  term  in  the  Tennessee  legislature,  where  he 
exhibited  the  same  traits  that  marked  his  Senatorial  career. 
Like  most  "Western  men,  he  was  enthusiastic  for  war  with 
England.  He  raised  a  regiment  of  volunteers  for  Jackson's 
first  army,  which  did  little  more  than  organize  before  it  was 
disbanded.  He  was  afterward  appointed  lieutenant-colonel 
by  the  President ;  but  before  he  could  reach  Canada,  where 
he  was  to  serve,  peace  was  declared  and  he  resigned  his 
commission.  In  1815  he  removed  to  St.  Louis,  continuing 
the  practice  of  the  law  and  publishing  a  newspaper.  His 
practice  was  lucrative  and  his  newspaper  productive  of 
quarrels  that  led  to  several  duels,  in  one  of  which  he  killed 
his  adversary.  There  were  few  men  of  any  influence  in  the 
Southwest  in  those  times  who  did  not  engage  in  these 
affairs;  readiness  to  face  the  pistol  when  the  "code  of 
honor"  required  it  was  one  of  the  essentials  of  popular  re 
spect.  That  Benton  never  outgrew  this  chivalrous  sentiment 
is  shown  by  the  zest  of  his  minute  account,  in  the  Thirty 
Years1  View,  of  ths  Clay-Randolph  duel,  which  he  witnessed. 
He  closes  by  saying:  "Certainly  duelling  is  bad  and  has 
been  put  down,  but  not  quite  so  bad  as  its  substitute — 
revolvers,  bowie-knives,  blackguarding,  and  street  assassi 
nations  under  the  pretext  of  self-defence." 

He  was  thoroughly  in  touch  with  the  people  of  his  region. 
Possessing  in  an  eminent  degree  the  qualities  that  character 
ized  the  prevailing  type,  his  ability  and  attainments  natural 
ly  advanced  him  to  the  rank  of  influence  he  so  long  held  in 
Missouri  and  the  "West.  He  was  not  the  inventor  of  politi 
cal  theories  and  projects,  but  the  representative  of  the  "West- 


172  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

ern  people  and  the  exponent  of  the  Western  policy.  In  the 
contest  over  the  admission  of  Missouri  he  took  chief  com 
mand  of  the  local  movement  against  the  restriction  of 
slavery,  which  finally  overcame  all  opposition.  Though  he 
was  a  slave-holder,  his  sentiments  were  adverse  to  slavery. 
He  opposed  restriction  in  Missouri  because  slavery  existed 
there  by  the  general  choice  of  the  people.  But  the  compro 
mise  through  which  Missouri  came  into  the  Union  met  his 
cordial  favor,  as  it  quieted  a  dangerous  agitation  and  fixed 
a  limit  to  the  extension  of  slavery.  He  was  elected  one  of 
the  first  Senators  from  the  new  State,  and  remained  the 
dictator  of  its  politics  until  the  heroic  course  he  took  in 
opposition  to  the  extension  of  slavery  caused  his  over 
throw. 

He  at  once  assumed  an  active  part  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  Senate.  He  was  not  an  orator  in  the  sense  that  Clay 
was,  but  a  skilful  and  prolific  debater,  sometimes  tedious 
and  often  pompous.  His  capacity  for  labor  was  prodigious, 
hence  his  speeches  usually  displayed  wide  and  accurate  in 
vestigation.  His  peculiar  strength  lay  in  his  mastery  of 
facts  and  details — and  the  impressive  boldness  with  which 
he  presented  them.  He  steadily  improved,  and,  what  best 
indicates  his  genuine  and  tenacious  powers,  he  continued  to 
improve  to  the  end  of  his  career.  On  most  of  the  numer- 
/ous  questions,  arising  in  various  ways,  that  related  to  the 
expansion  and  development  of  the  West,  he  took  a  vigorous 
initiative.  It  was  this  which  gave  him  by  degrees  that 
Western  character  and  influence  which  made  him  an  im 
portant  factor  in  national  politics.  During  the  canvass  of 
1824  he  supported  Clay;  but  after  the  election  devolved 
upon  the  House  he  supported  Jackson,  because  he  was  a 
Western  man  and  because  he  had  received  the  highest  pop- 


CH.  V.]  MEANS  TO  SECURE  THE  BANK'S  RECHARTER  173 

ular  and  electoral  vote.  Thenceforth  he  co-operated  with 
the  Democratic  party,  which  soon  began  to  receive  the  im 
press  of  his  views. 

Before  the  war,  Jackson  and  Benton  were  warm  friends. 
After  the  war  began,  Benton  was  Jackson's  aide-de-camp 
until  the  first  disbandment  of  his  troops.  It  was  Benton 
who  induced  the  President,  by  political  threats,  to  meet  the 
obligations  that  Jackson  had  incurred  to  provide  for  the  re 
turn  of  the  troops  at  Natchez.  For  some  years  after  the 
affray  between  Jackson  and  Coffee  and  the  Bentons  the 
two  were  estranged ;  they  then  resumed  their  friendly  re 
lations.  Before  Jackson's  declaration  in  his  message  against 
the  bank,  Benton  had  made  several  futile  attacks  upon  the 
bank,  and  the  subject  had  been  repeatedly  discussed  be 
tween  him  and  Jackson.  As  they  thoroughly  agreed  in 
their  opinions  concerning  the  institution,  Benton  was  ready 
to  lead  the  contest  against  it  when  the  time  arrived. 

The  bank  and  its  friends,  taking  the  alarm  which  the 
message  had  sounded,  exerted  all  possible  efforts  to  create 
public  sentiment  in  its  behalf.  A  committee  in  each  House 
of  Congress  made  a  long  and  vigorous  report  upholding  the 
bank.  In  the  House  adverse  resolutions  were  quickly  and 
silently  tabled.  The  press,  with  few  exceptions,  teemed 
with  articles  in  favor  of  the  recharter.  Besides  these  means, 
every  resource  of  politics  was  brought  to  bear.  Little,  how 
ever,  was  done  to  counteract  the  effect  of  this  agitation. 
"The  current  was  all  setting  one  way,"  says  Benton.  "I 
determined  to  raise  a  voice  against  it  in  the  Senate,  and 
made  several  efforts  before  I  succeeded — the  thick  array  of 
the  bank  friends  throwing  every  obstacle  in  my  way,  and 
even  friends  holding  me  back  for  the  regular  course,  which 
was  to  wait  until  the  application  for  the  renewed  charter 


174  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1832 

was  presented,  and  then  oppose  it.  I  foresaw  that  if  this 
course  was  followed  the  bank  would  triumph  without  a  con 
test — that  she  would  wait  until  a  majority  was  installed  in 
both  Houses  of  Congress — then  present  her  application — 
hear  a  few  barren  speeches  in  opposition — and  then  gallop 
the  renewed  charter  through."  In  February,  1831,  he  asked 
leave  to  submit  a  resolution  declaring  that  the  charter  ought 
not  to  be  renewed,  and  supported  the  application  in  an  ex 
tended  speech. 

The  charter  was  similar  to  that  of  the  original  Bank  of 
the  United  States  founded  by  Hamilton.  One-fifth  ($7,000,- 
000)  of  the  capital  stock  was  subscribed  by  the  government 
by  a  stock-note  bearing  five  per  centum  interest;  the  re 
mainder  was  subscribed  by  the  public — one-fifth  in  specie 
and  three-fifths  in  United  States  stocks.  Five  of  the  twenty 
directors  were  appointed  by  the  President,  subject  to  con 
firmation  by  the  Senate.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
was  vested  with  certain  important  discretionary  powers  over 
the  government's  relations  with  the  bank.  The  principal 
powers  and  privileges  of  the  bank  were  exclusive ;  and  be 
sides  the  great  benefits  derived  from  its  currency  functions 
and  the  prestige  of  its  partnership  with  the  government,  it 
and  its  twenty-five  branches  were  depositories  of  the  pub 
lic  moneys,  the  undrawn  balances  of  which  were  steady  and 
considerable  and  bore  no  interest.1  The  bonus  to  the  gov 
ernment  of  a  million  and  a  half,  exacted  by  the  charter,  was 
more  than  offset  by  the  interest  paid  by  the  government 
on  loans  from  the  bank.  The  amount  of  the  dividends  re 
ceived  by  the  government  was  nearly  one  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars  less  than  the  interest  on  the  stock-note,  which 

1  The  average  monthly  balance  to  the  credit  of  the  government  in  the 
bank  and  its  branches  from  1818  to  1832  was  $6,700,000. 


CH.  V.]     BENTON'S   SPEECH  AGAINST  RECIIARTER      175 

was  not  paid  until  1831.  Other  losses,  indirect,  were  easily 
traced.  These  leading  facts  furnished  the  topics  for  Ben- 
ton's  harangue.  It  was  an  indictment  in  several  distinct 
and  subdivided  counts,  all  put  in  plain  terms  for  popular 
effect. 

His  method  of  attack,  as  well  as  many  of  his  arguments, 
were  drawn  from  the  debates  in  Parliament  over  the  re- 
charter  of  the  Bank  of  England,  which  presented  many 
points  of  resemblance  to  the  issue  here.  He  did  not  touch  on 
the  Constitutional  question,  but  assailed  the  bank  solely  on 
the  score  of  its  general  character.  He  denounced  it  as  "  an 
institution  too  great  and  powerful  to  be  tolerated  in  a  gov 
ernment  of  free  and  equal  laws ";  because  "  its  tendencies 
were  dangerous  and  pernicious  to  the  government  and  the 
people  ";  and  because  of  "  the  exclusive  privileges  and  anti-re 
publican  monopoly  it  gave  to  the  stockholders."  These  con 
siderations  he  explained  and  illustrated  in  various  ways  and 
with  graphic,  though  sometimes  rather  demagogical,  effect. 
He  closed  with  one  of  his  pleas  for  hard  money,  which  event 
ually  gave  him  the  sobriquet  of  "  Old  Bullion." 

As  soon  as  he  had  finished  his  speech  his  application  to 
introduce  the  resolution  was  denied  without  discussion. 
"  The  debate  stopped  with  the  single  speech,"  says  Benton, 
characteristically ;  "  but  it  was  a  speech  to  be  read  by  the 
people — the  masses — the  millions;  and  was  conceived  and 
delivered  for  that  purpose  ;  and  was  read  by  them  ;  and  has 
been  complimented  since  as  having  crippled  the  bank,  and 
given  it  the  wound  of  which  it  afterward  died,  but  not  with 
in  the  year  and  a  day  which  would  make  the  slayer  re 
sponsible  for  the  homicide." 

In  his  annual  message  at  the  opening  of  the  Twenty- 
second  Congress,  Jackson  merely  declared  that  he  still  held 


176  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

the  same  opinions  concerning  the  bank  which  he  had  stated 
in  his  previous  messages.  "  Having  thus  discharged  a  con 
scientious  duty,"  he  added,  "  I  deem  it  proper  on  this  occa 
sion,  without  more  particular  reference  to  the  views  of  the 
subject  there  expressed,  to  leave  it  for  the  present  to  the  in 
vestigation  of  an  enlightened  people  and  their  representa 
tives."  At  the  same  time  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in 
his  report,  strongly  favored  the  bank.1  The  effort  to  pro 
cure  a  recharter  at  this  session  was  contrary  to  the  wishes  of 
the  bank  and  its  non-political  friends.  Its  political  friends 
arbitrarily  compelled  it.  The  bank  policy  had  been  made 
one  of  the  principal  features  of  the  "Whig  platform  adopted 
at  the  Baltimore  convention,  held  only  a  few  days  after  the 
session  began,  and  Clay  declined  to  recede  from  the  fatuous 
plan  of  campaign  to  overthrow  Jackson  on  that  issue.  It  is 
related  that  Jackson  himself  tried  about  this  time  to  settle 
the  question  amicably,  by  proposing  a  compromise  through 
the  conditions  of  a  recharter.  "  Shortly  before  the  bank 
applied  to  Congress  for  a  recharter,"  says  Thurlow  Weed, 
"  the  Honorable  Louis  McLane,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury,  invited  Mr.  Biddle,  the  president  of  the  United  States 
Bank,  to  Washington.  At  their  interview  the  Secretary  in 
formed  Mr.  Biddle  that  he  was  authorized  by  the  President 
to  say  that  if  the  proposed  recharter  of  the  bank  contain 
ed  certain  modifications,  which  Mr.  McLane  handed  to  Mr. 


1  "  It  is  now  generally  admitted,  I  think,  after  a  considerate  examination 
of  Mr.  McLane's  views,  that  he  does  not  express  any  opposition  to  those 
entertained  by  myself ;  although  it  is  obvious  that  his  solicitude  to  obtain 
a  new  charter,  so  modified  as  to  free  the  institution  from  the  objections  of 
the  Executive,  springs  from  convictions  much  more  favorable  than  mine 
of  the  general  character  and  conduct  of  the  institution.  Mr.  McLane  and 
myself  understand  each  other,  and  have  not  the  slightest  disagreement 
about  the  principles  which  will  be  a  sine  qua  non  to  my  assent  to  a  bill  re- 
chartering  the  bank." — Jackson  to  Hamilton,  December  12,  1831. 


CH.  V.]   NO  COMPROMISE  ON  THE  BANK  QUESTION  177 

Biddle  in  writing,  the  bill  would  be  approved.  Mr.  Biddle 
returned  to  Philadelphia,  and  submitted  the  proposed  modi 
fications  to  Mr.  John  Sergeant,  a  director  of  the  bank  and 
its  counsel,  and  to  one  or  two  other  influential  directors,  by 
each  one  of  whom  the  modifications  were  accepted.  But 
before  announcing  such  acquiescence  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  it  was  deemed  proper  to  confer  with  the  leading 
friends  of  the  bank  then  in  Congress.  Mr.  Biddle  and  Mr. 
Sergeant,  therefore,  called  upon  Messrs.  Clay  and  Webster,  fc 
submitting  to  these  gentlemen  the  modifications  required  to 
secure  the  approval  by  the  President  of  a  recharter  of  the 
bank.  After  much  discussion  and  consideration,  Messrs. 
Clay  and  Webster  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  question 
of  a  recharter  had  progressed  too  far  and  had  assumed  aspects 
too  decided  in  the  public  mind  and  in  Congress  to  render 
any  compromise  or  change  of  front  expedient  or  desirable. 
Messrs.  Biddle  and  Sergeant  retired  for  consultation,  but  re 
turned  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  confirmed  in  their 
convictions  that  it  was  wise  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  Sec 
retary  of  the  Treasury.  Messrs.  Clay  and  Webster  replied 
that  they  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  battle  so  far,  and  that 
they  were  confident  of  their  ability  to  carry  a  bill  through 
Congress  rechartering  the  bank,  even  though  the  bill  should 
encounter  a  Presidential  veto ;  but  that  they  could  not  be 
responsible  for  the  result  if  in  the  heat  of  the  contest  the 
bank,  abandoning  its  reliable  friends,  should  strike  hands 
with  its  foe." ]  This  very  significant  account  finds  strong 
confirmation  in  the  brief  and  perfunctory  manner  in  which 
Jackson  had  touched  the  bank  question  in  his  last  message, 
and  in  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  One  of 


1  Thurlow  Weed's  Autobiography,  vol.  i.  p.  373. 
12 


178  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

the  chief  political  considerations  of  the  "Whig  leaders  in  pre 
cipitating  the  issue  was  the  expectation  of  winning  Pennsyl 
vania  from  Jackson.  As  the  bank  was  located  at  Philadel 
phia,  it  was  supposed  that  it  would  exert  a  decisive  influence 
on  the  popular  opinion  of  the  State. 

Upon  the  presentation  of  the  bank's  memorial  for  a  re- 
charter  it  was  referred  in  the  Senate  to  a  select  committee, 
and  in  the  House  to  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means, 
both  committees  having  a  majority  of  pro-bank  men.  Some 
days  after  this  Benton  returned  to  the  attack.  This  time  he 
asked  leave  to  introduce  a  resolution  declaring  that  the 
"  branch  drafts  "  were  illegal  and  ought  to  be  suppressed. 
This  was  the  text  for  another  speech.  These  drafts  were  an 
imitation  of  a  Scotch  invention  which  came  into  common 
use  in  Great  Britain.  They  were  prohibited  by  an  act  of 
Parliament  in  1826,  the  same  year  in  which  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States  adopted  the  contrivance.  The  drafts  were 
issued  by  the  branches,  most  of  them  by  the  branches  in  the 
South  and  West,  and  payable  at  the  main  bank  in  Philadel 
phia.  They  would  be  paid  on  presentation  at  any  of  the 
branches,  however;  but  as  they  were  in  small  denominations 
they  became  the  principal  currency  of  the  region  in  which 
they  were  issued,  and  were  rarely  redeemed.  In  1832  the 
amount  of  them  in  circulation  was  over  seven  million  dol 
lars.  Able  lawyers  had  pronounced  them  legal,  yet  it  was  a 
serious  question  whether  they  were  justified  by  the  terms  of 
the  charter,  which  guarded  with  scrupulous  care  the  emis 
sion  of  paper  expressly  designed  for  currency.  Certainly,  ' 
whatever  the  instruments  might  be  styled,  they  possessed 
most  of  the  attributes  of  an  unrestrained  paper  currency, 
and  no  one  denied  that  they  might  lead  to  dangerous 
suits.  Benton's  attack  was  sharp  and  vigorous  ;  but  it 


CH.  V.]     BENTON  LEADS  THE  ANTI-BANK  FORCES        179 

met  the  same  immediate  fate  that  had  befallen  the  former 
one. 

Though  Jackson  had  been  willing  to  avoid  the  bank  issue 
by  a  compromise,  the  course  of  his  opponents  could  not 
have  been  better  calculated  to  stimulate  his  combative 
energy  to  its  highest  tension.  He  and  his  advisers  were  no 
doubt  actuated  in  their  desire  to  take  the  question  out  of  the 
pending  election  by  an  appreciation  of  the  tremendous  and 
ramified  power  the  bank  could  wield  against  him.  But 
when  his  conciliatory  proposition  was  defiantly  rejected,  for 
political  reasons  solely,  it  was  a  political  necessity,  and 
would  have  been  with  any  candidate  in  the  same  situation, 
to  enter  the  contest  with  all  his  power.  He  did  so,  and  with 
keen  delight.  Benton  now  assumed  authoritative  command 
of  the  anti-bank  forces.  His  assault  on  the  branch -draft 
system  was  only  a  preliminary  skirmish ;  an  organized  and 
concerted  campaign  followed.  "  It  was  seen,"  says  Benton, 
"  to  be  the  policy  of  the  bank  leaders  to  carry  the  charter 
first  and  quietly  through  the  Senate,  and  afterwards  in  the 
same  way  through  the  House.  We  determined  to  have  a 
contest  in  both  places  and  to  force  the  bank  into  defences 
which  would  engage  it  in  a  general  contest  and  lay  it  open 
to  side  blows  as  well  as  direct  attacks.  With  this  view  a 
great  many  amendments  and  inquiries  were  prepared  to  be 
offered  in  the  Senate,  all  of  them  proper  or  plausible,  recom- 
mendable  in  themselves  and  supported  by  acceptable  reasons, 
which  the  friends  of  the  bank  must  either  answer  or  reject 
without  answer,  and  so  incur  odium.  In  the  House  it  was 
determined  to  make  a  move  which,  whether  resisted  or  ad 
mitted  by  the  bank  majority,  would  be  certain  to  have  an 
effect  against  the  institution — namely,  an  investigation  by  a 
committee  of  the  House  as  provided  in  the  charter.  If  the 


180  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

investigation  was  denied,  it  would  be  guilt  shrinking  from 
detection ;  if  admitted,  it  was  well  known  that  misconduct 
would  be  found.  I  conceived  this  movement  and  had  charge 
of  its  direction." 

This  plan  was  diligently  prosecuted.  Two  things  were 
certain :  the  recharter  would  be  passed  by  both  Houses,  and 
the  President  would  veto  it.  All  the  operations  of  both 
parties,  therefore,  had  for  their  exclusive  object  the  produc 
tion  of  campaign  material.  Under  these  circumstances,  had 
any  one  desired  an  impartial,  accurate,  and  exhaustive  in 
vestigation  and  presentation  of  the  subject,  necessary  to  the 
complete  solution  and  settlement  of  a  momentous  question 
of  national  finance,  it  could  not  have  been  accomplished. 
One  party  was  bound  to  continue  the  bank  at  all  hazards ; 
the  other,  to  destroy  it.  Any  means  that  promised  utility 
to  either  of  the  combatants  was  certain  to  be  employed. 

Inasmuch  as  the  several  prior  reports  of  committees  went 
for  naught,  and  as  neither  of  the  committees  to  which  the 
memorial  of  the  bank  had  been  referred  was  directed  to 
conduct  a  detailed  inquiry  into  the  management  and  condi 
tion  of  the  bank,  the  appointment  of  a  select  committee  for 
that  purpose  was  moved  in  the  House.  Benton  had  drawn 
the  charges  and  specifications,  twenty-two  in  number,  and 
they  were  boldly  preferred  by  the  member  who  made  the 
motion  for  a  committee.  After  an  acrimonious  discussion, 
in  which  it  soon  developed,  as  had  been  foreseen,  that  the 
partisans  of  the  bank  deemed  it  impolitic  to  prevent  the  in 
vestigation,  the  committee  was  appointed.  It  spent  some 
time  in  taking  evidence,  and  then  made  three  reports.  The 
majority  report  was  against  the  bank,  the  minority  reports — 
one  of  which  was  drawn  by  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  began 
his  remarkable  career  in  the  House  at  the  preceding  session 


CH.  V.]   JACKSON'S  REASONS  FOR  THE  VETO     181 

— were  in  its  favor.  Though  most  of  the  charges  were  not 
adequately  sustained  by  proof,  sufficient  maladministration 
— and  it  required  but  little  —  was  shown  to  exist  as  to 
affect  the  public  mind.  But  above  all  now  stood  out  as 
it  had  never  done  before  the  dangerous  possibilities  of  a 
gigantic  financial  corporation  invested  with  functions  that 
should  alone  be  exercised  by  the  government. 

The  bill  to  recharter  the  bank  on  essentially  the  old  plan 
was  in  due  time  reported  to  the  Senate.  After  a  protracted 
debate  over  separate  provisions  and  proposed  amendments, 
it  was  passed.  According  to  the  programme,  it  went 
through  the  House  without  much  delay.  No  doubt  when 
it  reached  the  President  the  veto  message  was  ready.  The 
space  of  six  days,  during  which  he  held  the  bill,  was  suited 
to  the  double  effect  he  desired  to  produce — the  appearance 
of  respectful  consideration,  yet  unhesitating  decision. 

The  message  contained  little  that  was  new  to  the  contro 
versy,  but  presented  the  old  arguments  best  adapted  for 
popular  effect.  It  was  the  perfection  of  political  art,  to 
which  even  its  errors  contributed. 

The  President  favored  a  bank,  but  not  this  bank.  The 
monopoly  bestowed  by  the  original  charter  operated  as  a 
gratuity  of  many  millions  by  greatly  increasing  the  value  of 
the  stock.  The  renewal  would  still  further  improve  the 
stock  to  fifty  per  centum  above  its  par  value,  rendering  the 
market  value  of  the  monopoly  §17,000,000.  "  It  appears," 
said  the  message,  "  that  more  than  one-fourth  of  the  stock 
is  held  by  foreigners,  and  the  residue  by  a  few  hundreds 
of  our  own  citizens,  chiefly  of  the  richest  class.  For  their 
benefit  does  this  act  exclude  the  whole  American  people 
from  competition  in  the  purchase  of  this  monopoly,  and  dis 
pose  of  it  for  many  millions  less  than  it  is  worth.  ...  If  our 


182  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

government  must  sell  monopolies,  it  would  seem  to  be  its 
duty  to  take  nothing  less  than  their  full  value ;  and  if  gratui 
ties  must  be  made  once  in  fifteen  or  twenty  years,  let  them 
not  be  bestowed  on  the  subjects  of  a  foreign  government 
nor  upon  a  designated  and  favored  class  of  men  in  our  own 
country." 

That  the  termination  of  the  existing  charter  might  cause 
embarrassment  by  requiring  the  bank  to  call  in  its  loans 
was  no  reason  for  the  renewal  of  the  charter;  otherwise 
the  bank  might  justly  claim  to  be  perpetual.  Besides,  there 
was  ample  time  for  it  to  close  its  business  without  distress 
ing  its  debtors;  if  it  caused  distress  the  fault  would  be  its 
own.  The  proposed  modifications  of  the  charter  were  of 
little  value  or  importance.  "  All  the  objectionable  principles 
of  the  existing  corporation,  and  most  of  its  odious  features, 
were  retained  without  alleviation."  The  provision  that  the 
paper  of  the  bank,  though  made  payable  at  one  place,  should 
nevertheless  be  received  at  any  of  the  branches  if  tendered 
in  liquidation  of  a  balance  due  from  any  other  incorporated 
bank,  would  give  to  the  banks  a  privilege  withheld  from  all 
private  citizens,  and  was  therefore  "  most  odious,  because  it 
did  not  measure  equal  justice  to  the  high  and  the  low,  the 
rich  and  the  poor."  Several  forcible  considerations  were 
presented  against  the  holding  of  stock  by  foreigners, 'both 
as  to  the  effect  upon  taxation  of  the  stock  under  the  proposed 
provisions,  and  the  dangers  that  might  attend  the  control  by 
aliens  of  the  finances  of  the  nation.  Then  followed  an  argu 
ment  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  scheme,  a  part  of 
which  was  directed  to  showing  that  the  provisions  would 
result  in  exempting  a  large  portion  of  the  stock  and  all  the 
property  of  the  bank  from  taxation. 

The  message  referred  to  the  charges  against  the  bank 


CH.  V.]    JUST  TEACHINGS   IN   JACKSON'S   MESSAGE    183 

and  spoke  of  the  investigation  by  the  House  as  too  brief 
to  be  complete  and  satisfactory.  "  As  the  charter  had  yet 
four  years  to  run,  and  as  a  renewal  was  not  necessary  to 
the  successful  prosecution  of  its  business,  it  was  to  be  ex 
pected  that  the  bank  itself,  conscious  of  its  purity  and 
proud  of  its  character,  would  have  withdrawn  its  applica 
tion  for  the  present,  and  demanded  the  severest  scrutiny 
into  all  its  transactions."  This  furnished  another  reason 
why  the  government  should  proceed  with  "  less  haste  and 
more  caution  "  in  the  renewal  of  the  monopoly.  Moreover, 
the  "  executive  branches  of  the  government,"  as  the  agent 
of  which  the  bank  "  was  professedly  established,"  had  no 
need  for  it ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  then  regarded  as  "  not 
only  unnecessary,  but  dangerous  to  the  government  and  the 
country." 

The  close  of  the  message  contains  these  just  and  eloquent 
observations,  which  were  not  hackneyed  then,  and  probably 
had  greater  effect  on  the  popular  mind  than  was  produced 
by  the  merely  argumentative  parts  of  the  document : 

"  Distinctions  in  society  will  always  exist  under  every 
just  government.  Equality  of  talents,  of  education,  or 
wealth  cannot  be  produced  by  human  institutions.  In  the 
full  enjoyment  of  the  gifts  of  Heaven  and  the  fruits  of  su 
perior  industry,  economy,  and  virtue,  every  man  is  equal-\ 
ly  entitled  to  protection  by  law.  But  when  the  laws  y 
undertake  to  add  to  these  natural  and  just  advantages  arti 
ficial  distinctions,  to  grant  titles,  gratuities,  and  exclusive 
privileges,  to  make  the  rich  richer  and  the  potent  more 
powerful,  the  humble  members  of  society,  the  farmers,  me 
chanics,  and  laborers,  who  have  neither  the  time  nor  the 
means  of  securing  like  favors  to  themselves,  have  the 
right  to  complain  of  the  injustice  of  their  government. 


184  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

There  are  no  necessary  evils  in  government.  Its  evils  exist 
only  in  its  abuses.  If  it  would  confine  itself  to  equal 
protection,  and,  as  heaven  does  its  rains,  shower  its  favors 
alike  on  the  high  and  the  low,  the  rich  and  the  poor,  it 
would  be  an  unqualified  blessing.  .  .  .  Most  of  the  difficul 
ties  our  government  now  encounters,  and  most  of  the  dan 
gers  which  now  impend  over  our  Union,  have  sprung  from 
the  abandonment  of  the  legitimate  objects  of  government 
by  our  national  legislation  and  the  adoption  of  such  princi 
ples  as  are  embodied  in  this  act.  Many  of  our  rich  men 
have  not  been  content  with  equal  protection  and  equal 
benefits,  but  have  besought  us  to  make  them  richer  by  acts 
of  Congress.  By  attempting  to  gratify  their  desires  we 
have,  in  the  results  of  our  legislation,  arrayed  section 
against  section,  interest  against  interest,  and  man  against 
man." 

Strange  as  it  now  seems,  the  message  was  rapturously  re 
ceived  by  the  Whig  party,  which  industriously  aided  in  cir 
culating  it  among  the  people.  The  history  of  politics  does 
not  exhibit  a  more  preposterous  delusion  than  the  idea 
which  possessed  that  party  that  there  would  be  a  popular 
uprising  to  save  the  bank  from  the  vindictive  tyrant  in  the 
White  House.  The  whole  proceeding  was  founded  on  that 
hallucination.  The  Whig  leaders  were  still  blind  to  the 
forces  which  had  elected  Jackson,  and  which,  from  the  sense 
of  mastery  they  had  derived,  would  thenceforth  dominate  the 
politics  of  the  country.  From  Jefferson  to  Jackson,  poli 
ticians  had  been  little  in  the  habit  of  considering,  so  far  as 
Presidential  elections  were  concerned,  how  the  masses  gener 
ally  view  any  given  national  policy ;  the  probable  attitude 
of  sections  and  interests  had  been  the  main  factors  in  their 
calculations.  The  men  who  had  organized  victory  for  Jack- 


CH.  V.]    CLAY  ATTACKS  JACKSON'S  VETO      185 

son  were  for  the  most  part  an  entirely  new  order  of  politi 
cians.  Unlike  the  anti-Jackson  leaders,  they  were  free  from 
the  influence  of  those  ideas  and  prepossessions  usually  be 
gotten  by  long  continuance  in  public  office.  They  were 
of  the  people,  familiar  with  the  drift  of  popular  sentiment, 
which  they  constantly  and  involuntarily  consulted.  Their 
opponents,  oblivious  to  these  new  elements  or  underrating 
them,  clung  in  the  pride  of  their  talents  to  their  accustomed 
theories  and  methods. 

When  the  message  was  received  by  the  Senate  the  final 
scene  in  the  bank  programme  was  enacted.  As  the  bill 
could  not  be  passed  over  the  veto,  the  occasion  was  only  of 
spectacular  importance;  it  was  the  formal  appeal  of  the 
bank  to  the  people.  Jackson  was  denounced  as  a  despot 
and  destroyer,  and  his  message  was  dissected  and  arraigned 
as  no  other  message  except  his  has  ever  been.  Webster,1 
Clayton,  Ewing,  and  Clay  were  the  bank's  Senatorial 
champions.  Clay  closed  the  case  for  it  with  a  speech  that 
was  to  betaken  as  his  manifesto  in  the  approaching  election. 
It  was  not  long,  but  it  displayed  deliberation  and  a  nicer  ac 
curacy  of  phrase  than  was  common  with  him.  He  spoke 
with  haughty  freedom,  perhaps  more  so  than  became  his 
position  as  Jackson's  nominated  rival. 

He  assailed  the  veto  as  the  ordinary  use  of  an  extraor 
dinary  power.  "The  veto,"  said  he,  "is  hardly  reconcil- 

1  Martin  Van  Buren  very  justly  places  Hamilton  and  Clay  superior  to 
Webster  in  "genius  and  eloquence."  "But,"  he  adds,  "  as  a  close  and 
powerful  reasoner,  an  adroit  and  wary  debater — one  capable  of  taking 
comprehensive  and  at  the  same  time  close  views  of  a  subject,  who  sur 
veyed  all  points  in  his  case,  the  weak  as  well  as  the  strong,  and  dealt  with 
each  in  a  way  best  calculated  to  serve  his  purpose  and  to  reduce  the  ad 
vantage  of  his  antagonist  to  the  lowest  allowable  point,  and  who  was  withal 
unscrupulous  in  the  employment  of  his  great  powers — he  was  in  his  day 
unsurpassed." — Political  Parties  in  the  United  States,  p.  319. 


186  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

able  with  the  genius  of  representative  government.  It  is 
totally  irreconcilable  with  it  if  it  is  to  be  frequently  em 
ployed  in  respect  to  the  expediency  of  measures  as  well  as 
their  constitutionality.  It  is  a  feature  of  our  government 
borrowed  from  a  prerogative  of  the  British  king.  And 
it  is  remarkable  that  in  England  it  has  grown  obsolete, 
not  having  been  used  for  upward  of  a  century."  Never 
theless,  it  is  obvious  as  a  legal  proposition  that  since  the 
President  possesses  the  unqualified  Constitutional  right, 
his  exercise  of  it  is  wholly  discretionary.  If  it  were  im 
proper  for  the  President  to  veto  a  bill  as  inexpedient,  it 
might  be  asserted  with  equal  correctness  that  he  should 
not  veto  a  bill  as  unconstitutional,  because  the  validity  of 
laws  is  to  be  determined  by  the  courts.  Considering  the 
veto  in  its  purely  legal  aspect,  as  the  exercise  of  a  power 
expressly  granted  by  a  written  constitution,  reference  to  the 
British  practice  had  no  force ;  for  the  British  constitution 
is  chiefly  tradition  and  precedent.  Clay's  argument,  there 
fore,  only  went  to  the  propriety  of  the  Constitutional  pro 
vision.  Jackson  was  condemned  for  doing  what  his  adver 
saries  had  forced  him  to  do;  and  his  action  was  not  in 
opposition  to  the  popular  will,  but  to  prevent  Congress  from 
subverting  it,  for  the  charter  once  granted  was  irrevocable. 
Despite  the  propriety  of  the  veto,  the  argument  of  the 
message  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  bank  could  not 
stand.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  a  suit  arising  under  the  ex 
isting  charter,  had  sanctioned  the  power  to  establish  such 
an  institution.  Had  not  the  question — which  belonged  to 
the  old  radical  difference  of  political  opinion  as  to  the  lati 
tude  to  be  given  the  implied  powers  of  the  Constitution — 
been  thus  authoritatively  settled,  Jackson's  argument,  princi 
pally  that  of  Clay's  speech  in  1811,  would  have  been  legally 


CH.  V.]     THE  CONSTITUTIONALITY  OF  THE  BANK       187 

appropriate.    But  respect  for  the  law  as  declared  by  the      ^ 
ultimate  tribunal  demanded  acquiescence. 

Clay  did  not  enter  into  a  general  examination  of  the  Con 
stitutional  question.  But  as  his  speech  in  1811  had  been  read 
to  the  Senate  during  the  debate,  he  was  led  to  speak  of  his 
change  of  opinion  after  the  war,  and  to  read  extracts  from 
his  speech  in  1816  in  justification.  He  asserted,  in  contra 
diction  of  the  statement  in  the  message  that  Congressional 
precedents  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  a  national  bank 
were  equally  divided,  that  at  no  time  was  there  a  majority 
against  the  legal  power,  although  bills  failed  in  1811  and 
1815.  Undoubtedly,  as  he  maintained,  they  failed  on  other 
grounds.  Yarious  other  acts  in  relation  to  the  bank  after 
it  was  established  were  to  be  regarded  as  a  practical  con 
struction  in  favor  of  the  power. 

Jackson's  disregard  of  judicial  construction  led  him  to 
announce  a  doctrine  totally  indefensible.  "Each  public 
officer,"  said  the  message,  "  who  takes  an  oath  to  support  < 
the  Constitution  swears  that  he  will  support  it  as  he  under 
stands  it,  and  not  as  it  is  understood  by  others.  .  .  .  The 
opinion  of  the  judges  has  no  more  authority  over  Congress 
than  the  opinion  of  Congress  has  over  the  judges ;  and  on 
that  point  the  President  is  independent  of  both."  This 
doctrine  taken  literally  would  lead  to  a  chaos  in  adminis 
tration —  the  least  of  its  consequences.  It  was  refuted 
by  "Webster  with  grave  logic,  and  rebuked  by  Clay  with 
vivid  energy.  The  only  apology  for  it  is  that  Jackson 
could  not  have  intended  precisely  what  the  message  made 
him  say ;  but  that  the  President,  in  considering  bills  pre 
sented  to  him  for  approval,  should  take  his  own  view  as 
to  whether  or  not  they  violate  the  true  spirit  of  the  organic 
law,  independent  of  Congress  or  the  courts.  Indeed,  the 


188  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

President  can  seldom,  perform  a  better  service  than  to  ar 
rest  a  tendency  to  make  and  uphold  laws  that  depend  for 
their  validity  upon  legislative  powers  practically  equivalent 
to  the  discretion  of  Congress.  But  preventing  the  enactment 
of  such  laws  is  entirely  different  from  nullifying  them  after 
they  are  enacted  and  voiding  transactions  based  upon  them.1 
Clay  defended  the  policy  of  allowing  foreigners  to  hold 
bank  stock,  which  he  placed  in  the  same  category  as  the 
stock  of  other  corporations.  He  also  defended  the  opera 
tions  of  the  bank  against  the  charge  that  they  were  injuri 
ous  to  the  "West,  and  predicted  ruinous  consequences  if  the 
bank  should  be  compelled  by  the  termination  of  its  charter 
to  enforce  the  payment  of  its  Western  loans.  The  mes 
sage  stated  that  had  the  Executive  been  called  upon  to  fur 
nish  the  project  of  a  bank  that  would  obviate  his  objections, 
the  duty  would  have  been  cheerfully  performed.  Clay  criti 
cised  this  with  caustic  severity.  "  Does  the  President,"  he 
asked,  "wish  to  introduce  the  initiative  here?  Are  the 
powers  of  recommendation  and  that  of  veto  not  sufficient? 
Must  all  legislation,  in  its  commencement  and  its  termina 
tion,  concentrate  in  the  President?  When  we  shall  have 
reached  that  state  of  things  the  election  and  annual  sessions 
of  Congress  will  be  a  useless  charge  upon  the  people,  and 
the  whole  business  of  government  may  be  economically  con 
ducted  by  ukases  and  decrees."  He  closed,  as  Webster 
did,  in  a  strain  of  lurid  prophecy  of  the  downfall  of  our 
institutions  if  the  course  Jackson  had  begun  were  not 
checked,  setting  a  fashion  of  Whig  oratory  that  was  to  pre 
vail  for  years  to  come. 


1  See  Lincoln's  first  inaugural  address  ;  Tyler's  Taney,  p.  410  ;  Sumner's 
Works,  vol.  iii.  p.  375  ;  Van  Buren's  Political  Parties  in  Hie  United  States, 
p.  316. 


CH.  V.]  BENTON'S   REPLY   TO  CLAY  189 

Benton  at  once  took  the  floor.  As  a  campaign  speech  his 
reply  was  a  skilful  performance.  His  retorts  and  political 
appeals  showed  the  art  of  a  master.  An  uninformed  stran 
ger,  however,  might  well  have  supposed  that  in  any  case  the 
country  was  doomed  ;  for  Benton's  prediction  of  a  moneyed 
aristocracy  and  monarchy  as  the  ultimate  result  of  contin 
uing  the  bank  outvied  the  prophecies  of  Webster  and  Clay. 
The  weightiest  part  of  his  speech  was  in  answer  to  the  re 
iterated  pleas  that  the  West  would  be  ruined  by  the  dissolu 
tion  of  the  bank.  He  asserted  that  since  the  subject  of  re 
newing  the  charter  had  been  agitated  the  bank  had  increased, 
its  loans  over  thirty  million  dollars.  This  increase  had  been 
largely  in  the  politically  doubtful  states,  particularly  in  the 
South  and  West,  one-third  of  it  being  in  Louisiana,  Kentucky, 
and  Ohio.  He  then  referred  to  certain  curtailments  recently 
made  by  some  of  the  Western  branches,  through  the  alleged 
dearth  of  funds,  caused  mainly  by  decrease  of  the  public  de 
posits,  and  pronounced  this  reason  a  mere  pretence ;  for  the 
bank  had  ample  funds,  and  was  then  increasing  its  loans  in 
other  quarters  at  the  rate  of  §1,250,000  per  month.  "  The 
true  reasons,"  said  he,  "  were  political ;  a  foretaste  and  pre 
lude  to  what  is  now  threatened.  It  was  a  measure  to  press 
the  debtors — a  turn  of  the  screw  upon  the  borrowers — to 
make  them  all  cry  out  and  join  in  the  clamors  and  petitions 
for  a  renewed  charter.  .  .  .  All  this  for  political  effect,  and 
to  be  followed  by  electioneering  fabrication  that  it  was  the 
effect  of  the  veto  message."  Nor  was  this  the  only  ex 
pedient  adopted  by  the  bank.  "  Numerous  promises  for 
new  branches,"  said  Benton,  "  is  another  trick  of  the  same 
kind.  Thirty  new  branches  are  said  to  be  in  contemplation, 
and  about  three  hundred  villages  have  been  induced  each  to 
believe  that  itself  was  the  favored  spot  of  location ;  but  al- 


190  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

ways  upon  the  condition,  well  understood,  that  Jackson 
should  not  be  re-elected,  and  that  it  should  elect  a  Represent 
ative  to  vote  for  the  recharter." 

In  the  course  of  the  speech  he  intimated  that  Clay  had 
not  shown  proper-  courtesy  toward  the  President ;  and,  as 
soon  as  he  had  concluded,  Clay  responded  in  a  manner  that 
would  have  won  admiration  in  a  frontier  court-room.  It 
led  to  an  angry  passage  of  recriminations  that  boded  an 
other  duel.1  The  question  was  then  put,  and  the  bill  failed, 
receiving  the  requisite  two-thirds  vote.  On  the  16th 
Congress  adjourned.  The  Presidential  campaign  was  begun. 

The  contest  of  1828  was  mild  in  comparison  with  it.  It 
was  scarcely  impeded  by  the  cholera,  which  raged  in  several 
cities  during  the  summer.  Detraction,  misrepresentation, 
buncombe,  rioted  unrestrained.  All  the  slanders  and  per 
versions  of  1828  were  renewed  and  reinforced.  Yet  the 
more  flagrant  characteristics  of  the  campaign,  instead  of 
denoting,  as  many  supposed,  a  decline  of  public  morality, 
were  due  rather  to  the  license  naturally  attending  the  novel 
political  conditions  of  the  time.  It  has  taken  many  years  to 
lessen  the  barbarous  asperity  of  Presidential  contests ;  not 
that  the  masses  have  improved  in  their  public  morals,  but 
that  among  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  people  passionate 
and  unbridled  partisanship  has  to  a  great  extent  exhausted 
itself.  The  larger  experience  of  the  country  has  rendered 
the  people  less  emotional  in  politics ;  they  have  grown  more 
wary  of  the  "  campaign  lie,"  which  has  therefore  lost  much 
of  its  former  efficacy.  In  1832,  personal  vilification  was 
not  confined  to  either  party ;  the  epithets  and  imputations 
with  which  Jackson  was  assailed  were  not  less  scurrilous 


1  Beaton  quotes  the  whole  of  this  fierce  colloquy  in  the  Thirty  Tears' 
View,  vol.  i.  p.  203. 


CH.  V.]      CLAY'S  WHOLE  POLICY   CONDEMNED  191 

and  unfounded  than  those  from  which  Clay  suffered.1  In 
deed,  Jackson  doubtless  got  the  worst  of  it  in  this  regard ; 
for  the  great  majority -of  the  newspapers  were  "Whig,  and 
their  columns  were  constantly  laden  with  all  that  partisan 
ingenuity  could  invent.2 

But  apart  from  these  vicious  phases  of  the  struggle,  the 
important  issues  involved  gave  it  a  character  and  signif 
icance  that  the  preceding  elections  did  not  possess.  And 
each  of  these  issues,  although  of  Clay's  own  making,  worked 
to  his  detriment.  His  tariff  policy  was  hateful  to  the  South ; 
his  public-lands  policy  was  unsatisfactory  to  the  West ;  while 
the  bank  policy  was  altogether  the  most  ill-advised  political 
issue  that  could  have  been  conceived.  Had  there  been  no 
other  question  before  the  people,  it  alone  would  have  been 
fatal  to  his  success.  Aged  men  long  afterward  related  with 
keen  enthusiasm  the  part  they  took  in  "slaying  the  monster." 
It  was  in  vain  to  call  the " Hero  of  New  Orleans"  a  public  *•; 
enemy ;  the  question,  as  it  was  put,  whether  he  or  a  gigan-  Y 
tic  corporation  supported  by  a  moneyed  aristocracy  were  the 
more  dangerous  to  our  institutions,  could  receive  but  one 
answer  by  the  popular  voice.  The  spectacle  of  the  bank  ^  • 


1  Hunt's  Livingston,  p.  369. 

2  "  Caricatures,  poorly  designed  and  worse  executed,  were  published  in 
great  numbers  in  the  course  of  the  season.    A  favorite  idea  of  the  carica 
turists  was  to  depict  Mr.  Van  Buren  as  an  infant  in  the  arms  of  General 
Jackson,  receiving  sustenance  from  a  spoon  in  the  hand  of  the  General. 
One  popular  picture  represented  the  President  receiving  a  crown  from  Mr. 
Van  Buren  and  a  sceptre  from  the  devil.     Another  showed  the  President 
raving  at  a  delegation.     Another  gave  Clay  and  Jackson  in  the  guise  of 
jockeys  riding  a  race  toward  the  White  House — Clay  half  a  length  ahead. 
Another  represented  Jackson,  Van  Buren,  Benton,  Blair,  Kendall,  and 
others  attired  as  burglars,  aiming  a  huge  battering-ram  at  the  bank's  im 
pregnable  front  door.   Another  portrayed  General  Jackson  as  Don  Quixote 
tilting  at  one  of  the  pillars  of  the  same  marble  edifice,  and  breaking  his 
puny  lance  against  it." — Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii.  p.  423. 


192  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

openly  using  every  possible  means  to  preserve  its  existence 
was  the  most  powerful  argument  against  it.  Its  conduct 
during  the  campaign  justified  the  chief  objection  to  such  an 
institution.  In  reaching  a  correct  view  of  the  subject  it 
matters  not  whether  Jackson  or  the  bank  was  the  first  as 
sailant,  nor  what  were  the  motives  that  led  to  the  issue ; 
that  the  bank  could  under  any  circumstances  become  the 
subject  of  a  political  contest  was  reason  enough  why  it 
should  not  exist. 

Many  subsequent  elections  have  occasioned  much  specula 
tion  as  to  the  effect  minor  things  had  or  might  have  had  in 
determining  the  result ;  but  in  1832  the  outcome  was  inevita 
ble.  The  Anti-masonic  movement  figured  conspicuously  in 
the  canvass,  but  it  had  no  decisive  effect.1  Jackson's  election 
was  an  overwhelming  triumph.  Clay  received  but  49  out  of 
286  votes.  The  disparity  in  the  popular  vote  was  not  so 
marked,  though  sufficiently  emphatic :  Clay  received  530,189 
to  Jackson's  687,502.  The  humiliation  was  intensified  by 
Yan  Buren's  election  to  the  Vice-Presidency  by  nearly  the 
same  vote.  The  rejection  of  his  nomination  for  Minister  to 
England  had  produced  precisely  the  opposite  effect  from 
that  intended.  Yet  so  completely  were  the  Whigs  deceived 
that  they  continued  boastfully  confident  until  the  result  of 
the  election  was  known.  And  with  most  of  the  press  and 
the  cultivated  classes  enlisted  in  the  Whig  cause  the  external 
appearances  seemed  promising.  The  sentiment  of  the 
"plain  people"  had  no  means  of  spectacular  display:  its 
mode  of  expression  was  the  ballot.2 


1  Kennedy's  Wirt,  vol.  ii.  p.  330. 

3  "An  English  election,  instead  of  the  tranquil,  dignified  scene  we 
witness  in  this  country,  presents  nothing  but  riot  and  misrule.  The  open 
ing  of  the  poll  is  the  signal  for  the  prostration  of  legal  restraint  and  the 


CH.  V.]       THE  QUESTION   OF  NULLIFICATION  193 

A  man  of  less  elastic  temperament  than  Clay  would  have 
been  disheartened  by  the  utter  defeat  he  had  sustained. 
Under  less  vigorous  and  alluring  leadership  his  party  would 
have  been  long  in  recovering  from  its  total  rout.  But 
acutely  as  he  felt  the  defeat,  he  wrote  and  spoke  of  it  stoi 
cally.  For  some  time  his  health  had  not  been  good.  In  April 
he  wrote  to  a  friend : "  Naturally  ardent,  perhaps  too  ardent, 
I  cannot  avoid  being  too  much  excited  and  provoked  at  the 
scenes  of  tergiversation,  hypocrisy,  degeneracy,  and  corrup 
tion  which  are  daily  exhibited.  I  would  fly  from  them  and 
renounce  forever  public  life  if  I  were  not  restrained  by  a  sen 
timent  of  duty  and  of  attachment  to  my  friends.  ...  I  will 
endeavor  to  moderate  my  interest  in  public  affairs."  Never 
theless,  he  did  not  curb  his  political  zeal.  Congress  reassem 
bled  December  3.  A  few  days  later  he  appeared  on  the  scene. 

The  topic  of  the  hour  was  "  nullification."  The  excite 
ment  of  the  Presidential  election  had  merged  in  that  which 
the  attitude  of  South  Carolina  had  aroused.  The  dissatis 
faction  of  the  South  generally  with  the  tariff  of  1828  had 
been  driven  wellnigh  to  exasperation  by  the  tariff  of 
1832;  but  in  none  of  the  Southern  States,  except  South 
Carolina,  had  the  anti-protection  sentiment  led  to  any  new 
mode  of  opposition.  The  novelty  of  nullification  was  con 
fined  to  that  State.  This  unique  doctrine,  first  promulgated 
in  1828,  had  rapidly  matured  to  action.  Before  the  tariff  of 
1832  was  enacted  the  course  of  the  State  was  virtually  de 
cided  ;  the  people  were  at  least  two  to  one  in  favor  of  nulli- 


comniencemeut  of  the  reign  of  anarchy.  The  contest  frequently  lasts  for 
several  days,  and  during  this  time  the  unfortunate  borough  is  given  over 
to  the  mob.  The  shops  are  all  closed— business  is  at  an  end— parties  at 
tracted  to  the  different  candidates  are  parading  the  streets  and  frequently 
meeting,  when  desperate  battles  are  sure  to  ensue."— North  American  Re 
view,  vol.  xiii.  p.  356. 
13 


194  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

fication.  In  November  a  convocation  in  the  nature  of  a  con 
stitutional  convention,  which  had  been  regularly  called  and 
empowered,  adopted  an  ordinance  declaring  the  acts  of  1828 
and  1832  null  and  void,  and  prohibiting  the  payment  of  any 
duties  under  them  within  the  State  after  February  1,  1833. 
It  made  any  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  touching  the  validity  of  the  ordinance  a  penal  offence ; 
and  required  all  State  officers,  civil  and  military,  and  all  jurors, 
to  take  an  oath  to  support  the  ordinance.  It  further  assert 
ed  the  determination  to  maintain  the  ordinance  at  every 
hazard,  and  threatened  secession  from  the  Union  if  any  at 
tempt  were  made  to  coerce  the  State. 

In  his  annual  message,  December  4,  the  President  de 
voted  but  one  short  paragraph  directly  to  the  subject.  He 
merely  stated  that  "in  one  quarter  of  the  United  States 
opposition  to  the  revenue  laws  had  risen  to  a  height  which 
threatened  to  thwart  their  execution,  if  not  to  endanger  the 
integrity  of  the  Union,"  but  that  it  was  hoped  to  overcome 
peaceably  any  obstructions  that  might  be  thrown  in  the  way 
of  the  judicial  authorities ;  and  in  any  case  it  was  believed 
that  the  laws  themselves  were  fully  adequate  to  the  suppres 
sion  of  such  attempts  as  might  immediately  be  made.  But 
the  preceding  part  of  the  message  bore  indirectly  upon  the 
question,  which  was  the  only  shadow  upon  the  general  pict 
ure  of  harmony  and  prosperity  presented  by  this  politic 
paper.  The  entire  public  debt  was  to  be  extinguished  dur 
ing  the  ensuing  year  ;  this  would  permit  a  reduction  of  the 
revenue,  as  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
Then  followed  some  judicious  and  carefully  guarded  consid 
erations  against  the  protective  system,  with  the  recommen 
dation  that  "  the  whole  scheme  of  duties  be  reduced  to  the 
revenue  standard  as  soon  as  just  regard  to  the  faith  of  the 


CH.  V.]  SOUTHERN   CLAIMS   CONCEDED  195 

government  and  to  the  preservation  of  $he  large  capital  in 
vested  in  the  establishments  of  domestic  industry  will  per 
mit."  In  short,  while  the  administration  meant  to  execute 
the  laws  and  to  preserve  the  Union,  it  admitted  the  justice 
of  the  Southern  complaints,  and  proposed  to  ameliorate  the 
cause  of  them.  These  views  on  the  tariff  indicated  Jack 
son's  abandonment  of  the  protective  system,  to  which  he 
had  not  until  then  been  avowedly  opposed,  although  grad 
ually  tending  in  that  direction.  In  his  messages  prior  to 
that  of  December,  1831,  he  had  expressed  himself  as  favor 
ing  protection  to  a  moderate  degree  ;  but  he  then  advised  a 
reduction  of  the  revenue,  in  consequence  of  the  approaching 
extinguishment  of  the  public  debt.  It  was  on  this  theory, 
to  some  extent,  that  he  had  approved  the  act  of  1832.  Thus 
far,  however,  the  tariff  question  had  not  materially  entered 
into  the  Jacksonian  policy. 

Considered  as  a  whole,  the  message  was  apparently  as 
favorable  to  South  Carolina  as  the  most  hopeful  nullifier 
could  reasonably  expect ;  for  not  only  was  the  avowed  policy 
of  the  administration  pledged  to  a  reduction  of  the  tariff, 
but  all  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  message  relating  to 
the  powers  of  the  government  were  those  of  the  strict-con 
struction  school.  It  was  a  thoroughly  Democratic  docu 
ment.  The  Whigs  thought  it  the  complete  espousal  of  the 
extreme  State-rights  doctrine.  But  in  this  they  were  mis 
taken.  Its  true  meaning  and  its  consummate  art  were  not 
perceived  until  six  days  later,  when  the  President's  procla 
mation  to  the  people  of  South  Carolina  appeared. 

The  leading  arguments  of  this  celebrated  manifesto  were 
drawn  from  "Webster's  reply  to  Hayne,1  in  1830,  denying 

1  Benton  gives  an  appreciative  sketch  of  Hayne  in  the  Thirty  Tears' 
View,  vol.  ii.  p.  186.  See  also  Life  of  Silliman,  vol.  ii.  p.  119. 


196  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

that  the  Constitution  forms  a  league  and  not  a  nation,  and 
that  it  is  incompetent  for  a  State  lawfully  to  annul  an  act 
of  Congress  or  to  withdraw  from  the  Union.  The  people 
of  South  Carolina  were  eloquently  adjured  to  retrace  their 
steps  and  warned  that  the  Constitution  and  the  Union  would 
be  maintained  even  at  the  cost  of  blood. 

The  fact  that  no  Southern  State  would  join  South  Caro 
lina1  might  suggest  that  the  Northern  sentiment  against 
nullification  was  intense.  It  was  so.  Politics  was  quite 
forgotten  in  the  patriotic  fervor  with  which  the  President's 
proclamation  was  greeted  throughout  the  North.  The  im 
petuous  loyalty  to  the  Union  there  exhibited  might  well  have 
terrified  South  Carolina  in  her  wayward  course.  The  de 
termination  and  unanimity  of  the  opposition  were  a  surprise 
to  the  leaders  of  the  nullification  movement,  who  expected 
some  degree  of  co-operation  in  the  South  and  no  vigorous 
and  general  resistance  in  the  North ;  and  undoubtedly  this 
result  influenced  their  subsequent  action.  No  small  share 
of  Jackson's  peculiar  fame  at  the  present  day  is  due  to  the 
effect  produced  by  that  proclamation. 

Clay,  of  course,  was  in  no  mood  to  join  in  the  fervid  ap 
proval  of  the  President.  Two  days  after  the  proclamation 
he  wrote  in  a  letter  with  somewhat  of  petulance :  "  One 
short  week  produced  the  message  and  the  proclamation — the 
former  ultra  on  the  side  of  State-rights,  the  latter  ultra  on 
the  side  of  consolidation.  How  they  can  be  reconciled  I 
must  leave  to  our  Virginia  friends.  As  to  the  proclamation, 
although  there  are  some  good  things  in  it,  especially  as  to 

1  The  legislatures  of  Virginia,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  North  Carolina 
declared  against  the  doctrine  of  nullification.  The  Virginia  legislature  sent 
Leigh  as  a  commissioner  to  counsel  moderation,  and  he  accordingly  ad 
dressed  the  South  Carolina  legislature.  Cass,  Secretary  of  War,  at  once  or 
dered  troops  to  Charleston.— Smith's  Cass,  pp.  269,  274. 


CH.  V.]  THE  VERPLANCK  BILL  197 

what  relates  to  the  judiciary,  there  are  some  entirely  too 
ultra  for  me  and  which  I  cannot  stomach.  A  proclamation 
should  have  been  issued  weeks  ago,  but  I  think  it  should  have 
been  a  different  paper  from  the  present,  which,  I  apprehend, 
will  irritate  instead  of  allaying  any  excited  feeling." ' 

Meantime  Calhoun  resigned  the  Yice-Presidency  and  was 
elected  to  the  Senate  to  fill  the  vacancy  caused  by  the  resig 
nation  of  Hayne,  who  had  become  Governor  of  South  Caro 
lina.  The  State  showed  no  sign  of  receding  from  its  posi 
tion.  Its  strongest  men  were  at  the  front.  Though  Calhoun 
took  the  most  responsible  and  arduous  post,  he  was  sup 
ported  by  the  whole  machinery  of  the  State  government, 
Hayne  boldly  issuing  a  proclamation  of  defiance,  and  the 
legislature  adopting  a  series  of  resolutions  to  the  same  effect. 
January  16,  the  President  sent  to  Congress  another  mes 
sage.  It  was  a  long  one,  accompanied  by  all  the  documents 
relating  to  the  subject.  It  closed  by  recommending  various 
legislation,  including  a  grant  of  additional  powers  to  the 
Executive  to  enforce  the  collection  of  duties.  On  the  21st 
a  bill  in  compliance  with  the  message  was  reported  to  the 
Senate.  On  the  next  day,  Calhoun  met  the  whole  issue  by 
introducing  a  set  of  resolutions  declaring  his  theory  of  the 
nature  and  powers  of  the  government. 

Soon  after  the  opening  of  the  session  the  Yerplanck  bill, 
as  it  was  called,  was  introduced  in  the  House.  It  was  an 
administration  measure,  framed  on  the  recommendation  of 
the  President's  annual  message  and  the  report  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury.  Its  avowed  object  was  to  reduce 
the  revenue  from  §27,000,000,  which  had  been  the  aver 
age  annual  income  of  the  government  for  several  years 

1  To  Tyler  he  pronounced  it  an  "  ultra-Federal  black  cockade." — Letters 
and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  vol.  iii.  p.  75.  See  also  Life  of  Story,  vol.  ii.  p.  121. 


198  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

preceding  the  tariff  of  1832,  to  $15,000,000  within  two  years. 
The  latter  tariff  had  effected  some  reduction,  though  not 
nearly  so  much  as  had  been  expected ;  but  it  was  estimated 
that  the  proposed  bill  would  work  a  further  reduction  of 
$7,000,000.  "To  the  great  opponents  of  the  tariff  (the 
South  Carolina  school),"  says  Benton,  who  unquestionably 
states  the  views  of  the  subject  then  entertained  by  the  ad 
ministration,  "it  was  also  bound  to  be  satisfactory,  as  it 
carried  back  the  whole  system  of  duties  to  the  standard  at 
which  that  school  had  fixed  them,  with  the  great  amelio 
ration  of  the  arbitrary  and  injurious  minimums.  The  bill, 
then,  seemed  bound  to  conciliate  every  fair  interest — the 
government,  because  it  gave  all  the  revenue  it  needed ;  the 
real  manufacturers,  because  it  gave  them  an  adequate  inci 
dental  protection;  the  South,  because  it  gave  them  their 
own  bill,  and  that  ameliorated."  It  was  assiduously  de 
bated  until  Clay's  "compromise  bill"  was  suddenly  pro 
jected  into  the  House. 

Between  the  demands  of  the  nullifiers  and  the  policy  of 
the  administration  the  protective  system  was  in  extreme 
jeopardy.  Should  the  inevitable  revision  of  the  tariff  be 
made  by  the  enemies  or  the  friends  of  protection?  To 
this  question  Clay  had  at  once  addressed  himself.  In  De 
cember  he  visited  Philadelphia,  where,  after  conferring  with 
various  manufacturers,  he  devised  a  plan  of  adjusting  the 
Controversy.  He  then  submitted  it  to  a  few  of  his  immedi 
ate  friends,  and  also  to  Webster  and  Calhoun.  The  former 
refused,  but  the  latter  determined  to  support  it.  The  combi 
nation  of  Clay  and  Calhoun  would  ensure  its  passage. 

The  political  career  of  no  other  public  man  of  that  event 
ful  period  inspires  the  candid  student  with  such  mingled 
feelings  of  respect  and  regret  as  Calhoun's.  He  entered 


CH.  V.]       CALHOUN  LEADS  THE  WAR  PARTY  199 

the  arena  of  national  politics  in  1811,  in  his  thirtieth  year, 
after  a  brief  service  in  the  South  Carolina  legislature.  He 
was  a  graduate  of  Yale  College,  and  finished  his  law  studies 
at  Litchfield.  He  began  the  practice  of  law,  but  did  not 
long  continue  it ;  a  competency  relieved  him  of  that  neces 
sity.  His  instinctive  interest  in  public  affairs,  which  indeed 
was  conspicuously  displayed  in  college,  soon  led  him  into 
public  life.  Able  men  were  quickly  recognized  in  the  South, 
and  seldom  experienced  much  difficulty  in  procuring  and  re 
taining  seats  in  Congress — a  fact  that  accounts  for  the  uni 
form  superiority  in  talents  and  training  of  the  Southern 
members,  as  a  class,  over  the  Northern. 

He  at  once  took  a  leading  position  in  the  House.  He 
was  eager  for  war ;  and  Clay,  quick  to  appreciate  his  ability 
and  alliance,  assigned  him  to  the  most  appropriate  place — on 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  from  which  emanated 
the  declaration  of  war.  In  this  capacity  he  became  the  lead 
er  of  the  war  party  on  the  floor  of  the  House.  His  only 
difference  with  that  party  was  in  regard  to  the  restrictive 
S3^stem,  which  he  strenuously  opposed.  After  the  war  he 
zealously  co-operated  with  Clay  in  his  entire  domestic  pro 
gramme — a  national  bank,  a  protective  tariff,  and  extensive 
internal  improvements.  Nor  did  Clay  ever  go  to  greater 
lengths  in  advocating  those  policies  than  Calhoun  went  at 
that  period.  The  Constitution  then  offered  no  obstacles  to 
him.  All  his  views  were  characterized  by  the  utmost  lib 
erality  and  freedom  from  sectional  interest.  The  nation  and 
a  strong  national  government  were  the  prime  objects  of 
his  solicitude.  He  was  much  admired  generally  for  his  per 
sonal  and  intellectual  qualities.  His  style  of  speech  was 
pure,  poised,  and  strong.  It  did  not  possess  the  eloquent 
energy  and  fervor  of  Clay's,  nor  the  terseness  and  solid 


200  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

power  of  Webster's,  yet  it  had  more  elegance  and  finish  than 
either.  During  this  period  he  freely  employed  historical 
illustrations  and  evinced  a  strong  tendency  to  general 
ize.  His  early  speeches  are  interspersed  with  philosophic 
maxims  and  comments  which  indicate  the  wide  and  pro 
found  thought  he  bestowed  upon  the  subjects  of  his  atten 
tion  in  all  their  relations ;  and  so  marked  is  this  trait  as 
to  suggest  familiarity  with  the  works  of  Edmund  Burke. 
These  qualities  of  style  and  method,  however,  he  gradually 
relinquished,  until  his  speeches  became,  for  the  most  part, 
the  naked  exposition  of  his  own  reasoning  undeviatingly 
directed  to  the  subject  before  him. 

In  1817  he  became  Secretary  of  War  under  Monroe,  and 
retained  that  post  until  he  entered  upon  the  duties  of  Yice- 
President  in  1825.  During  this  time  his  political  and  eco 
nomic  opinions  underwent  no  change ;  they  were  emphati 
cally  reiterated  whenever  occasion  offered.  He  now  openly 
aspired  to  the  Presidency.  Though  his  administration  of 
the  "War  Department  received  some  criticism,  mostly  due 
to  the  warm  rivalry  of  Presidential  candidates  during  the 
political  chaos  of  Monroe's  last  term,  he  had  gained  ground 
in  popular  favor.  While  it  was  soon  manifest  that  he  could 
not  succeed  Monroe,  it  was  equally  clear  that  he  would  be 
raised  to  the  second  place.  But,  unknown  to  the  political 
world,  there  had  been  sown  the  seeds  of  a  difficulty  that  was 
to  frustrate  the  great  ambition  of  his  life. 

He  was  elected  Yice-President  by  a  combination  of  the 
Adams  and  Jackson  electors,  probably  because  of  his  neu 
trality.  But  as  soon  as  the  effect  of  Adams's  election  by  the 
House  became  apparent,  Calhoun  joined  the  opposition.  Dis 
cerning  Jackson's  rising  star,  he  sought  its  auspicious  in 
fluence.  The  prospect  seemed  flattering.  He  was  re-elected 


CH.  V.]     JACKSON'S   ENMITY  TOWARD   CALHOUN       201 

with  Jackson  in  1828.  Nevertheless,  the  catastrophe  was 
close  at  hand.  Soon  came  the  disclosure  of  the  fact,  until 
then  kept  secret,  that  as  Secretary  of  War  he  had  favored 
the  proposed  censure  of  Jackson  for  his  proceedings  in  the 
Seminole  war.  This  was  followed  by  the  disruption  of  the 
cabinet,  the  banishment  of  Calhoun's  adherents,  and  the 
plain  indication  that  Yan  Buren  was  destined  to  the  Presi 
dential  succession. 

Another  cause  of  dislike,  however,  had  been  working  in 
Jackson's  mind.  Calhoun  had  concurred  in  the  Southern 
hostility  to  the  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828 :  he  could  not  have 
done  otherwise  and  be  countenanced  in  the  South.  That 
course  once  taken,  he  labored  with  all  his  might  to  make  the 
cause  succeed.  Naturally  he  was  regarded  as  the  leader-in- 
chief.  The  "  South  Carolina  Exposition,"  adopted  by  the 
legislature  of  that  State  in  1828,  and  the  first  formal  decla 
ration  of  the  doctrine  of  nullification,  was  his  handiwork. 
Though  couched  in  rather  vague  and  covert  terms,  it  found 
no  favor  with  Jackson.  Calhoun  undoubtedly  believed  that 
Jackson  would  cast  his  influence  against  protection  ;  but  he 
utterly  mistook  Jackson  if  he  imagined  that  he  would  tol 
erate  any  scheme  that  savored  of  disunion.  Events  now  rap 
idly  conspired  to  put  Calhoun  hopelessly  without  the  pale  of 
Presidential  possibility.  The  Hayne-Webster  debate  took 
place  in  January,  1830,  Hayne  being,  as  every  one  knew,  the 
spokesman  on  his  side,  because  Calhoun  was  not  in  a  posi 
tion  to  speak.  In  April  following  a  banquet  in  celebration 
of  Jefferson's  birthday  was  held  at  "Washington.  It  was  at 
tended  by  many  leading  Democrats,  including  Jackson  and 
Calhoun.  The  tenor  of  the  toasts  and  speeches  indicated 
that  the  affair  had  been  arranged  to  promote  principally  the 
nullification  movement.  After  the  regular  speeches,  the 


202  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

President  was  invited  to  propose  a  toast.  He  did  so,  and 
in  a  manner  that  left  no  doubt  as  to  his  sentiments  on 
the  subject — "The  Union:  It  must  be  preserved."  Cal- 
houn  gave  the  next  toast — "  The  Union  :  Next  to  our  lib 
erty  the  most  dear :  may  we  all  remember  that  it  can 
only  be  preserved  by  respecting  the  rights  of  the  States 
and  distributing  equally  the  benefit  and  burthen  of  the 
Union." 

The  die  was  cast.  As  a  candidate  for  President,  Calhoun 
was  undone;  and  no  one  recognized  it  more  clearly  than 
himself.  Henceforth  he  was  the  political  head  of  the  slave 
interest,  acting  apart  from  the  two  great  parties,  except  as 
particular  objects  led  him  into  temporary  combinations.  He 
took  up  the  work  where  the  disjointed  efforts  of  Randolph 
had  left  it,  and  pursued  it  with  fanatical  energy  to  his  latest 
day.  Politics  and  personal  interests  no  longer  influenced 
him.  He  had  become  a  changed  man.  From  the  broadest 
latitudinarianism  he  had  gone  to  the  opposite  extreme. 
Without  motive  to  temporize  or  dissemble,  or  occasion  to 
deceive  himself,  he  saw  the  inevitable  result  that  was  to 
come  from  the  divergent  elements  then  taking  undisguised 
form  and  force.  "While  he  did  not  devote  his  labors  to  cause 
disunion,  he  strove  in  every  way  to  protect  and  strengthen 
the  institution  of  slavery  and  its  political  power.  Yet  his 
course  cannot  be  justly  charged  to  vindictiveness.  He  was 
the  victim  of  circumstance.  With  a  wonderfully  acute,  ana 
lytical,  and  subtly  logical  mind,  it  was  a  necessity  with 
him  to  carry  to  the  last  result  the  conclusion  that  his  en 
forced  premises  required.  His  manner  gradually  assumed 
a  cold  and  distant  dignity.  His  intense,  sustained  thought, 
the  consciousness  of  his  isolated  position,  and  the  per 
petual  struggle  against  odds  creased  and  hardened  his 


CH.  V.]  CLAY  INTRODUCES  THE  COMPROMISE  BILL  203 

visage,  upon  which  dwelt   the   shadow  of  his   thwarted 
hopes.1 

On  February  12,  Clay  asked  leave  to  introduce  his  tariff 
bill.  Having  given  notice  of  his  purpose  the  day  before, 
he  had  a  large  and  eager  audience  to  hear  his  explanatory 
speech.  He  professed  two  objects — to  save  the  protective 
system  from  the  destruction  designed  by  the  administration 
in  any  event,  and  to  allay  the  South  Carolina  outbreak,  and 
thus  prevent  the  calamities  that  might  follow  it  in  conse 
quence  of  the  general  Southern  discontent.  "  I  am  anxious," 
said  he,  "  to  find  some  principle  of  mutual  accommodation, 
to  satisfy,  as  far  as  practicable,  both  parties — to  increase  the 
stability  of  our  legislation,  and  at  some  distant  day — but  not 
too  distant — to  bring  down  the  rate  of  duties  to  the  revenue 
standard  for  which  our  opponents  have  so  long  contended." 
This  basis  was  to  be  one  of  time.  His  plan  was  to  reach 
the  revenue  standard  in  a  little  less  than  ten  years.  One- 
tenth  of  the  excess  of  duties  above  twenty  per  centum  ad 


'For  the  less  familiar  sources  of  this  sketch  of  Calhoun,  see  Life  of 
Silliman,  vol.  i.  p.  309 ;  Webster's  Works,  vol.  v,  p.  369  ;  Tyler's  Taney,  p. 
185  ;  Kennedy's  Wirt,  vol.  ii.  p.  161  ;  Life  of  Story,  vol.  i.  p.  426  ;  Quincy's 
Figures  of  the  Past,  p.  264;  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  v.  p.  361 ;  vol.  vii.  p.  447  ; 
vol.  viii.  p.  536 ;  vol.  ix.  p.  461 ;  Godwin's  Bryant,  vol.  i.  p.  268 ;  Marti- 
neau's  Retrospect  of  Western  Travel,  vol.  i.  p.  147.  "  His  head  was  long 
rather  than  broad,  the  ears  were  placed  low  upon  it,  the  depth  from  front 
to  back  was  very  great ;  his  forehead  was  low,  steep,  and  beetled  squarely 
over  the  most  glorious  pair  of  yellow-brown,  shining  eyes  that  seemed  to 
have  a  light  inherent  in  themselves  ;  they  looked  steadily  out  from  under 
bushy  eyebrows  that  made  the  deep  sockets  look  still  more  shrunken. 
He  lowered  them  less  than  any  one  I  have  ever  seen  ;  they  were  steadily 
bent  on  the  object  with  which  he  was  engaged  ;  indeed  on  some  people 
they  had  an  almost  mesmeric  power.  .  .  .  No  dignity  could  be  more  su 
preme  than  Mr.  Calhoun's.  .  .  .  He  always  appeared  to  me  rather  as  a 
moral  and  mental  abstraction  than  a  politician,  and  it  was  impossible,  know 
ing  him  well,  to  associate  him  with  mere  personal  ambition.  His  theories 
and  his  sense  of  duty  alone  dominated  him." — Memoir  of  Jefferson  Dams, 
pp.  209-211. 


204  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1832 

valorem  was  to  be  removed  after  September,  1833;  one- 
tenth,  biennially  thereafter  until  1841 ;  one-half  of  the  re 
maining  excess  the  following  year;  and  the  residue  the 
next.  If  in  1842  there  should  be  a  surplus  of  revenue,  it 
could  be  devoted  to  internal  improvements.  The  free  list 
was  to  be  somewhat  extended,  and  the  credit  system,  which 
had  always  obtained,  was  to  be  abolished.1  In  case  of  war 
or  other  emergency,  Congress  was  to  be  at  liberty  to  lay 
whatever  duties  it  saw  fit.  While  there  could  be  no  abso 
lute  guarantee  that  the  scheme  would  be  held  inviolate  dur 
ing  the  proposed  period,  there  was  a  practical  assurance 
that  it  would  be.  "If  the  measure,"  he  argued,  "should  be 
carried  by  the  consent  of  all  parties,  we  shall  have  sufficient 
security ;  history  will  faithfully  record  the  transaction ;  nar 
rate  under  what  circumstances  the  bill  was  passed ;  that  it 
was  a  pacifying  measure ;  that  it  was  oil  poured  from  the 
vessel  of  the  Union  to  restore  peace  and  harmony  to  the 
country.  "When  all  this  is  done,  what  Congress,  what  legis 
lature,  will  mar  the  guarantee  ?  What  man  who  is  entitled 
to  deserve  the  character  of  an  American  statesman  would 
stand  up  in  his  place  and  disturb  this  treaty  of  peace  and 
amity  ?"  He  also  contended,  to  appease  the  stubborn  parti 
sans  of  protection,  that  his  plan  was  not  the  abandonment 
of  that  system.  It  was  at  most  provisional,  to  allow  differ 
ences  of  opinion  to  be  adjusted.  After  1842,  any  plan  could 
be  adopted  that  circumstances  and  the  demands  of  the  peo 
ple  might  dictate.  The  bill  did  "  not  touch  the  power  of 
protection";  on  the  contrary,  the  free  admission  of  raw 
materials  distinctly  "  extended  and  upheld  "  it.  As  reluc- 

1  "For  eighteen  or  twenty  years,  John  Jacob  Astor  had  what  was 
actually  a  f ree-of-interest  loan  from  the  government  of  over  five  millions 
of  dollars.  "—Barrett's  Old  Merchants  of  New  York  (first  series),  p.  32. 


CH.  V.]  THE  ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  NULLIFICATION  205 

tantly  as  he  yielded  so  much  of  what  he  held  to  be  the  true 
method  of  protection — raising  the  necessary  revenue  "  from 
the  protected  and  not  from  the  unprotected  articles — it  was 
preferable  to  the  immediate  and  total  destruction  of  the 
policy." 

Such  were  the  leading  ideas  of  his  exposition  of  the  bill. 
His  reasoning  thus  far  was  wisely  tempered  and  judicious. 
But  to  meet  the  rebuke  that  his  plan  was  a  surrender  to  the 
threats  of  South  Carolina  was  a  more  difficult  task.  His 
treatment  of  this  phase  of  the  matter  partook  of  forensic 
ingenuity.  Although  he  pronounced  the  course  of  South 
Carolina. "  rash,  intemperate,  and  greatly  in  error,"  he  sought 
to  palliate  it  on  the  theory  that  the  State  was  not  really 
threatening  forcible  resistance,  but  was  appealing  to  law. 
"  From  one  end  to  the  other  of  this  continent,"  said  he, "  by 
acclamation,  as  it  were,  nullification  has  been  put  down  in  a 
manner  more  effectual  than  by  a  thousand  armies :  by  the 
irresistible  force,  by  the  mighty  influence  of  public  opinion. 
Not  a  voice  beyond  the  single  State  of  South  Carolina  has 
been  heard  in  favor  of  nullification,  which  she  has  asserted 
by  her  ordinance ;  and  I  will  say  that  she  must  fail  in  her 
lawsuit." 

His  argument  against  peaceable  nullification  was  brief, 
and  practical  rather  than  Constitutional.  It  is  not  possible, 
he  maintained,  to  devise  a  system  of  State  legislation  that 
cannot  be  successfully  counteracted  by  federal  legislation. 
Congress  is  expressly  empowered  to  pass  all  laws  necessary 
to  carry  into  effect  the  powers  vested  in  the  government. 
If  the  government  be  administered  with  prudence  and  pro 
priety,  the  responsibility  of  employing  force  must  rest  with 
the  State  government.  "  I  am  ready,"  said  he,  "  to  give 
the  tribunals  and  the  Executive  of  the  country,  whether 


206  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

that  Executive  has  or  has  not  my  confidence,  the  necessary 
measure  of  power  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union.  But  I 
would  not  go  a  hair's-breadth  farther  than  what  was  neces 
sary  for  those  purposes."  According  to  the  apologetic  view 
he  had  taken,  South  Carolina  was  doing  no  more  than  Ohio 
had  done  in  attempting  to  tax  the  branch  of  the  bank  in 
that  State,  and  no  more  than  Yirginia  had  done  in  attempt 
ing  to  deprive  the  federal  courts  of  jurisdiction  in  cases 
arising  under  certain  lottery  laws.  Moreover,  the  1st  of 
February  was  passed.  South  Carolina  had  practically  post 
poned  t]ie  operation  of  the  ordinance,  and  if  the  question 
were  not  at  once  settled  she  would  further  postpone  it.  It 
was  impossible,  for  various  practical  reasons  which  he  re 
counted,  that  she  should  wish  to  become  a  separate  and 
independent  state.  If  the  existence  of  the  ordinance  were 
a  sufficient  motive  for  not  passing  the  bill,  she  could  defeat 
all  legislation  by  postponing  the  ordinance  from  time  to 
time.  The  condition  of  South  Carolina  was  only  one  of  the 
elements  that  rendered  it  expedient  to  resort  at  that  ses 
sion  to  some  measure  to  tranquillize  the  country.  He  closed 
with  a  persuasive  appeal. 

The  motion  for  leave  to  introduce  the  bill  was  stoutly 
opposed  by  several  Senators,  "Webster  being  the  most  aggres 
sive  and  formidable.1  He  did  not  content  himself  with 
merely  announcing  his  disapproval  of  the  bill  and  then 
awaiting  the  opportunity  of  debate  upon  it,  but  on  the  next 
day  he  offered  an  elaborate  set  of  resolutions  declaring 
against  the  scheme.  Calhoun,  on  the  other  hand,  at  once 
gave  evidence  of  his  partnership  in  the  design  to  compro 
mise  by  expressing  his  entire  approbation  of  the  "  object " 


1  Curtis's  Webster,  vol.  i.  p.  443  ;  Clay's  Correspondence,  pp.  351,  352. 


CH.  V.]   THE  REVENUE  COLLECTION  BILL  DEBATE    207 

and  "general  principles"  of  the  bill.  Nor  was  Jackson 
averse.1 

The  motion  was  successful,  and  the  bill  was  referred  to 
a  select  committee,  of  which  Clay  was  made  chairman.  It 
was  reported  on  the  19th.  Meantime  the  debate  on  the 
revenue  collection  bill  grew  more  heated.  It  was  in  con 
nection  with  this  subject  that  Calhoun,  on  the  15th,  de 
livered  his  notable  speech  in  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of 
nullification.  It  was  immediately  answered  by  Webster,  in 
a  speech  that,  as  a  legal  argument,  is  superior  to  his  reply  to 
Hayne.  Even  to  those  most  friendly  at  the  present  day  to 
the  theory  of  the  utmost  rights  of  the  States  consistent  with 
the  nationality  of  the  Union  in  purely  national  concerns,  it 
is  remarkable  that  so  fine  and  strong  a  mind  as  Calhoun's 
should  have  evolved  and  advocated  with  all  its  powers  so 
impracticable  a  theory  as  nullification.  "Whatever  the  opin 
ion  as  to  the  origin  of  the  leading  features  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  the  ultimate  question  involved  in  the  controversy  was 
simply  as  to  where  the  power  was  vested  to  pronounce 
upon  the  constitutionality  of  laws.  From  any  possible 
point  of  view,  the  doctrine  that  a  State  can  exercise  that 
power  as  a  finality  is  to  render  the  Constitution  merely  the 
evidence  of  a  provisional  acquiescence  in  a  national  govern 
ment  that  shall  cease  in  and  over  any  State  at  its  own  dis 
cretion. 

During  the  early  years  of  the  Constitution  there  was 
diversity  of  opinion  as  to  the  fundamental  nature  of  the 
national  organism — whether  it  is  a  dissoluble  compact  be 
tween  sovereign  States  or  a  perpetually  consolidated  nation 
ality.  This  necessarily  arose  from  the  extraordinary  con- 


Jackson  to  Hamilton,  February  23,  1833. 


208  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

ditions  that  produced  it,  the  divergent  purposes  that  enter 
ed  into  it,  and  hence  the  novelty  of  the  political  system  it 
created.  In  the  nature  of  things  it  could  not  have  been  other 
wise.  Fortunately  the  question  was  almost  wholly  specula 
tive  ;  no  actual  and  general  emergency  had  arisen  to  compel 
its  practical  determination.  The  subjects  of  difference  were 
settled  as  merely  political  questions.  The  Virginia  and 
Kentucky  resolutions  and  the  proceedings  of  the  Hartford 
Convention,  subsequently  cited  as  authorities,  are  to  be  re 
garded,  so  far  as  they  may  seem  to  warrant  the  theory  of 
Constitutional  nullification  and  secession,  as  little  else  than 
obiter  dicta,  inasmuch  as  there  was  no  real  design  to  ac 
complish  more  than  an  emphatic  protest,  for  political  effect, 
against  objectionable  acts  of  the  government.  The  evolu 
tion  of  the  principles  of  the  original  Democratic  party  lay 
in  the  distinct  separation  of  the  functions  of  State  and  federal 
government,  giving  to  each  its  true  sphere  and  operation — 
preserving  the  autonomy  of  the  States,  yet  maintaining  ade 
quate  national  power  and  dignity.  The  gradual  growth  of 
the  national  sentiment  is,  perhaps,  no  better  illustrated  than 
by  the  changed  use  of  the  word  "  Union."  Until  after  the 
civil  war  it  was  the  common  appellation  of  the  United 
States.  It  has  since  assumed  a  poetic  significance,  and  is 
mostly  employed  for  sentiment  or  euphony. 

To  the  last  the  revenue  collection  bill  encountered  bitter 
opposition.  It  was  branded  as  the  "  force  bill "  and  the 
"  bloody  bill,"  and  denounced  with  extreme  asperity  even 
after  the  Compromise  was  virtually  assured  and  the  bill  thus 
rendered  hardly  more  in  practical  effect  than  a  mere  decla 
ration  of  principle.  "While  little  was  openly  said,  the  deep 
er  motive  of  the  opposition  was  plainly  insinuated — it  was 
the  practical  beginning  of  the  struggle  to  fortify  the  slave 


CH.  V.]     THE   MANUFACTURERS  AND   COMPROMISE     209 

interest.  Clay  did  not  speak  on  the  subject.  He  could  not 
well  have  voted  against  the  bill,  and  he  withdrew  before 
the  vote  was  taken.  The  bill  was  passed  by  the  Senate  on 
the  20th,  the  day  after  Clay,  from  the  select  committee,  re 
ported  the  compromise  bill. 

When  the  proposed  Compromise  was  first  announced  the 
manufacturing  interests  were  stricken  with  consternation. 
That  Clay  should  propose  it  confounded  them.  Et  tu, 
Brute!  Their  representatives  hastened  to  Washington  to 
remonstrate ;  but  on  learning  the  true  situation  many  of 
them  were  converted  :  a  half-loaf  was  better  than  no  bread. 
When  the  bill  was  reported,  various  amendments  to  it  were 
proposed,  the  principal  one  being  to  adopt  home  valuation 
instead  of  foreign,  which  had  always  prevailed.  The  im 
portance  of  this  amendment,  although  not  to  take  effect 
until  1842,  is  shown  by  a  remark  Clay  made  years  after 
ward.  "  Give  me,"  said  he,  "  but  the  power  of  fixing  the 
valuation  of  the  goods,  and  I  care  little,  in  comparison,  what 
may  be  the  rate  of  duties  you  propose." 

The  amendment  at  once  provoked  violent  opposition.  It 
was  pronounced  unconstitutional,  because  of  the  inequality 
of  its  effect,  goods  being  cheaper  in  the  Northern  than  in  the 
Southern  markets;  and  besides  this,  was  the  possibility  that 
the  duties  themselves  might  be  made  to  enter  into  the  valu 
ation.  The  obnoxious  feature  had  not  formed  a  part  of  the 
original  scheme,  and  Calhoun  revolted.  Amid  great  excite 
ment  he  announced  that  if  it  were  insisted  upon  he  would 
not  support  the  bill.  Clayton,  who  was  mainly  instrumen 
tal  in  proposing  the  amendment,  moved  to  table  the  bill. 
Under  the  circumstances,  if  this  were  done,  the  bill  would 
have  been  killed.  He  was  induced  to  withdraw  the  motion. 
After  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  qualify  the  amendment,  an 

14 


210  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

adjournment  was  taken.  But  the  contrivers  of  the  amend 
ment  remained  inexorable.  The  next  day,  Calhoun  ac 
quiesced,  veiling  his  coercion  with  the  thin  pretext  that  he 
felt  himself  " justified  in  concluding"  that  no  valuation 
would  be  adopted  that  would  come  in  conflict  with  the 
Constitution,  and  that  the  duties  would  not  form  an  element 
of  the  valuation.  This  was  on  the  22d. 

The  debate  proceeded.  The  Constitutional  objection  was 
now  raised  that  a  revenue  bill  could  not  originate  in  the 
Senate ;  but  instead  of  its  operating  to  obstruct  the  bill,  it 
hastened  its  success  by  prompting  a  coup -de -main.  But 
few  days  of  the  session  remained.  "Whatever  was  done 
must  be  done  quickly.  On  the  25th  a  motion  was  made  in 
the  House  by  Letcher1  to  strike  out  all  after  the  enacting 
clause  of  the  Yerplanck  bill,  which  was  still  under  debate, 
and  substitute  the  Senate  bill.  None  but  those  favorable 
to  this  extraordinary  operation  had  notice  of  it.  Without 
regard  to  the  astonished  protests  of  the  opposition,  the  de 
sign  was  accomplished.  This  occurred  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  Tuesday.  The  next  clay  debate  was  stifled  by  carrying 
the  previous  question.  The  bill  was  then  passed,  119  to  85. 
It  was  at  once  taken  up  by  the  Senate,  and  on  Friday, 
March  1,  passed,  29  to  16.  On  the  preceding  Wednesday 
the  House  passed  the  force  bill.  On  Saturday  both  bills 
were  signed  by  the  President.  On  the  16th  the  South 
Carolina  Convention,  which  had  adjourned  to  that  time,  re 
pealed  the  ordinance,  but  adopted  another  against  the  force 
bill — a  harmless  fulmination  for  spectacular  effect. 

Whatever  the  opinion  concerning  the  wisdom  of  the  Com- 


1  Concerning  Letcher,  who  was  one  of  Clay's  chief  lieutenants  in  both 
compromises,  see  Life  of  Cassius  M.  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  215  ;  Adams's  Diary, 
vol.  viii.  p.  336 ;  Coleman's  Crittenden,  vol.  i.  p.  182. 


CH.V.]   CLAY'S  GREAT  EFFORTS  FOR  COMPROMISE  211 

promise,  the  responsibility  for  it  rests  mainly  upon  Clay, 
not  only  as  the  originator  of  the  plan,  but  as  the  chief 
agent  in  carrying  it  through.  "While  his  principal  motive, 
as  he  always  affirmed,  was  to  preserve  all  that  was  possible 
of  the  protective  system,  he  was  doubtless  stimulated  by 
the  imposing  effect  of  his  action  and  a  desire  to  prevent 
Jackson  from  executing  his  militant  threats  against  South 
Carolina.  ]^o  act  of  his  career  called  out  more  signally  all 
his  peculiar  resources.  He  labored  night  and  day — plead 
ing,  manipulating,  bartering,  threatening.  In  the  closet,  in 
committee,  on  the  floor,  he  was  the  controlling  spirit.1  With 
the  protected  interests  at  stake  he  had  the  materiel  to  un 
dermine  the  plan  of  the  administration.  Though  the  secret 
history  of  the  transaction  is  not  known  in  detail,  the  vari 
ous  means  that  were  successfully  used  are  evidenced  by  the 
vote.  A  more  variegated  combination  of  diverse  elements 
was  never  fused  in  a  legislative  act.  Every  interest,  influ 
ence,  and  device  that  could  gain  a  supporter  without  impair 
ing  the  general  purpose  of  the  scheme  was  unhesitatingly 
resorted  to. 

The  main  obstacles  that  Clay  encountered  were  the  efforts, 
of  Benton  and  Webster,  the  latter  giving  the  original  policy 
of  the  administration,  in  regard  to  nullification,  such  sup 
port  as  to  create  the  impression  that  he  had  permanently 
abandoned  his  former  party  affiliations.  He  achieved  great 
renown  by  his  speeches  on  the  subject  of  nullification,  his 
position  compelling  him  to  take  an  uncompromising  stand 
for  the  nationality  of  the  Union.  He,  therefore,  favored 
putting  the  question  to  the  test  of  arms  if  necessary  rather 
than  yield  anything  to  the  menace  of  nullification  and 

1  Sargent's  Clay,  p.  144  ;  Garland's  Randolph,  vol.  ii.  p.  362 ;  Clays 
Correspondence,  p.  352. 


212  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1833 

secession.  He  did  not  favor  the  Verplanck  bill ;  but  had 
it  reached  the  Senate  it  is  not  unlikely  that  he  would  have 
supported  it,  provided  he  could  have  obtained  such  amend 
ments  as  would  reasonably  satisfy  the  New  England  in 
terests.  He  was  in  a  peculiar  predicament  in  regard  to  the 
tariff.  Having  forsaken  his  early  principles  through  politi 
cal  exigency,  he  desired  to  gain  all  the  advantage  he  could 
for  the  interests  for  which  he  had  practically  sacrificed  those 
principles,  and  yet  disclaim  all  responsibility  for  protection. 
He  sought  to  blend  the  necessary  reduction  of  the  revenue 
with  the  retention  of  the  utmost  protection  possible  under 
the  circumstances.  His  chief  objections  to  the  Compromise 
were  that  a  horizontal  reduction  would  prevent  the  dis 
crimination  essential  to  protection,  and  that  to  bind  the 
action  of  Congress  for  a  long  term  of  years  was  unwise  and 
unconstitutional. 

For  years  after  the  Compromise  there  was  much  dispute 
between  the  principal  parties  to  it  as  to  which  of  them  got 
the  best  of  the  bargain.  The  truth  is  that  the  arrangement 
afforded  a  convenient  escape  for  all  concerned.  Protection, 
which  would  otherwise  have  soon  been  eradicated,  retained 
a  considerable  measure  of  vitality,  with  the  chance  of  com 
plete  restoration;  nullification,  which  had  proven  odious 
and  impracticable,  had  nevertheless  effected  a  large  part  of 
the  actual  object  at  which  it  was  aimed ;  and  the  adminis 
tration  had  gained  a  substantial  modification  of  the  tariff, 
and  upheld  the  national  theory  of  the  Union  and  the  right 
of  the  government  to  resort  to  force  to  maintain  it. 

From  no  practical  point  of  view  can  the  Missouri  Compro 
mise  be  justly  condemned.  Although  the  reasons  that  jus 
tified  it  were  more  imposing  in  appearance  than  those  which 
induced  the  Compromise  of  1833,  they  were  not  more  urgent 


CH.  V.]       THE    WISDOM  OF  THE  COMPROMISE  213 

and  important ;  in  reality  they  were  much  the  same.  The 
time  had  not  arrived  to  effect  by  force — and  it  could  be 
done  in  no  other  way — a  complete  and  final  settlement  of 
the  difference  that  lay  at  the  bottom  of  all  the  sectional 
controversies.  Had  the  existing  tariff  system  been  main 
tained  intact,  and  force  successfully  exerted  to  prevent  the 
secession  of  South  Carolina,  the  result  could  have  been  but 
temporary.  The  underlying  motives  that  prompted  the 
action  of  that  State  were  quite  as  powerful  in  all  the  South 
ern  States.  Discontent  pervaded  the  South,  and  but  little 
would  have  been  required  to  rally  the  entire  section  to  the 
aid  of  South  Carolina,  which  would  have  been  moved  to 
new  efforts  by  the  terrible  incentives  of  humiliation  and  re 
venge.  At  that  period  the  North  could  not  have  preserved 
the  Union  against  the  concerted  withdrawal  of  the  South. 

Critics  exceed  their  prerogative  when  they  condemn  by 
an  ideal  standard  those  who  partake  in  such  a  trans 
action  as  this  Compromise.1  The  question  is  not  whether 
this  or  that  man  or  set  of  men  was  theoretically  right  or 
wrong,  but  what  was  the  most  practicable  expedient  to 
adopt,  considering  the  whole  situation  —  the  clashing  in 
terests  of  the  sections,  the  immaturity  of  the  republic,  and 
the  untried  quality  of  the  Constitution.  The  imperfect 
human  nature  that  governs  all  the  affairs  of  a  people  de 
mands  allowances  that  critics  no  less  than  public  men  who 
represent  hostile  elements  and  bear  the  practical  responsi 
bilities  are  bound  to  make.  If  they  who  criticise  and  carp 
had  been  placed  in  the  same  situation  with  those  who 

1  This  presentation  of  the  subject  cannot  well  ignore  the  comment  of 
Von  Hoist  (Constitutional  and  Political  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  i. 
p.  505),  who,  notwithstanding  the  ability  of  his  work,  so  often  betrays  the 
peevishness  and  lack  of  insight  characteristic  of  the  idealist  and  book 
man. 


214  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1833 

shaped  events  at  that  perilous  juncture,  and  had  employed 
the  logic  of  their  present  criticism,  their  voices  would  not 
have  been  heard  above  the  mutter  of  the  impending  storm. 
Precisely  two  months  before  he  offered  the  compromise 
bill,  Clay  introduced  the  land  bill  which  had  failed  at  the 
preceding  session.  It  formed  a  part  of  his  general  plan  for 
dealing  with  the  financial  situation  mainly  caused  by  the 
tariff.  After  a  vigorous  debate  the  bill  was  narrowly  pass 
ed  by  the  Senate.  It  was  finally  passed  by  the  House  also, 
but  with  amendments,  which  were  not  concurred  in  by  the 
Senate  until  just  before  the  close  of  the  session.  The  Presi 
dent  did  not  sign  it,  but  retained  it  until  the  beginning  of 
the  next  session,  when  he  returned  it  with  his  veto,  and  thus 
furnished  one  of  the  topics  that  made  the  Twenty-third 
Congress  memorable. 


CHAPTER  VI 

Clay  and  Jackson  make  Northern  Tours— The  Removal  of  the  Deposits- 
Tactics  of  the  Whigs  in  the  Senate— Clay's  Resolutions  Censuring  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury — The  Debate — The  Anti- 
Bank  Resolutions  of  the  House  —  The  Distress  Petitions  —  Jackson's 
Protest  against  the  Censure  and  the  Subsequent  Proceedings— Taney's 
Nomination  for  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Rejected — Other  Phases  of 
the  Bank  Struggle — Coinage  Legislation  —  The  Land  Bill  —  The  De 
posits  Bill  — The  French  Spoliations  — The  Cherokee  Indians  — The 
Four  Years  Law  and  the  Spoils  System 

THE  session  over,  Clay  returned  to  Ashland  and  resumed 
his  rural  pursuits.  He  had  planned  to  make  an  extensive 
tour  through  Canada  and  the  Northern  States,  intending  to 
set  out  in  July.  Part  of  this  plan,  however,  he  relinquished. 
In  October  he  went  to  Baltimore,  and  thence  northward, 
visiting  various  points  in  New  England  and  New  York.1 
He  also  stopped  at  several  cities  on  his  way  to  Washington. 
The  tour  was  a  continuous  ovation,  flattering  to  his  pride 
and  stimulating  to  his  purpose  to  renew  the  "Whig  war 
against  the  administration. 

In  the  summer,  Jackson  had  preceded  him  over  much  the 
same  ground  and  amid  similar  demonstrations,3  which  like- 


1  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  ix.  pp.  25,  43  ;  Giles's  Register,  vol.  xlv.  p.  176  ; 
Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  371. 

2  When  Jackson  visited  New  England  on  this  tour,  Harvard  University 
conferred  upon  him  the  degree  of  LL.D.,  which  excited  the  deepest  con 
tempt  of  Adams,  who  was  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Overseers. — Adams's 
Diary,  vol.  viii.  p.  576.    "  A  few  years  ago  one  of  the  universities  conferred 
the  honorary  degree  of  LL.D.  on  Henry  Clay  .  .  .  and  Dr.  Clay,  Doctor 


216  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

wise  encouraged  him  to  carry  out  the  policy  upon  which  he 
was  resolved.  About  the  time  that  Clay  started  north,  Jack 
son  performed  the  culminating  act  of  his  design  to  destroy 
the  bank — the  removal  of  the  government  deposits.1  An 
inkling  of  the  great  struggle  that  was  soon  to  follow  was 
given  by  Clay  in  a  note,  October  14,  declining  a  public  dinner 
which  was  proposed  to  be  held  in  his  honor  at  Philadelphia. 
"  The  time  has  arrived,"  he  wrote,  "  which  I  long  ago  ap 
prehended,  when  our  greatest  exertions  are  necessary  to 
maintain  the  free  institutions  inherited  from  our  ancestors. 
Yes,  gentlemen,  disguise  is  useless.  The  time  is  come  when 
we  must  decide  whether  the  Constitution,  the  laws,  and  the 
checks  which  they  have  respectively  provided,  shall  prevail, 
or  the  will  of  one  man  shall  have  uncontrolled  sway.  In 
the  settlement  of  that  question  I  shall  be  found  where  I 
have  ever  been." 

Congress  convened  December  2.  Ten  years  of  increas 
ing  political  agitation  had  made  Congress  the  centre  of 
popular  interest,  with  the  effect  of  bringing  into  both 
Houses  an  unwonted  number  of  men  of  marked  talent  and 
ability.2  The  proceedings,  particularly  of  the  Senate,  where 
the  Whigs  still  had  a  majority,  were  watched  like  a  gladi- 


Clay  was  said  and  sung  a  million  of  times  by  noisy  fools  who  affected  much 
pride  in  remembering  Doctor  Franklin  as  one  of  their  countrymen— and 
who  obtained  the  title  in  the  same  way  that  it  was  conferred  on  Mr.  Clay, 
and  on  the  same  principles.  Well— this  degree  has  been  bestowed  on  An 
drew  Jackson,  and  it  is  pretty  near  '  treason '  to  call  him  Doctor.  .  .  .  Mr. 
Clay  did  not  present  himself  to  receive  the  degree,  as  General  Jackson 
did."— Niles's  Register,  vol.  xliv.  p.  323. 

1  Van  Buren  accompanied  Jackson  on  this  tour,  and  was  induced  to 
change  his  opinion  in  regard  to  the  removal  of  the  deposits.     He  had  pre 
viously  been  adverse  to  it. — Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Hamilton,  p.  258. 

2  "Of  the  members  of  this  Congress  five  have  been  President ;  five 
Vice  -  President ;  eight  Secretary  of   State;  twenty -five   Governor  of  a 
State  ;  besides  other  men  of  note."— Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii.  p.  537. 


CH.  VI.]  JACKSON'S  PURPOSE  TO  RUIN  THE  BANK  217 

atorial  combat.1  Undaunted  by  defeat  and  the  apparent 
odds  against  them,  Clay  and  the  Whig  leaders  determined 
to  persist  in  the  policy  of  sustaining  the  bank.  The  removal 
of  the  deposits  was  now  the  gage  of  battle.  Thus  began 
the  famous  "  Panic  Session." 

The  action  of  the  President,  through  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  in  withholding  further  deposits  of  the  pub 
lic  moneys  from  the  bank  and  its  branches,  was  prompted 
by  no  sudden  impulse.  It  was  a  very  natural  stroke  in 
Jackson's  crusade  against  the  institution,  which  he  flatly 
declared  in  his  message  to  Congress  was  "converted  into 
a  permanent  electioneering  engine."  It  was  hardly  to 
be  expected,  in  view  of  all  which  had  preceded,  that  he 
would  spare  so  efficient  a  means  to  hasten  and  complete 
its  destruction.  Sumner,  his  ablest  biographer,  asserts,  after 
the  manner  of  most  of  those  who  have  since  written  on  the 
subject,  that  "Jackson's  animosity  towards  the  bank,  in 
the  autumn  of  1832,  had  gathered  the  intensity  and  bull 
dog  ferocity  which  he  always  felt  for  an  enemy  engaged  in 
active  resistance."  Not  satisfied  with  this  energetic  meta 
phor,  the  same  writer  also  ascribes  Jackson's  procedure  to 
the  "  impulse  of  the  passions  which  animate  the  Indian  on 
the  war-path."  Such  characterizations  are  not  calculated  to 
promote  a  just  and  complete  view  of  the  matter ;  they  re-  W 
semble  the  splenetic  exaggerations  of  Yon  Hoist,  and  dis>^— - 
play  somewhat  the  same  temper  of  mind  as  such  writers 
impute  to  Jackson.  Starting  from  the  proposition  that  the 
scheme  of  the  bank  was  fundamentally  wrong,  by  reason  of 
its  partnership  of  public  with  private  interests,  which  left 

1  It  was  during  this  period  that  James  Brooks  introduced  the  practice 
of  writing  regular  letters  from  Washington  to  distant  newspapers.  His 
correspondence  was  regarded  as  a  revelation  in  journalism. 


218  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

the  institution  open  to  political  influences,  it  follows  that  to 
ry'prevent  the  recharter  on  that  basis  was  right.  If  Jackson 
acted  like  a  bulldog  or  an  Indian  in  the  subsequent  contest, 
the  bank  and  its  champions  were  hardly  less  savage  and  in 
considerate  of  the  business  interests  of  the  country.  The 
bank  had  entered  into  an  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive, 
with  the  Whig  party,  and  was  using  its  prodigious  power  to 
that  end.  Refusing  to  compromise  upon  a  modified  plan  of 
recharter,  the  allies  prematurely  projected  the  issue  into  a 
Presidential  election  as  a  means  of  party  success.  The  result 
proving  disastrous,  they  sought  to  coerce  a  change  of  popular 
opinion  by  furthering  a  financial  stringency,  which  would  be 
charged  to  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  and  which  in  truth 
would  alone  tend  to  some  extent  to  produce  that  result. 
Certainly  the  bank  would  not  be  likely  to  mitigate  the  con 
sequences  when  it  was  supposed  that  great  political  advan 
tages  could  under  the  circumstances  be  derived  from  them. 
"While  these  considerations,  too  often  lost  sight  of,  do  not 
lessen  any  just  criticism  of  Jackson,  they  will  aid  in  appor 
tioning  the  blame  between  him  and  the  bank  party. 

The  authority  for  the  removal  was  contained  in  this  pro 
vision  of  the  charter:  "The  deposits  .  .  .  shall  be  made  in 
said  bank  or  branches  thereof,  unless  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  at  any  time  otherwise  order  and  direct;  in  which 
case  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall  immediately  lay 
before  Congress,  if  in  session,  and  if  not,  immediately  at 
the  commencement  of  the  next  session,  the  reason  for  such 
order  or  direction."  The  bank  of  course  had  not  been  un 
mindful  of  the  danger  in  which  it  stood  from  this  pro-*- 
vision.  Soon  after  Jackson's  re-election  it  was  rumored 
that  he  meditated  removing  the  deposits.  Another  investi 
gation  by  a  committee  of  the  House  took  place,  resulting  as 


CH.  VI.]    JACKSON'S  FIRMNESS  AS  TO  THE  BANK    219 

usual  in  a  majority  and  minority  report.  The  latter  report, 
however,  did  not  recommend  the  removal  of  the  deposits ;  it 
only  brought  to  view  some  bad  practices  of  the  bank,  yet 
nothing  of  sufficient  importance  to  show  that  the  bank 
was  insolvent,  and  that  the  deposits  were  insecure.  Indeed, 
it  may  be  conceded,  in  the  full  light  of  subsequent  informa 
tion,  that  at  this  period  the  bank  was  solvent,  and  such  was 
the  general  opinion  without  regard  to  party  lines.  On  the 
heels  of  these  reports,  two  days  before  Jackson  was  inaugu 
rated,  a  resolution  was  adopted  by  the  House,  by  a  large 
majority,  declaring  that  the  deposits  might  be  safely  con 
tinued  in  the  bank.  This  was  done  confessedly  to  stay  the 
hands  of  the  President. 

But  his  purpose  was  not  so  easily  frustrated.  The  House 
resolution  was  the  least  of  the  difficulties  he  encountered .  He 
found  himself  in  the  same  position  in  which  he  was  placed 
when  he  first  announced  his  opposition  to  renewing  the 
charter — the  majority  of  his  party,  so  far  as  they  had  any 
opinion  on  the  subject,  as  well  as  the  majority  of  his  imme 
diate  advisers,  were  opposed  to  the  plan.  To  remove  the 
deposits  was  viewed  as  an  unnecessary  and  dangerous  pro 
ceeding.  But  when  at  length  he  determined  that  it  should  be 
done,  opposition,  even  in  his  own  party,  did  not  deter  him. 
Despite  all  evidence  that  had  been  adduced,  he  believed 
that  the  bank  was  unsound  and  was  using  every  means,  in 
cluding  the  public  moneys  on  deposit  with  it,  to  perpetuate 
its  existence  contrary  to  the  expressed  will  of  the  people. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  tangible  evidence  of  the 
operations  of  the  bank  that  were  politically  most  effective 
is  not  attainable.  The  motives  that  governed  its  officers 
in  making  loans  and  discounting  paper  were  generally 
inscrutable.  But  the  slightest  insight  into  financial  affairs 


220  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

suggests  not  only  the  possibility  but  the  practical  certainty 
that  at  this  juncture  at  least  the  business  of  the  bank  was 
conducted  with  a  view  to  its  political  interests,  and  hence 
that  its  favors  were  bestowed  only  upon  its  tried  friends 
and  those  who  became  its  friends  through  the  accommo 
dations  they  received.  Undoubtedly  considerations  of  this 
kind  controlled  Jackson's  decision  more  than  any  fears  he 
may  have  entertained  concerning  the  safety  of  the  public 
funds.  At  all  events,  having  made  up  his  mind  to  remove 
them,  he  forthwith  proceeded  to  execute  his  purpose.  But 
he  was  now  met  by  obstacles  more  difficult  to  surmount 
than  adverse  counsels.  McLane,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
refused  to  issue  the  necessary  order.  He  was  promptly 
transferred  to  the  State  Department  to  take  the  place  of 
Livingston,  who  was  made  Minister  to  France.  Duane,  of 
Philadelphia,  was  then  appointed  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
He  had  thus  far  been  a  warm  supporter  of  the  President  in 
his  opposition  to  the  renewal  of  the  charter.  It  was  there 
fore  assumed,  without  inquiry,  as  it  seems,  that  he  would  be 
willing  to  make  the  desired  order ;  but  the  President  was 
immediately  surprised  and  chagrined  to  find  himself  mis 
taken  in  the  new  Secretary.  Without  delay  or  equivocation 
Duane  refused  to  make  the  order ;  and  no  argument  or  per 
suasion  could  shake  his  resolution.  And  not  only  did  he 
refuse  to  make  the  order,  but  he  also  refused  to  resign  his 
place  voluntarily.  He  preferred  political  martyrdom  for 
the  good  of  the  cause  he  had  espoused.  He  was  then  sum- 
.marily  dismissed,  and  he  retired  denouncing  the  President 
and  the  "  irresponsible  cabal,"  as  he  charged,  under  whose 
influence  the  President  acted.  Taney,  the  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  was  at  once  appointed  in  his  stead.  This  time  no  mis 
take  was  made.  The  order  was  issued  with  alacrity.  In 


CH.  VI.]  REMOVING  STATE  DEPOSITS  221 


fact,  Taney  had  from  the  first  strongly  advocated  the  meas-  A 
ure  and  contributed  materially  to  strengthening  the  Presi 
dent's  purpose.1 

The  order  was  issued  September  26.  It  did  not  affect  ex 
isting  deposits,  which  amounted  to  nearly  ten  millions ;  they 
were  left  to  be  drawn  in  the  usual  course  of  disbursement, 
and  after  a  lapse  of  fifteen  months  there  still  remained  a 
balance  with  the  bank  of  about  four  millions.  The  order 
related  exclusively  to  moneys  to  be  henceforth  collected, 
and  these  were  to  be  deposited  with  specified  State  banks. 
The  bank  at  once  began  to  curtail  its  discounts  and  to  in 
crease  its  clamor.  The  "Whig  press  furiously  joined  the  cry, 
assailing  Jackson  with  increased  license  and  rancor.  The 
State  banks  were  compelled  to  curtail,  while  the  "  pet 
banks  "  were  not  as  yet  able  to  relieve  the  pressure.  The 
result  was  a  serious  disturbance  of  business,  with  the  usual 
incidents  of  general  financial  fright.  Such  in  brief  was  the 
situation  at  the  opening  of  the  "  Panic  Session." 

Although  Benton  had  not  been  consulted  by  the  Presi 
dent  as  to  the  policy  of  removing  the  deposits,  it  received 
his  exuberant  approval.  "  I  felt,"  he  says,  "  an  emotion  of 
the  moral  sublime  at  beholding  such  an  instance  of  civic 
heroism."  As  before,  he  took  command  of  the  anti-bank 
forces  in  Congress.  December  5,  he  submitted  a  resolution 
calling  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  a  statement 
of  the  public  funds  in  the  bank  at  the  end  of  each  month 
during  the  whole  period.  On  the  10th  the  resolution  was 
amended  on  Clay's  motion  so  as  to  call  also  for  detailed 
information  touching  the  State  banks  selected  as  the  new 


1  The  internal  history  of  the  measure  is  given  in  detail  by  Amos  Ken 
dall  in  his  Autobiography,  p.  374  et  seq.  For  Van  Buren's  estimate  of 
Taney,  see  his  Political  Parties  in  the  United  States,  p.  364. 


222  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

depositories.  On  the  same  day,  Clay  offered  a  resolution 
requesting  the  President  to  inform  the  Senate  whether  a 
certain  paper,  purporting  to  have  been  read  by  him  at  the 
cabinet  meeting  in  September,  was  genuine,  and  if  so  that  a 
copy  of  it  be  laid  before  the  Senate.  The  paper  had  been 
published  for  months.  It  had  been  formally  prepared  by 
Taney,  according  to  the  President's  views,  and  was  little  more 
than  an  animated  restatement  of  the  considerations  which 
had  already  been  expressed  in  his  official  message,  together 
with  certain  facts  which  had  been  brought  out  in  the  "  in 
vestigations,"  showing  the  political  activity  and  mismanage 
ment  of  the  bank.  It  closed  with  an  assumption  of  personal 
responsibility  for  the  proposed  act  and  its  consequences. 
The  resolution  met  with  the  criticism  that  the  Senate  had 
no  right  to  demand  the  paper ;  that  it  was  not  an  official 
document,  but  precisely  the  same  as  a  speech  made  by  the 
President  at  a  cabinet  meeting.  Clay  virtually  admitted 
that  if  the  paper  had  not  been  published  the  Senate  would 
have  no  right  to  it,  but  as  it  had  been,  the  case  was  altered 
— a  distinction  without  a  difference.  The  resolution  was 
adopted,  Calhoun  and  his  friends  voting  with  the  majority. 
The  imprudence  of  this  move  immediately  appeared. 
The  President  responded  in  a  curt  message  declining  to 
comply  with  the  request.  And  there  is  no  doubt  that  he 
was  entirely  justified  in  doing  so.  The  publication  of  the 
paper  presented  merely  a  question  of  propriety.  It  was  the 
President's  mode  of  making  public  the  motives  for  doing 
an  act  that  was  violently  assailed.  It  was  one  of  the  symp 
toms  of  the  intense  political  strife — and  not  materially  dif 
ferent  in  character  from  the  various  reports  and  communi 
cations  issued  by  the  bank  for  political  effect.  That  he 
would  refuse  to  comply  with  the  resolution  must  have  been 


Cii.VL]          CLAY'S   INTEREST   IN  THE  BANK  223 

foreseen,  and  that  the  advantage  of  the  affair  would  lie 
with  him  ought  to  have  been.1 

For  several  days  after  this  incident  the  time  of  the  Senate 
was  mostly  given  to  organizing  the  standing  committees  and 
to  other  preliminary  and  routine  business.  Clay  was  elected 
to  but  one  committee — Public  Lands — and  was  not  made 
chairman  of  that.  This  was  undoubtedly  from  choice,  so 
that  his  functions  of  leadership  might  not  be  interfered 
with.  He  was  almost  invariably  present  during  the  sessions 
of  the  Senate,  and  participated  in  the  discussion  of  nearly 
every  question  of  any  importance  that  arose.  His  exten 
sive  experience  usually  gave  controlling  weight  to  his  views 
when  the  subjects  were  not  political.  When  politics  was 
concerned  his  opinions  were  practically  law  to  his  side. 

Meantime  he  was  perfecting  his  preparations  for  the 
main  assault.  On  the  18th  he  offered  resolutions  calling  on 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  further  specified  informa 
tion  in  regard  to  the  deposits  question.  They  were  amend 
ed  next  day  on  Benton's  motion,  so  as  to  call  for  additional 
facts.  In  explaining  his  reasons  for  submitting  the  resolu 
tions,  Clay  severely  criticised  Taney,  who,  he  alleged,  had 
erroneously  cited  Crawford  as  an  authority  for  controlling 
the  deposits.  But  especial  interest  was  given  the  speech 
by  his  statement  of  his  past  relations  with  the  bank.  It 
had  been  charged  that  he  had  a  pecuniary  interest  in  sup 
porting  the  bank.  He  said  that  he  had  not  subscribed  for 
any  of  the  stock  when  the  bank  was  created,  and  did  not 
own  any  until  a  few  years  afterward,  when  five  shares  were 
purchased  for  him  and  he  was  made  a  director  without  con 
sultation.  He  paid  for  the  shares,  but  soon  afterward  ceased 


1  Adams's  Diary,  vol.  ix.  p.  51. 


224  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

to  be  a  director  and  sold  his  stock.  Since  then  he  had  not 
owned  a  single  share.  At  one  period  he  had  acted  as 
counsel  for  the  bank  in  a  large  amount  of  litigation,  and 
had  received  the  usual  compensation,  and  no  more.  He  had 
also  owed  the  bank  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of  a  friend 
whose  paper  he  had  endorsed.  But  he  had  paid  the  debt 
and  had  not  acted  as  counsel  for  the  bank  during  the  pre 
vious  eight  years. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  session  the  President  nominated 
the  five  government  directors  of  the  bank  as  provided  by  the 
charter.  Four  of  them  had  already  served  a  year,  and  being 
friendly  to  the  administration  had  brought  to  light  some 
facts  showing  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the  bank;  and 
these  facts  had  been  used  in  the  minority  report  of  the 
investigating  committee  and  in  the  paper  read  by  the 
President  to  his  cabinet.  The  four  nominees  were  imme 
diately  rejected.  The  President  then  replied  in  a  message 
arguing  the  propriety  of  the  nominations  and  returning  the 
names.  The  message  and  renominations  were  referred  to  the 
Finance  Committee.  The  report  was  adverse  and  grounded 
on  the  absolute  right  of  the  Senate  to  reject  all  nominations 
in  its  discretion  without  giving  reasons.  The  report  was 
adopted.  The  debates,  having  taken  place  in  executive 
session,  were  not  published ;  but  the  action  of  the  Senate 
heightened  the  animosity  of  the  contending  parties. 

December  26,  Clay  opened  the  great  debate  of  the  session 
in  the  presence  of  a  crowded  and  eager  audience.  The 
speech  was  in  support  of  two  resolutions  which  he  submitted 
at  the  outset.  They  were  as  follows  : 

"  Resolved,  That  by  dismissing  the  late  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  because  he  would  not,  contrary  to  his  sense  of  his 
own  duty,  remove  the  money  of  the  United  States  on  deposit 


CH.  VI.]  PROTEST  AGAINST  WITHDRAWING  DEPOSITS  225 

with  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  its  branches,  in  con 
formity  with  the  President's  opinion;  and  by  appointing 
his  successor  to  effect  such  removal,  which  has  been  done, 
the  President  has  assumed  the  exercise  of  a  power  over  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  not  granted  to  him  by  the 
Constitution  and  laws,  and  dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  the 
people. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  reasons  assigned  by  tlie  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  for  the  removal  of  the  money  of  the  United 
States  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  its 
branches,  communicated  to  Congress  on  the  3d  of  Decem 
ber,  1833,  are  unsatisfactory  and  insufficient." 

"  We  are  in  the  midst  of  a  revolution,"  he  began, "  hither 
to  bloodless,  but  rapidly  tending  toward  a  total  change  of 
the  pure  republican  character  of  our  government,  and  to  the 
concentration  of  all  power  in  the  hands  of  one  man.  The 
powers  of  Congress  are  paralyzed,  except  when  exerted  in 
conformity  with  his  will,  by  frequent  and  extraordinary  ex 
ercise  of  the  Executive  veto,  not  anticipated  by  the  founders 
of  our  Constitution  and  not  practised  by  any  of  the  prede 
cessors  of  the  present  Chief  Magistrate.  And  to  cramp 
them  still  more,  a  new  expedient  is  springing  into  use,  of 
withholding  altogether  bills  which  have  received  the  sanc 
tion  of  both  houses  of  Congress,  thereby  cutting  off  all  op 
portunity  of  passing  them,  even  if  after  their  return  the 
members  should  be  unanimous  in  their  favor.  The  Constitu 
tional  participation  of  the  Senate  in  the  appointing  power 
is  virtually  abolished  by  the  constant  use  of  the  power  of 
removal  from  office  without  any  known  cause,  and  by  the 
appointment  of  the  same  individual  to  the  same  office  after 
his  rejection  by  the  Senate.  .  .  . 

"  The  judiciary  has  not  been  exempt  from  the  prevailing 

15 


226  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

rage  for  innovation.  Decisions  of  the  tribunals,  deliberate 
ly  pronounced,  have  been  contemptuously  disregarded,  and 
the  sanctity  of  numerous  treaties  openly  violated.  Our 
Indian  relations,  coeval  with  the  existence  of  the  govern 
ment  and  recognized  and  established  by  numerous  laws  and 
treaties,  have  been  subverted  and  the  rights  of  the  helpless 
and  unfortunate  aborigines  trampled  in  the  dust,  and  they 
are  brought  under  subjection  to  unknown  laws,  in  which 
they  have  no  voice,  promulgated  in  an  unknown  language. 
The  most  extensive  and  valuable  public  domain  that  ever 
fell  to  the  lot  of  one  nation  is  threatened  with  total  sacrifice. 
The  general  currency  of  the  country — the  life-blood  of  all 
business — is  in  the  most  imminent  danger  of  universal  dis 
order  and  confusion.  The  power  of  internal  improvement 
lies  crushed  beneath  the  veto.  The  system  of  protection  to 
American  industry  was  snatched  from  impending  destruc 
tion  at  the  last  session ;  but  we  are  now  coolly  told  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  without  a  blush,  'that  it  is  under 
stood  to  be  conceded  on  all  hands  that  a  tariff  for  protection 
merely  is  to  be  finally  abandoned.'  By  the  3d  of  March, 
1837,  if  the  progress  of  innovation  continues,  there  will  be 
scarcely  a  vestige  remaining  of  the  government  and  its  pol 
icy  as  they  existed  prior  to  the  3d  of  March,  1829.  In  a 
term  of  eight  years,  a  little  more  than  equal  to  that  which 
was  required  to  establish  our  liberties,  the  government  will 
have  been  transformed  into  an  elective  monarchy  —  the 
worst  of  all  forms  of  government." 

This  exordium  set  the  key  of  the  entire  performance. 
The  first  step  of  the  argument,  which  was  graphically  pre 
sented,  was  that  the  removal  of  the  deposits  was  not  the 
independent  act  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  but  was 
done  at  the  dictation  of  the  President.  While  it  was  true 


OH.  VL]   THE   ILLOGICAL   REASONING   OF   CLAY          227 

that  the  primary  cause  of  the  measure  was  the  will  of  the 
President,  the  fact  afforded  no  foundation  for  the  use  Clay 
sought  to  make  of  it.  He  maintained  that  the  office  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  wholly  independent  of  the 
President ;  that  the  Treasury,  therefore,  was  not  one  of  the 
Executive  Departments  over  which  the  President  had  control, 
and  further, that  the  President's  Constitutional  duty  "to  take 
care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed  "  had  no  applica 
tion  to  the  subject,  because  that  clause  means  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  that  if  resistance  is  made  to  the  laws  he  shall 
take  care  that  the  resistance  cease — a  construction  plainly 
too  restricted.  He  asserted  that  the  bank  and  the  President 
were  likewise  independent  of  each  other,  and  that  the  powers 
possessed  by  the  President  in  relation  to  the  institution  were 
only  to  nominate  the  government  directors  and  to  take 
proceedings  to  annul  the  charter  if  he  apprehended  that  it 
had  been  violated.  This  consideration,  however,  did  not  aid 
his  argument,  which  was  thus  far  radically  unsound.  Had 
it  been  made  in  a  suit  to  test  the  validity  of  the  order  re 
moving  the  deposits  it  would  not  have  been  even  plausible. 
He  apparently  lost  sight  of  three  things  absolutely  conclusive 
against  him :  that  the  President  had  unquestionable  author 
ity  to  dismiss  Duane ;  that  Duane's  successor  had  express 
power  to  remove  the  deposits,  and  that  it  was  his  actual 
order  that  was  issued ;  and  that  the  law  does  not  consider 
the  motives  that  lead  to  the  exercise  of  a  legal  power. 

He  also  argued  that  the  removal  of  the  deposits  in  accord 
ance  with  the  will  of  the  President  was  practically  a  union 
in  his  hands  of  the  sword  and  the  purse,  the  possibility  of 
Executive  encroachment  against  which  Patrick  Henry  had 
inveighed  in  opposing  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution; 
and  he  used  more  neatly  than  appositely  the  familiar  anec- 


228  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1833 

dote  of  Julius  Caesar  in  seizing  the  treasury  of  Rome  from 
Metellus,  the  tribune.  But  here  also  he  was  in  palpable 
error.  By  the  removal  of  the  deposits  the  President  had 
asserted  and  acquired  no  more  control  over  the  use  and  ex 
penditure  of  the  public  moneys  than  he  possessed  before, 
which  was  solely  to  approve  or  disapprove  legislation  ap 
propriating  them. 

But  if  Clay  had  travelled  beyond  the  limits  of  solid  argu 
ment,  the  President  had  to  some  extent  done  likewise  in 
some  of  the  reasons  declared  by  him  in  his  paper.  "  The 
responsibility,"  said  he,  "  has  been  assumed,  after  the  most 
mature  and  deliberate  reflection,  as  necessary  to  preserve 
the  morals  of  the  people,  the  freedom  of  the  press,  and  the 
purity  of  the  elective  franchise."  Clay  pungently  asked 
whence  the  President  derived  his  functions  as  public  guar 
dian.  The  statement  was  induced  by  the  President's  not 
unfounded  belief  that  the  bank  was  using  the  government 
deposits  to  win  supporters  in  order  to  procure  a  renewal  of 
the  charter.  It  nevertheless  laid  him  open  to  the  criticism 
that  he  was  assuming  an  unwarranted  paternalism  over  the 
people,  and  this  gave  some  color  to  the  charge  that,  whether 
or  not  he  had  violated  the  letter  of  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws,  he  had  violated  their  spirit.  However,  had  the  Sec 
retary  of  the  Treasury  removed  the  deposits  contrary  to  the 
wTill  of  the  President  and  been  dismissed  in  consequence, 
and  had  they  then  been  restored  by  the  President's  dicta 
tion,  Clay  would  have  found  the  task  of  defending  those 
acts  far  more  easy  and  congenial. 

The  first  part  of  the  speech  thus  outlined  was  delivered 
on  Thursday.  The  Senate  then  adjourned  to  the  following 
Monday,  when  Clay  resumed.  He  concluded  on  the  next 
day.  On  resuming  he  proceeded  to  examine  the  legal 


CH.  VI.]      CLAY'S  ARGUMENT  FOR  THE  BANK  229 

power  of  the  Secretary  over  the  deposits.  The  Secretary 
asserted  the  power  to  be  absolute  and  unconditional.  This 
Clay  denied,  using  the  same  line  of  argument  that  he  had  pre 
viously  employed.  He  failed  utterly  to  demonstrate  that  the 
provision  of  the  charter  under  which  the  removal  was  made 
did  not  authorize  it.  That  the  condition  of  the  bank  was 
not  such  as  to  make  the  removal  necessary  as  a  prudential 
measure  did  not  in  the  least  affect  the  naked  question  of 
legal  power.  The  language  of  the  charter  was  too  plain  to 
call  for  any  extrinsic  considerations  by  way  of  construc 
tion  or  interpretation.  Nor  did  the  act  of  the  Secretary,  as 
Clay  maintained,  interfere  with  the  power  of  Congress  to 
pass  other  laws  to  regulate  the  custody  of  the  deposits  or 
even  to  restore  them  to  the  bank. 

He  then  considered  at  length  the  various  reasons  pre 
sented  by  the  Secretary  in  his  report  as  justifying  the  re 
moval.  They  were  substantially  the  same  as  those  contained 
in  the  President's  paper.  This  was  the  strongest  part  of  the 
speech,  some  of  the  strictures  being  entirely  just.  Though 
it  was  ineffectual  as  an  argument  against  the  legality  of  the 
removal,  it  was  a  spirited  and  forcible  presentation  of  the 
case  against  the  expediency  of  it,  and  as  such  was  not  im 
proved  upon  during  the  debate. 

He  concluded  by  reviewing  the  manner  in  which  the  Sec 
retary  had  exercised  his  power  over  the  deposits.  He  as 
serted  that  in  selecting  the  new  depositories  the  Secretary 
had  unfairly  discriminated  in  favor  of  banks  at  the  Atlantic 
seaports,  which  would  thus  receive  most  of  the  public  moneys ; 
and,  further,  that  these  banks  had  been  chosen  without  ade 
quate  information  as  to  their  financial  condition.  Moreover, 
he  argued  that  inasmuch  as  there  was  a  law  prohibiting  the 
Secretary  from  entering  into  any  contracts  except  by  special 


230  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1833 

authority,  this  law  had  been  violated  in  making  the  new  de 
positories,  for  the  reason  that  in  so  doing  he  had  necessarily 
made  contracts  with  those  banks,  lie  denied  that  the  power 
to  remove  from  implied  the  power  to  designate  the  places 
to  which  the  deposits  should  be  removed,  a  contention  too 
clearly  erroneous  to  require  any  argument  to  refute  it.  It 
may  be  that  in  some  of  the  details  of  the  new  arrangement 
the  Secretary  had  exceeded  his  strict  legal  authority ;  but 
this  did  not  militate  against  the  validity  of  the  main  act  nor 
prevent  Congress  from  making  any  laws  it  deemed  advisa 
ble  to  protect  the  public  funds.  Clay  closed  in  the  same 
strain  as  he  began. 

"  The  eyes  and  the  hopes  of  the  American  people  are 
anxiously  turned  to  Congress.  They  feel  that  they  have 
been  deceived  and  insulted,  their  confidence  abused,  their 
interests  betrayed,  and  their  liberties  in  danger.  They  see 
a  rapid  and  alarming  concentration  of  all  power  in  one 
man's  hands.  They  see  that  by  the  exercise  of  the  positive 
authority  of  the  Executive,  and  his  negative  power  exerted 
over  Congress,  the  will  of  one  man  prevails  and  governs  the 
republic.  The  question  is  no  longer  what  laws  will  Congress 
pass,  but  what  will  the  Executive  not  veto.  The  President, 
and  not  Congress,  is  addressed  for  legislative  action.  .  .  . 
We  behold  the  usual  incidents  of  approaching  tyranny.  The 
land  is  filled  with  spies  and  informers,  and  detraction  and 
denunciation  are  the  orders  of  the  day.  People,  especial 
ly  official  incumbents  in  this  place,  no  longer  dare  speak  in 
tones  of  manly  freedom,  but  in  the  cautious  whispers  of 
trembling  slaves.  The  premonitory  symptoms  of  despotism 
are  upon  us ;  and  if  Congress  do  not  apply  an  instantaneous 
and  effective  remedy  the  fatal  collapse  will  soon  come 
on,  and  we  shall  die,  ignobly  die !  base,  mean,  and  abject 


CH.VL]     CLAY'S  INVECTIVE   ANGERS  JACKSON          231 

slaves — the  scorn  and  contempt  of  mankind — unpitied,  un 
wept,  and  unmourned !" 

The  speech  was  received  by  the  "Whigs  with  unbounded 
approval  and  admiration.  The  effect  upon  Jackson  was,  of 
course,  the  extreme  reverse.1  "  Oh !"  he  exclaimed,  upon 
reading  it,  "  if  I  live  to  get  these  robes  of  office  off  me,  I 
will  bring  the  rascal  to  dear  account !"  To  those  who  heard 
the  speech  Clay  fully  sustained  his  oratorical  reputation.2 
Many  passages  were  pronounced  with  that  magnetic  effect 
which  always  made  the  more  animated  parts  of  his  speeches 
so  striking  to  his  listeners.  The  applause  was  so  frequent 
that,  after  he  had  finished,  the  Vice  -  President  announced 
that  upon  any  further  manifestations  of  the  kind  the  gal 
leries  would  be  cleared. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  trace  the  course  of  the  prolonged 
debate  that  ensued.  Benton  followed  Clay,  completely  an 
swering  his  legal  argument  and  presenting  the  anti-bank 
side  of  the  question  with  his  usual  thoroughness  and  force. 
Calhoun  continued  in  the  alliance  he  had  formed  at  the  pre 
ceding  session,  and  gave  Clay  earnest  co-operation.  Webster 
resumed  his  former  affiliations  and  renewed  his  powerful 
support  of  the  bank.  He  spoke  many  times  on  various 
phases  of  the  controversy  and  wrote  the  elaborate  report 
of  the  Finance  Committee  approving  the  second  resolution.3 


1  "The  action  of  the  Senate  .  .  .  was  a  fearful  shock  to  Jackson's  strong 
nervous  system.     It  produced  more  than  anger.     This  word  faintly  con 
veys  the  idea." — Smith's  Cass,  p.  284. 

2  A  few  days  after  Clay's  speech,  and  perhaps  somewhat  influenced  by 
it,  Judge  Story  wrote  :  "I  seem  almost,  while  I  write,  to  he  in  a  dream, 
and  to  be  called  back  to  the  last  days  of  the  Roman  Republic,  when  the 
people  shouted  for  Caesar,  and  liberty  itself  expired  with  the  dark  but 
prophetic  words  of  Cicero." — Life  and  Letters  of  Story,  vol.  ii.  p.  154. 

s  He  also  proposed  a  bill  to  continue  the  charter  of  the  bank  for  six 
years  under  certain  limitations ;  but  it  was  not  acceptable  to  either  party 


232  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1834 

Most  of  the  Senators  took  an  active  part  in  the  debate, 
which  continued  until  March  28.  It  was  closed  by  Clay,  who 
began  his  speech  by  saying :  "  It  was  just  three  months  yes 
terday  since  I  opened  the  debate  in  the  Senate  which  is  now 
drawing  to  a  close.  The  period  which  has  since  elapsed  is 
long  enough  for  a  vessel  to  have  passed  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  or  to  have  made  a  return  voyage  from  Europe.  It  is 
the  longest  period  which  has  been  occupied  in  a  single  debate 
since  the  organization  of  the  government."  The  second 
resolution  was  adopted  in  its  original  form.  The  first  was 
not  entirely  acceptable  to  Calhoun,  Webster,  and  others,  who 
could  not  deny  that  the  President  had  the  power  to  remove 
Duane ;  they  held  that  he  had  abused,  but  not  usurped,  the 
power  of  removal.  The  resolution  was  accordingly  modified 
so  as  to  read:  "fiesolved,  That  the  President,  in  the  late 
executive  proceedings  in  relation  to  the  public  revenue,  has 
assumed  upon  himself  authority  and  power  not  conferred  by 
the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  but  in  derogation  of  both." 
In  this  form  it  was  adopted. 

During  this  time  the  House  had  not  been  inactive  toward 
the  subject.  There  the  administration  had  a  majority,  by 
which  to  counteract,  to  some  extent,  the  more  imposing 
operations  of  the  Senate.  After  a  long  discussion  the  report 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  regard  to  the  deposits 
was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  "Ways  and  Means,  of 
which  James  K.  Polk  was  chairman.  March  3,  the  committee 
reported.  The  majority  sustained  the  administration  on  all 


and  nothing  came  of  it.  Sumner  wrote  from  Washington,  March  3,  1834: 
"  Webster  is  doing  the  labor  in  court  which  should  have  been  done  out  of 
court.  In  fact,  politics  has  entirely  swamped  his  whole  time  and  talents. 
All  here  declare  that  he  has  neglected  his  cases  this  term  in  a  remarkable 
manner." — Pierce's  Sumner,  vol.  i.  p.  136. 


Cn.VL]         THE  HOUSE   SUPPORTS   JACKSON  233 

points  and  proposed  four  resolutions :  that  the  bank  ought 
not  to  be  rechartered ;  that  the  deposits  ought  not  to  be 
restored  to  the  bank ;  that  the  State  banks  ought  to  be  con 
tinued  as  the  depositories,  under  a  law  prescribing  the  mode 
and  terms  of  their  selection  and  the  securities  to  be  taken ; 
and  that  a  committee  be  appointed  to  ascertain  the  causes 
of  the  commercial  depression,  and  particularly  whether  the 
bank  had  furthered  it.  Discussion  of  the  resolutions  was 
twice  postponed,  probably  for  the  Senate  to  conclude  its 
proceedings  on  Clay's  resolutions.  The  debate  then  began 
and  continued  vigorously  until  April  4,  when  the  previous 
question  was  ordered  and  the  resolutions  were  adopted. 

That  the  President  would  take  official  notice  of  the 
Senate's  censure  was  not  generally  expected ;  but  it  was  soon 
understood  that  he  would  not  remain  silent.  That  there 
was  no  precedent  to  guide  him.  was  regarded  as  not  likely  to 
deter  him  more  than  it  ever  had  in  any  of  his  undertakings. 
"While  his  counter-stroke  was  preparing,  and  after  the  formal 
debate  on  the  removal  of  the  deposits  had  ceased  in  both 
houses,  another  phase  of  the  proceedings  in  relation  to  the 
subject  continued  unabated.  From  the  beginning  of  the 
session  to  its  close  memorials  and  petitions  were  presented 
almost  daily,  picturing  in  the  most  sombre  hues  the  calamity 
and  distress  which  had  befallen  the  country  as  the  result  of 
removing  the  deposits,  and  praying  their  restoration.  They 
were  met  by  others  of  contrary  character,  but  they  were 
more  numerous  and  were  presented  with  more  display.1 

In  these  proceedings  Clay  was  very  active.  He  spoke 
often,  using  the  memorials  he  presented  as  the  subjects  of 
a  variety  of  comment.  On  one  occasion  he  endeavored  to 


1  See  Benton's  Thirty  Tears'  View,  vol.  i.  p.  421. 


234  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1834 

affix  the  name  "Tory"  to  the  Democratic  party,  but  it 
made  no  progress ;  on  another  he  made  an  appeal  to  the 
Vice -President  to  intercede  with  Jackson  to  rescue  the 
country  from  the  pitiable  condition  which  he  pathetically 
described.  In  some  quarters  this  ingenious  harangue  was 
taken  more  seriously  than  it  was  by  Yan  Buren.  "  As  Clay 
closed  his  eloquent  philippic,  Yan  Buren  called  a  Senator  to 
the  chair  and  went  straight  across  the  chamber  to  Clay's 
seat.  The  tall  Kentuckian  stared  at  the  '  Little  Magician ' 
while  the  perturbed  spectators  awaited  the  result  with  un 
disguised  anxiety.  Yan  Buren  bowed  gracefully  to  Clay 
and  said  :  '  Mr.  Senator,  allow  me  to  be  indebted  to  you  for 
another  pinch  of  your  aromatic  maccoboy.'  Clay  waved  his 
hand  towards  the  gold  snuff-box  on  his  desk  and  took  his 
seat,  while  Yan  Buren  took  a  deliberate  pinch  and  leisurely 
returned  to  the  Yice-President's  chair."1  Charles  Sumner 
was  present  on  one  of  these  occasions  when  Clay  spoke. 
"  His  eloquence,"  wrote  Sumner,  "  was  splendid  and  thrill 
ing.  Without  notes  or  papers  of  any  kind,  he  seemed  to 
surrender  himself  entirely  to  the  guidance  of  his  feelings. 
He  showed  feeling ;  to  which,  of  course,  his  audience  re 
sponded.  There  was  not  one  there  whose  blood  did  not 
flow  quickly  and  pulse  throb  quickly  as  he  listened.  He  de 
livered  a  violent  attack  upon  Jackson  and  a  vehement  exhor 
tation  to  the  people  to  continue  their  memorials  and  re 
monstrances.  His  language,  without  being  choice,  is  strong ; 
but  it  is  his  manner,  or  what  Demosthenes  called  action — 
action — ACTION — which  makes  him  so  powerful.  The  op 
position  have  now  a  majority  of  members  in  the  Senate 
and  much  the  heaviest  weight  of  talents.  Yan  Buren  sits 


1  Stanton's  Random  Recollections,  p.  206. 


CH.  VI]   JACKSON  REPLIES  TO  THE  CENSURE  VOTE  235 

like  a  martyr  under  the  torrents  of  abuse  that  are  poured 
upon  his  masters  and  followers." J 

There  was  an  organized  effort  by  the  friends  of  the  bank 
throughout  the  country  to  create  excitement  and  alarm, 
and  to  bring  about  public  meetings  at  which  inflamma 
tory  speeches  were  made  and  the  distress  petitions  were 
circulated  and  signed.  In  many  cases  these  petitions  were 
taken  to  "Washington  by  large  delegations  that  besieged  the 
"White  House  and  the  halls  of  Congress.  The  effort  was 
successful.  What  would  have  been  at  most  but  a  short 
financial  flurry  was  thus  aggravated  to  a  severe  panic  and 
depression  disastrous  to  many  business  interests  and  harm 
ful  to  all. 

In  the  face  of  the  facts,  conceding  that  the  policy  of  the 
administration  was  wrong,  the  subsequent  action  of  the 
bank  in  intensifying  the  financial  distress  was  worse.  Jack 
son  should  at  least  be  acquitted  of  any  design  to  cripple 
commerce  and  finance  for  political  effect. 

His  reply  to  the  resolutions  of  censure  came  April  17,  in 
the  form  of  a  message  to  the  Senate.  It  was  a  well- 
constructed  document,  admirable  in  temper  and  style.  He 
challenged  the  propriety  of  the  censure,  because  it  was  not 
a  joint  resolution  of  both  houses,  and  asserted  no  legislative 
powers  and  proposed  no  legislative  action.  He  maintained 
that  it  was  unconstitutional,  because  it  was  virtually  an  at 
tempt  to  impeach  him  by  a  majority  of  less  than  two-thirds 
of  the  Senate,  without  observing  any  of  the  requirements 
in  impeachment  proceedings,  and  without  contemplating 
any  of  the  consequences  of  a  regular  impeachment.  He 
adverted  caustically  to  the  modification  of  the  resolution 


1  Pierce's  Sunnier,  vol.  i.  p.  137. 


236  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1834 

originally  introduced,  in  order  that  it  could  obtain,  a  ma 
jority  of  the  Senate.  He  then  argued,  that  the  Treasury 
Department  was  an  Executive  Department,  and  therefore 
under  his  supervision,  and  also  that  he  had  unrestricted 
power  to  remove  cabinet  officers.  He  quoted  resolutions 
adopted  by  the  legislatures  of  Maine,  New  Jersey,  and 
Ohio  approving  the  proceedings  that  effected  the  removal  of 
the  deposits.  This  was  done  for  the  moral  effect  of  show 
ing  that  if  four  Senators  from  those  States  who  had  voted 
for  the  censure  had  complied  with  those  resolutions  they 
would  not  have  been  adopted,  although  he  was  careful  to 
disclaim  any  implication  that  Senators  could  be  bound  by 
such  instructions.  He  criticised  the  tendency  of  the  doc 
trines  asserted  by  the  Senate,  and  formally  protested  against 
the  right  of  the  Senate  to  adopt  the  resolutions.  He  closed 
with  an  eloquent  passage  appealing  to  his  personal  history 
and  public  services  as  a  vindication  from  any  imputation 
against  the  purity  of  his  motives  and  purposes.  He  request 
ed  that  the  "  message  and  protest "  be  entered  on  the  jour 
nal  of  the  Senate. 

As  soon  as  it  was  read  it  met  with  violent  opposition. 
Poindexter  moved  that  it  be  not  received.  One  paragraph 
of  his  remarks  in  making  the  motion  will  illustrate  the  acri 
mony  that  the  protest  instantly  aroused.  "  This  is  no  mes 
sage,"  said  he ;  "  it  is  merely  a  paper  signed  by  Andrew 
Jackson ;  and  much  more  dangerous  in  its  tendency  than 
the  same  man  sent  here  in  1819,  and  which  the  Senate 
kicked  out-of-doors.  Then  he  held  the  military  power 
only ;  now  he  holds  both  the  civil  and  the  military.  This  is 
a  measure  calculated  to  produce  no  general  good.  It  is 
merely  an  attack  on  this  body.  It  will  make  a  good  article 
for  a  certain  official  journal ;  but  it  is  unfit  for  the  serious 


CH.VL]  BENTON  DEFENDS   JACKSON  237 

consideration  of  the  Senate.  I  would  spurn  it  from  the 
Senate.  It  is  an  attempt  to  use  the  Senate  as  the  medium 
through  which  to  assail  itself — this  body  which  stands  as  a 
barrier  between  the  people  and  the  encroachments  of  Execu 
tive  power — upon  which  liberty  may  repose  without  danger 
to  the  remotest  posterity.  Destroy  this  branch,  and  with 
the  aid  of  the  Blue  Book  no  limit  can  be  set  to  the  extent 
of  Executive  power.  It  is  a  most  miserable  attempt  to 
sustain  that  power.  But  it  is  nothing  more  than  what  the 
Executive  has  said  in  his  private  chamber  and  what  appears 
daily  in  the  columns  of  the  Executive  journal  itself." 

He  was  followed  by  two  other  Senators  who  spoke  in  the 
same  temper.  Benton  then  took  the  floor,  speaking  at  con 
siderable  length  and  confessedly  after  much  deliberation  : 
he  was  manifestly  prepared  for  what  had  taken  place.  His 
main  object  was  to  announce  the  intention  to  move  to  ex 
punge  from  the  journal  the  resolutions  of  censure  and  to 
persevere  in  that  purpose  until  it  was  accomplished.  In  re 
plying  to  the  motion  not  to  receive  the  protest  he  used  one 
argument  that  was  an  effective  answer.  "  The  President," 
said  he,  "  in  the  conclusion  of  his  message  has  respectfully 
requested  that  his  defence  might  be  entered  upon  the  jour 
nal  of  the  Senate — upon  the  same  journal  that  contains  the 
record  of  his  conviction.  Will  they  refuse  this  act  of  sheer 
justice  and  common  decency  ?  Will  they  go  further,  and 
not  only  refuse  to  place  it  on  the  journal,  but  refuse  even  to 
suffer  it  to  remain  in  the  Senate  ?  Will  Senators  exhaust 
their  minds,  and  their  bodies  also,  in  loading  this  very  com 
munication  with  epithets,  and  then  say  it  shall  not  be  re 
ceived?  Will  they  receive  memorials,  resolutions,  essays, 
from  all  that  choose  to  abuse  the  President,  and  not  receive 
a  word  from  him  2"  After  some  further  discussion  carried 


238  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1834 

on  with  the  same  asperity  the  Senate  adjourned  on  motion 
of  Leigh,  who  said  :  "  I  cannot  now  discuss  this  question 
without  giving  utterance  to  feelings  of  passion  which  would 
be  thought  by  others  unbecoming  the  occasion  and  my  sta 
tion — feelings  which  I  now  feel  boiling  in  my  bosom." 1 

The  motion  to  reject  was  formulated  in  a  series  of  resolu 
tions  declaring  that  the  protest  was  not  authorized  by  the 
Constitution  ;  that  it  was  calculated  to  destroy  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  Senate  and  degrade  it  in  public  opinion  ;  and 
that  it  be  not  received.  Subsequently  a  different  set  was 
substituted  at  Clay's  request.  The  language  of  the  prelimi 
nary  resolutions  was  materially  modified,  though  the  pur 
port  was  similar  ;  but  the  last  was  radically  changed,  being 
made  to  read,  "  that  the  aforesaid  protest  is  a  breach  of  the 
privileges  of  the  Senate,  and  that  it  be  not  entered  on  the 
journal."  Benton's  criticism  had  taken  effect. 

Though  severe  and  exciting,  the  previous  debate  had  been 
conducted  with  dignity.  But  the  sequel,  which  the  protest 
provoked,  raged  with  a  violence  of  feeling  and  invective 
then  unparalleled  in  the  proceedings  of  Congress.  The 
Whigs  were  exasperated  beyond  restraint.  In  their  eyes 
the  proceedings  by  which  the  deposits  were  removed  were 


1  On  the  next  day  Leigh  made  his  speech  ;  but  the  delay  did  not  sub 
due  his  feelings.  Here  are  some  of  his  remarks  :  "  He  has  a  presumption 
which  no  mortal  man  has  ever  before  been  cursed  with,  which  no  mon 
arch  since  the  days  of  King  Henry  the  Eighth  ever  claimed  before.  .  .  . 
I  suppose  that  never  has  a  hero,  in  any  age,  obtained  such  a  mass  of  mili 
tary  renown  from  a  single  victory  as  the  President  has  received  for  that 
[New  Orleans]  ;  and  I  venture  to  say  that  I  will  find  five  hundred  brigadier- 
generals  in  the  Revolution  of  France  who  have  equally  distinguished  them 
selves.  As  to  the  President's  gray  hairs,  on  which  he  draws  inspirations  of 
heavenly  blessings,  I  know  him  too  well  to  believe  that  the  frosts  of  age 
have  quenched  the  boilings  in  his  bosom.  He  rather  reminds  me  of  Mount 
uJEtna,  whose  summit  is  capped  with  eternal  snow,  but  which  is  always 
vomiting  forth  its  liquid  fire." 


CH.  VI.]     THE  DEBATE   ON   JACKSON'S   PROTEST        239 

moderate  assertions  of  Executive  power  when  compared 
with  the  doctrines  of  the  protest.  Had  Jackson  threatened 
to  disperse  the  Senate  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  he  would 
hardly  have  been  assailed  with  more  vehemence  and  stig 
matized  less  as  a  usurper  and  tyrant.  Legal  argument  now 
played  but  a  secondary  part;  denunciation,  crimination,  and 
recrimination  characterized  the  debate,  from  the  furious 
tirade  to  the  studied  philippic,  for  Jackson  was  defended 
with  the  same  vigor  and  license  exhibited  by  his  assailants. 
No  theatrical  performances  were  ever  attended  with  more 
excited  interest.  Spectators  came  from  afar  to  witness  the 
proceedings,  and  no  one  followed  them  with  more  acute 
attention  than  did  Jackson  himself,  although,  of  course,  he 
did  not  visit  the  chamber.  "  Nothing  escaped  him,"  says 
Parton ;  "no  matter  to  how  late  an  hour  of  the  night  the 
debates  were  protracted,  he  never  went  to  sleep  till  Major 
Lewis  or  Major  Donelson  came  from  the  Capitol  and  told 
him  what  had  been  said  and  done  there." 

The  debate  continued  until  May  7,  when  the  resolutions 
were  adopted.  But  Calhoun,  whose  hostility  to  Jackson  was 
even  more  rabid  than  Clay's,  was  not  content  with  merely 
refusing  to  enter  the  protest  on  the  journal.  He  was  un 
willing  to  relinquish  the  original  proposition  not  to  receive 
it.  He  therefore  submitted  two  additional  resolutions — 
that  the  President  had  no  right  to  protest  to  the  Senate 
against  any  of  its  proceedings,  and  that  the  protest  be  not 
received.  The  first  was  adopted,  but  the  latter  failed,  re 
ceiving  but  seven  votes. 

In  opening  his  speech  on  the  resolutions  of  censure,  Clay 
made  a  statement  that  now  seems  an  exaggeration.  "  It  is 
not,"  said  he,  "  among  the  least  unfortunate  symptoms  of 
the  times  that  a  large  portion  of  the  good  and  enlightened 


240  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1834 

men  of  all  parties  are  yielding  to  sentiments  of  despondency. 
There  is,  unhappily,  a  feeling  of  distrust  and  insecurity  per 
vading  the  community.  Many  of  our  best  citizens  enter 
tain  serious  apprehensions  that  our  Union  and  our  institu 
tions  are  destined  to  a  speedy  overthrow."  The  statement 
contained  some  truth ;  but  the  apprehensions  were  confined 
to  the  Whig  party,  which  shared  the  opinions  of  its  leaders 
in  Congress,  that  Jackson's  conduct  toward  the  bank  and 
the  Senate  was  autocratic  and  unconstitutional.  From  this 
the  conclusion  that  our  institutions  were  in  danger  was 
a  natural  consequence.  At  that  period  the  people  were 
accustomed  to  hearing  or  holding  such  sentiments.  Yery 
many  remembered  with  sharp  distinctness  when  George 
III.  reigned  over  the  colonies.  Hence  to  those  who  op 
posed  it  every  departure  from  familiar  conditions  and 
practices  was  sufficient  to  invoke  the  spectres  of  monarchy 
and  subverted  liberty.  The  controversies  over  the  Alien 
and  Sedition  laws,  the  embargo,  the  admission  of  Missouri, 
and  nullification  had  kept  keenly  alive  the  fear  of  disunion 
and  its  possible  consequences.  That  Jackson's  bold  and 
novel  doctrines  and  methods  should  excite  genuine  alarm 
in  many  intelligent  and  able  minds  made  sensitive  by  in 
tense  party  feeling  is  not  surprising  therefore,  however 
unfounded  the  cause  may  now  appear  to  have  been.  To 
reprimand  the  Senate  as  he  did  was  entirely  characteristic 
of  the  arbitrary  independence  with  which  he  always  acted. 
Certainly  his  right  to  protest  was  quite  as  clear  as  the  right 
of  the  Senate  to  censure.  But  undoubtedly  the  safer  judg 
ment  upon  the  whole  affair  is  that  strict  propriety  would 
have  been  better  observed  had  the  Senate  and  the  President 
both  kept  within  their  ordinary  and  acknowledged  spheres 
of  action.  Nevertheless,  this  is  one  of  the  cases  where  criti- 


CH.  VI.]  THE  BANK  AND  THE  PENSION  FUND    241 

cism  is  futile  except  to  disclose  the  topography  of  the  field 
of  political  battle.  Under  the  circumstances  battle  was  in 
evitable  ;  and  the  character  of  the  combatants  made  it 
equally  certain  that  no  obstacles  of  mere  form  would  hin 
der  their  operations.  "Whatever  differences  of  opinion  may 
exist  as  to  any  feature  or  tendency  of  the  strife,  there  is 
one  overshadowing  agreement — neither  party  harbored  a 
sinister  design  against  the  institutions  or  the  liberties  of  the 
country. 

The  session  was  drawing  to  a  close.  Comparatively  little 
of  the  time  had  been  devoted  to  general  legislation.  But 
notwithstanding  all  that  had  taken  place  in  connection  with 
the  absorbing  deposits  question,  the  struggle  was  not  yet 
entirely  over.  Early  in  the  session  the  President  had  sent 
a  short  but  sharp  message  assailing  the  bank  for  its  refusal 
to  surrender  to  the  control  of  the  War  Department  the  pen 
sion  fund  and  the  books  and  papers  connected  with  it.  He 
desired  to  terminate  every  financial  relation  between  the 
bank  and  the  government.  The  direct  question  involved 
was  merely  a  legal  one  arising  under  a  special  statute. 
Both  parties  seemed  unmindful  in  all  the  proceedings 
where  the  bank  was  concerned  that  the  appropriate  place 
to  determine  questions  of  legal  right  was  in  the  courts. 
In  the  Senate  the  message  was  referred  to  the  Judiciary 
Committee,  which  at  length  reported  in  favor  of  the  bank. 
After  the  action  on  the  protest  this  matter  came  up  for  dis 
cussion,  and  resolutions  sustaining  the  bank  were  adopted 
by  the  usual  majority.  Clay  then  recurred  to  the  principal 
subject.  He  had  evidently  become  convinced  that  the  criti 
cism  upon  the  resolutions  of  censure,  that  they  were  but  the 
fulmination  of  a  majority  of  the  Senate  and  did  not  con 
template  any  legislative  action,  could  not  be  wholly  disre- 

16 


242  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  ,       [1834 

garded.  Accordingly,  on  May  28,  he  submitted  two  resolu 
tions.  The  first  reaffirmed  the  one  before  adopted,  that  the 
reasons  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  removing  the 
deposits  were  unsatisfactory  and  insufficient ;  the  other  was 
that  after  July  1  the  deposits  should  be  restored.  They 
were  offered  as  joint  resolutions  of  both  houses.  In  view 
of  the  certain  failure  of  the  resolutions  in  the  House  he  ad 
mitted  that  his  purpose  was  to  avoid  the  technical  objection 
that  the  previous  resolution  was  abstract  and  could  lead  to 
no  practical  results.  He  professed  the  opinion  that  the  ob 
jection  had  no  force,  yet  he  desired  to  meet  it  and  leave 
nothing  undone  to  regain  the  lawful  custody  of  the  public 
treasure.  The  avowed  reason  why  the  resolutions  of  cen 
sure  were  not  joint  was  because  the  House  would  reject 
them.  Clay  now  acknowledged  that  this  consideration 
ought  not  to  influence  the  Senate,  which  owed  to  itself  and 
to  the  country  the  discharge  of  its  whole  duty  regardless  of 
any  other  branch  of  the  government.  "We  may  well  won 
der  why  he  did  not  pursue  this  course  originally.  Had  the 
resolutions  of  censure  been  joint  or  the  debate  centred  on 
a  bill  to  restore  the  deposits,  Jackson  would  have  had  no  op 
portunity  to  defend  himself  and  attack  his  accusers,  a  dan 
gerous  advantage  before  the  people.  This  retreat  from  the 
former  procedure  may  be  taken  as  a  tacit  admission  that 
Jackson  was  not  entirely  wrong  in  the  doctrines  of  the  pro 
test.  The  resolutions  were  stoutly  opposed,  but  they  were 
soon  adopted.  In  the  House  they  were  summarily  laid  on 
the  table  and  remained  there. 

There  was  another  mode  of  rebuking  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  far  more  efficient  than  any 
resolutions.  In  his  remarks  on  submitting  the  joint  resolu 
tions,  Clay  plainly  intimated  it.  "To-morrow,"  said  he, 


CH.  VI.]    CLAY  AND  THE  TREASURY  NOMINATIONS   243 

"  will  be  one  year  since  any  head  of  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment  has  been  appointed  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con 
sent  of  the  Senate.  Gentlemen  have  said,  Why  this  anxiety 
for  these  nominations?  I  answer,  JSTo  other  reason  but  that 
the  Constitution  requires  them  to  be  made.  Gentlemen  ask 
if  we  want  to  reject  them.  I  do  not  acknowledge  a  right 
to  make  such  an  inquiry  into  motives,  but  if  it  may  be  made 
I  may  with  equal  propriety  ask,  Are  they  withheld  from  a  fear 
of  their  being  rejected  ?"  June  23,  Taney's  nomination  was 
sent  to  the  Senate.  It  was  rejected  forthwith.  Taney  at 
once  resigned,  and  the  first  clerk  of  the  Treasury  became  by 
law  the  acting  Secretary.  Subsequently,  Woodbury  was  ap 
pointed  and  confirmed.  The  other  nomination  to  which 
Clay  alluded  was  that  of  Butler  for  Attorney-General.  It 
was  sent  in  with  the  nomination  of  Taney;  but  as  Butler 
had  taken  no  official  action  in  regard  to  the  deposits,  his 
nomination  was  confirmed. 

Meantime  the  investigating  committee  appointed  by  the 
House  made  its  report.  It  was  a  prolix  description  of  utter 
failure.  The  committee  had  endeavored  to  get  evidence 
from  the  bank  on  the  subjects  of  investigation,  but  every 
effort  was  frustrated.  It  first  met  with  technical  legal  ob 
jections,  and  finally  with  the  absolute  refusal  of  the  officers 
to  testify  or  produce  the  books.  It  was  thus  forced  to  give 
up  the  task  and  return  empty-handed.  The  report  proposed 
resolutions  asserting  the  right  of  either  house  of  Congress  to 
investigate  the  affairs  of  the  bank  and  to  compel  the  produc 
tion  of  its  books  and  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  and  directing 
the  Speaker  to  issue  his  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  the  presi 
dent  and  directors  of  the  bank  that  they  might  be  brought 
to  the  bar  of  the  House  to  answer  for  contempt.  The  reso 
lutions  were  not  acted  upon  because  it  was  believed  that  the 


244  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1834 

bank  would  suffer  seriously  in  public  opinion  for  its  conduct 
without  the  House  entering  upon  a  protracted  trial  of  the 
refractory  officers.  This  course  proved  judicious.  The  bank 
had  done  itself  far  greater  injury  than  any  investigation  or 
any  punishment  of  its  officers  could  have  accomplished.  The 
effects  were  so  soon  apparent  that  it  was  determined  on  the 
last  da,y  of  the  session  to  have  the  Finance  Committee  of  the 
Senate  conduct  an  investigation.  "With  one  exception,  the 
committee  was  composed  of  Senators  friendly  to  the  bank. 
The  anti  -  bank  member  refused  to  serve.  As  might  have 
been  expected,  this  "  whitewashing  committee,"  as  it  was 
termed,  failed  to  aid  the  tottering  cause  of  the  bank. 

The  most  important  legislation  enacted  at  this  session  was 
to  regulate  the  coinage  of  money.  For  years  the  currency 
of  the  country  had  consisted  chiefly  of  bank-notes.  In  1834 
that  currency  was  in  a  very  sound  condition,  owing  to  the  safe 
guards  upon  the  circulation  issued  by  the  Bank  of  the  Uni 
ted  States  and  the  general  security  of  the  State  banks ;  but 
the  administration,  influenced  largely  by  -Benton,  favored  the 
retirement  of  paper  currency  and  the  restoration  of  specie. 
The  coinage  was  still  governed  by  the  original  laws  on  the  sub 
ject,  which  were  enacted  in  1792  and  1793.  Several  attempts 
had  been  made  to  change  the  mint  ratio  between  gold  and 
silver  (1  to  15)  established  by  those  laws,  but  nothing  had 
been  accomplished.  Gold  in  the  mean  time  had  somewhat  en 
hanced  in  value,  and  in  consequence  had  nearly  disappeared 
from  circulation,1  while  the  volume  of  small  notes  had  pro- 


1  "A  golden  piece  of  money  was  a  curiosity  at  that  time.  It  was  a 
distinction  in  the  country  places  to  possess  one.  Clay  and  eternal  rag- 
money,  Jackson  and  speedy  gold,  was  diligently  represented  as  the  issue 
between  the  candidates  [1832],  Storekeepers  responded  by  announcing 
themselves  as  anti-bank  hatters  and  hard-money  bakers." — Psn'tou's  Jackson, 
vol.  iii.  p.  421. 


CH.  VI]      JACKSON  VETOES   THE  LAND  BILL  245 

duced  a  similar,  though  not  so  extensive,  effect  upon  silver. 
The  ratio  was  now  fixed  at  1  to  16.002  by  a  law  passed  dur 
ing  the  last  days  of  the  session.  The  majority  for  it  was 
very  large  in  both  houses,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of 
the  paper  interest.  In  the  Senate  only  seven  voted  against 
it,  Clay  being  among  the  number.  By  this  law,  as  it  proved, 
gold  was  slightly  overvalued.  This  soon  had  the  effect  of 
banishing  silver.  Such  is  the  delicacy  of  the  monetary  rela 
tion  between  the  two  metals,  which  renders  the  "double 
standard  "  so  difficult  of  practical  operation. 

One  other  topic  of  the  session  remains  to  be  noticed.  The 
President's  veto  of  the  land  bill  was  sent  to  the  Senate  soon 
after  the  opening  of  Congress.  Had  the  bill  been  returned 
immediately  after  its  passage  during  the  previous  session  it 
would  doubtless  have  been  passed  over  the  veto.  But  it 
was  sent  to  the  President  on  the  last  day  but  one  of  the  ses 
sion,  and  failed  by  reason  simply  of  not  receiving  his  signa 
ture.  His  message,  therefore,  was  rather  a  manifesto  than 
a  veto.  It  roused  Clay's  ire  that  his  pet  measure  should  be 
balked  in  this  manner,  and  he  expressed  his  opinion  with 
much  freedom.  He  introduced  the  bill  again.  It  was  re 
ferred  to  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands,  which  later  re 
ported  it  with  a  commentary  written  by  Clay  in  the  same 
tenor  as  his  remarks  when  the  President's  message  was  re 
ceived.  No  further  action  was  taken.  On  June  20,  the  ses 
sion  ended. 

Clay's  reflections  on  the  results  of  the  session  must  have 
suggested  little  cause  for  exultation.  The  labors  of  him 
self  and  his  coadjutors  had  been  exacting  and  exciting,  but 
were  in  vain.  The  bank  was  doomed.  The  administration 
had  already  begun  to  regain  the  ground  it  had  lost  through 
the  panic.  The  financial  distress  was  fast  subsiding,  and 


246  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1835 

there  was  a  corresponding  revulsion  of  popular  sentiment 
against  the  Whig  party.  The  prospect  was  that  the  Senate 
itself  would  soon  be  Democratic.  Yet  there  was  one  consola 
tion  in  which  Clay  probably  found  some  degree  of  comfort — 
the  redoubtable  Jackson  would  soon  pass  off  the  scene. 

The  next  session,  which  began  December  1,  was  short, 
only  lasting  until  March  3,  when  the  Twenty-third  Congress 
expired.  However,  a  large  amount  of  business  wras  transacted, 
but  most  of  it  was  of  a  non-political  character.  The  bank  was 
but  a  subordinate  topic,  although  the  President,  in  his  mes 
sage,  resumed  hostilities  against  the  institution.  He  recom 
mended  the  sale  of  the  government  stock,  the  suspension  of 
the  receipt  of  the  bank's  notes  for  public  dues,  the  regulation 
by  law  of  the  public  deposits  in  the  State  banks,  and  the 
termination  of  all  connection  whatsoever  between  the  bank 
and  the  government.  The  Finance  Committee  of  the  Senate, 
which  was  directed  at  the  last  session  to  make  an  investiga 
tion  of  the  bank  and  its  operations,  presented  a  long,  defen 
sive  report,  written  by  John  Tyler.  JSTone  of  the  recom 
mendations,  either  of  the  President  or  the  committee,  were 
embodied  in  legislation.  A  bill  to  regulate  the  deposits  had 
been  passed  by  the  House  at  the  last  session,  but  it  failed  in 
the  Senate.  The  same  bill  was  now  reintroduced.  It  re 
ceived  a  large  majority  in  both  houses,  and  became  a  law. 

For  many  years  the  "  French  spoliations "  had  been  a 
subject  of  much  importunity  and  discussion.  In  1800  a 
treaty  between  France  and  the  United  States  was  con 
cluded,  by  which  the  claims  asserted  by  each  power  against 
the  other  for  injuries  to  commerce  prior  to  that  year  were 
mutually  relinquished.  In  consequence,  our  government 
was  incessantly  besought  for  redress  by  citizens  who  had 
sustained  injuries  for  which  France  had  been  released  from 


Cii.VL]   THE    "FRENCH   SPOLIATIONS"   AGITATION  247 

compensation.  The  claims  against  our  government  were 
based  on  the  theory  that,  by  releasing  France,  it  had  as 
sumed  the  payment  of  these  claims.  The  agitation  had  now 
gained  sufficient  momentum  to  demand  action  by  Congress. 
As  the  public  debt  was  nearly  extinguished,  there  was  no 
reason  why  the  claims,  if  just,  should  not  be  paid.  A  bill 
was  introduced  in  the  Senate  to  provide  for  them  to  the  ex 
tent  of  $5,000,000.  It  was  supported  chiefly  by  the  Whigs, 
and  was  passed  by  the  Senate  after  a  debate  that  displayed 
much  ability  and  research.  It  was  defeated  in  the  House  by 
a  substantially  party  vote.  The  entire  discussion  of  the  sub 
ject,  however,  evinced  nothing  of  a  partisan  nature.  Wheth 
er  our  government  was  justty  bound  to  pay  the  claims  was 
by  no  means  clear ;  indeed,  the  case  against  them,  on  the  law 
and  facts,  was  undoubtedly  the  stronger.  That  the  Whigs 
should  advocate  the  payment  was  a  natural  result  of  their 
party  policy  of  high  tariffs  and  high  prices  for  the  public 
lands.  Surplus  revenues  must  be  spent.  The  claims  con 
tinued  to  be  pressed  for  many  years,  but  the  effort  was  al 
ways  unsuccessful.  There  was  another  branch  of  the  same 
general  subject  of  much  greater  importance  and  urgency. 

The  depredations  upon  our  maritime  commerce  after 
1800,  through  the  piratical  policy  of  Napoleon,  were  more 
grievous  and  extensive  than  those  which  had  preceded. 
After  the  close  of  the  war  with  England  our  government  de 
manded  reparation  on  behalf  of  those  of  our  citizens  who  had 
suffered  from  the  spoliations.  Some  fifteen  years  of  diplo 
matic  fencing  ensued  over  the  question.  The  justice  of  the 
claim  was  to  some  extent  uniformly  conceded  by  the  dif 
ferent  administrations  of  the  French  government ;  but  from 
one  cause  or  another  a  treaty  settling  the  controversy  was 
not  reached  until  1831.  To  enforce  this  claim  was  one  of 


248  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

the  first  things  that  Jackson  proposed  after  the  beginning 
of  his  Presidency.  In  his  first  message  he  directed  atten 
tion  to  it  in  very  emphatic  language.  The  result  of  the  ne 
gotiations  soon  instituted  was  the  treaty  of  1831,  by  which 
the  French  government  agreed  to  pay  an  indemnity  of 
25,000,000  francs.  This  sum  was  to  be  paid  in  six  annual 
instalments,  the  first  of  which  became  due  in  February, 
1833.  Although  King  Louis  Philippe  was  anxious  to  main 
tain  relations  of  cordial  amity  with  the  United  States,  the 
French  Chambers  failed  to  pass  the  necessary  appropriations 
to  meet  the  two  accrued  instalments.  Jackson  was  wroth. 
He  sharply  reviewed  the  situation  in  his  message  of  1834, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  recommend  a  law  authorizing  repri 
sals  if  provision  were  not  made  for  the  payment  of  the  debt 
at  the  next  session  of  the  French  Chambers.  The  attitude 
of  the  President  created  alarm  throughout  the  country,  for 
France  would  undoubtedly  view  it  as  virtually  a  recommen 
dation  of  war.  Parton  relates  that  before  the  message  was 
sent  members  of  the  cabinet  argued  against  this  extreme 
measure  and  urged  the  President  to  modify  several  passages 
which  they  regarded  as  needlessly  irritating  and  menacing ; 
but  he  refused  to  change  them.  "  No,  gentlemen,"  he  ex 
claimed,  "  I  know  them  French  !  They  won't  pay  unless 
they're  made  to."  l 

The  feeling  of  alarm  excited  by  this  energetic  message 
was  shared  even  by  many  of  the  President's  stanchest  ad- 


1  "  After  the  message  had  been  written  some  of  its  expressions  were 
softened  by  a  member  of  the  cabinet  before  the  MS.  was  sent  to  the 
printer,  without  the  President's  knowledge.  When  it  was  in  type  the  con 
fidential  proof-reader  of  the  Globe  office  took  the  proof-sheets  to  the  Presi 
dent  ;  and  he  afterwards  said  that  he  never  before  knew  what  profane 
swearing  was.  General  Jackson  promptly  restored  his  own  language  to 
the  proof-sheets."— Curtis's  Buchanan,  vol.  i.  p.  235. 


CH.VL]      TO  AVOID   FRICTION  WITH   FRANCE  249 

« 

herents  in  Congress.  In  the  Senate  the  subject  was  referred 
to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  of  which  Clay 
was  elected  chairman.  Perceiving  that  something  should 
be  done  to  allay  the  certain  bad  effect  of  the  message  upon 
the  French,  he  took  the  matter  in  hand.  On  January  6  he 
presented  the  report  of  the  committee.  It  was  prepared  by 
him,  and  was  an  exhaustive,  temperate,  and  politic  treatment 
of  the  subject.  It  firmly  sustained  the  justice  of  the  indem 
nity,  the  binding  obligation  of  the  treaty,  and  the  patriotic 
duty  of  enforcing  our  rights ;  yet  it  skilfully  excused  the 
delay  of  the  French  government,  and  qualified  the  harsh 
ness  of  the  President's  recommendation.  It  proposed  this 
resolution  :  "  That  it  is  inexpedient  at  this  time  to  pass  any 
law  vesting  in  the  President  authority  for  making  reprisals 
upon  French  property,  in  the  contingency  of  provision  not 
being  made  for  paying  to  the  United  States  the  indemnity, 
as  stipulated  by  the  treaty  of  1831,  during  the  present  session 
of  the  French  Chambers."  On  the  14th  the  resolution  came 
up  for  consideration.  Clay  spoke  briefly  in  its  support,  but 
he  did  not  now  restrain  the  criticism  that  the  President  had 
gone  too  far  in  proposing  reprisals.  Some  discussion  fol 
lowed,  in  which  objections  were  made  to  the  wording  of 
the  resolution.  Clay,  however,  expressed  his  willingness  to 
accept  any  phraseology  consistent  with  the  object  he  had  in 
view — suspending  action  until  further  developments.  This 
harmonized  the  entire  Senate.  The  resolution  was  then  put 
in  this  form :  "  That  it  is  inexpedient  at  present  to  adopt 
any  legislative  measure  in  regard  to  the  state  of  affairs  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  France."  In  this  form  it  was 
unanimously  adopted. 

The  temper  of  the  House  was  somewhat  different.    Its 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  to  which  that  part  of  the 


250  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

message  concerning  the  relations  with  France  had  been  re 
ferred,  did  not  report  until  February  27.  The  report  was 
very  short.  It  proposed  resolutions  declaring  that  the 
House  would  insist  upon  the  execution  of  the  treaty,  that 
contingent  preparations  ought  to  be  made  to  meet  any  emer 
gency  growing  out  of  our  relations  with  France,  and  that 
the  committee  be  discharged  from  further  consideration  of 
the  message.  They  caused  a  spirited  debate,  in  which  John 
Quincy  Adams  advocated  them  with  especial  vigor.  The 
first  resolution  was  finally  amended  so  as  to  read  :  "  That  in 
the  opinion  of  this  House  the  treaty  of  the  4th  of  July, 
1831,  should  be  maintained  and  its  execution  insisted  upon." 
This  patchwork  of  resolutions — not  different  in  practical 
effect  from  the  Senate's  resolution,  though  more  compli 
mentary  to  the  President — proved  acceptable  to  the  House, 
and  was  unanimously  adopted  on  the  day  before  adjourn 
ment.  For  the  time  the  course  of  Congress  quieted  the  fear 
of  hostilities.  The  rates  of  marine  insurance,  which  had 
been  largely  increased  through  the  influence  of  the  message, 
resumed  their  former  level;  and  commerce,  relieved  from 
danger,  put  to  sea.  Here  the  matter  rested  until  the  next 
session  of  Congress. 

On  February  4,  Clay  presented  the  memorial  of  a  coun 
cil  of  Cherokee  Indians,  and  made  it  the  occasion  of  a 
speech  on  the  relations  between  the  government  and  the 
tribes  in  the  Southwest.  In  that  region  the  Indians  had 
been  an  unceasing  source  of  trouble.  The  spread  of  the 
white  population  and  the  planting  interest^  pressed  upon 
the  boundaries  of  the  Indian  lands,  which  were  gradually 
narrowed  by  successive  treaties,  not  always  obtained  by 
fair  means.  Most  of  the  Cherokees  were  located  in  Geor 
gia,  where  the  desire  and  the  efforts  for  their  removal  ap- 


CH.  VI.]  THE   INDIAN  TROUBLES  251 

proached  ferocity.  In  1802,  in  consideration  of  the  cession 
by  Georgia  of  the  territory  forming  the  present  States  of 
Alabama  and  Mississippi,  the  United  States  agreed  to  ex 
tinguish  the  Indian  titles  in  Georgia  whenever  it  could  be 
done  peaceably  and  on  reasonable  terms.  It  had  not  yet 
been  accomplished,  and  consequent  difficulties  and  contro 
versies  had  produced  an  extreme  degree  of  exasperation 
against  both  the  Indians  and  the  government.  During  his 
administration,  John  Quincy  Adams,  emulating  Jefferson's 
example,  favored  the  firm  protection  of  the  Indians  in  all 
their  treaty  rights,  and  so  far  as  he  could  he  afforded  it. 
His  policy  in  this  respect  excited  such  ill-will  toward  him 
among  the  people  of  Georgia  that  he  did  not  receive  a  vote 
in  that  State  in  the  election  of  1828.  At  that  time,  Clay 
shared  the  prevailing  opinion  of  those  who  lived  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  Indians — that  the  race  could  not  be  civilized,  that  it 
was  destined  to  extinction,  and  the  sooner  it  was  extinct  the 
better ;  yet  he  advocated  humane  treatment  and  protection. 
Of  all  the  tribes  the  Cherokees  were  the  most  advanced 
in  civilization.  They  had  established  an  elective  govern 
ment  wholly  independent  of  State  laws,  as  they  had  the  right 
to  do  under  the  treaties.  They  had  a  written  language,  and 
churches,  schools,  and  courts.  The  features  of  Indian  life 
were  not  remarkable  except  by  the  fact  that  they  existed 
at  all.  This  community,  promising  as  it  was,  considering  the 
general  character  of  the  aboriginal  tribes,  was  chiefly  interest 
ing  as  a  curiosity  of  embryo  civilization.  Many  of  its  mem 
bers  were  not  reclaimed  from  their  savage  instincts,  and  the 
lawless  elements  of  both  races  came  into  frequent  collision. 
This  annoyance  was  much  aggravated  by  the  want  of  juris 
diction  of  the  State  over  the  Indian  country,  which  thus 
became  the  refuge  of  the  unruly.  This  situation  finally  be- 


252  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

came  so  obnoxious  to  the  people  of  Georgia  that  they  were 
ready  to  take  any  course  to  be  rid  of  it.  In  December, 
1828,  a  law  was  passed  by  the  State  legislature  dividing 
the  Indian  lands  into  several  parts  and  annexing  them  to 
adjacent  counties.  It  declared  the  native  customs  and 
usages  of  no  valid  effect,  and  made  the  Indians  incompetent 
to  act  as  witnesses.  The  real  object  was  to  extend  the 
sovereignty  of  the  State  over  the  whites  who  lived  in  the 
reservation ;  and  Indian  institutions  were  not  further  mo 
lested.  It  was  the  preparatory  step  to  ascertain  the  policy 
that  Jackson  would  adopt,  though  it  was  expected  that  he 
would  not  interfere.  Only  a  short  time  before  Jackson's 
inauguration,  Adams  was  formally  appealed  to  by  the 
Cherokees  for  protection.  He  left  the  subject  to  his  suc 
cessor,  who  refused  to  take  any  action  and  advised  them 
to  submit  to  the  laws  of  Georgia  or  remove  beyond  the 
Mississippi,  whither  a  part  of  the  tribe  had  gone  in  1818. 
With  this  immunity  from  Executive  interference,  the  legis 
lature  of  Georgia  enacted  a  series  of  harsh  and  arbitrary 
laws  calculated  to  destroy  nearly  all  the  rights  of  the 
Indians  and  drive  the  unfortunate  people  from  the  State. 
Most  of  their  lands  were  taken  and  disposed  of  by  lottery. 
Application  was  then  made  by  the  Cherokee  nation  to  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  to  restrain  the  State  of 
Georgia  from  executing  these  laws ;  but  jurisdiction  was 
refused  by  the  court  on  the  ground  that  the  Cherokees  were 
not  a  "  foreign  state  "  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  could  not,  therefore,  maintain  a  suit  against  a 
State  of  the  Union.  Not  long  after  this  the  question  as  to 
the  validity  of  these  laws  was  again  brought  before  the 
court,  but  this  time  in  a  manner  that  gave  it  jurisdiction, 
and  they  were  declared  null  and  void  because  in  violation 


CH.VI.]    CLAY'S   SYMPATHIES  WITH  THE   INDIANS   253 

of  the  Constitution,  laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United  States. 
The  State  court  refused  to  conform  to  the  decision.  The 
case  arose  through  the  arrest  and  conviction  of  two  mission 
aries  who  refused  to  obey  the  State  laws  in  question.  Be 
fore  the  next  session  of  the  Supreme  Court,  at  which  an  ap 
plication  could  be  made  to  enforce  its  decision,  the  prisoners 
agreed  to  submit  to  the  State  laws  and  were  pardoned. 
Through  all  this  the  President  remained  passive.  Thus  at 
the  very  time  he  was  resisting  the  doctrine  of  nullification 
proclaimed  by  South  Carolina,  he  tolerated  actual  nullifica 
tion  in  Georgia. 

The  helpless  situation  of  the  Indians  appealed  to  Clay's 
sympathies  so  strongly  as  to  outweigh  all  political  con 
siderations.  He  consented  to  bring  the  subject  before  the 
Senate,  and  he  did  so  in  his  most  effective  manner.  His 
speech  was  admirable.  He  first  presented  the  rights  of  the 
Indians  under  a  long  succession  of  treaties,  and  then  depicted 
with  affecting  eloquence  the  wrongs  to  which  the  Cherokees 
had  been  subjected  by  the  State  of  Georgia.  At  the  conclu 
sion  of  the  speech  he  submitted  resolutions  directing  inquiry 
into  the  expediency  of  further  provisions  of  law  enabling 
the  Indians  to  maintain  their  rights  in  the  federal  courts, 
and  also  of  provisions  setting  apart  a  district  west  of  the 
Mississippi  for  such  of  the  Cherokees  as  would  occupy  it, 
and  securing  their  undisturbed  possession  of  it. 

The  speech  of  course  was  offensive  to  the  Georgia  Senators, 
and  one  of  them,  Cuthbert,  immediately  protested  against  it 
in  a  manner  that  shows  the  sympathetic  effect  it  produced 
on  those  who  heard  it.  "  The  subject,"  said  he,  "  has  been 
introduced  altogether  unnecessarily.  It  is  a  subject  that 
cannot  be  tried  here.  Georgia  does  not  plead  before  this 
tribunal.  I  do  not  stand  here  to  plead  in  her  behalf.  The 


254  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

case  does  not  admit  of  that  minute  examination  which  the 
gentleman  from  Kentucky  would  give  it.  To  what  purpose, 
then,  was  the  address  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  ?  Was 
it  to  secure  to  himself  that  praise  which  all  had  been  pre 
viously  so  ready  to  yield  to  him  — the  praise  of  splendid 
rhetoric,  of  studied  eloquence,  of  measured  tones,  of  theatric 
starts,  of  pathos  of  manner  ?  He  had  already  the  credit  of 
these.  No  one  disputes  his  unrivalled  claim  to  them.  If 
the  gentleman  intended  to  play  a  theatrical  part,  the  oppor 
tunity  has  been  afforded  him.  What  part  does  Roscius  next 
enact  ?" 

He  was  followed  by  White,  of  Tennessee,  who  took  the 
ground  that  the  Indian  treaties  were  not  treaties  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Constitution,  and  could  not  legally  deprive 
the  States  of  sovereignty  over  their  entire  areas,  nor  of  the 
right  to  judge  whether  their  laws  were  adapted  to  the  con 
ditions  and  wants  of  the  people.  He  favored  the  removal 
of  the  Indians  to  the  West,  with  a  guarantee  of  permanent 
security  in  their  new  abode.  Benton  spoke  briefly  to  the 
same  effect.  Clay  then  replied  with  his  consummate  skill. 

"  The  finest  speech,"  says  Martineau,  "  I  heard  from  Mr. 
Clay  in  the  Senate  was  on  the  sad  subject  of  the  injuries  to 
the  Indians.  ...  It  was  known  that  he  would  probably  bring 
forward  this  great  topic  that  day.  Some  of  the  foreign  am 
bassadors  might  be  seen  leaning  against  the  pillars  behind 
the  chair,  and  many  members  of  the  other  House  appeared 
behind  and  in  the  passages ;  and  one  sat  on  the  steps  of  the 
platform,  his  hands  clasped  and  his  eyes  fixed  on  Mr.  Clay 
as  if  life  hung  upon  his  words.  As  many  as  could  crowd 
into  the  gallery  leaned  over  the  balustrade ;  and  the  lower 
circle  was  thronged  with  ladies  and  gentlemen,  in  the  centre 
of  whom  stood  a  group  of  Cherokee  chiefs  listening  immova- 


CH.  VI.]     CLAY'S   INDIAN  RESOLUTIONS  ADOPTED     255 

bly.  I  never  saw  so  deep  a  moral  impression  produced  by  a 
speech.  The  best  testimony  to  this  was  the  disgust  excited 
by  the  empty  and  abusive  reply  of  the  Senator  from  Georgia. 
This  gentleman's  speech,  however,  showed  us  one  good  thing, 
that  Mr.  Clay  is  as  excellent  in  reply  as  in  proposition; 
prompt,  earnest,  temperate,  and  graceful.  The  chief  char 
acteristic  of  his  eloquence  is  its  earnestness.  Every  tone  of 
his  voice,  every  fibre  of  his  frame,  bears  testimony  to  this. 
His  first  sentences  are  homely,  and  given  with  a  little  hesi 
tation  and  repetition,  and  with  an  agitation  shown  by  a  fre 
quent  putting  on  and  taking  off  of  the  spectacles  and  a  trem 
bling  of  the  hands  among  the  documents  on  the  desk.  Then 
as  the  speaker  becomes  possessed  with  his  subject  the  agita 
tion  changes  its  character,  but  does  not  subside.  His  utter 
ance  is  still  deliberate,  but  his  voice  becomes  deliciously 
winning.  Its  higher  tones  disappointed  me  at  first ;  but  the 
lower  ones,  trembling  with  emotion,  swelling  and  falling 
with  the  earnestness  of  the  speaker,  are  very  moving,  and 
his  whole  manner  becomes  irresistibly  persuasive.  I  saw 
tears,  of  which  I  am  sure  he  was  wholly  unconscious,  falling 
on  his  papers  as  he  vividly  described  the  woes  and  injuries 
of  the  aborigines.  I  saw  Webster  draw  his  hand  across 
his  eyes;  I  saw  every  one  deeply  moved  except  two  persons, 
the  Yice-President,  who  yawned  somewhat  ostentatiously, 
and  the  Georgian  Senator,  who  was  busy  brewing  his  storm. 
I  was  amazed  at  the  daring  of  this  gentleman,  at  the  audac 
ity  which  could  break  up  such  a  moral  impression  as  this 
Cherokee  tale,  so  told,  had  produced,  by  accusing  Mr.  Clay 
of  securing  an  interest  in  opposition  to  Georgia  i  by  stage 
starts  and  theatric  gesticulations.'  The  audience  was  visibly 
displeased  at  having  their  feelings  thus  treated  in  the  presence 
even  of  the  Cherokee  chiefs  ;  but  Mr.  Clay's  replies  both  to 


256  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1835 

the  argument  and  abuse  were  so  happy  and  the  Georgian's 
rejoinder  so  outrageous  that  the  business  ended  with  a  gen 
eral  burst  of  laughter." 1 

The  resolutions  were  adopted,  but  no  further  action  was 
taken.  In  December  following  a  treaty  was  made  with  the 
Cherokees  by  which  the  titles  to  their  lands  were  extin 
guished.  The  tribe  was  afterward  removed  to  Indian  Ter 
ritory,  which  was  established  in  1834.  By  this  process  the 
Indian  question  in  the  South  was  solved,  although  it  in 
volved  a  long  and  expensive  war  with  the  Seminoles  in 
Florida.2 

Another  important  topic  of  the  session  was  the  proposed 
repeal  of  the  so-called  "  four  years  law,"  passed  in  1820  at 
the  instance  of  Crawford  to  aid  him  in  his  candidacy  for 
the  Presidency.  This  law  limited  the  tenure  of  office  of 
several  classes  of  federal  officials  to  four  years,  and  thus 
insidiously  introduced  the  spoils  system  into  the  national 
government.  In  1825,  the  practical  effects  of  the  measure 
having  become  distinct,  an  effort  was  made,  but  unsuccess 
fully,  to  repeal  it ;  it  was  too  thoroughly  in  harmony  with 
the  new  political  tendencies.  Under  Jackson,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  system  had  developed  into  an  avowed  policy.  It 
had  become  so  obtrusive  that  another  attempt  was  now 
made  to  arrest  it.  Calhoun  took  the  initiative.  Early  in 
January  he  moved  the  appointment  of  a  select  committee 
to  inquire  into  the  extent  of  Executive  patronage,  the  causes 
of  its  recent  increase,  and  the  expediency  and  means  of  re 
ducing  it.  He  was  made  chairman  of  the  committee,  and  a 
month  later  presented  its  report — a  sombre  and  surcharged 

1  Martineau's  Retrospect  of  Western  Trawl,  vol.  i.  p.  177. 

2  Benton's  Thirty  Tears'  View,  vol.  i.  pp.  624,  626;  Kennedy's  Wirt,  vol. 
ii.  p.  251;  Sumner's  Jackson,  p.  174;  Shepard's  Van  Buren,  p.  312. 


CH.VL]   CALHOUN  ATTACKS   THE   SPOILS  SYSTEM    257 

account  of  the  powers  and  practices  of  the  Executive  branch 
of  the  government  in  regard  to  its  patronage.  It  proposed 
retrenchment,  and  alleged  the  existence  of  supernumerary 
offices  and  the  general  application  of  proscriptive  political 
reasons  in  the  making  of  appointments  and  removals.  Bad 
as  the  system  was,  it  was  not  so  direful  and  far-reaching 
as  Calhoun  painted  it.  JSTot  only  the  civil  service  in  all  its 
grades,  but  likewise  the  army  and  the  navy,  and  even  the 
pensioners,  were  treated  by  him  as  the  active  agents  of  Ex 
ecutive  influence  and  encroachment — "  supple  instruments 
of  power  "  and  "  subservient  partisans  ready  for  every  ser 
vice  however  base  and  corrupt."  Had  this  been  true,  even 
as  a  prevailing  tendency,  the  conclusion  drawn  by  him  that 
our  institutions  were  in  imminent  peril  would  have  been 
justified ;  but  his  assertions  were  too  general  and  too  mor 
bid.  The  character  of  the  mass  of  those  engaged  in  the 
service  of  the  government  does  not  deserve  so  low  an  esti 
mate.  The  average  office-holder,  though  more  or  less  a 
partisan,  is  above  baseness  and  corruption,  even  if  any 
wrongful  act  were  asked  of  him,  which  must  seldom  occur. 
Besides  this,  the  chief  posts  in  the  administration  of  gov 
ernment  are  generally  filled  by  men  of  integrity  and  honor 
able  ambition.  Any  theory  is  fallacious  that  disregards  the 
ordinary  facts  of  life. 

Yet  much  of  the  criticism  upon  the  spoils  system,  so  far 
as  that  system  was  actually  practised,  was  just.  Some 
effects  of  the  system  are  undeniably  pernicious,  however 
meritorious  the  great  majority  of  the  officials  in  the  ser 
vice  may  be.  The  spoils  system  tends  to  make  politics  a 
trade  by  which  to  gain  the  emoluments  of  place— to  officer 
from  colonel  to  corporal  the  forces  of  party  with  men  whose 
paramount  object  is  not  the  public  interest.  It  indirectly 

17 


258  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

pays  for  menial  partisan  service  out  of  the  public  purse. 
It,  therefore,  introduces  a  motive  and  an  element  that 
should  not  enter  into  political  contests.  It  is  not  a  factor 
of  aggressive  harm,  but  it  is  a  hinderance  to  the  best  re 
sults  of  representative  government  It  is  a  vice  rather  than 
a  direct  and  radical  danger.  Its  effects  are  not  concentrated 
—they  are  widely  diffused.  It  roils  the  current  of  popular 
institutions,  but  does  not  change  its  course. 

In  accordance  with  the  recommendations  of  the  report,  a 
bill  was  introduced  to  repeal  the  evil  features  of  the  four 
years  law,  and  to  provide  that  nominations  to  fill  vacancies 
caused  by  removal  should  be  accompanied  by  a  statement 
of  the  reasons  for  removal.  Even  this  measure  did  not  go 
far  enough  to  suit  Clay.  He  offered  an  amendment  to  pro 
vide  that  officials  appointed  "  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate"  could  only  be  removed  with  the 
concurrence  of  that  body.  It  soon  became  evident,  how 
ever,  that  this  amendment  could  not  succeed,  and  Clay  did 
not  bring  it  to  a  vote;  but  it  evoked  discussion  as  to  the 
power  of  the  President  to  remove  such  officials  regardless  of 
the  Senate.  At  the  outset  of  Washington's  first  administra 
tion  this  question  was  discussed,  and  it  was  decided  by  the 
casting  vote  of  the  Vice-President  in  favor  of  the  Presi 
dential  power.  The  precedent  thus  established  had  governed 
all  subsequent  cases.  The  correct  opinion,  therefore,  was 
undoubtedly  that  pronounced  by  "Webster,  that  long  usage 
had  sanctioned  the  power,  although  it  was  questionable  in 
the  beginning,  but  that  Congress  could,  nevertheless,  impose 
conditions  upon  the  tenure  of  office. 

The  debate  on  the  bill  was  general  and  earnest.  Little 
was  left  to  be  said  on  the  subject  of  the  spoils  system. 
Most  of  the  discussion  of  civil  service  reform  at  the  present 


CH.  VI.]  CLAY  AND  THE  PRESIDENT'S  PREROGATIVE  259 

day  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  arguments  used  in  that  debate. 
The  principal  difference  between  the  conditions  then  exist 
ing  and  those  which  now  exist  lies  in  the  fact  that  at  that 
period  the  main  source  of  the  evils  of  political  patronage 
was  that  office-mongering  was  not  yet  a  leading  function 
of  Senators  and  Representatives.  The  healthy  sentiment 
on  the  subject  that  still  prevailed  in  the  Senate  is  shown  by 
the  strong  support  the  bill  there  received.  It  was  passed 
by  a  vote  of  nearly  two  to  one,  and  would  doubtless  have 
received  a  larger  vote  had  not  the  administration  been  so  se 
verely  assailed.  As  it  was,  Benton  voted  for  it,  although  he 
vigorously  defended  the  administration  against  the  charge 
of  extravagance.  The  ablest  and  most  adroit  speech  in  oppo 
sition  to  the  bill  was  made  by  Silas  Wright.  Buchanan 
also  bore  a  prominent  part  in  opposition  to  the  bill.  Cal- 
houn's  defence  of  the  report  and  of  the  bill  was  philosophic 
and  excellent.  It  was  superior  to  the  report  itself,  because 
less  elaborate  and  more  moderate.  The  case  against  the 

o 

spoils  system  has  never  been  stated  with  more  breadth  and 
force. 

Clay's  speech  was  chiefly  directed  to  the  power  of  the 
President  to  remove  officials  appointed  with  the  concur 
rence  of  the  Senate.  His  attitude  toward  this  subject 
would  alone  indicate  his  opinions  concerning  official  patron 
age  generally.  No  one  was  more  pronounced  in  favor  of  re 
moving  as  far  as  possible  the  public  service  from  politics. 
His  speech  was  bold  and  animated.  He  began  by  reviewing 
from  his  habitual  point  of  view  what  he  regarded  as  the 
centralizing  tendency  of  Jackson's  Presidency,  and  fully 
presented  the  argument  against  the  implied  Constitutional 
power  of  the  President  to  dismiss  officials,  sharply  challeng 
ing  the  precedent  of  1789.  His  remarks  on  the  spoils  sys- 


260  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

tern  itself  were  made  incidentally  through  the  argument. 
His  convictions  in  regard  to  it  were  so  intense  that  instead 
of  reasoning  against  it  he  fiercely  denounced  it.  The  speech 
is  one  of  the  best  specimens  of  his  skill  as  a  debater;  but 
considered  as  a  permanent  contribution  to  the  subject  of 
patronage,  it  is  open  to  the  same  criticism  as  that  which 
Calhoun's  report  compels.  It  was  delivered  toward  the 
close  of  the  debate.  The  subject  was  not  complex  or 
many-sided,  and  it  had  been  thoroughly  canvassed.  Yet 
Clay's  speech  was  fresh  and  graphic.  One  of  the  most 
significant  marks  of  his  genius  was  the  ease  and  facility 
with  which  he  lifted  out  of  the  commonplace  whatever  en 
gaged  his  attention.  The  bill  reached  the  House  too  late 
for  action  upon  it,  even  had  there  been  a  majority  in  its 
favor,  which  is  doubtful.  Many  years  passed  before  this 
reform  was  again  attempted. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Distribution  of  the  Surplus— The  French  Spoliations— The  Slavery  Ques 
tion—The  Abolition  Petitions  and  Incendiary  Publications — Admission 
of  Arkansas  and  Michigan  into  the  Union — Texas — Madison's  Death 
and  Character — The  Colonization  Society — Clay  and  Garrison — Taney 
Becomes  Chief  Justice— The  Political  Situation— The  Election  of  1836 
— Politico-Finance — Jackson's  Physical  and  Mental  Traits— Efforts  for 
Further  Distribution— The  Financial  Condition  of  the  Country— The 
Mania  for  Speculation — The  Specie  Circular 

THE  first  session  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Congress  opened 
December  7.  On  the  next  day  Clay  made  his  appearance, 
having  passed  the  recess  at  Ashland.  He  was  again  elected 
Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Eelations.  The  post 
was  still  especially  important,  as  the  difficulty  with  France 
had  not  yet  been  settled.  He  had  been  in  Washington  but 
a  few  days  when  he  received  information  of  the  death  of 
his  only  surviving  daughter,  Anne,  the  wife  of  James 
Erwin,  a  gentleman  of  high  standing  and  character,  resid 
ing  at  New  Orleans.  She  was  Clay's  favorite  child.  Her 
letters  to  him,  published  in  his  Correspondence,  indicate  that 
she  possessed  refined  intelligence  and  a  most  amiable  dispo 
sition.  Her  death  affected  Clay  more  keenly  throughout 
his  life  than  any  other  of  his  numerous  domestic  bereave 
ments.  On  reading  the  letter  conveying  the  sad  tidings  he 
fainted.  For  several  days  he  did  not  leave  his  apartments. 

Upon  his  return  to  the  Senate,  December  29,  he  again  in 
troduced  his  familiar  bill  to  distribute  the  proceeds  of  the 
public  lands.  He  delivered  a  speech  on  the  subject,  briefly 


262  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

presenting  in  new  form  the  old  arguments  in  favor  of  the 
measure.  He  closed  the  speech  with  the  following  passage, 
unique  on  such  an  occasion : 

"  I  confess  I  feel  anxious  for  the  fate  of  this  measure,  less 
on  account  of  any  agency  I  have  had  in  proposing  it,  as  I 
hope  and  believe,  than  from  a  firm,  sincere,  and  thorough 
conviction  that  no  one  measure  ever  presented  to  the  coun 
cils  of  the  nation  was  fraught  with  so  much  unmixed  good 
and  could  exert  such  powerful  and  enduring  influence  in  the 
preservation  of  the  Union  itself.  If  I  can  be  instrumental 
in  any  degree  in  the  adoption  of  it  I  shall  enjoy  in  that  re 
tirement  into  which  I  hope  shortly  to  enter  a  heart-feeling 
satisfaction  and  a  lasting  consolation.  I  shall  carry  there 
no  regrets,  no  complaints,  no  reproaches  on  my  own  account. 
When  I  look  back  upon  my  humble  origin,  left  an  orphan 
too  young  to  have  been  conscious  of  a  father's  smiles  and 
caresses,  with  a  widowed  mother  surrounded  by  a  numerous 
offspring  in  the  midst  of  embarrassments,  without  a  regular 
education,  without  fortune,  without  friends,  without  patrons, 
I  have  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  my  public  career.  I  ought 
to  be  thankful  for  the  high  places  and  honors  to  which  I 
have  been  called  by  the  favor  and  partiality  of  my  country 
men,  and  I  am  thankful  and  grateful.  And  I  shall  take 
with  me  the  pleasing  consciousness  that  in  whatever  station 
I  have  been  placed  I  have  earnestly  and  honestly  labored  to 
justify  their  confidence  by  a  faithful,  fearless,  and  zealous 
discharge  of  my  public  duties." 

The  bill  went  in  due  course  to  the  Committee  on  Public 
Lands,  and  was  reported  a  month  later.  Debate  upon  it 
began  in  March  and  continued  fitfully  until  May  4,  when  it 
was  passed  by  the  Senate.  In  the  House,  after  considerable 
discussion,  it  was  laid  on  the  table.  The  effort,  however,  to 


CH.  VII.]  THE  « PET  BANKS "  SYSTEM  263 

effect  some  sort  of  distribution  did  not  end  here.  Clay's 
plan  failed,  partly  because  the  principle  of  it  was  bad,  but 
chiefly  because  it  was  his.  Yet  something  had  to  be  done. 
The  public  debt  was  paid.  The  revenues  of  the  govern 
ment  from  all  sources  continued  to  be  much  in  excess  of  its 
needs,  and  were  increasing.  The  situation  was  embarrass 
ing.  The  recent  adjustment  of  the  tariff  by  the  Compro 
mise  produced  no  reduction  of  the  customs  revenue,1  and 
the  Whigs  prevented  a  reduction  of  the  receipts  from  the 
sales  of  the  public  lands.  One  proximate  cause  of  the 
peculiar  condition  of  affairs  was  undoubtedly  the  vicious 
policy  of  depositing  the  surplus  in  the  "  pet  banks."  This 
policy .  operated  inequitably  among  the  different  sections 
of  the  country,  and,  favoring  the  West,  it  promoted  an  ab 
normal  speculation  in  the  public  lands.  From  a  preced 
ing  annual  average  of  §2,500,000,  the  receipts  from  the 
land  sales  had  within  three  years  risen  to  nearly  ten  times 
that  amount.  This  mania  for  speculation,  however,  was 
not  confined  to  the  public  lands,  but  spread  rapidly  to 
everything  that  could  be  made  a  medium  for  speculation.2 
It  was  a  distemper  of  the  public  mind,  engendered  by  sev 
eral  causes  and  destined  to  produce  speedily  the  most  severe 
and  wide-spread  havoc  the  country  had  ever  experienced. 
In  short,  all  the  chief  evils  of  the  prevailing  public  policy, 
for  which  both  parties  were  about  equally  responsible,  had 
conspired  to  create  another  more  serious  and  alarming. 

The  surplus  had  become  so  large  as  to  be  viewed  with 
deep  anxiety,  not  less  by  the  opposition  than  by  the  ad- 


lOn  the  contrary,  it  increased.  In  1834  it  was  $16,200,000;  in  1835, 
$19,400,000  ;  and  in  1836,  $26,400,000.  June  1,  1836,  the  surplus  amount 
ed  to  $41,500,000. 

8  Diary  of  Philip  Hone,  vol.  i.  pp.  173,  204. 


264  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1835 

ministration;  for  not  only  were  the  "Whigs  influenced  by 
the  bad  economic  policy  of  the  deposit  system,  but  by  the 
powerful  political  leverage  it  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
administration.  Its  harmful  effects  were  becoming  daily 
more  apparent.  Under  these  circumstances  some  mode  of 
disposing  of  the  surplus  was  a  peremptory  necessity  —  it 
had  to  be  either  expended  or  distributed.  Various  schemes 
were  proposed.  Calhoun  was  for  a  Constitutional  amend 
ment  authorizing  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  among 
the  States ;  Benton,  for  expending  it  in  fortification  and 
other  means  of  national  defence ;  "Wright,  for  investing  it 
in  State  bonds ;  Grundy,  for  purchasing  from,  the  railroads 
perpetually  free  transportation  of  the  mails  and  war  muni 
tions.  But  none  of  these  propositions  gained  much  sup 
port.  It  was,  of  course,  known  that  Clay's  bill  would  fail 
in  the  House :  the  administration  was  pledged  against  it. 
Yet  no  other  measure  for  distribution  was  reported  until 
a  few  days  before  Clay's  bill  was  tabled. 

A  bill  to  regulate  the  deposits  had  been  reported  by  the 
Finance  Committee.  The  propriety  of  such  a  measure  was 
undeniable,  and  there  was  comparatively  little  difficulty  in 
devising  a  bill  satisfactory  to  all.  Calhoun  had  in  the 
mean  time  overcome  his  Constitutional  scruples,  and  pro 
posed  an  amendment  to  the  deposit  bill  to  direct  a  division 
of  the  surplus,  beyond  five  million  dollars,  among  the 
States,  in  proportion  to  their  population.  This  amendment 
was  at  length  adopted  by  the  Finance  Committee,  largely 
through  the  influence  of  Webster.  After  some  discussion 
the  ratio  of  distribution  was  changed  to  that  of  the  repre 
sentation  of  the  States  in  Congress.  In  this  form  the  bill 
went  to  the  House.  It  there  met  with  strenuous  opposi 
tion.  "While  the  provisions  of  the  bill  relating  to  the  de- 


CH.  VII.]     STRAINED  RELATIONS   WITH   FRANCE         265 

posits  were  approved,  the  proposed  distribution  was  not. 
An  effort  was  made  to  separate  the  incongruous  provisions 
into  two  bills,  but  without  success.  An  amendment  was 
then  offered  to  the  section  for  distribution,  by  which  instead 
of  donating  the  surplus  to  the  States,  it  was  to  be  deposited 
with  them  as  a  call-loan,  to  bear  five  per  centum  interest  in 
case  the  certificates  were  assigned  by  the  government  to 
raise  money.  The  amendment  prevailed  and  the  bill  was 
passed  by  a  vote  of  four  to  one.  The  Senate  quickly  con 
curred,  only  six  members  voting  in  the  negative — Benton, 
Black,  Cuthbert,  Grundy,  Walker,  and  Wright.  The  Presi 
dent  signed  the  bill,  but  not  with  a  very  good  grace.  He 
professed  to  do  so  reluctantly,  and  doubtless  he  did  so  at 
the  instance  of  Yan  Buren's  friends,  who  feared  that  politi 
cal  disadvantage  would  follow  a  veto.  It  was  the  same 
motive  that  gained  for  the  bill  so  large  a  vote  in  both 
houses.  But  little  time  elapsed  before  the  ill  effects  of  this 
vicious  measure  became  apparent. 

Before  the  original  deposit  bill  had  been  transformed  into 
a  distribution  bill  several  other  questions  of  moment  had 
arisen.  The  first  was  the  renewal  of  the  difficulty  with 
France,  which  had  been  allayed  at  the  preceding  session. 
After  the  action  of  the  two  houses,  already  recounted,  the 
French  Chambers  passed  a  bill  appropriating  the  amount  of 
the  indemnity,  but  with  the  proviso  that  it  would  not  be 
paid  until  their  government  had  received  a  satisfactory  ex 
planation  of  that  part  of  the  President's  message  which  rec 
ommended  reprisals— that  is  to  say,  until  he  apologized  for 
his  belligerent  affront  to  the  dignity  of  France.  The  more 
ominous  resentment  of  the  alleged  insult  was  the  recall 
of  the  French  Minister;  at  the  same  time  our  Minister 
received  his  passports,  and  left  France.  A  large  part  of 


266  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

the  President's  annual  message  was  devoted  to  the  sub 
ject.  In  January  he  sent  a  special  message  stating  that 
our  charge  d'affaires,  who  remained  in  France  after  our 
Minister  had  left,  had,  pursuant  to  his  instructions,  demand 
ed  payment  of  the  money  without  apology ;  that  payment 
had  been  refused,  and  he  had  returned.  It  also  stated  that 
the  French  charge  d'affaires  had  been  recalled,  and  all  diplo 
matic  intercourse  between  the  two  countries  was  suspended. 
The  tone  of  the  President's  message  was  more  spirited  and 
warlike  than  that  of  his  preceding  messages  in  regard  to  the 
matter.  He  refused  to  recede  from  the  position  he  had 
taken ;  he  had  offered  all  the  "  explanation "  that  could 
reasonably  be  expected  of  him.  The  money  was  admittedly 
due,  and  payment  had  been  withheld  beyond  any  excusable 
delay.  If  Jackson  had  been  a  little  less  vigorous  and  if  the 
French  government  had  been  as  regardful  of  its  obligation 
as  of  its  sentiment,  there  would  have  been  no  trouble.  As 
it  was  the  rupture  was  now  complete. 

In  the  Senate  the  whole  subject  was  again  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  While  it  was  under  con 
sideration,  all  the  correspondence  having  been  furnished,  the 
President  sent  another  message,  conveying  the  information 
that  the  British  government  had  offered  to  mediate,  and 
that  the  offer  had  been  accepted.  When  the  correspondence 
relating  to  this  offer  was  laid  before  Congress,  Clay  made  a 
brief  speech  in  which  he  could  not  resist  taunting  the  Presi 
dent  with  the  course  he  had  pursued  in  the  affair.  "  In  his 
message  of  December  last,"  said  Clay,  "  he  made  an  explana 
tion  almost  in  the  very  language  required  by  the  Due  de 
Broglie.  This  explanation  was  made  with  two  objects  in 
view.  The  first  was  to  get  with  France  all  the  merit  of 
making  an  explanation ;  and  the  next  was  to  get  with  the 


CH.  VIL]   EVENTS  THAT   LED  TO   THE   CIVIL.  WAR  267 

people  of  the  United  States  the  merit  of  not  making  any 
explanation  at  all.  I  am  truly  glad  that  France  saw  the 
subject  in  the  true  light.  The  moment  she  saw  the  explana 
tion,  she  made  arrangements  to  pay  the  money.  France  saw 
that  while  the  President  protested  that  he  would  not  ex 
plain,  he  did  explain ;  and  that  while  protesting  that  he 
would  not  apologize,  he  did  apologize."  The  offer  of  me 
diation  was  as  eagerly  accepted  by  the  French  government 
as  by  that  of  the  United  States,  and  soon  resulted  in  a  satis 
factory  adjustment  of  the  difference.  It  enabled  both  par 
ties  to  cloak  their  indiscretion  in  a  cloud  of  verbose  palaver, 
the  usual  medium  of  diplomacy  for  effecting  an  honorable 
outcome  in  such  cases.  This  accomplished,  the  money  was 
paid. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  approach  a  subject  which,  though 
not  new,  assumed  at  this  session  an  unwonted  and  persist 
ent  importance  in  public  attention. 

Much  of  the  literature  pertaining  to  our  political  history 
has,  in  a  sense,  been  written  backward.  The  history  of  the 
entire  period  preceding  the  Civil  War  has  generally  been 
treated  as  the  preliminary  to  that  great  struggle.  Nearly 
every  event,  however  small  or  remote,  showing  the  existence 
of  a  more  or  less  active  antislavery  sentiment,  has  been 
magnified  beyond  its  real  significance.  This  is  the  neces 
sary  result  of  history  written  to  maintain  a  proposition  and 
of  biography  to  create  seers  and  heroes.  A  history  of  the 
country  is,  of  course,  inadequate  that  fails  to  trace  the  slow 
development  of  the  antislavery  movement  until  it  attained 
the  proportions  of  a  distinct  and  continuous  political  fac 
tor;  but  a  like  consideration  applies  to  each  of  the  numer 
ous  elements  that  enter  into  the  history  of  a  people.  The 
error  of  omission  is  not  greater  than  the  fault  of  distension. 


268  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

It  is  not  designed  here  to  resurvey  this  over-cultivated  field. 
It  is  only  needful  to  restore  the  salient  facts  to  the  propor 
tions  they  then  had  in  the  popular  mind. 

It  is  probable  that  slavery  would  have  become  extinct  in 
the  South,  as  it  did  in  the  North,  but  for  the  cotton  culture, 
which  rapidly  increased  after  the  invention  of  the  cotton- 
gin  and  machinery  for  the  production  of  cotton  fabrics.  It 
does  not  heighten  the  glory  of  the  North  that  the  oppo 
sition  to  slavery  there  had  its  origin  in  the  humane  and 
philosophic  opinions  of  the  early  Southern  statesmen,  and 
developed  only  after  slavery  had  become  extinct  in  that 
section  because  free  labor  was  more  profitable.  Until  the 
slave-trade  had  fallen  under  the  ban  of  the  law  and  the 
decent  opinion  of  the  world  it  was  prosecuted  to  a  large 
extent  by  New-Englanders.1  But  it  was  certain  that  when 
any  considerable  class  came  to  have  no  material  interest  to 
serve  in  maintaining  or  ministering  to  slavery  a  crusade 
against  it  would  begin :  the  natural  instinct  of  aversion  to 
it  would  be  liberated  and  the  abolitionist  become  inevita 
ble.  Nevertheless,  open  and  active  opposition  grew  but 
slowly.  The  powerful  interests  of  commerce  and  manu 
facture  profited  by  the  striking  difference  in  the  economic 
conditions  of  the  free  and  the  slave  States.  In  the  latter, 
planting  was  almost  the  sole  interest;  hence  the  business  of 
the  former  was  not  only  relieved  of  Southern  competition, 
but  was  there  given  a  large  and  virtually  exclusive  market 
besides  so  long  as  the  policy  of  protection  survived.  More 
over,  odious  as  slavery  was  in  some  of  its  phases,  and  in  all 
so  repugnant  to  natural  justice  and  the  first  principle  of 
our  polity,  every  practical  mind  knew  that  it  could  not  be 

1  Butler's  Book,  p.  81  ;  Tyler's  Taney,  p.  337  ;  Democratic  Review,  vol. 
xxvi.  p.  4. 


CH.  VII.]     GROWTH  OF  ANTISLAVERY  SOCIETIES         269 

abolished  without  force,  and  that  force  was  out  of  the  ques 
tion.  The  Constitution  recognized  and  indirectly  legalized 
it ;  thus  in  the  common  opinion  the  moral  responsibility  for 
it  rested  alone  upon  the  South — the  North  was  absolved. 
This  general  situation,  combined  with  politics,  long  recon 
ciled  the  body  of  the  Northern  people  to  slavery  in  the 
South. 

Antislavery  societies  were  not  a  novelty.  Such  organiza 
tions  had  existed  from  an  early  period,  but  they  were  not 
numerous,  and  exerted  no  appreciable  influence.  Their 
usual  object  was  the  advocacy  of  gradual  emancipation. 
After  1830,  through  the  fanatical  ardor  of  such  zealots  as 
Garrison,  the  formation  of  antislavery  societies  received  a 
new  impetus.  By  1837  no  fewer  than  twelve  hundred  of 
them  had  been  organized,  and,  for  a  year  or  so,  at  nearly 
the  rate  of  one  a  day.  The  purpose,  boldly  proclaimed,  of 
most  of  them  was  to  agitate  immediate  and  unconditional 
abolition.  The  seat  of  this  movement  was  in  the  Eastern 
States  and  its  chief  medium  the  New  England  Antislavery 
Society,  formed  in  1832.  Garrison's  Liberator,  published  at 
Boston,  soon  became  the  leading  organ  of  the  radical  abo 
lition  element,  although  it  was  some  years  before  it  gained 
much  circulation.  It  made  him  the  most  conspicuous  of  the 
extreme  abolitionists.  He  was  a  man  of  small  talent  and 
an  eccentric  of  the  most  pronounced  type.  His  power  lay 
in  his  fearless  and  tireless  energy,  which  made  him  proof 
against  hardship  and  persecution.  His  writings  had  some 
merit,  but  for  the  most  part  they  were  verbose,  frothy,  and 
ranting.  Had  he  and  his  followers  been  more  practical 
they  would  have  acquired  a  stronger  and  speedier  influence. 
Not  content  with  preaching  abolition,  Garrison  urged  so 
many  other  things  having  no  relation  to  slavery  that  he 


270  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

repelled  many  who  were  disposed  in  principle  against  sla 
very,  but  who  did  not  care  to  be  in  such  bizarre  company. 
Most  of  the  early  abolitionists  resembled  Garrison  in  eccen 
tricity  of  mind,  which  displayed  itself  in  a  variety  of  ridicu 
lous  ways,  and  thus  brought  the  whole  class  into  general 
contempt.1  Their  combined  efforts  produced  little  else,  be 
sides  bringing  slavery  into  discussion,  than  local  irritation 
here  and  there,  which  was  intensified  by  the  ferocious  feel 
ing  they  aroused  in  the  South.  So  strongly  were  their 
operations  deprecated  by  the  mass  of  the  Northern  people 
that  frequently  the  apostles  of  abolition  were  mobbed  and 
maltreated.  In  some  places  it  was  impossible  to  procure 
rooms  and  buildings  in  which  to  hold  their  meetings  and 
conventions.  Even  the  churches  were  generally  closed 
against  them. 

The  vital  weakness  of  the  Garrison  element  was  the  recog 
nition,  which  could  not  be  avoided,  of  the  Constitutional 
warrant  of  slavery.  This  compelled  the  agitators  to  assail 
the  Constitution  itself,  which  they  styled  in  Biblical  phrase, 
a  covenant  with  death  and  an  agreement  with  hell.  In 
stead  of  directing  their  efforts  to  some  practical  mode  of 
furthering  their  object,  the}^  merely  clamored.  The  con 
sequence  was  that  as  the  antislavery  element  increased  in 
number  and  ability  a  schism  developed.  It  was  perceived 
by  the  more  sagacious  that  nothing  substantial  could  be  ac 
complished  save  through  political  means — the  organization 
of  an  antislavery  party  of  voters.  And  there  was  little 
wisdom  or  method  in  the  cause  until  this  was  done,  and 
restriction  rather  than  abolition  was  the  ostensible  policy. 


1  Stanton's  Random  Recollections,  p.  69 ;  Life  of  R.  II.  Dana,vo\.  i.  p.  69  ; 
Adams's  Diary,  vol.  ix.  p.  255  ;  Goodell's  Slavery  and  Antislavery,  p.  460  ; 
Life  and  Times  ofBirney,  pp.  256,  278,  292. 


CH.  VII.]     ANTISLAVERY  PROPAGANDA  BY  MAIL      271 

This  dissension  hampered  and  delayed  the  cause  for  some 
years.  So  slow  was  its  political  progress  that  in  1840  the 
Liberty  party  cast  but  one  vote  in  three  hundred  and  sixty. 

From  these  facts  it  is  apparent  that  until  the  Twenty- 
fourth  Congress  the  antislavery  agitation  was  but  a  ripple 
on  the  general  surface  of  affairs.  Most  people  paid  little 
attention  to  it,  and  it  did  not  enter  as  a  direct  factor  into 
the  common  currents  of  thought  and  activity.  But  now  the 
Southern  Senators  and  Kepresentatives  adopted  a  course 
that  forced  the  subject  into  novel  prominence  and  unwit 
tingly  aided  what  it  was  intended  to  suppress. 

From  the  beginning,  one  of  the  principal  means  of  foment 
ing  the  agitation  was  the  dissemination  of  abolition  writ 
ings  through  the  mails ;  and  they  ranged  through  every  de 
gree,  from  temperate  argument  to  the  wildest  paroxysms 
of  arraignment.  Great  quantities  of  such  matter,  including 
inflammatory  prints,  were  thus  sent  into  the  South.1  This 
was  not  only  exasperating  to  the  intense  pride  of  the  South 
ern  people,  but  it  was  believed  by  them  to  be  designed  to 
incite  the  slaves  to  insurrection.  The  fear  of  such  a  possi 
bility  was  unfeigned,  although  the  conduct  of  the  slaves 
during  the  Rebellion  proves  that  it  was  unfounded.  The 
insurrection  led  by  Nat  Turner  in  1831  prompted  the  dread 
that  this  most  horrible  of  all  calamities  might  be  generally 
precipitated.  For  this  reason  the  extreme  feeling  against 


1  "  These  pictures  were  smuggled  amongst  the  slaves  in  many  ways. 
The  wrappers  of  packages  of  goods,  such  as  tobacco  and  other  articles 
consumed  by  slaves,  were  upon  their  inner  sides  covered  with  pictures 
representing  the  slaves  in  chains  and  rags,  with  lordly  masters  holding 
scourges  in  their  hands  ;  and  many  other  designs  of  like  character  were 
impressed  upon  articles  of  dress  and  pieces  of  paper  smuggled  into  goods 
consumed  by  the  blacks  and  thus  sent  amongst  them." — Ormsby's  History 
of  the  Wliig  Party,  p.  272. 


272  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1836 

the  abolitionists  was  not  without  palliation ;  it  was  natural 
that  their  reckless  operations  should  be  viewed  as  incen 
diary  and  infernal.  Another  cause  of  the  sensibility  of  the 
South  on  the  subject  of  slavery  was  the  consciousness  that 
wherever  the  institution  existed  in  other  countries  it  was 
losing  ground.  The  sentiment  of  civilization  was  gradually 
crystallizing  against  it.  In  Great  Britain  a  movement  had 
been  started  some  years  before  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
colonies,  and  in  1833  it  ended  in  success.  This  freed  the 
slaves  in  the  West  Indies  and  brought  closely  home  to  the 
South  the  possible  danger  of  the  agitation  in  the  North, 
which  had  its  immediate  inception  in  the  British  example.1 
But  though  the  growing  sentiment  of  the  world  against  sla 
very  was  recognized  at  the  South,  it  did  not  change  the 
conviction  there  as  to  the  propriety  of  the  institution. 
The  consequence  was  only  to  harden  opinion  and  render 
the  South  more  watchful  of  hostile  influences.  The  South 
ern  people  had  from  their  infancy  been  accustomed  to 
negro  slavery.  Most  of  them  had  been  nursed  by  slaves, 
and  were  as  familiar  with  the  aspect  of  slavery  as  with  the 
natural  conditions  of  existence.2  It  had  become  the  foun- 


1  "  Wilberforce  and  bis  coadjutors  commenced  their  labors  in  the  anti- 
slavery  cause  just  at  the  period  of  the  adoption  of  the  United  States  Con 
stitution.      It  was  about  that  period  that  Parliament,  under  the  Wilber 
force  movement,  began  to  agitate  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade  ;  and  the 
speeches  of  the  British  orators,  the  books  and  essays  of  British  authors, 
and  the  songs  of  British  poets,  vividly  portraying  the  foul  sin  of  slavery, 
were  instantly  reproduced,  perused,  and  wept  over  in  New  England. 
Cowper's  spirited  poem,  which  came  forth  at  that  period,  no  doubt  inspired 
millions  of  hearts  with  hatred  of  slavery." — Ormsby's  History  of  the  Whig 
Party,  p.  83. 

2  Calhoun  told  Adams  in  1820  that  "domestic  labor  was  confined  to 
blacks,  and  such  was  the  prejudice  that  if  the  most  popular  man  in  his  dis 
trict  were  to  keep  a  white  servant  in  his  house  his  character  and  reputation 
would  be  irretrievably  ruined." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  v.  p.  10. 


CH.VIL]  THE  ABOLITION  PETITIONS  273 

dation  of  their  social  fabric  and  represented  a  great  part  of 
their  wealth.  They  had  come  to  look  upon  it  as  absolutely 
essential  to  them,  and  on  the  whole  as  more  beneficial  than 
freedom  to  the  slaves,  whom  they  regarded  as  an  inferior 
race,  fit  only  for  bondage ;  and  doubtless  the  majority  of 
the  slaves  were  well  treated  and  contented.  While  these 
considerations  do  not  justify  the  institution,  they  must  be 
borne  in  mind  in  judging  fairly  the  temper  and  attitude  of 
the  South. 

Another  phase  of  the  agitation  were  the  abolition  peti 
tions.  They  were  in  many  forms  and  urged  various  pro 
ceedings,  from  the  most  tentative  and  restricted  to  the  most 
radical  and  irrational.  Most  of  the  petitions,  however,  were 
for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 
They  were  often  couched  with  violent  license  of  language, 
describing  slavery  and  the  slave-holders  in  a  manner  that 
aroused  the  deepest  ire  of  the  Southern  members.  It  was 
asserted  on  the  floor  of  the  House  that  during  the  session 
the  number  of  the  signers  of  the  petitions  was  about  thirty 
thousand,  of  whom  one-half  were  women  and  a  large  pro 
portion  of  the  remainder  minors.  For  several  years  this 
mode  of  bringing  the  subject  before  Congress  had  been  re 
sorted  to,  but  the  petitions  were  received  and  laid  on  the 
table  without  comment.  This  silent  reception  did  not  in 
the  least  discourage  the  petitioners.  More  and  more  of  the 
documents  were  prepared  and  offered  until  at  this  session 
their  unusual  number,  together  with  the  progress  of  the 
agitation  in  other  ways,  provoked  a  protest.  The  aboli 
tionists  had  at  last  penetrated  the  Capitol. 

In  the  House  the  petitions  were  challenged  very  soon 
after  the  opening  of  the  session  and  gave  rise  to  frequent 
scenes  of  angry  discussion  and  disorder.  They  were  so 

18 


274  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

irritating  that  some  of  the  Southern  members  strenuously 
sought  to  prevent  the  reading  and  reception  of  them,  and 
in  some  cases  were  successful,  notwithstanding  the  outcry 
that  the  procedure  was  against  the  Constitutional  right  of 
petition.  But  as  new  provocations  were  continually  arising 
by  the  appearance  of  fresh  petitions,  it  became  necessary  to 
adopt  some  general  rule  in  regard  to  them.  At  length,  on 
February  8,  Pinckney,  of  South  Carolina,  introduced  a  reso 
lution  from  which  was  finally  evolved  what  has  always 
been  known  as  the  "  gag  "  rule.  It  was  afterward  divided 
into  three :  (1)  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  interfere  in 
any  way  with  slavery  in  any  State ;  (2)  that  it  ought  not  to 
interfere  in  any  way  with  slavery  in  the  District  of  Colum 
bia  ;  and  (3)  that  all  petitions,  memorials,  resolutions,  prop 
ositions,  or  papers  relating  in  any  way  to  the  subject  of 
slavery  should,  without  being  either  printed  or  referred, 
be  laid  on  the  table,  and  that  no  further  action  whatever  be 
had  upon  them.  After  an  excited  debate  they  were  adopt 
ed,  May  26  ;  the  first  by  a  vote  of  128  to  9  ;  the  second,  132 
to  45 ;  the  third,  117  to  68.  This  action  was  signalized  by 
the  conduct  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  then  began  his 
remarkable  course  of  opposition  to  slavery  and  defence  of 
the  right  of  petition.  On  the  adoption  of  the  last  resolu 
tion  he  refused  to  vote.  According  to  the  sober  journal  of 
the  House,  "  "When  the  name  of  Mr.  Adams  was  called,  that 
gentleman  arose  and  said :  '  I  hold  the  resolution  to  be  a 
direct  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
the  rules  of  this  House,  and  the  rights  of  my  constituents.' 
Mr.  A.  resumed  his  seat  amid  loud  cries  of  '  Order !'  from 
all  parts  of  the  hall."  His  course  was  the  more  startling 
because  he  had  previously  presented  abolition  petitions  and 
expressed  his  disapproval  of  their  object. 


CH.  VII.]     ADAMS  AND  THE  RIGHT  OF  PETITION         275 

It  was  at  this  time  that  his  peculiarities  of  mind  began 
entirely  to  dominate  him.  He  was  old,  and  without  chance 
or  desire  for  preferment.  That  he  was  willing,  after  having 
been  President,  to  be  a  member  of  the  House  was  deemed  by 
many  as  evidence  of  eccentricity.  Yet  his  age,  experience, 
and  unique  power  in  debate  rendered  his  position,  despite 
the  violent  antipathy  and  ruthless  treatment  he  encoun 
tered,  formidable  in  that  body  and  influential  in  the  North. 
Probably  nothing  aided  so  much  at  that  juncture  in  enlist 
ing  the  attention  of  thoughtful  men  who  had  been  hostile 
or  indifferent  to  the  antislavery  agitation  as  Adams's  per 
sistent  efforts  in  battling  for  the  right  of  petition  and 
against  the  slave  interest.  He  possessed  what  the  aboli 
tionist  agitators  lacked  —  instinctive  perception  of  every 
point  that  the  fury  of  his  adversaries  made  vulnerable. 
He  wasted  no  energy  on  abstractions  and  met  each  con 
crete  question  with  practical  weapons.  His  strong  mind, 
unwearied  industry,  and  wide  attainments  formed  a  solid 
foundation  for  his  courage  and  keenness  in  debate.  He 
was  far  from  being  an  orator  in  the  usual  sense.  Before 
entering  the  House,  although  he  had  sat  in  the  Senate,  he 
had  little  experience  in  public  speaking.  But,  with  a  mo 
tive,  he  was  not  long  in  that  arena  in  becoming  a  danger 
ous  antagonist.1  In  directness,  sarcasm,  ridicule,  and  retort 
he  was  nearly  as  withering  as  Randolph,  though  in  a  differ 
ent  style.  Fear  was  unknown  to  him.  He  was  often  the 
centre  of  scenes  of  frenzied  commotion  that  his  bold  senti 
ments  and  bitter  words  created.  No  denunciations,  abuse, 


1  "Mr.  Adams  wrote  with  a  rapidity  and  ease  which  would  hardly  be 
suspected  from  his  somewhat  measured  style.  Notwithstanding  the  finish 
of  his  sentences,  they  were,  like  Gibbon's,  struck  off  at  once  and  never  had 
to  be  retouched."— Everett's  Works,  vol.  ii.  p.  590. 


276  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

or  threats  could  change  his  course.  Nor  did  he  lose  his 
temper — men  of  such  acrid  intellect  and  caustic  tongue  sel 
dom  do.  This  made  his  opponents  all  the  more  exasperated 
and  furious,  and  led  them  into  conduct  that  steadily  corrod 
ed  friendly  sentiment  in  the  North. 

Whatever  the  public  interest  in  the  action  of  the  House, 
it  was  much  greater  in  that  of  the  Senate.  The  House  was 
the  theatre  of  so  much  incubating  ambition  and  demagogic 
display  that  it  did  not  impress  the  country  like  the  Senate, 
which  contained  most  of  the  political  chieftains  and  public 
men  of  greatest  ability  and  distinction.  The  proceedings 
of  the  House,  therefore,  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  were 
largely  dictated  from  the  Senate,  which  thus  became  the 
focus  of  public  attention.  If  anything  had  been  lacking  in 
Calhoun's  recent  course  to  show  that  he  had  become  pos 
sessed  by  the  one  controlling  purpose  of  guarding  slavery, 
it  was  now  disclosed.  Thus  far  slavery  had  been  the  indirect 
object  of  his  solicitude ;  to  protect  it  directly  was  now  stern 
ly  announced  by  him  to  be  his  paramount  and  unyielding 
aim.  He  was  the  acknowledged  head  and  front  of  the 
slave  interest  and  the  dictator  of  its  policy.  His  command 
ing  position  was  yielded  with  full  consent ;  his  great  pres 
tige,  powers,  and  intensity  of  purpose  placed  him  beyond 
all  envy  and  rivalry.  He  was  the  embodiment  of  his  cause. 
Through  the  fiat  of  his  example  all  apologetic  defences  of 
slavery  were  haughtily  thrown  aside.  He  and  his  followers 
defiantly  proclaimed  that  it  was  not  an  evil,  but  a  positive 
good,  and  that  its  security  was  the  price  of  preserving  the 
Union.  His  stand  against  abolition  petitions  and  publica 
tions  revealed  the  Southern  determination  to  insist  upon  the 
most  radical  and  extreme  measures  to  further  the  dominant 
purpose. 


CH.  VII.]      TO  CURB  INCENDIARY  PUBLICATIONS      277 

In  the  preceding  summer  the  excitement  in  Charleston 
was  so  intense  that  the  post-office  was,  without  much  dif 
ficulty,  rifled  of  a  quantity  of  abolition  publications,  which 
were  destroyed.  The  postmaster  at  New  York  was  requested 
to  prevent  the  further  transmission  of  such  matter.  He  ap 
plied  for  instructions  to  the  Postmaster-General,  Amos  Ken 
dall,  who  answered  that  there  was  no  legal  authority  to  ex 
clude  matter  from  the  mails,  and  that  such  a  power  would 
be  dangerous ;  yet  he  virtually  advised  that  course.  He  as 
sured  the  postmaster  at  Charleston  that  "  we  owe  an  obli 
gation  to  the  laws,  but  a  higher  one  to  the  communities 
in  which  we  live ;  and  if  the  former  be  perverted  to  destroy 
the  latter,  it  is  patriotism  to  disregard  them."  The  Presi 
dent,  in  his  annual  message,  expressed  himself  pointedly  in 
relation  to  "the  painful  excitement  produced  in  the  South 
by  attempts  to  circulate  through  the  mails  inflammatory 
appeals  addressed  to  the  passions  of  the  slaves,  in  prints  and 
various  sorts  of  publications  calculated  to  stimulate  them  to 
insurrection  and  to  produce  all  the  horrors  of  a  servile  war"; 
and  recommended  the  enactment  of  a  law  prohibiting  under 
severe  penalties  the  circulation  of  incendiary  publications 
through  the  mails.  Calhoun  at  once  moved  to  refer  this  part 
of  the  message  to  a  select  committee.  The  motion  met  with 
some  resistance.  It  was  urged  that  the  matter  should  be 
referred  instead  to  the  standing  Committee  on  Post-offices ; 
and  that  reference  to  a  special  committee  would  give  the 
subject  too  much  prominence  and  provoke  unnecessary  dis 
cussion  and  excitement.  But  Calhoun  insisted,  and  the  mo 
tion  prevailed. 

Pending  the  report,  the  other  branch  of  the  general  ques 
tion,  already  tormenting  the  House,  was  taken  up.  January 
7,  two  petitions  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  being  pre- 


278  THE  JACKSOOTAN  EPOCH  [1836 

sented,  Calhoun  moved  that  they  be  not  received.  He 
pronounced  them  "a  gross,  false,  and  malicious  slander  upon 
eleven  States";  and  argued  that  inasmuch  as  Congress  had 
no  jurisdiction  over  slavery  either  in  the  States  or  in  the 
District,  the  petitions  demanded  a  violation  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  should  therefore  be  peremptorily  rejected.  That 
the  language  of  many  of  the  petitions  presented  would  have 
justified  this  rejection  is  undeniable  ;  but  this  objection,  had 
it  been  generally  utilized,  as  it  was  occasionally,  would  have 
accomplished  nothing  except  to  render  the  wording  of 
petitions  less  offensive;  it  did  not  go  to  the  root  of  the 
matter.  The  assumption  that  Congress  was  without  power 
to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  was  based  on  the  theory 
that  the  States  which  ceded  the  District  to  the  government 
being  slave  States,  there  was  an  implied  condition  or  com 
pact  guaranteeing  slavery  in  the  District.  But  this  proposi 
tion  was  indefensible  and  was  entertained  by  few  men.  The 
procedure  demanded  by  Calhoun  would  in  effect  have  been 
the  denial  of  the  right  of  petition,  and  as  such  it  was  strong 
ly  opposed  even  by  most  of  the  Southern  Senators.  Some  of 
them,  indeed,  severely  criticised  it  as  tending  in  itself  to  fur 
ther  the  agitation.  He  frankly  gave  to  the  petitions  a  grave 
importance.  u  We  must,"  said  he,  "  meet  the  enemy  on  the 
frontier — on  the  question  of  receiving ;  we  must  secure  that 
important  pass — it  is  our  Thermopylae.  The  power  of  resist 
ance,  by  a  universal  law  of  nature,  is  on  the  exterior.  Break 
through  the  shell,  penetrate  the  crust,  and  there  is  no  resist 
ance  within.  In  the  present  contest  the  question  on  receiv 
ing  constitutes  our  frontier.  It  is  the  first,  the  exterior 
question,  that  covers  and  protects  all  others.  Let  it  be  pen 
etrated  by  receiving  this  petition,  and  not  a  point  of  resist 
ance  can  be  found  within,  as  far  as  this  government  is  con- 


CH.  VII.]  CLAY  AND  THE  ANTISLAVERY  PETITIONS  279 

cerned."  January  11,  Buchanan  presented  an  abolition  peti 
tion  and  moved  that  it  be  read  and  the  prayer  rejected. 
Calhoun  at  once  demanded  that  the  question  whether  the 
petition  should  be  received  be  first  taken.  The  debate  con 
tinued  intermittently  until  March  9,  when  the  motion  to  re 
ceive  was  carried,  36  to  10. 

Clay  was  emphatically  in  favor  of  receiving  the  petitions, 
and  went  as  far  as  any  Northern  Senator  in  his  desire  to  put 
them  through  the  form  of  respectful  consideration.  In  his 
opinion,  the  right  of  petition  required  of  the  servants  of  the 
people  that  they  should  examine,  deliberate,  and  decide  either 
to  grant  or  refuse  the  prayer  of  a  petition  and  to  give  the  rea 
son  for  the  decision.  This  he  thought  would  "  carry  conviction 
to  every  mind,  satisfy  the  petitioners  of  the  impropriety  of 
granting  their  request,  and  thus  have  the  best  effects  in  put 
ting  an  end  to  the  agitation  of  the  public  mind  on  the  sub 
ject."  He  further  declared  his  belief  that  slavery  was  justi 
fied  by  its  necessity ;  that  were  he  a  Southern  man  he  would 
resist  emancipation  in  every  form,  gradual  or  other,  because 
the  white  race  was  superior,  and  because  emancipation  would 
necessarily  give  the  blacks  eventually  a  numerical  prepon 
derance.  He  proposed,  as  an  amendment  to  Buchanan's  mo 
tion  to  reject  forthwith,  a  resolution  asserting  the  practi 
cal  reasons,  without  affirming  or  denying  the  Constitutional 
power,  why  Congress  should  not  abolish  slavery  in  the  Dis 
trict.  But  as  it  did  not  meet  with  approval  he  withdrew  it, 
and  a  few  days  afterward  voted  for  the  original  motion, 
which  was  carried,  34  to  6.  After  some  further  discussion 
the  subject  was  laid  on  the  table  for  the  session. 

Meantime  the  select  committee  appointed  on  Calhoun's 
motion  made  its  report.  Much  of  it  was  not  concurred  in 
by  a  majority  of  the  committee.  It  was  written  by  Calhoun, 


280  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

and  was  substantially  a  treatise  on  his  theory  of  the  Consti 
tution  as  well  as  of  slavery,  and  the  relations  among  the 
States  in  regard  to  it.  The  tendency  of  the  views  it  ex 
pressed  was  regarded  as  inimical  to  the  Union ;  even  King, 
of  Georgia,  one  of  Calhoun's  colleagues  on  the  committee,  so 
asserted.  The  report  was  accompanied  by  a  bill  which  pro 
vided  that  it  should  be  criminal  for  any  postmaster  know 
ingly  to  receive  and  put  into  mail  any  written,  printed,  or 
pictorial  matter  concerning  slavery  directed  to  any  post- 
office  or  person  in  a  State  where  the  circulation  of  such  mat 
ter  was  prohibited  by  law ;  and  that  if  such  matter  should 
be  deposited  and  not  withdrawn  within  a  month  after  notice 
to  withdraw  it,  it  should  be  destroyed.  It  was  further  made 
the  duty  of  the  entire  department,  from  the  Postmaster-Gen 
eral  down,  to  co-operate  in  the  enforcement  of  the  law. 

The  bill  was  much  debated.  Clay  opposed  it.  He  argued 
that  the  harm  of  such  matter  did  not  come  from  sending  it 
through  the  mails,  but  from  the  use  of  it  afterward;  hence 
that  the  States  had  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  prevent  its 
being  taken  from  the  post-offices  to  which  it  was  sent.  For 
this  reason  he  denied  the  Constitutional  power  of  Congress 
to  enact  such  a  law,  which  was  really  designed  to  aid  the 
enforcement  of  State  laws.  He  also  challenged  the  right  to 
designate  persons  or  classes  who  should  have  the  benefit  of 
the  mails  and  exclude  all  others.  Moreover,  he  contended 
that  the  bill  would  be  practically  inoperative,  as  the  post 
masters  were  to  be  held  accountable  only  when  they  know 
ingly  delivered  the  prohibited  matter — a  condition  difficult 
to  prove.  These  views  prevailed.  After  much  political 
manoeuvring,  the  bill  was  defeated,  25  to  19.  The  only 
Northern  Senators  to  vote  for  it  were  Buchanan  and  the 
two  from  New  York,  Wright  and  Tallmadge,  who  were  no 


CH.  VII.]  MICHIGAN  AND  ARKANSAS  MADE  STATES    281 

doubt  actuated  by  the  political  desire  not  to  injure  Van 
Buren.  Indeed,  it  was  so  arranged  that  he  gave  the  cast 
ing  vote  on  a  preliminary  question,  to  show  that  he  was  not 
opposed  to  the  bill. 

These,  however,  were  but  the  more  conspicuous  phases  of 
the  slavery  question,  that  now  began  to  assert  itself  through 
every  avenue  which  the  protection  and  advancement  of  the 
institution  suggested.  At  this  session  Michigan  and  Arkan 
sas  applied  for  admission  into  the  Union,  the  former  as  a 
free  and  the  latter  as  a  slave  State.  Both  encountered 
varied  opposition,  but  succeeded.  Michigan  had  been  an 
applicant  for  some  three  years  and  Arkansas  for  nearly  as 
long;  but  Congress  had  not  authorized  either  to  form  a 
constitution  and  provide  for  a  State  government.  For  this 
reason  their  action  was  deemed  irregular  by  many.  Clay  so 
regarded  it,  and  voted  against  the  admission  of  both.  The 
slavery  question  did  not  assume  a  formidable  bearing,  osten 
sibly  because  it  was  generally  conceded,  even  by  Adams,  that 
the  terms  of  the  Louisiana  purchase  and  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  warranted  slavery  in  Arkansas  if  the  State  chose 
to  permit  it.  But  the  fact  remains  that  neither  State  would 
have  been  admitted  without  the  other.  Their  simultaneous 
admission  preserved  the  sectional  equilibrium  for  which 
the  admission  of  Missouri  and  Maine  had  established  the 
precedent.1  The  chief  source  of  the  opposition  was  the  un 
doubted  desire  of  the  Whigs  to  postpone  the  admission  of 
both  States  until  after  the  Presidential  election,  which  was 
soon  to  occur.  It  was  quite  certain  that  both  would  choose 
Democratic  electors. 

Notwithstanding  the  extreme  sensitiveness  on  the  subject 

1  The  admission  of  Kentucky  and  Vermont,  Mississippi  and  Indiana,  un 
doubtedly  prepared  tho  way. 


282  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

of  slavery  which  the  proceedings  of  the  session  had  pro 
duced,  Benton  undertook  the  apparently  impossible  feat 
of  enlarging  Missouri.  It  was  already  one  of  the  largest 
States  in  the  Union,  and  the  territory  which  it  was  proposed 
to  annex,  a  fertile  domain  as  large  as  Rhode  Island,  con 
sisted  of  Indian  lands  under  treaty.  But  the  most  serious 
obstacle  was  that  the  project  involved  a  departure  from  the 
lines  of  the  Compromise,  thus  converting  free  into  slave 
soil.  Yet  there  was  manifest  propriety  in  the  plan,  as  it 
would  symmetrize  the  proportions  of  the  State  by  filling 
out  the  northwest  corner.  Perhaps  it  was  this  consider 
ation  mainly  that  allayed  the  danger  of  opposition;  for 
Benton's  efforts  were  entirely  successful.  The  project  was 
managed  with  so  much  tact  that  it  received  little  public 
notice  or  discussion  in  Congress.  The  bill  passed  quietly 
through  both  houses  and  became  a  law.  A  new  treaty 
with  the  Indians  was  made  and  ratified,  and  the  State  as 
sumed  its  present  outlines  on  the  map. 

Another  phase  of  the  slavery  question  that  vexed  the 
session  in  so  many  ways  was  the  asserted  independence  of 
Texas.  The  first  stage  of  Texan  independence  was  the 
overthrow  of  Spanish  dominion  by  Mexico,  of  which  Texas 
formed  a  part.  Early  in  1824  Mexico  established  a  republi 
can  constitution  resembling  that  of  the  United  States.  It 
joined  Texas  and  Coahuila  as  one  State,  and  three  years 
later  a  State  constitution  was  formed.  Both  the  national 
and  State  governments,  however,  were  little  more  than 
nominal.  The  former  was  frequently  shaken  by  changes  of 
administration,  usually  accomplished  by  force;  hence  its 
authority  sat  lightly  on  the  States  more  remote  from  the 
City  of  Mexico,  the  seat  of  the  national  government.  In 
1830  the  vast  area  of  Texas,  nearly  270,000  square  miles, 


CH.VII.]        THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF   TEXAS  283 

contained  a  population  of  only  21,000,  whites  and  negroes 
combined,  of  which  the  greater  part  had  come  from  the 
United  States.  The  joinder  of  Texas  and  Coahuila  was  ill- 
advised,  the  population  of  the  latter  being  almost  entirely 
Mexican.  Coahuila  dominated  the  legislature  and  caused 
the  enactment  of  a  law  forbidding  the  further  immigration 
of  American  settlers.  But  this  law,  like  the  provision  in 
the  constitution  prohibiting  slavery,  had  no  practical  effect 
except  to  embitter  the  Texans  against  everything  Mexican. 
Although  this  law  was  afterward  repealed,  the  dissensions 
among  the  irreconcilable  elements  of  the  State  increased 
until  at  length  the  Texans  demanded  a  separate  State  gov 
ernment.  This  being  refused,  they  revolted,  declared  their 
independence,  and  began,  under  the  leadership  of  Sam  Hous 
ton,  the  war  that  eventually  achieved  it.1 

The  struggle  for  independence  naturally  aroused  keen  in 
terest  throughout  the  United  States ;  and  as  the  war  at  the 
outset  was  attended  by  barbarous  atrocities  on  the  part  of 
the  Mexicans,  that  interest  was  quickened  into  patriotic 
sympathy,  which  rapidly  recruited  the  ranks  of  the  revolu 
tionists.  Behind  this  was  the  ever-present  desire  for  terri 
torial  expansion  ;  for  it  was  assumed  that  the  establishment 
of  independence  by  Texas  would  be  followed  by  its  admis 
sion  into  the  Union.  This  outcome  was  the  studied  design 
of  the  South,  as  frankly  declared  by  Calhoun,  because  it 
would  bring  an  enormous  accession  to  the  slave  interest ; 
yet  this  consideration  did  not  seriously  influence  popular 


1  It  has  been  commonly  asserted  that  Houston,  with  Jackson's  tacit 
consent,  went  to  Texas  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  there. — Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  iii.  p.  655 ;  Von  Hoist's  Constitu 
tional  and  Political  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  ii.  p.  562.  This  is 
denied,  on  apparently  good  grounds,  by  Houston's  most  recent  biogra 
pher. — Williams's  Houston,  p.  74. 


284  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

sentiment  at  the  North,  where  that  national  pride  which 
resisted  secession  in  1861  was  more  potent  than  the  fear  of 
sectional  advantage  to  the  South.  As  soon  as  information 
of  the  progress  of  the  Texan  cause  spread  through  the  coun 
try  Congress  was  petitioned  by  individuals,  public  meetings, 
and  legislatures,  North  and  South,  to  recognize  the  inde 
pendence  of  Texas.  Precise  information,  however,  upon 
which  the  government  could  act  with  propriety,  came  but 
slowly. 

June  24,  in  response  to  a  resolution  of  the  Senate,  the 
President  reported  that  he  was  without  such  knowledge, 
but  had  taken  measures  to  obtain  it.  Nevertheless,  Con 
gress  was  disposed  to  do  something  to  gratify  the  popular 
demand.  July  1,  the  Senate  adopted  resolutions  declaring 
that  "  the  independence  of  Texas  should  be  acknowledged 
whenever  satisfactory  information  has  been  received  that 
it  has  in  successful  operation  a  civil  government  capable 
of  performing  the  duties  and  fulfilling  the  obligations  of 
an  independent  power,"  and  expressing  satisfaction  with  the 
effort  of  the  President  to  gain  that  information.  The  first 
was  introduced  a  month  before  by  Clay,  from  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  although  he  preferred  not  to  have  it 
acted  upon  at  this  session.  "With  the  development  of  the 
slavery  question  his  attitude  in  regard  to  Texas  had  changed. 
He  had  severely  criticised  Monroe's  administration  for  re 
linquishing  to  Spain,  by  the  Florida  treaty,  our  claim  to 
Texas  under  the  Louisiana  purchase,  and  while  Secretary  of 
State  he  proposed  the  purchase  of  Texas  from  Mexico.  He 
was  now  reluctant  to  promote  in  any  way  the  growing  dis 
cord  over  slavery.  Pacification  was  his  policy  and  his  pas 
sion.  The  resolutions  were  empty  and  useless  except  to 
indicate  what  would  be  done  if  a  suitable  pretext  offered. 


CH.VIL]  DEATH  OF  MADISON  285 

Nine  days  later  similar  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the 
House.  Thus  closed  the  first  scene  of  what  was  to  prove  a 
devious  and  bloody  drama.  Congress  then  adjourned. 

A  few  days  before  the  adjournment  the  venerable  Madi 
son  died.  He  was  the  last  of  the  eminent  early  states 
men,  and  was  long  regarded  as  the  political  mentor  of 
the  country.  His  writings  shed  invaluable  light  on  some 
phases  of  our  history,  particularly  Constitutional.  The  gen 
eral  scheme  of  the  Constitution  is  more  largely  his  concep 
tion  than  that  of  any  other  member  of  the  convention.  No 
American  statesman  except  Hamilton  so  well  deserves  the 
title  of  publicist.  The  most  serious  disparagement  of  this 
title  is  his  approval  of  the  restrictive  measures  preceding 
the  War  of  1812.  The  purity  of  his  character,  the  seren 
ity  of  his  mind,  the  poise  of  his  judgment,  the  depth  of  his 
patriotism,  and  his  watchful  interest  in  public  affairs  nat 
urally  attracted  throughout  his  long  retirement  the  esteem 
and  homage  of  public  men  without  distinction  of  party. 
This  is  well  illustrated  by  his  relations  with  both  Jackson 
and  Clay.  It  is  related  that  he  was  roused  from  his  bed  by 
Edward  Livingston,  the  author  of  the  nullification  procla 
mation,  to  pass  his  opinion  on  the  document  before  it  was 
published;  and  that  the  suggestions  and  amendments  he 
proposed,  sitting  in  his  night-dress  between  two  spluttering 
candles,  were  eagerly  adopted.  Between  him  and  Clay,  de 
spite  their  early  disagreements,  a  strong  friendship  had  de 
veloped.  Their  correspondence  shows  the  cordial  regard 
they  had  for  each  other.  Shortly  before  Madison's  death 
he  expressed  to  a  mutual  friend  his  admiration  of  Clay's 
success  in  compromising  differences  that  threatened  the  per 
manence  of  the  Union,  and  the  hope  that  he  might  be  equal 
ly  successful  in  pacifying  the  dread  dissension  over  slavery. 


286  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

"  I  wish,"  said  Madison,  "  he  could  fall  on  some  plan  of 
compromising  this,  and  then  all  parties,  or  enough  of  all 
parties,  might  unite  and  make  him  President." 

For  years  Madison  had  been  president  of  the  American 
Colonization  Society,  which  was  formed  in  1817,  in  accord 
ance  with  a  plan  originally  projected  during  the  Revolution. 
The  object  of  the  society  was  the  transportation  of  free 
negroes  to  Africa,  primarily  because  of  the  fear  that  they 
would  incite  insurrections  among  the  slaves.  The  society 
and  its  branches  were  long  regarded  with  general  favor, 
even  by  the  abolitionists,  and  were  aided  by  legislation, 
appropriations,  and  donations  during  the  dubious  vicissi 
tudes  attending  the  finally  successful  establishment  of  the 
colony  of  Liberia.  From  the  first,  Clay  had  been  zealously 
interested  in  the  society.  He  was  chairman  of  the  first 
meeting  called  at  Washington  preliminary  to  the  forma 
tion  of  the  society,  and  continued  in  active  connection  with 
it.  Upon  Madison's  death  he  succeeded  him  as  president. 
By  this  time,  however,  the  society  had  lost  favor  with  the 
abolitionists.  With  the  progress  of  the  antislavery  agitation 
they  had  gradually  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  scheme 
of  colonization,  instead  of  being  a  valuable  adjunct  to  their 
cause,  was  a  disguised  auxiliary  to  slavery,  and  as  such 
they  began  to  denounce  it.1  Garrison  waxed  violent  against 
it,  and  therefore  against  Clay.  Only  a  few  years  before, 
Clay  had  been  his  political  idol.  At  the  annual  meeting  of 
the  society  in  1827,  Clay  delivered  an  address  extolling  its 


1  In  December,  1837,  there  were  fifty-nine  votes  in  the  House  against 
a  motion  to  allow  the  society  to  hold  its  annual  meeting  in  the  hall,  ac 
cording  to  its  custom.  The  reason  for  these  adverse  votes  does  not  ap 
pear  ;  but  the  number  is  about  the  same  as  supported  Adams  in  his  efforts 
to  procure  the  reception  of  the  abolition  petitions. 


CH.  VII.]     CLAY  AND  THE  COLONIZATION  SOCIETY    287 

operations  and  aspirations.  He  was  so  emphatic  in  declar 
ing  his  antipathy  to  slavery  as  to  gain  the  ecstatic  admiration 
of  its  most  radical  opponents.  "  If  I  could  be  instrumental," 
he  exclaimed,  "in  eradicating  this  deepest  stain  upon  the 
character  of  our  country  and  removing  all  cause  of  reproach 
on  account  of  it  by  foreign  nations ;  if  I  could  only  be  instru 
mental  in  ridding  of  this  foul  blot  that  revered  State  that 
gave  me  birth,  or  that  no  less  beloved  State  which  kind 
ly  adopted  me  as  her  son,  I  would  not  exchange  the  proud 
satisfaction  which  I  should  enjoy  for  the  honor  of  all  the 
triumphs  ever  decreed  to  the  most  successful  conqueror." 
And  this  is  a  fair  specimen  of  the  frankness  with  which  he 
always  expressed  himself  on  slavery  in  the  abstract.  But 
there  was  a  striking  inconsistency  in  his  characterization  of 
the  free  negroes  and  his  description  of  the  results  they  would 
accomplish  if  transported.  "  There  is,"  said  he,  "  a  moral 
fitness  in  the  idea  of  returning  to  Africa  her  children,  whose 
ancestors  have  been  torn  from  her  by  the  ruthless  hand  of 
fraud  and  violence.  Transplanted  in  a  foreign  land,  they  will 
carry  back  to  their  soil  the  rich  fruits  of  religion,  law,  and 
liberty.  May  it  not  be  one  of  the  great  designs  of  the  Euler 
of  the  Universe,  whose  ways  are  often  inscrutable  by  short 
sighted  mortals,  thus  to  transform  an  original  crime  into  a 
signal  blessing  to  that  most  unfortunate  portion  of  the  globe  ? 
Of  all  classes  of  our  population  the  most  vicious  is  that  of 
the  free  colored.  It  is  the  inevitable  result  of  their  moral, 
political,  and  civil  degradation.  Contaminated  themselves, 
they  extend  their  vices  to  all  around  them,  to  the  slaves  and 
to  the  whites.  .  .  .  Every  emigrant  to  Africa  is  a  missionary 
carrying  with  him  credentials  in  the  holy  cause  of  civiliza 
tion,  religion,  and  free  institutions."  Yet  this  glaring  in 
consistency  seems  to  have  attracted  no  marked  attention 


288  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1836 

at  the  time;  neither  did  the  utter  impracticability  of  the 
scheme  to  effect  any  diminution  of  the  free  negro  popula 
tion,  although  the  results  thus  far  totally  refuted  the  argu 
ments  and  promises  of  the  society.1  At  all  events,  Garrison 
was  satisfied.  "When  Clay  retired  from  the  Department  of 
State,  in  1829,  he  made  a  speech  at  a  dinner  given  in  his 
honor  which  roused  Garrison  to  the  highest  pitch  of  de 
voted  enthusiasm.  "  Henry  Clay,"  he  wrote,  "  at  this  mo 
ment  stands  on  a  higher  eminence  than  he  ever  before 
occupied.  His  attitude  is  sublime— his  front  undaunted — 
his  spirit  unsubdued.  It  is  impossible  to  read  his  noble 
speech  without  mingled  emotions  of  pride,  indignation, 
reverence,  and  delight."  And  in  the  following  year  he  de 
scribed  Clay  as  "  the  champion  who  is  destined  to  save  the 
country  from  anarchy,  corruption,  and  ruin."  Clay  was 
then  his  candidate  for  President.  But  soon  after  this  his 
ardor  was  quenched  by  his  rapidly  increasing  frenzy  against 
slavery ;  and  he  was  finally  to  contribute  in  no  small  degree 
to  defeat  the  Presidential  aspirations  of  his  former  hero. 

At  the  close  of  the  first  session  of  the  Twenty -fourth  Con 
gress,  Clay  seriously  contemplated  retiring  from  the  Sen 
ate.  He  decided,  however,  not  to  resign,  but  to  complete 
his  term,  which  expired  March  3,  1837,  intending  to  refuse 
a  re-election.  While  the  Senate  was  Whig  there  had  been 
some  satisfaction  in  leading  the  majority.  But  all  branches 
of  the  government  were  now  strongly  Democratic.  Even 
the  political  tendencies  of  the  Supreme  Court  had  changed. 


1  "The  whole  amount  of  the  colonization  of  manumitted  slaves  in 
eighteen  years  ending  in  1835  was  eight  hundred  and  nine,  equal  to  the 
increase  of  the  slave  population  for  five  days  and  a  half  !  .  .  .  Up  to  this 
time  the  funds  raised  by  the  society  amounted  to  $220,449,  and  it  had  in 
curred  a  debt  of  $45,645."— Goodell's  Slavery  and  Antislavery,  p.  344. 


CH.VIL]     TANEY  A  SUPREME   COURT  JUSTICE  289 

Five  of  the  seven  justices  were  Jackson's  appointees.  The 
last  two  were  Barbour  and  Taney.  The  confirmation  of 
the  latter  was  bitterly  opposed  by  the  Whigs  and  filled 
them  with  deep  disgust.  To  Jackson  it  was  a  source  of 
vindictive  delight.  The  refusal  of  the  Senate  to  confirm 
the  nomination  of  Taney  for  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in 
fused  Jackson  with  a  fierce  determination  to  place  Taney 
on  the  Supreme  Court  bench,  where  his  Constitutional 
views  would  work  greater  and  more  enduring  havoc  to  the 
Whig  party  than  any  mere  political  influence  could  accom 
plish.  Upon  the  resignation  of  Justice  Duval,  in  January, 
1833,  Taney  was  nominated  to  fill  the  vacancy.  But  the 
Senate  deferred  action  until  the  last  day  of  the  session, 
when  the  subject  was  indefinitely  postponed  on  the  pretext 
that  a  new  arrangement  of  the  circuits  was  proposed.  This 
was  equivalent  to  rejection.  In  the  following  summer 
Chief-Justice  Marshall  died ;  and,  with  the  changes  in  the 
membership  of  the  Senate,  Jackson  was  able  to  compass  his 
darling  project  more  impressively  than  he  had  before  con 
ceived.1 

Strongly  intrenched  in  every  avenue  to  power,  the  Demo 
cratic  party  was  in  a  state  of  organization  and  discipline 
hitherto  unknown  in  American  politics.  It  appeared  invin 
cible  for  a  long  time  to  come.  That  Yan  Buren  was  to  suc- 


1  "Mr.  Clay  had  long  ago,  in  the  presence  of  Reverdy  Johnson,  made 
a  personal  apology  for  the  style  of  his  remarks  upon  his  [Taney's]  nom 
ination  to  the  Senate,  and  paid  the  highest  possible  tribute  to  his  great 
judicial  abilities.  And  ever  after  Mr.  Clay,  as  his  many  letters  to  the 
Chief-Justice  show,  seemed  to  strive  for  the  generous  forgiveness  of  the 
Chief -Justice,  and  by  his  courteous  and  kind  bearing.  And  the  many  in 
stances  in  which  Mr.  Webster  sought  the  counsel  of  the  Chief-Justice  on 
matters  of  state  show  his  estimate  of  his  great  capacity  and  wisdom." — 
Tyler's  Taney,  p.  317.  Because  of  Taney's  opinion  in  the  Dred  Scott  case, 
Sumner  was  very  bitter  toward  him. — Sumner's  Works,  vol.  ix.  p.  274. 
19 


290  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

ceed  Jackson  was  as  well  understood  as  any  future  political 
event  can  be.  The  design  was  undisguised,  and  all  available 
means  were  employed  to  execute  it.  Had  he  been  President 
the  court  and  consideration  he  received  could  hardly  have 
been  more  distinguished.  His  candidacy  was  generally  ac 
ceptable  to  the  party.  The  Jacksonian  mandate  was  suf 
ficient  to  remove  all  ordinary  obstacles.  But  no  adverse 
chance  was  to  be  taken  by  delay.  In  May,  1835,  nearly 
eighteen  months  before  the  election,  the  Democratic  Na 
tional  Convention  was  held  at  Baltimore.  As  this  mode 
of  nomination  had  been  but  recently  instituted,  it  was  not 
popular  with  the  masses.  Yet  this  mattered  little.  The 
convention  was  manned  by  office-holders  and  unflinching 
partisans  of  the  administration.  Yan  Buren  was  quickly 
and  unanimously  nominated.  In  the  ensuing  canvass  there 
was  no  vital  defection.  Calhoun,  of  course,  was  still  in 
lonesome  hostility.  Aside  from  this,  the  only  open  rebellion 
of  any  account  centred  in  Tennessee ;  for,  with  all  his  influ 
ence,  Jackson  was  unable  to  control  his  own  State  either  as 
to  the  nomination  or  in  the  election.  Hugh  L.  White,  a 
former  adherent  of  Jackson,  and  a  Senator  from  Tennessee, 
was  nominated  in  Tennessee,  Alabama,  and  Illinois.  Jus 
tice  McLean,  of  Ohio,  another  of  Jackson's  former  adhe 
rents,  was  also  a  candidate ;  but  he  received  no  electoral 
votes.  Clay  recognized  the  hopelessness  of  defeating  Yan 
Buren,  and  refused  to  be  a  candidate.  The  "Whigs  were 
therefore  disintegrated  and  presented  three  candidates — 
Harrison,  "Webster,  and  Mangum.  Harrison,  however,  was 
the  most  general  representative  of  the  party  in  the  contest, 
and  received  73  electoral  votes.  Webster  was  loyally  sup 
ported  by  Massachusetts,  and  received  her  14  votes.  Man- 
gum  received  South  Carolina's  11  votes.  White  received 


CH.  VII.]  VAN  BUREN  NOMINATED  FOR  PRESIDENT  291 

26  votes,  those  of  Tennessee  and  Georgia.  Yan  Buren  re 
ceived  170,  a  majority  of  46  over  the  combined  votes  of  his 
rivals.  The  Vice-Presidency  had  now  relapsed  into  its  for 
mer  inconsequence.  No  candidate  received  a  majority  of 
the  votes,  hence  the  Senate  dutifully  elected  Richard  M. 
Johnson,  who  had  been  nominated  with  Van  Buren.  He 
was  a  worthy  man,  but  without  much  political  importance. 
He  augured  no  hinderance  to  future  designs. 

Analysis  of  the  Democratic  victory  over  the  dissociated 
elements  of  the  opposition  boded  danger  to  the  party.  The 
popular  vote  of  those  elements  was  only  about  25,000  less 
than  Yan  Buren's,  which  was  nearly  100,000  less  than  Jack- 
son's  in  1832.  Yan  Buren's  chief  strength  was  in  the  North 
and  East,  then  as  now  quickly  responsive  to  the  commercial 
and  financial  interests ;  and  to  thoughtful  observers  indica 
tions  already  portended  the  approach  of  disaster.  That  the 
West  was  so  strong  for  Harrison  vividly  demonstrated  that 
the  tactics  of  the  more  active  and  practical  managers  of  the  ' 
Whig  party,  following  the  example  that  led  to  Jackson's 
elevation,  were  well  grounded.  They  listened  to  the  outcry 
of  their  Senatorial  chieftains  against  military  1-eputation  as 
a  means  of  Presidential  preferment,  but  proceeded  never 
theless  with  exclusive  view  to  success  and  patronage.  Yan 
Buren's  candidacy  was  an  efficient  illustration.  It  evoked 
no  enthusiasm.  His  personality  and  career  were  the  com 
plete  obverse  of  Jackson's.  The  popular  taste,  which  had 
been  cultivated  by  the  bold  and  belligerent  character  and 
exploits  of  "  Old  Hickory,"  still  plainly  preferred  military 
renown  and  martial  vigor  to  merely  civic  qualifications. 
Clay  was  beginning  painfully  to  perceive  it ;  and  he  was 
soon  to  be  the  victim  of  it  again. 

He  spent  the  recess  at  Ashland  studying  events,  harvesting 


292  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1836 

his  crops,  and  watching  his  fine  herds  of  live-stock.  The 
only  incident  to  mar  the  quiet  tenor  of  these  occupations 
was  to  be  attacked  by  one  of  his  bulls,  that  gored  and 
killed  the  horse  Clay  was  riding.  He  was  bruised  by  his  fall, 
but  not  otherwise  injured.  Before  the  details  of  the  elec 
tion  were  fully  known  he  was  again  at  his  post  in  the  Sen 
ate.  The  session  opened  December  5,  and  proved  a  fitting 
climax  to  Jackson's  public  career. 

Historical  criticism  that  bestows  upon  opposing  political 
elements  about  the  same  measure  of  praise  and  blame  is  not 
always  difficult  and  has  the  aspect  of  fairness,  but  it  is  apt 
to  be  superficial.  Yet  a  candid  survey  of  our  political  his 
tory  during  the  administrations  of  Jackson  and  Yan  Buren 
compels  substantially  this  conclusion.  For  the  heated  and 
ofttimes  frantic  struggles  during  this  period  over  questions 
that  should  have  had  no  connection  with,  politics,  both  par 
ties  were  guilty  in  nearly  the  same  degree.  It  is  amazing 
that  statesmen  of  experience,  understanding,  and  ability 
should,  through  zeal  for  partisan  advantage,  have  been  so 
led  to  disregard  the  fundamental  interests  of  the  country. 
The  first  requisite  of  national  prosperity  is  sound  and  un 
disturbed  finance;  yet  for  years  this  vital  matter  was  the 
football  of  politics. 

The  remote  origin  of  this  protracted  contest  undoubtedly 
lay  in  Jackson's  belligerent  temperament  and  the  swift  and 
narrow  working  of  his  mind.  Men  do  not  become  philoso 
phers  after  sixty — much  less  do  men  of  Jackson's  type.  He 
came  into  the  Presidency  with  all  his  traits  and  defects  not 
only  incorrigible,  but  accentuated  by  his  political  success 
and  the  remarkable  fealty  of  his  party.  The  character  and 
mental  attributes  of  a  human  being  were  never  more  un 
mistakably  revealed  by  physical  appearance  than  by  Jack- 


CH.VIL]     SOME   CHARACTERISTICS   OF  JACKSON        293 

son's.  His  figure  was  tall,  spare,  erect,  and  commanding. 
His  features  were  worn  and  seamed,  but  fixed  and  strong. 
His  steady,  deep-set  eyes,  shadowed  by  shaggy  brows,  had 
a  piercing  gleam.  His  lips,  when  not  suavely  relaxed,  had 
a  rigidly  firm  and  defiant  expression.  His  hair  was  white, 
dense,  and  bristling,  and  an  appropriate  crown  to  a  bearing 
and  individuality  that  no  stranger  could  meet  without  start 
ling  recognition.  As  with  all  such  characters,  he  was  some 
what  superstitious  :  if  he  could  avoid  it  he  would  not  begin 
anything  on  Friday ;  and  probably  he  was  more  or  less  a 
believer  in  his  destiny.  Any  opposition  to  his  plans  and 
purposes  he  took  as  a  personal  affront ;  for  he  always  as 
cribed  the  basest  motives  to  his  opponents.  From  this  habit 
of  mind,  coupled  with  his  tremendous  resolution  to  accom 
plish  whatever  he  desired  to  do,  proceeded  his  implacable 
hatred  of  his  political  adversaries.  He  no  doubt  sincerely 
believed  that  Adams's  election  over  him  in  1824  was  a  das 
tardly  political  crime.  Thenceforth  he  saw  nothing  good 
in  anything  proposed  or  done  by  any  party  to  that  trans 
action.  He  already  hated  Clay  for  his  speeches  on  the 
Seminole  war;  and  this  feeling  quickly  embraced  all  who 
followed  Clay's  lead.  Thus  Jackson's  temper  and  com- 
bativeness  compressed  the  free  elements  that  soon  formed 
the  Whig  party,  whose  leaders  fully  reciprocated  Jackson's 
hostility.  The  inevitable  result  was  that  partisanship  too 
often  excluded  statesmanship.  Had  the  bank  kept  scru 
pulously  within  its  proper  sphere,  Jackson  probably  would 
not  have  seriously  attempted  its  overthrow ;  certainly  he 
could  not  have  succeeded.  In  his  annual  messages  a  few 
abstract  paragraphs  against  the  institution  would  have 
satisfied  his  conscience  and  proved  harmless.  But  when 
his  enemies  spurned  all  compromise  and  made  the  existing 


294  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

policy  of  the  bank  a  political  issue,  and  transformed  the 
bank's  enormous  powers  into  political  functions,  war  with 
out  quarter  began,  regardless  of  consequences.  When  Jack 
son  conceived,  on  good  grounds,  that  the  public  funds  were 
loaned  through  political  considerations  in  the  interest  of 
the  Whig  party,  the  most  powerful  instinct  of  his  nature 
was  aroused.  He  could  not  have  been  moved  by  a  deep 
regard  for  the  public  interests  or  for  the  safety  and  proper 
use  of  the  deposits,  for  in  distributing  the  revenues  among 
the  "  pet  banks  "  he  gave  opportunity  for  the  same  charge 
against  the  administration  that  he  had  urged  against  the 
bank,  although  the  danger  of  some  improprieties  in  the  de 
posit  and  use  of  the  funds  was  removed  by  the  bill  passed 
soon  afterward.  Like  all  the  other  proceedings  concerning 
the  bank,  his  course  was  chiefly  induced  by  political  strategy. 
But  the  principal  evil  resulting  from  it  was  not  favoritism 
to  borrowers— though  it  was  shown  to  the  deposit  banks — 
but  the  stimulus  it  gave  to  abnormal  inflation  of  values,  and 
hence  to  speculation.  And  this  unhealthy  condition  was 
furthered  and  intensified  by  the  vicious  and  demagogical 
scheme  of  depositing  the  surplus  revenues  with  the  States — 
a  scheme  upon  which  both  parties  had  united  a  few  months 
before  the  election.  Jackson  signed  the  bill  for  the  same 
reason  that  most  of  the  Senators  and  Eepresentatives  voted 
for  it — the  fear  of  popular  disfavor.  It  is  not  probable  that 
he  would  have  sanctioned  it  without  Yan  Buren's  assent, 
as  he  was  the  one  to  be  most  directly  affected  politically. 
But  so  rapidly  had  the  disastrous  consequences  of  political 
finance  begun  to  threaten  that  Yan  Buren,  before  the  elec 
tion,  expressed  emphatic  disapproval  of  the  scheme;  and 
by  the  time  Congress  reconvened,  Jackson  had  repented 
his  approval  of  it.  He  now  fully  perceived  its  dangerous 


CH.  VIL]  EVILS  ARISING  FROM  SURPLUS  REVENUE     295 

tendencies,  and  elaborately  stated  in  his  message  the  rea 
sons  against  it. 

Notwithstanding  the  manifest  lessons  and  logic  of  the 
situation,  distribution  continued  to  be  invincibly  popular, 
and  many  prominent  members  of  both  houses  of  Congress 
were  eager  to  press  the  policy  beyond  the  scope  of  the  de 
posit  bill.  Many  other  schemes  were  presented ;  the  fungi 
of  political  and  sectional  rapacity  multiplied  and  differen 
tiated  on  this  muck -heap  of  public  plunder.  Perhaps  the 
worst  feature  of  the  whole  matter  was  the  lamentable  con 
dition  into  which  the  popular  mind  had  fallen  in  the  pres 
ence  of  this  temptation.  It  was  strikingly  evinced  by  a 
wanton  disregard  of  the  express  letter  of  the  deposit  bill, 
which  explicitly  provided  that  the  funds  were  to  be  merehr 
deposited  with  the  States,  loaned^  and  therefore  subject  to 
recall.  This  was  bad  enough,  yet  very  few  regarded  the 
process  as  anything  but  an  absolute  distribution,  gift. 
During  the  debates  on  the  bill  this  purpose  wras  openly 
proclaimed.  The  people  generally  so  regarded  it ;  and  so 
it  ultimately  proved  to  be.1  Aside  from  the  popularity  of 
the  measure,  the  Whigs,  to  a  large  extent,  favored  it  be 
cause  it  would  materially  reduce  the  federal  funds  in  the 
deposit  banks  and  thus  deprive  the  administration  of  so 
much  political  leverage.  From  any  point  of  view,  it  was  a 


1  In  a  speech  in  January,  1841,  Clay  said  :  "The  Senator  from  New  York 
[Wright]  has  adverted  to  the  twenty-eight  millions  of  surplus  divided  a 
few  years  ago  among  the  States.  He  has  said,  truly,  that  it  arose  from  the 
public  lands.  Was  not  that,  in  effect,  distribution  ?  Was  it  not  so  under 
stood  at  the  time  ?  Was  it  not  voted  for  by  Senators  as  practical  distribu 
tion  ?  The  Senator  from  North  Carolina  [Mangum]  has  stated  that  he  did. 
I  did.  Other  Senators  did ;  and  no  one,  not  the  boldest,  will  have  the 
temerity  to  rise  here  and  propose  to  require  or  compel  the  States  to  refund 
that  money.  If,  in  form,  it  was  a  deposit  with  the  States,  in  fact  and  in 
truth  it  was  distribution.  So  it  was  regarded.  So  it  will  ever  remain." 


296  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

flagrant  makeshift  to  remedy  an  unwholesome  condition 
produced  by  equally  pernicious  causes. 

Early  in  the  session,  Clay,  undaunted  by  the  previous  fail 
ures  of  his  land-money  distribution  bill,  introduced  it  again ; 
but  it  went  no  further,  as  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands, 
to  which  it  was  referred,  reported  a  substitute  providing 
that  the  lands  should  be  only  sold  to  actual  settlers  and  in 
limited  quantities.  Two  days  after  Clay  had  introduced  his 
familiar  bill,  Calhoun  presented  one  providing  that  the  de 
posit  law  be  extended  to  any  surplus  above  §5,000,000  that 
might  exist  after  January  1, 1838.  In  the  South,  distribution 
was  considered  rather  as  a  partial  recompense  for  the  bur 
den  of  an  inequitable  tariff  than  a  matter  of  financial  policy. 
Calhoun  did  not  say  this,  but  no  doubt  it  was  his  opinion. 
He  expressed  the  belief  that  inasmuch  as  the  surplus  was 
unavoidable  it  should  not  be  left  in  the  Treasury,  and  that 
it  was  more  safe  and  equitable  that  the  States  should  have 
the  use  of  it  in  preference  to  the  banks.  "  This,  in  fact," 
said  he,  "is  the  great  and  leading  principle  which  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  the  act  of  the  last  session — an  act  that 
will  forever  distinguish  the  Twenty  -  fourth  Congress  —  an 
act  which  will  go  down  writh  honor  to  posterity,  as  it  has 
obtained  the  almost  unanimous  approbation  of  the  present 
day.  The  passage  has  inspired  the  country  with  new  hopes. 
It  has  been  beheld  abroad  as  a  matter  of  wonder,  a  phenom 
enon  in  the  fiscal  world,  such  as  could  have  sprung  out  of  no 
institutions  but  ours,  and  which  goes  in  a  powerful  and  im 
pressive  manner  to  illustrate  the  genius  of  our  government." 
It  is  hard  to  believe  that  this  was  Calhoun's  candid  judg 
ment.  It  is  more  likely  that  he  intended  it  for  political  ef 
fect.  The  bill  was  rejected.  He  then  proposed  the  cession  of 
all  the  public  lands  to  the  several  States  in  which  they  were 


CH.  VII.]   PROJECTS  TO  DISPOSE  OF  THE  SURPLUS     297 

situate,  to  be  sold  by  those  States,  one-third  of  the  proceeds 
to  be  paid  into  the  federal  Treasury.  This  was  vigorous 
ly  opposed,  and  it  failed.  It  was  stigmatized,  to  Calhoun's 
irritation,  as  a  direct  bid  for  popular  favor  in  the  West. 

Meanwhile  the  House  was  not  barren  of  projects  to  dis 
pose  of  the  surplus.  One  member  made  bold  to  attempt 
the  embodiment  in  law  of  the  prevailing  desire  to  declare 
the  proposed  deposits  irreclaimable.  He  moved  to  instruct 
the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  to  report  a  bill  to  that 
effect.  The  motion  found  strong  support,  but  was  defeat 
ed.  Another  member  proposed  the  direct  cession  to  the  old 
States  of  lands  equal  in  quantity  to  those  which  had  been 
granted  to  the  new  States.  This  proposition  was  summarily 
laid  on  the  table.  Still  another  member  moved  Calhoun's 
first  proposal,  to  extend  the  deposit  bill.  This  was  finally 
attached  to  the  fortifications  bill  and  passed.  The  Senate 
disagreed,  but  the  House  adhered  ;  thus  the  bill  failed,  and 
its  first  object,  appropriations  for  the  defences  of  the  coun 
try,  was  incontinently  balked.  Such  were  the  efforts,  not 
to  mention  the  various  amendments  proposing  minor  and 
less  inclusive  schemes  offered  in  both  houses,  by  which  un 
seemly  greed  and  reckless  political  ambition  sought  to  de 
bauch  the  country.  But  here  the  problem  remained  until 
general  bankruptcy  solved  it. 

After  the  rally  from  the  panic  of  1833  the  fairly  sound 
condition  of  the  currency  was  due  to  the  force  of  circum 
stances  rather  than  to  the  system.  The  status  of  the  bank 
compelled  it  to  extreme  prudence,  while  the  local  banks,  in 
order  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment  before  they  could  obtain  deposits  of  the  public  money, 
had  made  themselves  reasonably  secure.  The  increase  of 
population,  the  development  of  the  country,  the  progress 


298  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

of  invention,  and  the  expansion  of  enterprise  which  the 
period  exhibited,  indicated  phenomenal  prosperity  and 
promised  still  greater.  Thousands  of  miles  of  new  rail 
roads  and  canals,  hundreds  of  new  steamboats,  and  the 
propulsive  activities  of  commerce  and  business,  inspired  the 
people  with  industrial  valor  and  energy  seldom  witnessed. 
Prices  of  all  products  rose  steadily,  and  for  a  time 
healthily.  Cotton  and  timber  lands  advanced  in  value 
wondrously  and  were  briskly  followed  by  agricultural  and 
urban  property.1  The  final  extinguishment  of  the  national 
debt,  a  marvel  in  European  eyes,  enormously  enhanced 
American  credit  abroad,  and  a  vast  amount  of  foreign  cap 
ital  was  immediately  invested  here.  A  large  part  of  the 
bonded  debts  of  the  States  was  thus  absorbed;  and  with 
such  facility  could  money  be  borrowed  in  this  way  that 
many  States  were  rashly  precipitated  into  further  debt  for 
extravagant  projects  of  public  improvements.  Private  en 
terprise  received  similar  impetus  and  aid,  and  with  the  same 
results. 

To  a  certain  degree  much  of  this  was  sound ;  but  it  soon 
produced  what  extreme  national  prosperity  always  develops 


1  "  Under  this  process  prices  rose  like  smoke.  Lots  in  obscure  villages 
were  held  at  city  prices  ;  land  bought  at  the  minimum  cost  of  government 
•was  sold  at  from  thirty  to  forty  dollars  per  acre,  and  considered  dirt  cheap 
at  that.  .  .  .  Money,  got  without  work,  by  those  unaccustomed  to  it, 
turned  the  heads  of  its  possessors  and  they  spent  it  with  a  recklessness  like 
that  with  which  they  gained  it.  The  pursuits  of  industry  were  neglected, 
riot  and  coarse  debauchery  filled  up  the  vacant  hours.  .  .  .  The  old  rules 
of  business  and  the  calculations  of  prudence  were  alike  disregarded,  and 
profligacy,  in  all  departments  of  the  crimen  falsi,  held  riotous  carnival. 
Larceny  grew  not  only  respectable,  but  genteel,  and  ruffled  it  in  all  the 
pomp  of  purple  and  fine  linen.  Swindling  was  raised  to  the  dignity  of  the 
fine  arts.  Felony  came  forth  from  its  covert,  put  on  more  seemly  habili 
ments,  and  took  its  seat  with  unabashed  front  in  the  upper  places  of  the 
synagogue." — Baldwin's  Flush  Times  of  Alabama  and  Mississippi,  p.  83. 


CH.VIL]        RECKLESS   CREATION  OF  BANKS  299 

— undue  distension  of  values  and  the  spirit  of  speculation. 
To  accommodate  the  fictitious  thrift  that  now  set  in,  and 
without  regard  to  real  financial  necessity  or  prosperity,  new 
banks  were  organized  on  every  side.  Thus  bank  capital, 
circulation,  and  loans  inordinately  increased  without  a  cor 
responding  basis  of  specie.  And  for  the  lavish  accommo 
dation  to  borrowers  the  administration  was  partly  respon 
sible,  for  it  expressly  recommended  to  the  deposit  banks 
liberality  in  the  use  of  the  public  money.  The  moneyed  in 
terest  of  the  country  seemed  beset  with  financial  dementia : 
banks  were  thought  the  magical  means  of  creating  wealth 
out  of  paper.  It  was  this  situation  that  rendered  the  scat 
tering  of  the  public  funds  among  this  rank  growth  of  banks 
so  harmful.  Its  encouragement  to  speculation,  especially  in 
the  public  lands,  was  prodigious.  In  the  first  instance,  the 
lands  were  bought  at  the  insignificant  figure  fixed  by  law. 
They  were  then  sold  and  resold,  and  the  multiplied  pro 
ceeds  invested  in  fresh  purchases  from  the  government. 
By  these  means  the  best  and  most  attractive  lands  were 
being  speedily  disposed  of.  To  dispassionate  observers  the 
results  of  this  process  had  reached  alarming  proportions. 
Benton,  with  his  usual  acumen  in  such  matters,  perceived 
the  situation  and  introduced  a  bill  to  prohibit  the  accept 
ance  by  the  government  of  anything  but  specie  in  payment 
for  the  public  lands  ;  but  the  bill  did  not  pass.  Both  parties 
were  stubbornly  against  it.  Many  members  of  Congress 
were  either  deeply  concerned  in  these  speculations  or  had 
numerous  constituents  who  were.  Even  the  cabinet  vigor 
ously  disapproved  of  any  interference.  But  despite  this  un 
toward  opposition,  Benton  convinced  the  President  of  the 
virtue  of  the  measure,  although  he  had  recently  declared  in 
a  message  that  the  great  increase  in  the  revenue  from  the 


300  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

land  sales  was  a  gratifying  mark  of  national  prosperity  and 
development  of  agriculture.  And  it  should  be  remarked  of 
Jackson  that  he  was  always  ready  to  change  his  impulsive 
opinions — if  his  prejudices  were  not  involved — when  con 
vinced  that  they  were  Avrong.  A  conspicuous  instance  of 
this  was  his  change  of  attitude  toward  distribution  ;  for  in 
two  of  his  early  messages  he  had  announced  his  disapproval 
of  that  course.  The  incontestable  fact  was  that  the  accu 
mulating  surplus  came  largely  from  the  public  lands,  and 
it  was  apparent  that  unless  Benton's  plan  was  soon  enforced 
the  surplus  would  be  in  danger  of  being  composed  of  irre 
deemable  paper.  Knowing  that  Congress  would  not  in 
terfere,  the  President  accepted  Benton's  urgent  advice  and 
resolved  to  adopt  an  heroic  measure.  He  waited  until  Con 
gress  adjourned ;  then,  forthwith,  over  the  remonstrance  of 
a  majority  of  the  cabinet,  carried  out  his  purpose.  At  the 
President's  request,  Benton  drafted  an  order  requiring  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  instruct  the  land  officers  to 
receive  after  August  15  only  gold,  silver,  and  land -scrip, 
for  the  public  lands,  except  from  actual  settlers  or  lona-fide 
residents  in  the  State  where  the  sales  were  made.  Until 
December  15  each  of  this  latter  class  of  purchasers  was  per 
mitted  to  buy  any  quantity  of  land  not  exceeding  three  hun 
dred  and  twenty  acres,  and  pay  in  the  usual  way.  These 
conditions  were  authorized  by  law.  The  order  wras  at  once 
obeyed  by  the  issue  of  the  "  specie  circular."  It  arrested 
many  millions  of  dollars  in  process  of  transmutation  into 
real  estate. 

The  commotion  this  fiat  produced  was  wide-spread  and 
violent.  Unlike  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  it  had  no 
partisan  aspect  and  evoked  no  merely  political  demonstra 
tions.  Every  individual,  every  interest,  and  every  bank  con- 


CH.  VII.]      EFFECT   OF  THE   SPECIE   CIRCULAR  301 

cerned  directly  or  indirectly  in  land  speculations  felt  the 
blow.  Not  only  were  the  immediate  operators  checked  and 
their  hopes  of  affluence  rudely  blighted,  but  they  suddenly 
found  themselves  in  unexpected  jeopardy  of  being  land  poor 
or  paper  poor;  for  the  indirect  consequences  of  the  order 
were  far-reaching  and  powerful.  It  was  a  vexatious  incon 
venience  to  transport  specie  from  the  East,  whence  it  had 
to  come ;  and  its  withdrawal  made  it  scarce  and  costly. 
The  money  centres  had  begun  to  discern  the  phantasy  of 
the  paper  system.  Besides  this,  the  time  for  making  the 
order  was  most  inopportune  for  speculation.  The  banks 
were  providing  for  the  first  instalment  of  the  distribution 
among  the  States.  Foreign  resources  were  also  curtailed 
by  fundamental  causes  similar  to  those  existing  here.  Thus 
every  financial  influence  was  conspiring  to  embarrass  the 
money-market;  and  the  myriad  of  borrowers  were  driven 
to  pay  exorbitant  rates  to  protect  their  inflated  investments. 
When  the  specie  circular  was  issued,  unforeseen  and  un- 
imagined,  the  shock  at  first  was  paralyzing.  There  broke 
forth  a  wail  of  consternation,  quickly  followed  by  explosions 
of  boisterous  wrath.  Many  of  Jackson's  devoted  followers 
turned  upon  him  and  reviled  him.  For  those  who  had  pre 
viously  opposed  him  no  epithets  or  denunciations  were  ade 
quate  in  which  to  vent  their  feelings.  All  the  time-worn 
terms  that  had  been  applied  to  Jackson's  acts — absolutism, 
tyranny,  usurpation,  ignorance,  perversity,  and  the  like — 
were  far  too  feeble.  The  terrible  chorus  of  invective  and 
reprobation  that  arose  has  never  been  equalled  in  our  his 
tory.  But  the  grim  old  man,  hardened  to  clamor  and  ob 
loquy,  was  unmoved.  Though  the  appalling  condition  that 
menaced  was  in  part  his  own  creation,  whether  or  not  he 
recognized  the  fact,  he  did  not  falter  in  the  course  he  had 


302  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1836 

taken.  He  was  ready  to  strike  again  if  necessary.  And  it 
became  necessary. 

The  meeting  of  Congress  was  anxiously  awaited  in  the 
hope  that  the  President's  arbitrary  edict,  issued  in  recess,  and 
in  defiance  of  the  well-known  opinion  of  both  the  Senate 
and  the  House,  would  be  abrogated.  Shortly  after  Congress 
reconvened,  the  parliamentary  process  was  started.  Senator 
Ewing,  of  Ohio,  a  conspicuous  figure  in  his  day,  impressive 
ly  set  it  in  motion  by  introducing  joint  resolutions,  which 
afterward  took  the  form  of  a  bill,  to  rescind  the  specie 
circular  and  restore  the  former  practice.  A  long  and  in 
termittent  debate  ensued.  The  Whigs  led  the  onset  with 
their  accustomed  vigor.  They  charged  the  President  with 
every  dishonorable  motive,  from  a  desire  to  aid  the  deposit 
banks  to  a  wilful  disregard  of  positive  law,  while  Demo 
crats  mildly  argued  against  the  policy.  Benton,  almost 
single-handed,  bore  the  brunt.  His  responsibility  for  the 
measure  was  understood,  and  the  battle  in  the  Senate  be 
came  virtually  his  personal  affair.  At  one  time  the  dis 
cussion  became  so  heated  that  he  again  nearly  involved 
himself  in  a  duel.  But  the  most  important  result,  as  it 
proved,  of  his  untiring  labor,  was  to  protract  the  debate 
until  toward  the  close  of  the  session.  The  main  cause  of 
this  was  that  the  debate  was  soon  diversified  by  other  re 
lated  topics,  particularly  the  currency,  which  for  years  had 
been  Benton's  almost  incessant  theme.  It  underlay  all  his 
various  struggles  against  the  bank.  This  primal  thought 
in  all  his  financial  discussion  is  shown  by  a  passage,  which 
strikingly  exhibits  his  characteristic  combination  of  sense 
and  pomposity,  in  one  of  his  speeches  on  the  bill  to  rescind 
the  circular : 

"  The  present  bloat,"  said  he,  "  in  the  paper  system  can- 


CH.  VII.]     BENTON  ON  HIS   FINANCIAL  POLICY          303 

not  continue ;  the  present  depreciation  of  money,  exempli 
fied  in  the  high  price  of  everything  dependent  upon  the 
home  market,  cannot  last.  The  revulsion  will  come,  as 
surely  as  it  did  in  1819-20.  But  it  will  come  with  less 
force  if  the  Treasury  order  is  maintained  and  if  paper 
money  shall  be  excluded  from  the  federal  Treasury.  But 
let  these  things  go  as  they  may,  and  let  reckless  or  mis 
guided  banks  do  what  they  please,  there  is  still  a  refuge 
for  the  wise  and  the  good;  there  is  still  an  ark  of  safety 
for  every  honest  bank,  and  for  every  prudent  man :  it  is  the 
mass  of  gold  and  silver  now  in  the  country — the  seventy- 
odd  millions  which  the  wisdom  of  President  Jackson's  ad 
ministration  has  accumulated — and  by  getting  their  share  of 
which  all  who  are  so  disposed  can  take  care  of  themselves. 
Sir,  I  have  performed  a  duty  to  myself,  not  pleasant,  but 
necessary.  This  bill  is  to  be  an  era  in  our  legislation  and 
in  our  political  history.  It  is  to  be  a  point  upon  which 
future  ages  will  be  thrown  back  and  from  which  future 
consequences  will  be  traced.  I  separate  myself  from  it;  I 
wash  my  hands  of  it ;  I  oppose  it.  I  am  one  of  those  who 
promised  gold,  not  paper.  I  promised  the  currency  of  the 
Constitution,  not  the  currency  of  corporations.  I  did  not 
join  in  putting  down  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  to 
put  up  a  wilderness  of  local  banks.  I  did  not  join  in  putting 
down  the  paper  currency  of  a  national  bank  to  put  up  a 
national  paper  currency  of  a  thousand  local  banks.  I  did 
not  strike  Caesar  to  make  Antony  master  of  Rome." 

Calhoun's  course  was  peculiar.  He  said  that  he  put  no 
faith  in  the  measure  to  arrest  the  downward  course  of  the 
country;  that  he  believed  the  state  of  the  currency  was 
almost  incurably  bad,  so  that  it  was  doubtful  whether  the 
highest  skill  and  wisdom  could  restore  it  to  soundness,  and 


304  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1836 

that  it  was  destined  at  no  distant  time  to  undergo  an  entire 
revolution ;  that  he  considered  an  explosion  inevitable,  and 
so  much  the  greater  the  longer  it  was  delayed.  Yet  he 
declined  to  vote  because  he  was  not  prepared  to  state  his 
reasons  at  large  for  the  vote  that  he  might  cast.  Webster 
strove  to  give  the  bill  the  sanction  of  his  ponderous  legal 
authority;  and  Clay  supported  it  in  his  usual  style  in  a 
speech  similar  to  one  he  had  made  to  his  constituents  be 
fore  the  session  opened.  It  was  finally  passed  by  the  Sen 
ate,  41  to  5.  The  thoroughness  of  the  debate  there,  how 
ever,  deprived  the  House  of  an  opportunity  to  invest  the 
subject  with  any  novelty ;  but  there  were  sufficient  discus 
sion  and  delay  to  prevent  the  bill,  which  was  passed  by 
the  House,  143  to  59,  from  reaching  the  President  until  the 
day  before  the  dissolution  of  Congress  and  his  own  retire 
ment.  He  neither  signed  nor  vetoed  it.  In  political  par 
lance,  he  "pocketed  it."  He  treated  it  as  he  had  Clay's 
land  bill.  He  announced  his  determination  in  a  short  mes 
sage,  but  placed  it  on  the  ground  that  the  provisions  of  the 
bill  were  too  complex  and  of  doubtful  meaning.  Perhaps 
he  thought  it  unnecessary  to  state  his  paramount  reasons — 
unalterable  resolution  to  maintain  the  circular,  and  the  as 
surance  that  Congress  would  override  a  veto.  It  was  al 
most  the  last  of  his  official  acts  and  one  of  the  most  vividly 
characteristic  of  the  man  and  his  Presidential  independence. 
His  subsequent  critics,  following  the  outcry  raised  at  the 
time,  have  regarded  his  action  in  retaining  the  bill  as  a  vio 
lation  of  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  charged  that 
he  despotically  thwarted  the  legislative  power,  preventing 
by  his  own  individual  caprice  and  obstinacy  the  enactment 
of  any  law  whatever  on  the  subject.  That  vague  essence 
denominated  the  "  spirit  of  the  Constitution "  has  alwa}Ts 


CH.  VII.]    THE  SPECIE  CIRCULAR  CONSTITUTIONAL    305 

been  the  refuge  of  theorists  as  well  as  of  those  who  have 
sought  to  distend  the  letter  of  that  instrument  for  political 
purposes.  It  has  thus  been  made  to  mean  anything  or 
nothing,  according  to  the  necessity  of  the  occasion.  The 
Constitution  is  the  organic  law ;  and,  being  such,  the  only 
safety  in  construing  it  lies  in  the  logic  of  civilized  jurispru 
dence.  Where  its  terms  are  clear  and  express  they  are  to 
be  taken  in  their  common  and  obvious  meaning ;  and  what 
they  explicitly  permit  is  Constitutional  and  valid  whatever 
the  consequences  may  be.  The  President  is  a  factor  in  the 
legislative  power.  That  he  has  the  Constitutional  right  to 
retain  a  bill  without  approval  or  veto  when  it  is  not  present 
ed  to  him  until  within  ten  days  of  the  adjournment  of 
Congress  is  as  certain  as  language  can  make  it.  Jackson's 
procedure,  therefore,  cannot  be  justly  challenged  on  any 
Constitutional  ground.  That  he  had  the  legal  right  and 
power  to  make  the  specie  order  is  likewise  open  to  no 
rational  doubt.  Neither  Webster  nor  Clay,  nor  any  other 
competent  lawyer  in  sympathy  with  their  attitude  toward 
the  circular,  could  he  have  divested  himself  of  his  personal 
and  political  prejudices,  would  have  argued  before  a  judicial 
tribunal  that  it  was  not  legally  justified.  That  power  was 
granted  by  a  joint  resolution  adopted  by  Congress  and  ap 
proved  by  the  President  in  1816,  which  therefore  had  all 
the  force  of  a  formal  statute.  Simply  stated,  the  question 
was,  Does  the  word  "  or,"  as  used  in  the  resolution,  mean 
"  and  "  ?  The  resolution  directed  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury  to  adopt  such  means  as  he  deemed  necessary  to  cause 
"  all  duties,  taxes,  debts,  or  sums  of  money  accruing  or  be 
coming  payable  to  the  United  States  to  be  collected  and 
paid  in  the  legal  currency  of  the  United  States,  or  Treasury 
notes,  or  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  as  by  law 

20 


306  THE  JACKSONIAN    EPOCH  [1836 

provided  and  declared,  or  in  notes  of  banks  which  are  pay 
able  and  paid  on  demand  in  said  legal  currency  of  the 
United  States."  It  then  needlessly  added  that  "  no  such 
duties,  taxes,  debts,  or  sums  of  money  .  .  .  ought  to  be 
collected  or  received  otherwise  than  in  the  legal  currency 
of  the  United  States,  or  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  or  Treasury  notes,  or  notes  of  banks  which  are  pay 
able  and  paid  on  demand  in  said  legal  currency  of  the 
United  States."  Beyond  doubt  the  resolution  granted  the 
power  of  selectiQn,  and  hepce  of  exclusion.  Nor  was  the 
practical  construction  of  precedent  wanting.  The  power  of 
prohibiting  the  acceptance  of  specified  classes  of  paper  had 
been  repeatedly  exercised  and  without  question.  Craw 
ford,  while  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  under  Monroe,  had 
exercised  it  several  times  ;  and  Rush,  under  John  Quincy 
Adams,  had  exercised  it  twice.  Legally  considered,  there 
fore,  the  specie  circular  was  jvalid.  The  question  whether 
or  not  it  was  financially  right  is  of  course  debatable ;  yet 
it  scarcely  admits  of  just  criticism.  It  did  not  accomplish 
the  good  it  might  had  it  been  issued  sooner ;  but  had  it 
been,  it  would  certainly  have  been  overruled  by  Congress. 
/  As  it  was,  it  had  comparatively  slight  effect,  for  the  over 
shadowing  crisis  was  close  at  hand.  But  it  performed  some 
service — to  the  prudent  it  was  a  warning,  to  the  imprudent 
a  restraint,  and  it  stayed  further  waste  of  the  public  domain. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Recognition  of  Texas  —  The  Mexican  Claims  —  International  Copy 
right—Slavery — Benton's  Resolution  to  Expunge  the  Senate's  Censure 
of  Jackson  for  the  Removal  of  the  Deposits — The  Final  Preparations — 
The  Debate — Clay's  Speech,  Buchanan's  Speech,  and  Webster's  Pro 
test — The  Resolution  Adopted  and  Executed— Jackson's  Gratification — 
Analysis  of  his  Presidency — Clay  Decides  to  Remain  in  the  Senate 

BEYOND  the  usual  routine  laws,  the  session  was  not  pro 
lific  of  legislation.  The  three  months  of  its  duration  were 
mostly  consumed  in  debate.  Like  the  distribution  schemes 
and  the  bill  to  rescind  the  specie  circular,  an  effort  to  reduce 
the  tariff  failed.  Late  in  February,  after  stout  opposition, 
the  Senate  passed  a  bill  for  that  purpose  ;  but  it  made  little 
progress  in  the  House,  where  a  similar  bill  had  already  been 
under  discussion  without  avail.  Clay  indignantly  combated 
the  plan,  which  he  imputed  to  the  administration,  as  an  ex 
hibition  of  bad  faith  toward  the  Compromise  of  1833.  He 
spoke  with  much  feeling  and  narrated  at  some  length  his 
part  in  that  measure,  which  for  years  was  the  source  of  ex 
planation,  accusation,  and  retort. 

The  disposition  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Texas 
was  more  successful.  In  a  special  message  the  President 
reported  such  information  as  he  had  acquired  touching  the 
status  of  Texas,  but  he  was  not  satisfied  that  it  yet  war 
ranted  the  government  in  recognizing  it  as  an  independent 
state.  He  advised  delay,  but  expressed  his  willingness  to 
co-operate  with  the  judgment  of  Congress.  By  this  time 


308  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

the  popular  desire  was  not  to  be  overcome.  March  1,  the 
Senate  adopted  a  resolution,  23  to  19,  that  Texas  be  recog 
nized  as  an  independent  state.  Clay  was  not  present  when 
the  vote  was  taken,  and  probably  he  was  not  in  favor  of 
the  resolution  ;  but  the  next  day  he  voted  against  a  motion 
to  reconsider,  which  was  barely  lost  by  an  equal  division. 
While  the  House  was  not  disposed  to  adopt  a  formal  reso 
lution  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Texas,  it  inserted 
in  the  appropriation  bill  a  provision  for  the  expense  of  a 
diplomatic  agent  to  the  "republic  of  Texas"  —  whenever 
the  President  received  satisfactory  evidence  that  it  was  an 
independent  power  and  he  should  deem  it  expedient  to  send 
a  minister.  As  originally  introduced,  the  provision  was  un 
equivocal  and  called  for  immediate  action ;  the  appropria 
tion  was  for  "  the  salary  and  outfit  of  a  diplomatic  agent 
to  be  sent  to  the  independent  government  of  Texas."  But 
as  modified  it  was  regarded,  as  it  was  intended  to  be,  as 
equivalent  to  an  express  declaration  that  independence  be 
recognized.  It  answered  the  purpose. 

Closely  connected  with  this  subject  was  a  series  of  diffi 
culties  with  Mexico,  which  had  for  some  years  been  grow 
ing  more  aggravated,  arising  on  one  side  from  the  claims 
of  our  citizens  for  injuries  inflicted  by  the  Mexicans,  and  on 
the  other  from  the  overbearing  and  hostile  action  of  our 
government  and  of  our  troops  along  the  frontier.  The  im 
pulsive  Mexican  Minister  at  length  involved  himself  in  a 
violent  quarrel  with  the  administration,  demanded  his  pass 
ports,  and  wrathfully  left  the  country.  Our  claims  were  so 
strongly  maintained  by  the  government  that  they  rapidly 
multiplied  in  number.  Many  of  them  were  spurious  or 
grossly  exaggerated,  and  the  friction  between  the  two  gov 
ernments  increased,  Mexico  being  naturally  angered  at  the 


CH.VHI.]     TEXAS  AN  INDEPENDENT  STATE  309 

feeling  prevalent  in  this  country  in  favor  of  Texas.  And 
the  conclusion  is  irresistible  that  the  course  of  the  admin 
istration  was  chiefly  guided  by  the  purpose  of  embroiling 
Mexico  in  the  interest  of  the  ultimate  annexation  of  Texas. 
After  unsuccessfully  pressing  the  claims  for  a  time  with  in 
continent  zeal,  our  charge  d'affaires  left  Mexico  with  a 
swaggering  show  of  indignation.  The  administration  was 
strongly  inclined  to  forcible  measures.  In  a  special  mes 
sage,  February  7,  the  President  said :  "  The  length  of  time 
since  some  of  the  injuries  have  been  committed,  the  re 
peated  and  unavailing  applications  for  redress,  the  wanton 
character  of  some  of  the  outrages  upon  the  property  and 
persons  of  our  citizens,  upon  the  officers  and  flag  of  the 
United  States,  independent  of  recent  insults  to  this  gov 
ernment  and  people  by  the  late  extraordinary  Mexican 
Minister,  \vould  justify  in  the  eyes  of  all  nations  immediate 
war."  But  to  evince  "  wisdom  and  moderation,"  he  recorrf- 
mended  the  passage  of  an  act  authorizing  reprisals  if 
Mexico  should  not  "come  to  an  amicable  adjustment  of 
the  matters  in  controversy  between  us  upon  another  de 
mand  thereof  from  on  board  one  of  our  vessels  of  war  on 
the  coast  of  Mexico."  The  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  of  which  Buchanan  was  now  chairman,  made 
a  report  sustaining  for  the  most  part  the  views  of  the 
President,  but  presented  a  resolution  that  fell  just  short  of 
approving  the  radical  means  he  had  proposed.  It  declared 
in  careful  and  temperate  phrase  that  the  Senate  concurred 
with  the  President  that  another  demand  for  redress  should 
be  made,  in  the  usual  mode,  and  if  the  effort  proved  unsuc 
cessful  "  a  state  of  things  will  then  have  occurred  which  will 
make  it  the  imperative  duty  of  Congress  promptly  to  con 
sider  what  measures  may  be  required  by  the  honor  of  the 


310  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

nation  and  the  rights  of  our  injured  fellow-citizens."  It  was 
unanimously  adopted.  In  the  House,  resolutions  of  somewhat 
similar  import,  but  more  vigorous,  were  also  adopted.  In 
the  face  of  this  demonstration  it  was  supposed  that  the 
weakness  of  Mexico  would  compel  acquiescence.  It  should 
be  observed  that  the  Senate  has,  until  of  late  years,  usually 
shown  more  commendable  caution  in  international  complica 
tions  than  the  Executive  Department  has  been  wont  to  prac 
tise.  The  House,  on  the  contrary,  has  generally  inclined, 
regardless  of  party,  to  countenance  the  President  in  such 
flourishes,  because  of  its  closer  relations  with  the  people. 
This  has  demonstrated  the  wisdom  of  excluding  it  from  the 
treaty-making  function. 

Clay  spoke  in  support  of  the  Senate  resolution,  but  took 
occasion  nevertheless  to  criticise  the  report  of  the  committee, 
and  indirectly  the  administration.  He  said  that  the  case 
against  Mexico  as  stated  by  the  committee  was  stronger 
than  the  evidence  warranted;  that  the  situation  did  not 
justify  either  war  or  reprisals;  and  that  the  Mexican  Min 
ister  and  our  charge  $  affaires  were  both  at  fault,  for  their 
precipitate  action.  But  he  endeavored  to  soften  the  censure 
of  the  Minister's  misconduct  in  publishing  a  pamphlet  on 
the  grievances  of  his  country  and  himself  by  relating  in  his 
mellowest  manner  an  anecdote  of  his  experience  while  a 
peace  commissioner  at  Ghent,  and  also  recounting  another 
circumstance  that  had  recently  occurred.  To  this  talent  for 
felicitous  speech,  so  often  employed  by  him,  Clay  owed 
much  of  his  peculiar  influence ;  and  it  is  worth  while,  as  an 
illustration,  to  quote  this  part  of  his  impromptu  remarks. 

"  While  up,"  said  he,  "  I  will  take  the  opportunity  of  say 
ing  that  I  do  not  concur  in  all  the  reasonings  of  the  com 
mittee  as  to  the  publication  of  a  pamphlet  by  Mr.  Goros- 


CH.  VIII.]  THE   MEXICAN  TROUBLES  311 

tiza,  the  Mexican  envoy  extraordinary.  I  will  say,  however, 
that  it  was  a  great  diplomatic  irregularity ;  but  I  do  not 
think  it  makes  out  a  case  for  war  or  for  any  serious  disturb 
ance.  It  is  not  an  unusual  case.  I  recollect  an  instance 
which  occurred  while  the  American  commissioners  were  at 
Ghent,  in  1814,  at  a  most  critical  state  of  the  negotiation — 
when  it  hung,  as  it  were,  on  a  balance,  and  when  it  was 
doubtful  whether  there  would  not  be  a  rupture.  "While  I 
was  treating  with  Lord  Gambier  and  the  other  British 
commissioners,  a  publication  from  the  United  States  con 
taining  the  correspondence  between  the  governments 
of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  found  its  way 
there.  Lord  Gambier,  having  seen  it,  expressed  his  sur 
prise  to  me  that  my  government  should  have  given  pub 
licity  to  this  correspondence,  and  said  he  could  not  see 
how  they  could  justify  the  act.  The  other  commission 
ers  were  equally  displeased  at  the  occurrence.  I  then  ex 
plained  to  them  that  the  course  which  had  been  adopted 
was  one  growing  out  of  the  peculiar  structure  of  this  gov 
ernment  and  which  the  people  here  demand  of  their  ser 
vants.  I  mention  this  to  show  that  what  Mr.  Gorostiza  has 
done  is  not  a  thing  unexampled.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  other  day  Mr.  Pageot,  the  French  Minister,  just 
before  embarking  for  France  from  New  York,  published  a 
letter  of  the  Due  de  Broglie.  Mr.  Pageot  has  since  returned 
to  this  country  and  has  been  received  frankly  and  without 
any  intimation  of  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  our  govern 
ment.  And  I  have  no  more  doubt  of  the  fact  than  of  my 
standing  on  this  floor  at  this  moment  that  there  had  been 
information  conveyed  through  some  channel,  official  or  un 
official,  to  France  that  Mr.  Pageot's  return  to  the  United 
States  would  be  welcomed  without  any  displeasure  being 


312  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

shown  toward  him  in  regard  to  his  having  published  the 
letter  of  the  Due  de  Broglie ;  otherwise  the  French  govern 
ment  would  not  have  sent  him  to  this  country.  Had  Mr. 
Gorostiza  not  known  the  fact  of  this  publication,  he  prob 
ably  would  not  have  pursued  the  example  set  him." 

Clay's  liberality  of  opinion  in  matters  not  political  was 
shown  by  the  interest  he  took  in  an  effort  by  foreign  au 
thors  to  procure  the  benefit  of  copyright  in  this  country. 
Their  case  was  confided  to  his  care.  He  presented  their 
memorials  and  enforced  them  with  brief  observations  fav 
oring  the  request.  Shortly  afterward  he  also  presented  the 
petition  of  several  American  authors,  doubtless  prepared  as 
a  remonstrance,  to  amend  the  existing  law  in  their  interest. 
They  complained  that  because  American  publishers  could 
print  British  works  without  expense  of  copyright,  they  could 
not  obtain  a  fair  compensation  for  their  works ;  and,  carry 
ing  the  theory  of  protection  to  its  full  limit,  they  be 
sought  Congress  to  prohibit  entirely  the  publication  of  for 
eign  works.  This  sordid  suggestion,  it  is  gratifying  to  know, 
met  with  no  encouragement.  In  fact,  it  was  soon  repelled  by 
a  large  number  of  other  American  authors,  who,  in  enlight 
ened  contrast,  urged  that  the  benefit  of  our  copyright  laws 
be  extended  to  foreigners.  Clay  took  this  just  view.  His  re 
marks  on  presenting  the  first  petition  excellently  stated  the 
broad  argument  for  international  copyright.  In  the  course 
of  his  remarks  on  presenting  the  petition  of  the  hostile 
American  authors,  he  gave  this  account  of  the  piratical  en 
terprise  of  American  publishers  in  appropriating  foreign 
works  : 

"I  understand  that  the  course  of  this  business  is  that 
American  booksellers  have  their  agents  in  Great  Britain, 
who  as  soon  as  a  new  work  makes  its  appearance  transmit 


CH.  VIIL]    CLAY  AND  THE  AMERICAN  PUBLISHERS     313 

it  to  them  by  the  first  packet.  Sometimes  it  is  received 
from  the  packet  at  The  JNrarrows,  and  the  vessel  being  de 
tained  there  a  short  time,  from  some  cause  or  other,  by  the 
time  she  arrives  at  the  wharves  the  work  is  published  and 
ready  for  distribution.  This  extraordinary  despatch  is  ef 
fected  by  means  of  steam-presses  and  the  hundreds  of  hands 
employed  by  some  of  the  booksellers.  The  consequence  is 
that  the  work  is  often  slovenly  published,  on  bad  paper, 
with  bad  types,  and  omitting  maps,  diagrams,  engravings, 
and  other  illustrations.  This  the  first  publishers  feel  them 
selves  constrained  to  do,  lest  some  rivals  shall  publish  a 
cheaper  edition  than  that  which  they  have  issued.  Pur 
chased  in  this  defective  form,  no  one  can  get  the  genuine 
production  of  the  British  author  without  sending  abroad 
for  it,  as  is  sometimes  done." 

The  petitions  were  referred  to  a  select  committee,  of  which 
Clay  was  made  chairman.  A  report  was  soon  presented  and 
a  bill  introduced  in  accordance  with  his  views ;  but  it  went 
no  further.1  Xor  was  the  principle  of  this  bill  incorporated  in 
the  copyright  laws  until  1891,  after  several  fruitless  attempts. 

At  this  session  the  slavery  question  would  have  engaged 
little  attention  but  for  an  episode  that  occurred  in  the 


1  Buchanan  said  :  "  Cheap  editions  of  foreign  works  are  now  published 
and  sent  all  over  the  country  so  as  to  be  within  the  reach  of  every  indi 
vidual  ;  and  the  effect  of  granting  copyrights  asked  for  by  this  memorial 
would  be  that  the  authors  who  were  anxious  to  have  their  works  appear 
in  a  more  expensive  form  would  prevent  the  issuing  of  these  cheap  edi 
tions  ;  so  that  the  amount  of  republications  of  British  works  in  this  coun 
try,  I  think,  would  be  at  once  reduced  to  one-half.  But  to  live  in  fame  is 
as  great  a  stimulus  to  authors  as  pecuniary  gain  ;  and  the  question  ought 
to  be  considered  whether  they  would  not  lose  as  much  of  fame  by  the 
measure  asked  for  as  they  would  gain  in  money.  It  is  especially  well 
worthy  of  the  committee  to  go  beyond  publishers  and  ascertain  what 
would  be  the  effect  on  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  in  this  vast  country." 


314  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

House.  Abolition  petitions  in  the  familiar  forms  were  in 
deed  plentiful,  but  in  consequence  of  the  prolonged  excite 
ment  they  had  previously  provoked  they  had  lost  much  of 
their  agitating  effect  and  were  taken  largely  as  a  matter  of 
course.  As  soon  as  they  were  presented  they  were  tabled 
under  the  "  gag,"  which  was  now  a  fixture  in  the  rules. 
Moreover,  the  other  topics  of  the  session  had  engrossed  so 
much  attention  that  the  House  had  become  quite  indifferent 
to  the  tireless  function  of  John  Quincy  Adams  as  the  main 
channel  of  presenting  the  petitions.  One  morning,  how 
ever,  he  aroused  the  slumbering  fury  of  the  Southern  mem 
bers  in  a  most  unexpected  and  exasperating  way.  After 
presenting  some  two  hundred  ordinary  petitions  he  said 
that  he  had  a  paper  on  which,  before  it  was  presented,  he 
desired  the  decision  of  the  Speaker.  It  was  a  petition  from 
twenty-two  persons  declaring  themselves  to  be  slaves.  He 
wished  to  know  whether  such  a  paper  came  within  the 
order  of  the  House.  The  Speaker,  James  K.  Polk,  at  once 
perceived,  with  evident  embarrassment,  what  was  imminent. 
He  replied  that  he  could  not  tell  unless  he  was  in  possession 
of  its  contents.  Mr.  Adams  also  appreciated  the  conse 
quences,  and  with  that  technical  dexterity  of  which  he  was 
master,  he  took  care  not  to  render  himself  vulnerable.  He 
said  that  if  the  paper  were  sent  to  the  clerk's  table  it  would 
be  in  possession  of  the  House,  and  if  sent  to  the  chair  the 
Speaker  could  see  what  were  its  contents.  "Now  I  wish 
to  do  nothing,"  he  continued,  "  except  in  submission  to  the 
rules  of  the  House.  This  paper  purports  to  come  from  slaves, 
and  it  is  one  of  those  petitions  which  have  occurred  to  my 
mind  as  not  being  what  they  purport  to  be.  It  is  signed 
partly  by  persons  who  could  not  write,  by  making  their 
marks,  and  partly  by  persons  whose  handwriting  would 


CH.  VIII.]     ADAMS  PRESENTS  A  SLAVES'  PETITION    315 

manifest  that  they  had  received  the  education  of  slaves. 
The  petition  declares  itself  to  be  from  slaves,  and  I  am  re 
quested  to  present  it.  I  will  send  it  to  the  chair."  By  this 
time  the  apathetic  members  of  the  House  began  to  discover 
what  was  taking  place.  Objection  was  made  to  the  paper 
going  to  the  chair,  and  the  Speaker  anxiously  expressed  his 
desire  to  obtain  the  sense  of  the  House. 

The  tumult  and  frenzy  of  the  scenes  and  debate  that  fol 
lowed  were  never  exceeded  in  all  the  subsequent  course  of 
the  antislavery  agitation  in  Congress.  The  boundless  rage 
of  the  Southern  members  at  first  blinded  them  to  parlia 
mentary  law  and  usage  as  well  as  to  the  precise  apprecia 
tion  of  what  Adams  had  actually  said  and  done.  He  was 
assailed  with  insult  and  vituperation.  The  first  impulse  of 
the  enraged  members  vented  itself  in  shouts  to  expel  him. 
Then  came  resolutions  that  he  be  called  to  the  bar  and  cen 
sured.  For  several  days  the  storm,  of  angry  discussion  con 
tinued,  Adams  maintaining  his  position  with  marvellous 
courage,  coolness,  and  skill.  Time  after  time  resolutions 
were  proposed  and  withdrawn,  and  amendments,  modifica 
tions,  and  substitutes  offered.  But  the  turmoil  gradually 
subsided,  and  when  the  House  became  sufficiently  composed 
to  appreciate  the  precise  facts  of  the  affair  it  reached 
a  very  temperate  conclusion.  It  adopted  two  resolutions 
with  a  preamble.  The  latter  did  not  even  mention  Adams's 
name,  but  merely  stated  the  naked  question  first  suggested 
by  him,  whether  the  petition  came  within  the  rule.  The 
resolutions  were,  first,  that  the  petition  could  not  be  re 
ceived  by  the  House  without  disregarding  its  own  dignity, 
the  rights  of  a  large  class  of  citizens  in  the  South  and  West, 
and  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States;  second,  that 
slaves  did  not  possess  the  right  of  petition  secured  to  the 


316  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

people  by  the  Constitution.  Adams  and  seventeen  others 
voted  against  both.  Despite  this  fortunate  outcome,  candor 
must  admit  that  admiration  for  the  wonderful  audacity  and 
ability  Adams  displayed  throughout  the  fearful  ordeal  should 
be  tempered  by  the  reflection  that  the  affair  was  needlessly 
provoked  and  did  more  harm  than  good.1 

In  the  Senate  the  slavery  question  remained  quite  inert. 
Aside  from  a  pointed  and  threatening  speech  by  Calhoun 
against  abolition  petitions,  the  only  notable  revival  of  it  was 
over  a  petition  of  the  colonization  society,  presented  by 
Clay,  for  a  corporate  charter  to  enable  it  to  hold  and  con 
vey  lands.  Calhoun  at  once  opposed  it.  He  had  become  as 
strongly  hostile  to  the  society  as  the  abolitionists  had,  but 
for  entirely  opposite  reasons.  His  attitude  was  the  result 
of  that  minute  watchfulness  and  refined  logic  which  led 
him  to  scrutinize  every  proposition  suggested,  to  discern 
any  lurking  possibility  of  an  adverse  bearing  on  slavery. 

"  The  Senator  from  Kentucky,"  said  he,  "  must  know  that 
a  great  diversity  of  opinion  exists  among  the  wisest  and 
best  men  of  the  country  as  to  the  ultimate  good  to  be  effect 
ed  by  this  society ;  and  that  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the 
great  body  of  the  people  of  the  South  is  against  it.  ...  A 
mysterious  Providence  has  brought  the  white  and  black 

1  "  I  remember  one  day  to  have  been  on  the  floor  of  the  House  when 
he  attacked  Mr.  Wise  with  great  personality  and  bitterness.  In  allusion 
to  the  Cilley  duel,  with  which  he  was  connected,  he  spoke  of  him  as  coming 
into  that  assembly,  'his  hands  dripping  with  blood!'  There  was  a  terri 
ble  jarring  tone  in  his  voice,  which  gave  added  effect  to  the  denunciation. 
Every  person  present  seemed  to  be  thrilled  with  a  sort  of  horror,  rather 
towards  Mr.  Adams  than  the  object  of  his  reproaches.  In  speaking  of 
this  scene  to  me  afterward  an  eminent  member  of  Congress  said  that  '  Mr. 
Adams's  greatest  delight  was  to  be  the  hero  of  a  row.'  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  rude  personal  passages  which  often  occurred  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  derived  countenance  from  Adams's  example." — Goodrich's 
Recollections,  vol.  ii.  p.  404. 


CH.  VIII.]  CALHOUN  AND  THE  COLONIZATION  PLAN  317 

people  together  from  different  parts  of  the  globe,  and  no 
human  power  can  now  separate  them.  The  whites  are  a 
European  race,  being  masters  ;  and  the  Africans  are  the  in 
ferior  race,  and  slaves.  I  believe  they  can  exist  among  us 
peaceably  enough,  if  undisturbed,  for  all  time ;  and  it  is  my 
opinion  that  the  colonization  society  and  all  other  schemes 
gotten  up  through  mistaken  motives  of  philanthropy,  in 
order  to  bring  about  an  alteration  in  the  condition  of  the 
African,  have  a  wrong  foundation  and  are  calculated  to  dis 
turb  the  existing  relations  between  the  North  and  South.  I 
believe  the  very  existence  of  the  South  depends  on  the  ex 
isting  relations  being  kept  up,  and  that  every  scheme  which 
might  be  introduced,  having  for  its  object  an  alteration  in 
the  condition  of  the  negro,  is  pregnant  with  danger  and  ruin. 
It  is  a  benevolent  object  and  highly  desirable  that  the  bless 
ings  of  civilization  and  Christianity  should  be  introduced 
into  Africa  ;  but  this  is  a  government  of  limited  powers  and 
has  no  more  to  do  with  free  negroes  than  with  slaves  ;  and 
if  Africa  is  to  be  civilized  and  Christianized,  I  hope  it  will 
not  be  done  by  this  government  acting  beyond  its  Consti 
tutional  powers." 

The  petition  was  laid  on  the  table  by  a  vote  of  2i  to  12 ; 
and  there  it  remained,  notwithstanding  Clay's  exertions  to 
procure  further  action  upon  it. 

But  whatever  might  have  been  the  interest  in  these  varied 
topics,  the  most  conspicuous  feature  of  the  session  was  the 
expunging  from  the  Senate  journal  of  the  resolution  cen 
suring  Jackson  for  the  removal  of  the  deposits.  Although 
the  circumstance  was  merely  a  spectacular  episode,  it  was 
nevertheless  invested  with  an  historical  importance  that 
makes  it  prominent  in  a  period  that  was  filled  with  striking 
events.  It  marked  the  zenith  of  Jackson's  personal  prestige 


318  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

and  the  nadir  of  the  Whigs'  humiliation.  The  occasion  was 
surcharged  with  all  the  accumulated  political  passions  that 
his  Presidency  had  engendered,  and  it  afforded  the  final  and 
comprehensive  opportunity  to  review  from  both  sides  his 
public  career  on  the  eve  of  his  retirement.  The  result  was 
the  parting  glorification  of  him  by  his  zealous  devotees  over 
the  prostrate  hopes  of  his  adversaries.  With  the  strident 
note  of  triumph  were  mingled  the  execrations  of  conquered 
power  and  unconquered  pride. 

Immediately  after  the  adoption  of  the  censure,  and  again 
during  the  debate  over  the  President's  protest,  Benton  gave 
formal  notice  of  his  intention  to  move  an  expunging  resolu 
tion,  and  pledged  himself  to  prosecute  this  purpose  until  he 
succeeded  or  terminated  his  political  life.  During  the  next 
session  he  introduced  such  a  resolution  and  made  an  elabo 
rate  speech  in  its  behalf.  As  it  could  not  then  succeed,  his 
efforts  were  designed  for  popular  effect,  and  it  was  tabled 
without  intention  on  his  part  to  revive  it  during  the  session. 
But  so  obnoxious  was  the  word  "  expunge  "  to  the  Whigs, 
and  so  fraught  with  danger  in  the  opinion  of  many  Demo 
crats,  that  an  attempt  was  made  by  mutual  agreement  to 
change  the  proposition  to  expunge  to  some  other  more  con 
sonant  with  Constitutional  scruples.  Accordingly  the  reso 
lution  was  called  up  by  one  of  its  opponents  with  this  object 
in  view.  At  once  Hugh  L.  White  moved  to  strike  out  the 
words  "  ordered  to  be  expunged  from  the  journal "  and  in 
sert  "  rescinded,  reversed,  repealed,  and  declared  to  be  null 
and  void."  But  as  there  was  still  some  difference  of  opin 
ion  among  Jackson's  supporters  as  to  what  should  be  insert 
ed,  King  moved  to  omit  the  proposed  substitute  from  the 
motion.  Such  insistent  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  on 
Benton  by  several  of  his  party  colleagues  that  he  was  com- 


CH.VIIL]     TO  EXPUNGE  THE  VOTE   OF   CENSURE     319 

pelled  to  acquiesce.  The  motion  was  carried,  39  to  7. 
Most  of  the  Senators  now  supposed  that  this  display  of 
conciliation  would  be  followed  by  filling  the  blank  with  the 
formula  White  had  proposed,  or  by  some  other  substantial 
ly  equivalent ;  and  that  if  this  were  done  expunging  would 
be  irretrievably  relinquished.  The  astonishment  was  there 
fore  extreme  when  "Webster  rose  and  theatrically  proclaimed 
the  triumph  of  the  Constitution  over  the  project  to  expunge, 
and  moved  to  lay  the  maimed  resolution  on  the  table,  as 
serting  that  he  would  not  withdraw  the  motion  for  friend  or 
foe.  The  motion  precluded  further  amendment  or  debate, 
and  prevailed  by  a  party  vote. 

The  Democrats  were  indignant,  and  most  of  them,  abandon 
ing  their  former  scruples,  determined  to  insist  on  expunging. 
Benton  naturally  was  most  deeply  incensed.  He  at  once  re- 
submitted  the  original  resolution,  to  stand  over  to  the  next 
session,  and  defiantly  declared  that  he  would  not  yield 
again  for  friend  or  foe.  And  he  did  not.  With  renewed 
and  redoubtable  energy  he  persisted  in  his  purpose.  Pur 
suant  to  the  programme  he  had  announced,  he  brought  up 
the  resolution  at  the  next  session  and  spoke  with  increased 
vigor.  At  the  session  following  he  presented  it  again  and 
made  another  long  harangue.  Through  his  exertions  ex 
punging  had  become  a  test  of  Democratic  loyalty.  The 
party  press,  the  local  leaders,  and  the  rank  and  file  clamored 
for  it,  and  a  majority  of  the  State  legislatures  elected  and 
instructed  Senators  to  execute  it.  One  of  the  prevailing  po 
litical  theories  of  the  period  was  that  Senators  and  Eepre- 
sentatives  were  bound  by  the  instructions  of  their  State  legis 
latures.  This  absurdity,  which  substituted  politics  for  the 
Constitutional  tenure  of  office,  and  the  opinions  of  State 
legislatures  for  the  functions  of  Congress,  long  had  the 


320  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

force  of  unwritten  law.  It  was  forcibly  exemplified  dur 
ing  the  expunging  agitation.  When  the  legislature  of  Vir 
ginia  adopted  resolutions  against  the  removal  of  the  depos 
its,  Rives,  a  supporter  of  the  administration,  felt  obliged  to 
resign,  and  Leigh  took  his  place.  But  the  legislature  soon 
became  Democratic,  and  instructed  the  Senators  to  vote  for 
expunging.  John  Tyler  refused  to  obey  the  mandate,  and 
on  his  resignation  Rives  was  returned.  Leigh  would  not  re 
sign,  and  in  consequence  totally  forfeited  his  political  caste. 
Tyler  received  his  reward  later. 

The  number  of  Democratic  Senators  steadily  increased 
until  they  formed  a  sufficient  phalanx  to  render  the  final 
assault  as  imposing  as  it  was  irresistible.  The  time  had 
come  much  sooner  than  Benton  expected;  and  it  came  op 
portunely  for  the  most  dramatic  effect — a  consideration  that 
he  fully  appreciated  and  adroitly  utilized.  Even  if  the  reso 
lution  could  have  been  adopted  at  the  preceding  session,  he 
might  well  have  been  content  to  wait.  The  last  session  dur 
ing  Jackson's  Presidency  was  the  most  fitting  time  to  hum 
ble  his  opponents  and  exalt  his  hero.  And  it  so  chanced 
that  the  cruelty  of  this  exultation  was  capable  of  refine 
ment.  December  7,  two  days  after  the  session  opened,  he 
gave  notice  of  his  intention  to  present  his  resolution.  But} 
he  waited  until  the  20th,  the  third  anniversary  of  the  day 
on  which  Clay  moved  the  censure.  The  resolution,  which 
was  preceded  by  a  long  explanatory  and  declamatory  pre 
amble,  was  as  follows : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  said  resolve  be  expunged  from  the 
journal;  and,  for  that  purpose,  that  the  secretary  of  the 
Senate,  at  such  time  as  the  Senate  may  appoint,  shall  bring 
the  manuscript  journal  of  the  session  of  1833-34  into  the 
Senate,  and,  in  the  presence  of  the  Senate,  draw  black  lines 


CH.  VIIL]         BENTON  URGES   EXPUNGING  321 

round  said  resolve,  and  write  across  the  face  thereof,  in 
strong  letters,  the  following  words:  ' Expunged  by  order 
of  the  Senate,  this  day  of  ,  in  the  year  of  our 

Lord,  1837.'" 

January  12,  he  opened  the  debate  by  delivering  a  set  speech 
on  the  resolution.  This  time  the  tone  of  his  oration  was 
changed  from  higli  -  wrought  argument  and  appeal  to  the 
dogmatic  and  gloating  assurance  he  enjoyed  in  the  prospect 
of  the  success  he  had  so  persistently  toiled  to  achieve.  He 
began  by  an  elaborate  display  of  personal  and  partisan  ego 
tism,  which  events,  indeed,  had  to  a  large  degree  made  par 
donable.  Complacently  disdaining  to  renew  the  argument, 
which  the  popular  voice  had  thus  rendered  superfluous,  he 
proceeded  in  the  full  panoply  of  the  Bentonesque  style  to 
pronounce  a  studied  eulogy  on  Jackson  and  his  adminis 
tration.  He  was  too  practical  to  indulge  in  much  vacuous 
rhapsody,  although  his  ardor  and  impetuous  feelings  often 
impelled  him  to  grotesque  exaggeration ;  but  combined  with 
this  were  his  practised  mastery  of  facts  and  a  brawny  sar 
casm  that  was  exacerbating  to  the  morbid  resentment  of 
his  adversaries. 

This  speech  was  made  on  Monday,  January  9.  But  four 
other  speeches  on  the  subject  were  delivered  between  that 
time  and  the  following  Monday,  when  the  closing  scenes  were 
enacted.  On  Saturday  a  sort  of  Democratic  caucus  was  held 
at  Boulanger's,  a  noted  restaurant,  to  canvass  the  situation 
fully.  The  task  was  not  without  difficulty.  Benton  and 
some  others  Avere  for  actual  expurgation ;  but  it  was  evi 
dent  that  some  would  not  agree  to  this — the  Constitutional 
objection  still  haunted  them.  Compromise  and  good  cheer, 
however,  at  length  surmounted  the  obstacles.  The  radical 
yielded,  the  reluctant  were  stimulated,  the  doubting  were 
21 


322  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1837 

convinced ;  all  harmonized  on  the  hybrid  plan  as  it  stood. 
Benton  confesses  that  "  it  required  all  the  moderation,  tact, 
and  skill  of  the  prime  movers  to  induce  and  maintain  the 
union  upon  details,  on  the  success  of  which  the  fate  of  the 
measure  depended."  The  conclave  lasted  until  midnight ; 
but  when  it  broke  up  the  final  arrangements  were  perfected. 
Each  Senator  pledged  himself  to  vote  for  the  resolution  and 
to  sit  up  all  night  if  needful  to  press  it  to  a  vote.  Benton 
took  care  to  provide  for  an  ample  supply  of  viands,  wine, 
and  coffee,  to  be  served  in  an  anteroom  of  the  Senate 
chamber,  where  the  wearied  and  hungered  champions  of 
expunging  could  snatch  refreshment  during  the  austerities 
and  anxieties  of  a  protracted  session. 

"When  the  resolution  was  taken  up  at  the  appointed  hour 
the  debate  proceeded.  Evening  set  in.  The  chamber  and 
its  approaches  were  brilliantly  lighted.  Every  available 
space  not  held  by  Senators  in  that  historic  room  was  occu 
pied  by  members  of  the  House  and  those  who  were  favored 
with  the  envied  privilege.  The  corridors  and  lobbies  were 
eagerly  thronged  and  the  galleries  were  resplendent  with 
the  fashion  and  display  that  grace  the  boxes  at  grand  opera 
on  the  opening  night.  The  spectacle  was  all  that  the  Senate 
in  its  greatest  epoch  could  evoke.  Such  an  occasion,  awed 
and  dignified  by  the  presence  of  such  a  galaxy  of  justly  dis 
tinguished  public  men,  has  not  been  possible  in  "Washington 
since  the  memorable  period  that  ended  with  their  lives. 

Chief  among  the  various  motives  that  brought  this  ex 
pectant  assemblage  together  was  the  desire  to  hear  the 
speech  of  Henry  Clay.  From  the  time  that  Benton  first 
proclaimed  the  expunging  design,  Clay  had  maintained  a 
contemptuous  silence  toward  it.  But  that  he  would  remain 
mute  at  the  final  hour  was  not  to  be  supposed.  More  than 


CH,  VIIL]   CLAY  SUSTAINS  THE  VOTE  OF  CENSURE  323 

any  other  man  he  was  bound  to  remonstrate.  No  stronger 
provocation  to  antipathy  and  resentment  could  animate  him 
than  that  which  was  boldly  flaunted  by  Benton's  resolution. 
And  he  of  all  men  was  best  qualified  to  give  expression 
to  the  sentiments  and  feelings  of  the  Whigs  toward  Jack 
son  and  this  unprecedented  mode  of  hero-worship.  Others 
could  argue  in  justification  of  the  censure  and  against  its 
propriety  and  constitutionality  as  well  as  he  could — possibly 
better;  but  no  man  possessed  in  so  great  a  degree  that  subtle 
fusion  of  presence,  manner,  voice,  speech,  temperament,  per 
sonality,  and  intellect  which  constitutes  the  highest  type  of 
the  parliamentary  orator.  Thus  it  was  rightty  judged  that 
the  philippic  he  would  pronounce  on  this  aggravating  oc 
casion  would  remain  to  those  who  heard  it  one  of  the  vivid 
memories  of  a  lifetime.  Apparently  unconscious  that  he 
was  the  focus  of  attention  and  comment,  he  sat  with  grave 
countenance,  yet  with  a  gleam  of  suppressed  rancor  in  the 
eye,  until  the  appropriate  moment  came  for  him  to  speak. 
He  then  rose  slowly,  and,  grimly  surveying  the  hushed 
scene,  proceeded  in  the  modulated  tones  of  his  rich  and 
wonderful  voice  with  one  of  the  most  notable  speeches  of 
his  long  career. 

His  exordium  was  plain  and  serious  and  displayed  that 
fluid  ease  of  diction  and  indefinable  quality  of  style  so 
rare  even  among  writers  and  extraordinary  in  public  speech. 
He  then  entered  upon  a  rapid  and  admirable  resume  of 
the  arguments  originally  advanced  in  support  of  the  resolu 
tion  of  censure — Jackson's  unwarranted  assumption,  as  the 
Whigs  maintained,  of  authority  over  the  public  money  and 
of  the  power  to  dismiss  Executive  officials ;  justifying  the 
resolution  against  the  criticism  that  it  was  virtually  an  im 
peachment  of  the  President  without  observing  the  Constitu- 


324  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

tional  forms  of  procedure,  and  maintaining  the  right  of  the 
Senate  to  declare  its  opinion  concerning  any  act  of  Execu 
tive  usurpation.  This  was  followed  by  an  examination  of 
the  asserted  right  to  expunge.  After  illustrating  this  argu 
ment,  he  turned  to  the  prolix  preamble  to  the  resolution  and 
commented  with  severity  on  the  statement  of  facts  it  con 
tained.  Then  came  his  peroration,  in  which  his  indignation 
and  contempt  reached  the  height  of  his  oratorical  expres 
sion.  For  many  years  it  was  printed  in  books  on  rhetoric 
with  noted  passages  from  the  speeches  of  Otis,  Henry,  Wirt, 
and  Webster,  and  declaimed  by  emulous  school-boys. 

Delivered  as  this  peroration  was,  with  all  of  his  intensity 
of  feeling  and  magnetic  power,  of  which  his  language  gives 
but  slight  token,  the  effect  on  his  auditory  was  prodigious 
and  thrilling.1  Even  Benton  says :  "  He  concentrated  his 
wrath  and  grief  in  an  apostrophizing  peroration  which 
lacked  nothing  but  verisimilitude  to  have  been  grand  and 
affecting."  It  certainly  had  as  much  verisimilitude  as  the 
profuse  and  fulsome  panegyrics  of  Jackson  displayed  ;  and 
it  would  doubtless  have  defeated  the  resolution  but  for 
the  extreme  pressure  of  politics  and  the  iron-clad  pledge  of 
the  Democrats  to  force  it  through.  The  less  determined 
among  them  writhed  under  his  drastic  scorn  and  sought  the 
refreshment-room  to  revive  their  wincing  courage.2 


1  Buchanan  began  his  speech  by  saying  :  "  Mr.  President,  after  the 
able  and  eloquent  display  of  the  Senator  from  Kentucky,  who  has  just 
resumed  his  seat,  after  having  so  long  enchained  the  attention  of  his  au 
dience,  it  might  be  the  dictate  of  prudence  for  me  to  remain  silent." 

2  "I  envy  not,"  said  Ewing,  "the  triumph  of  him  who  has  pressed 
forward  this  resolution  against  the  opinions  and  the  feelings  and  the  con 
sciences  of  those  whom  he  has  found  means  to  compel  to  its  support— a 
resolution  which  he  has  urged  on  with  passions  fierce,  vindictive,  furious. 
Still  less  do  I  envy  the  condition  of  those  who  are  compelled  to  go  on 
ward  against  all  those  feelings  and  motives  which  should  direct  the  actions 


CH.VIH.]      BUCHANAN'S  NOTION  OF  EXPUNGING     325 

Clay  was  followed  by  Buchanan  in  a  very  characteristic 
speech.1  He  was  generally  logical  and  candid,  laborious 
and  ineloquent.  He  plodded  carefully  over  the  entire 
original  controversy,  and  then  approached  the  difficulty 
which  had  taken  him  a  long  period  of  searching  suspense  to 
overcome.  "  I  entered  the  Senate,"  said  he,  "  in  December, 
1834,  fresh  from  the  ranks  of  the  people,  without  the  slight 
est  feeling  of  hostility  against  any  member  on  this  floor.  I 
then  thought  that  the  resolution  of  the  Senator  from  Mis 
souri  was  too  severe  in  proposing  to  expunge."  The  man 
ner  in  which  he  finally  succeeded  in  satisfying  his  mind  and 
overcoming  his  Constitutional  doubt  is  a  curious  example  of 
how  able  men  can,  under  stress  of  politics,  justify  a  palpa 
bly  unwarranted  thing  by  refined  argument  and  casuistry. 
Without  presenting  the  details  of  his  reasoning,  to  quote 
a  few  sentences  from  his  speech  will  suffice  to  explain  his 
position,  which  was  also  that  of  a  number  of  his  associates. 

"  My  own  impression,"  said  he,  "  is  that,  as  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution  have  directed  us  to  keep  a  journal,  a 
constructive  duty  may  be  implied  from  this  command  which 
would  forbid  us  to  obliterate  or  destroy.  ...  Is  any  such 
proceeding  as  that  of  expunging  the  journal  proposed  by  the 
resolution  ?  .  .  .  Will  this  obliterate  any  part  of  the  original 
resolution  2  If  it  does,  the  duty  of  the  secretary  will  be 


of  the  legislator  and  the  man.  Why  do  I  see  so  many  pale  features  and 
downcast  eyes  unless  it  be  that  repentance  and  remorse  go  hand  in  hand 
with  the  perpetration  of  the  deed?" 

1  Previous  to  1824  Clay  and  Buchanan  were  close  friends,  so  much  so 
that  Clay  named  one  of  his  sons  James  Buchanan.  But  subsequently  they 
became  estranged  in  consequence  of  Buchanan's  relations  with  Jackson. 
On  several  occasions,  which  Forney  recounts,  Clay  treated  him  with  indig 
nity.  "They  frequently  met  in  society  in  after  years,  especially  at  the 
dinner-table.  If  they  did  not  become  friends,  they  at  least  ceased  to  be 
enemies." — Forney's  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  p.  182. 


326  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

performed  in  a  very  bungling  manner.  No  such  thing  is 
intended.  It  would  be  easy  to  remove  every  scruple  from 
every  mind  upon  this  subject  by  amending  the  resolution 
so  as  to  direct  the  secretary  to  perform  his  duty  in  such  a 
manner  as  not  to  obliterate  any  part  of  the  condemnatory 
resolution.  Such  a  direction,  however,  appears  to  me  to 
be  wholly  unnecessary.  The  nature  of  the  whole  proceed 
ing  is  very  plain.  We  now  adopt  a  resolution  expressing 
our  strong  reprobation  of  the  original  resolution ;  and  for 
this  purpose  we  use  the  word  '  expunged '  as  the  strongest 
term  which  we  can  employ." 

In  answer  to  the  criticism  that  the  word  did  not  properly 
characterize  the  actual  proceeding,  he  cited  a  number  of 
authorities  as  sanctioning  that  use  of  it.  But  not  one  of 
them  supported  his  assertion.  Such  circumstances  are  not 
suited  to  investigations  in  philology.  Beyond  question  the 
resolution,  in  so  far  as  the  proposed  writing  across  the  face 
of  the  resolution  of  censure  would  cause  defacement,  was  a 
violation  of  the  Constitution,  trivial  indeed,  but  a  violation. 

Several  other  speeches  were  made  before  the  debate 
closed,  late  at  night.  As  the  question  was  about  to  be  put, 
Webster  delivered  an  oral  protest  against  the  whole  pro 
ceeding.  He  succinctly  stated  the  argument  against  it,  and 
the  argument  admitted  of  no  answer.  He  justly  summed 
up  the  matter  thus :  "  We  collect  ourselves  to  look  on  in  si 
lence  while  a  scene  is  exhibited  which,  if  we  did  not  regard 
it  as  a  ruthless  violation  of  a  sacred  instrument,  would  ap 
pear  to  us  to  be  little  elevated  above  the  character  of  a  con 
temptible  farce."  After  Webster  ceased,  a  short  but  im 
pressive  silence  ensued.  The  struggle  was  over.  On  motion 
the  blanks  for  the  date  were  then  filled  and  the  resolution 
was  adopted,  24  to  19.  Clay  did  not  wait  to  see  it  executed. 


CH.VIU.]      CONSUMMATION   OF  THE  EXPUNGING      327 

As  soon  as  the  vote  was  taken  he  stalked  out  of  the  chamber. 
As  the  secretary  began  to  execute  the  mandate,  such  a  vol 
ley  of  groans  and  hisses  broke  forth  from  one  of  the  galleries 
that  the  presiding  officer  ordered  it  to  be  cleared.  Benton  was 
enraged  at  the  disturbance,  which,  he  shouted,  was  caused 
by  "  the  bank  ruffians."  It  marred  the  dignity  with  which 
he  was  anxious  to  have  the  scene  invested.  After  venting 
his  anger,  he  moved  that  the  direction  to  clear  the  galleries 
be  revoked,  as  it  would  cause  the  ejection  of  innocent  spec 
tators,  and  that  the  culprits  be  seized  and  brought  to  the 
bar.  This  was  acceded  to,  but  the  raid  of  the  sergeant-at- 
arms  resulted  in  apprehending  only  one  individual,  who  was 
brought  before  the  Senate.  This  was  deemed  punishment 
enough  for  him,  and  he  was  discharged.  The  expunging  was 
then  consummated  in  peace. 

w  The  jubilation  of  Jackson's  followers  was  unbounded. 
Ben  ton's  lasted  for  life.  Long  after  the  event,  when  he 
wrote  his  Thirty  TearJ  View,  that  remarkable  medley  of 
the  useless  and  the  invaluable,  his  elation  was  unabated. 
"  The  gratification,"  he  says,  "  of  General  Jackson  was 
extreme.  He  gave  a  grand  dinner  to  the  expungers  (as 
they  were  called)  and  their  wives ;  and  being  too  weak  to 
sit  at  the  table,  he  only  met  the  company,  placed  the  '  head 
expunger '  in  his  chair,  and  withdrew  to  his  sick-chamber. 
That  expurgation !  It  was  the  ( crowning  mercy'  of  his  civil, 
as  New  Orleans  had  been  of  his  military,  life." 

At  this  day,  when  the  passions  and  strifes  of  that  time 
are  at  most  but  the  subjects  of  animated  descriptions,  we 
smile  at  what  they  provoked  and  marvel  that  the  giants 
who  then  contended  in  the  public  arena  should  have  devoted 
their  powers  to  such  barren  displays.  But  such  are  the  ways 
of  politics.  They  change  like  the  fashions ;  but  at  root  po- 


328  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

litical  partisanship  is  ever  the  same,  for  it  is  grounded  in 
human  nature  and  fostered  by  its  most  potent  characteristic 
— self-interest.  Under  its  influence  the  strongest  characters 
and  the  greatest  minds  are  governed  by  the  same  impulses 
that  drive  savages  to  combat  over  a  feather  and  children  to 
tear  one  another's  hair. 

To  Jackson,  Yan  Buren's  inauguration  was,  in  his  own 
phrase,  "  a  glorious  scene,"  not  so  much  because  of  anything 
it  represented  for  the  public  weal  as  because  it  signalized 
his  own  final  and  complete  triumph.  His  paramount 
thought  was  that  his  successor  was  not  only  his  personal 
choice,  but  he  was  the  man  whose  nomination  as  Minister 
to  England,  to  promote  his  succession,  had  been  factiously 
rejected  by  a  Whig  Senate ;  and  that  by  a  singular  coinci 
dence  he  was  sworn  into  office  by  Taney,  whose  nomination 
for  the  bench  had  once  been  likewise  rejected  because  of  the* 
part  he  took  in  the  removal  of  the  deposits.  To  Jackson's 
mind  it  was  a  retribution,  and  aroused  the  keenest  emotion 
he  could  feel — the  thrill  of  victory  over  hated  foes. 

It  had  been  the  custom  to  treat  his  public  career  as  the 
product  of  sheer  will,  and  most  of  the  prominent  features  of 
his  Presidency  as  studied  innovations  in  disregard  of  the 
Constitution,  the  laws,  and  the  public  welfare.  The  partisan 
views  of  his  adversaries  survived  his  time,  and  have  gener 
ally  been  advocated  by  historical  writers,  who  have  to  a  large 
degree  accepted  them  as  just.  This  is  not  surprising.  Most 
of  the  historical  writing  done  since  that  time  has  been  the 
work  of  those  who  were  educated  under  the  sway  of  the 
Whiggish  culture  of  the  country,  and  is  thus  imbued  with 
Whiggish  prepossessions.  One  source  of  this  extraordinary 
influence  will  illustrate  the  assertion.  No  one  occupies  a 
higher  place  in  American  literature  than  Daniel  Webster. 


CH.  VIIL]       JACKSON'S   INFLUENCE   ON   POLITICS       329 

Regarded  in  their  purely  literary  aspect,  his  works  undoubt 
edly  deserve  their  classic  reputation.  But  this  has  insensibly 
carried  with  it  the  political  bias  that  long  dominated  the 
educational  centres,  and  is  yet  far  from  extinct.1  After  the 
Whig  party,  as  such,  became  defunct,  its  intellectual,  social, 
and  political  tendencies  survived  in  the  changed  conditions, 
and  impregnate  most  of  the  literature  pertaining  to  the  pe 
riod  of  its  existence. 

The  influence  that  Jackson  exerted  on  the  chief  political 
events  immediately  preceding  and  during  his  Presidency, 
and  for  some  time  afterward,  was  indeed  powerful.  But 
this  was  mainly  the  natural  consequence  of  his  position. 
And  many  of  his  conspicuous  acts  were  virtually  forced  .  - 
upon  him  by  the  opposition.  Some  abiding  effects  folio  wed  y/C 
the  precedents  and  practices  then  established.  Yet  this  is 
not  peculiar  to  his  Presidency.  Moreover,  he  appeared  at  a 
juncture  that  made  new  departures  inevitable.  That  he  and 
his  advisers  were  sometimes  rash  and  precipitate,  and  un 
mindful  of  the  indirect  consequences  beyond  the  immediate 
objects  they  had  in  view,  is  all  too  true ;  and  it  is  the  most 
serious  criticism  that  can  be  justly  preferred  against  them. 
This  is  a  grave  error  in  statesmanship,  even  when  acts  are 
right  in  themselves  and  founded  on  true  principles.  The  in 
terests  of  a  people  are  multifarious  and  interwoven.  When 
a  condition  is  pervaded  with  mischievous  elements  produced 
by  wrong  policy,  radical  measures  are  perilous :  it  should  be 
treated  with  caution  and  in  progressive  degrees.  The  proc- 


1  "  At  this  moment  the  spirit  that  prevails  in  many  institutions  of 
learning  in  this  country  is  at  war,  open  and  declared  war,  with  the  spirit 
of  democracy.  And  if  at  the  present  time  [1860]  there  is  a  class  of  intel 
ligent  and  instructed  men  who  feel  with  the  people  and  are  striving  for 
popular  objects,  the  fact  is  not  due  to  the  colleges." — Parton's  Jackson,  vol. 
iii.  p.  700. 


330  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

ess,  however,  is  easier  to  prescribe  in  general  than  to  apply 
in  particular.  This  is  eminently  true  of  Jackson's  predica 
ment.  The  difficulty  lay  not  so  much  in  determining  what 
ought  to  be  done,  abstractly  viewed,  as  in  what  to  do  under 
all  the  circumstances,  considering  political  exigencies,  which 
could  not  be  ignored,  and  absolute  good,  which  politicians 
are  always  willing  to  compromise  if  necessary.  Some  palli 
ation  of  Jackson's  course  is  supplied  by  the  novel  state  of 
affairs  which  confronted  him,  and  of  which  all  the  conse 
quences  afford  his  critics  an  autopsical  advantage.  Had  he 
avoided  the  conflicts  that  signalize  his  Presidency  he  would 
have  been  a  marvel  among  statesmen  or  merely  an  official 
name.  Such  a  result  would  have  required  him  either  to 
reconcile  the  Whigs  to  Democratic  principles  or  submit  to 
Whig  dictation;  for  the  attitude  of  his  adversaries  pre 
cluded  any  middle  ground.  If  ever  a  Chief  Magistrate 
can  be  pardoned  for  partisan  excesses  Jackson  can.  Parlia 
mentary  history  contains  no  instance  where  the  executive 
administration  of  a  government  was  more  sorely  tried, 
baited,  and  assailed  by  a  relentless  opposition.  The  field  of 
his  operations  was  hedged  about  with  enormous  difficulties, 
for  he  was  compassed  by  formidable  foes  intent  upon  pres 
ent  success,  by  whatever  means  and  whatever  the  conse 
quences. 

Another  stricture,  not  so  merited,  arises  from  the  share 
Jackson  had  in  the  establishment  of  the  spoils  system.  This 
criticism  has  grown,  through  the  modern  gospel  of  "civil 
service  reform,"  from  resentful  accusation  to  absolute  con 
viction,  until  Jackson  is  now  generally  regarded  as  personal 
ly  responsible  for  the  introduction  of  the  prescriptive  system 
into  our  national  politics.  While  the  fact  cannot  be  gain 
said  that  it  was  under  his  administration  that  this  policy  was 


CH.  VIII.]       JACKSON  AND  THE   SPOILS   SYSTEM        331 

first  avowedly  practised,  it  is  an  imperfect  and  misleading 
idea  that  he  is  to  be  held  accountable  for  it.  The  true 
considerations  in  regard  to  this  subject  have  already  been 
presented  in  the  course  of  this  narrative,  but  it  is  not  su 
perfluous  to  restate  them  briefly  in  this  general  review. 
Jackson's  election  was  the  overthrow  of  a  long  political 
regime  and  the  beginning  of  a  radically  new  one.  There 
had  been  no  pressing  occasion  for  the  application  of  the 
spoils  doctrine  on  a  national  scale:  yet  it  was  not  a  novelty, 
as  it  had  been  operative  for  years  in  many  of  the  States, 
and  in  some  of  them  had  attained  consummate  develop 
ment.  When,  therefore,  the  opportunity  and  occasion  came 
to  apply  it  to  federal  offices  the  impulse  was  irresistible. 
There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  under  the  condi 
tions  then  existing  Jackson  did  only  what  any  President 
in  his  place  would  have  been  forced  to  do.  As  he  did 
not  originate  or  improve  the  system,  but  merely  applied  it 
under  force  of  circumstances,  he  cannot  be  justly  held  re 
sponsible  for  it.  And  it  is  ascribing  to  him  an  unwarranted 
influence  to  say  that  the  uniform  practice  of  it  by  all  par 
ties  ever  since  is  due  to  his  example.1  The  American  peo 
ple,  whatever  else  may  be  their  faults,  should  not  be  indicted 
for  such  a  blind  and  unquestioning  pursuit  of  the  example 
or  the  precepts  of  any  individual. 

To  attribute  the  leading  characteristics  of  his  Presidency 
to  his  initiative  is  the  common  and  fundamental  error  that  /C 

1  "Pernicious  practices  have  been  prevailing  for  the  last  fifteen  years, 
which  began  with  Jackson,  which  Van  Buren  had  little  need  to  exercise, 
but  never  repudiated,  and  which  his  party  always  pursued,  which  the 
Whigs  of  1840  were  afraid  fully  and  heartily  to  disavow,  and  which  when 
in  power  they  carried  out  as  far  as  any  before  them  had  done,  and  which 
now  have  become  the  standing  rule  of  practice  in  this  country." — Life  of 
R.  H.  Dana,  vol.  i.  p.  92. 


332  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

has  produced  so  many  distorted  notions  concerning  him. 
<v.  The  premise  is  as  false  as  it  can  be,  if  taken  in  connection 
'  with  the  fact  that  no  man's  conduct  can  be  wholly  sepa 
rated  from  his  personality.  Had  Jackson  been  born  a  few 
years  earlier  or.  later  he  would  have  died  in  obscurity.  He 
did  not  possess,  apart  from  adventitious  circumstances,  the 
intellect  or  the  qualities  to  make  an  impression  on  any 
modern  age,  unless  possibly  in  time  of  war.  He  was  not 
and  could  not  have  become  a  statesman  in  the  proper  sense 
of  the  word.  His  type  of  mind  is  alien  to  statesmanship 
and  is  lacking  in  that  patient,  searching  insight  into  widely 
diverse  interests,  public  and  private,  present  and  future,  and 
that  comprehensive  mastery  and  combination  of  these  com 
plex  elements  required  in  the  genuine  statesman. 

He  was  not  a  thinker  or  a  politician.  He  did  not  have  the 
education  and  sustained  habit  of  mind  essential  to  the  one, 
nor  the  ductility  of  disposition  and  conduct  necessary  to  the 
other.  His  ideas  were  limited  and  fragmentary,  but  they 
were  direct  and  concentrated,  and  came  from  his  mind  with 
a  fascinating  vigor  and  velocity.  He  could  not  express  in 
speech  or  writing  an  orderly  development  of  any  subject 
with  which  he  had  to  deal.  Though  he  was  not  illiterate,  it 
was  only  in  his  later  years  that  he  acquired  the  faculty  of 
expressing  himself  fittingly  in  ordinary  correspondence.  Un 
doubtedly  had  he  been  educated  and  accustomed  to  the  pen 
or  public  speech,  and  could  he  have  maintained  the  patience, 
he  would  have  learned  to  acquit  himself  respectably,  perhaps 
powerfully ;  for  his  manner  of  stating  facts  and  ideas  par 
took  of  his  virile  temperament  and  often  displayed  the  vivid 
force  of  Napoleon's  bulletins.  But  he  invariably  depended 
on  others  for  the  composition  of  his  official  communications. 
As  Parton  shrewdly  observes,  he  was  always  fortunate  in 


CH.  VIIL]  JACKSON'S  IMPETUOSITY  333 

his  secretaries;  and  thus  the  state  papers  that  bear  his  signa 
ture  have  seldom  been  surpassed  in  propriety  and  force  of 
diction.1 

Some  of  the  most  striking  acts  of  his  Presidency  would 
scarcely  have  been  undertaken  in  his  audacious  and  uncom 
promising  way  by  any  experienced  public  man,  however  he 
may  have  been  advised  and  abetted  by  men  of  that  descrip 
tion  ;  for  training  in  public  affairs  begets  a  politic  circum 
spection  that  seeks  the  point  of  least  resistance.  These  acts 
took  a  distinctive  aspect  from  his  personality  and  impetuous 
energy  rather  than  from  their  character  and  effect.  His 
guiding  principle  was,  "  Desperate  courage  makes  one  a 
majority."  His  intensity  of  purpose  often  impelled  him  to 
needless  exertions.  He  would,  so  to  speak,  use  a  battery 
when  a  platoon  of  musketry  was  sufficient.  This  thorough- 

1  "Not  one  public  paper  of  any  description  signed  'Andrew  Jackson ' 
ever  reached  the  public  eye  exactly  as  Jackson  wrote  it.  ...  Some  of  his 
most  famous  passages — those  which  are  supposed  to  be  peculiarly  Jackso- 
nian— he  never  so  much  as  suggested  a  word  of,  nor  saw  till  they  were  written, 
nor  required  the  alteration  of  a  single  syllable  before  they  were  despatched." 
— Parton's  Jackson,  vol.  i.  p.  68.  When  Harvard  University  conferred  on 
Jackson  the  degree  of  LL.D.,  Adams  wrote  :  "Myself  an  affectionate  child 
of  our  alma  mater,  I  would  not  be  present  to  witness  her  disgrace  in  con 
ferring  her  highest  literary  honors  upon  a  barbarian  who  could  not  write  a 
sentence  of  grammar  and  hardly  could  spell  his  name." — Adams's  Diary, 
vol.  iv.  p.  5.  "I  remember  that  in  my  youth,  during  his  Presidency,  it 
was  generally  believed  in  New  England  among  his  political  opponents  that 
he  was  an  entirely  illiterate  man,  who  could  not  write  an  English  sentence 
grammatically  or  spell  correctly.  This  belief  was  too  much  encouraged  by 
persons  who  knew  better  ;  and  it  was  not  until  many  years  afterward  that 
I  learned  how  unfounded  it  was.  There  now  lie  before  me  autograph 
letters  of  General  Jackson  written  wholly  with  his  own  hand,  and  written 
and  punctuated  with  entire  correctness,  and  with  no  small  power  of  expres 
sion.  The  handwriting  is  sometimes  rather  better,  for  example,  than  Mr. 
Webster's.  The  spelling  is  perfectly  correct  throughout.  General  Jackson 
wrote  better  English  than  Washington  ;  and  as  to  King  George  III.,  the 
General  was  an  Addison  in  comparison  with  his  Majesty."— Curtis's  Buch 
anan,  vol.  i.  p.  129.  See  also  Memoirs  ofj.  G.  Bennett,  p.  90. 


334  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

ness  had  the  inevitable  result  of  increasing  the  ardor  and 
the  assaults  of  the  enemy,  and  enhanced  the  general  effect 
in  the  popular  mind.  Such  intense  purpose  and  effort  always 
have  a  prodigious  influence  over  less  determined  minds.  It 
explains  the  success  of  many  men  otherwise  mediocre,  and 
frequently  produces  reputation  that  the  inherent  quality  of 
their  achievements  would  not  create.  Great  intellects  are 
usually  philosophical  and  not  over-eager  for  material  acquisi 
tions  or  preferment.  Narrow  and  combative  minds  are  too 
often  ambitious  to  attain  objects  unsuited  to  them.  They 
confound  transient  position  and  power  with  genuine  merit 
and  enduring  renown,  which  they  never  achieve,  unless  un 
der  exceptional  circumstances,  where  celerity,  resolution, 
and  force  are  the  prime  requisites.  But  these  conditions 
seldom  occur,  and  hence  the  way-sides  of  history  are  strewn 
with  bleaching  bones — one  of  the  saddest  and  most  sugges 
tive,  yet  one  of  the  most  natural  spectacles  wrought  by 
human  activity.  Although  Jackson  was  narrow-minded  and 
fiercely  energetic,  he  did  not  strive  to  force  himself  into  a 
sphere  to  which  he  did  not  belong.  In  this  respect  he  was  a 
remarkable  character,  and  he  can  only  be  understood  by 
comparison  with  types  of  mind  above  and  below  him.  He 
was  not  ambitious,  nor  was  his  nature  alloyed  by  any  selfish 
or  ignoble  element.  His  rise  to  the  Presidency  was  not  his 
design  or  achievement.  His  sole  contribution  to  the  result 
was  that  peculiarity  of  temperament  which  made  him  a  hero 
in  Indian  warfare  and  in  his  solitary  and  fortunate  battle 
of  New  Orleans.  His  exploits,  thus  performed,  made  him 
available  by  clever  politicians  as  a  Presidential  candidate, 
and  the  temper  of  the  times  made  him  President.  While 
President,  as  before,  he  was  often  absolute,  it  is  true,  in  his 
ideas  of  what  should  be  done,  and  utterly  fearless  in  execut- 


CH.VIII.]          BENTON'S  AID  TO  JACKSON  335 

ing  them.  Yet  seldom  did  the  initiative  proceed  from  his 
own  reflections.  No  President  ever  listened  more  intently 
to  his  advisers;  and  he  usually  followed  the  counsels  of  those 
in  whom  he  had  most  confidence,  albeit  the  manner  of  ac 
complishing  the  objects  determined  upon  were  generally  and 
distinctively  Jacksonian.  This  is  true  of  his  struggles  over 
financial  questions.  His  combative  instinct  quickly  pene 
trated  the  heart  of  the  bank  controversy ;  but  for  the  scheme 
of  the  contest  Benton  is  mainly  responsible.  And  so  he  was 
in  a  large  degree  for  most  of  the  more  noted  acts  of  Jack 
son's  Presidency.  From  this  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  that 
Jackson  was  a  passive  instrument  in  the  hands  of  others. 
Far  from  it.  None  were  more  ready  to  acknowledge  his 
masterful  individuality  than  those  who  stood  closest  to  him. 
But  the  fact  tends  to  qualify  the  common  opinion  that  it  \ 
was  his  domineering  will  that  shaped  his  entire  policy  and 
controlled  others  to  execute  it  according  to  his  behests. 

Yon  Hoist  formally  characterizes  Jackson's  Presidency 
as  a  " reign";1  and  the  appellation  has  clung  with  the  te 
nacity  usually  incidental  to  tersely  put  error.  The  ill  -  bal 
anced  judgment  of  this  distinguished  writer  is  shown  by  his 
coupling  this  theory  of  Jackson's  Presidency  with  the  un-  . 
philosophical  and  pessimistic  criticism  that  it  "  systemati 
cally  undermined  the  public  conscience  and  diminished  the 
respect  of  the  people  for  the  government."2  The  two  char 
acterizations  are  manifestly  inconsistent,  and  were  it  not 


1  This  is  not  original  with  Von  Hoist.     It  is  to  be  found  incessantly  in 
the  Whig  utterances  of  Jackson's  time. — See  Sargent's  Clay,  p.  186. 

2  No  student  of  our  political  history  can  fail  to  appreciate  the  industry 
of  Dr.  Yon  Hoist ;  but  it  must  be  recognized  that  his  work  is  a  polemical 
treatise,  not  a  philosophical  history.     The  stress  he  lays  upon  many  facts 
and  events  is  entirely  out  of  proportion  to  their  real  importance  and  sig 
nificance,  a  result  due  to  his  alien  training  and  congested  theories. 


336  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

that  the  ideas  they  represent  are  so  prevalent  they  might  be 
dismissed  without  further  comment.  To  form  a  correct  es 
timate  of  a  public  man  and  his  career,  the  actual  conditions 
in  which  he  was  placed  must  be  ascertained  and  considered 
— not  only  the  political  features,  but  the  quality  of  the 
times  and  the  temper  and  tendency  of  popular  thought  and 
feeling.  The  material  facts  are  easily  determined,  and 
when  sedulously  followed  they  lead  to  sound  conclusions. 
Mere  sentiments  and  abstractions  are  dangerous  and  decep 
tive  and  tend  to  substitute  imagination  and  prejudice  for 
investigation  and  truth.  Jackson  has  long  been  the  victim 
of  the  latter  process. 

The  management  of  our  foreign  affairs  has  never  been 
conducted  with  more  signal  effect  than  under  Jackson.  No 
President  has  ever  done  more  to  compel  respect  for  our 
national  rights  and  American  citizenship.  A  similar  spirit 
was  displayed  in  his  prompt  and  forceful  resistance  to  dis 
union.  No  President  has  demonstrated  greater  practical 
loyalty  to  the  larger  aims  of  the  Constitution  and  more  de 
votion  to  the  Union  and  the  democratic  theory  on  which 
the  Constitution  and  the  Union  rest.  The  charge,  inces 
santly  repeated,  that  he  autocratically  exercised  powers  in 
disregard  of  the  Constitution,  cannot  be  sustained.  For 
everything  he  did  in  which  his  Constitutional  warrant  has 
been  questioned,  and  where  he  did  not  act  under  express 
powers,  the  argument  in  his  support  is  stronger  than  that 
against  him.  And  no  important  instance  where  his  action 
was  professedly  under  statutory  authority  can  be  adduced 
that  was  not  sanctioned  by  a  fair  and  reasonable  interpre 
tation  of  the  law.  It  does  not  answer  to  inveigh  against 
infractions  of  the  "  spirit "  of  the  Constitution  and  the  laws 
when  the  letter  or  necessary  implication  furnished  ample 


CH.  VIIL]  JACKSON'S  ADMINISTRATION  DEMOCRATIC  337 

authority  for  the  acts  assailed.  In  a  constitutional  govern 
ment  there  can  be  no  more  vicious  tendency  than  to  ignore, 
even  in  the  name  of  patriotism  and  natural  justice,  the  plain 
injunctions  either  of  the  organic  law  or  of  statutes  validly 
enacted.  Far  greater  harm  has  always,  under  the  plea  of 
propriety,  followed  lax  construction  than  has  ever  been  in 
flicted  by  the  strict  enforcement  of  improper  or  unjust  pro 
visions.  Bad  laws  that  are  executed  will  soon  be  repealed 
or  modified  at  the  demand  of  public  sentiment ;  but  if 
through  mere  opinion  they  lose  their  stringency  or  effect 
they  inevitably  become  the  pretext  under  which  incalculable 
evil  is  perpetrated.  Underneath  almost  every  position  taken 
by  the  Whigs  was  the  presumptuous  but  imposing  fallacy 
that  whatever  they  advocated  was  right,  and  therefore  that 
their  opponents  were  public  enemies.  This  kind  of  assump 
tion  has  sanctified  error  since  the  pretensions  of  creeds  and 
dogmas  first  began  to  impress  and  mould  the  credulity  of 
man.  It  is  fortunate  that  occasionally  a  man  appears  who 
is  strong  and  willing  enough  to  recur  to  first  principles  and 
quell  the  sophistries  that  steal  into  the  thought  and  destroy 
the  robust  instincts  of  the  people.  Jackson  did  not  "  reign." 
He  administered  the  government  under  the  guidance  of  dem 
ocratic  principles  and  according  to  the  plain  purport  and 
purpose  of  the  Constitution,  and  against  the  strained  con 
structions  and  strenuous  efforts  of  a  party  undemocratic  in 
its  tenets  and  its  tendencies.  When  he  retired,  every  feat 
ure  of  our  governmental  institutions  was  unimpaired  and 
unaffected.  He  never  manifested  or  entertained  the  slight 
est  design  or  inclination  wilfully  to  transcend  his  lawful 
province.  Under  the  stress  of  extreme  provocation  and  ex 
citement,  he  sometimes  carried  the  war  into  the  enemy's 
country ;  but  his  patriotism  was  unchallenged.  Had  he  at 

22 


338  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

any  time  evinced  the  faintest  sinister  design  he  would  have 
been  repudiated  and  disgraced  instantly  and  by  his  own 
party. 

It  is  absurd  to  say  that  he  "  undermined  the  public  con 
science"  or  bred  among  the  people  a  spirit  of  lawlessness 
that  asserted  itself  in  riot,  tumult,  and  disrespect  for  social 
and  governmental  institutions.  No  one  man  or  set  of  men 
could  have  done  or  can  do  that  in  this  country.  It  was  not 
respect  for  the  government  that  was  affected,  but  acquies 
cence  in  the  dictation  of  a  small  number  of  distinguished 
Senators,  who  were  more  zealous  to  promote  the  interests  of 
their  party  than  the  well-being  of  the  country.  By  this  it 
is  not  meant  that  those  Senators  were  at  any  time  actuated 
by  unpatriotic  motives,  but  that  their  erroneous  principles, 
under  the  crucial  test  of  partisan  strife,  forced  them  to  acts 
that  were  indefensible  and  injurious.  During  this  period 
there  were  many  unfortunate  exhibitions  of  disorder  in  all 
parts  of  the  country.  In  "Washington  several  members  of 
Congress  were  assaulted  for  what  they  had  said  in  debate. 
But  these  outbreaks  were  not  peculiar  to  Jackson's  Presi 
dency  nor  legitimately  traceable  to  him  or  his  policy.  Sim 
ilar  acts  were  common  before  and  after  his  Presidency. 
Many  of  them  grew  out  of  the  antislavery  developments 
and  were  committed  by  men  who  were  least  affected  by 
Jackson's  principles.  Even  classic  Boston  presented  un 
seemly  spectacles  of  this  kind,  perpetrated  by  its  most  ex 
clusive,  if  not  aristocratic,  elements.  Jackson  himself  nar 
rowly  escaped  assassination  by  a  lunatic  whose  pistols 
miraculously  failed  to  discharge.  The  motive  for  the  act 
was  engendered  in  a  disordered  mind  by  hearing  Whig  Sena 
tors  denounce  Jackson  as  an  enemy  to  the  country.  But  no 
reasonable  mind  would  attribute  such  a  baleful  incident  to 


CH.VIIL]     THE  TENDENCIES  OF  JACKSON'S  TIME     339 

the  principles  and  precepts  of  the  Whigs,  no  more  than  that 
Conkling  would  be  held  guilty  of  the  frightful  but  crazy 
crime  of  Guiteau.  The  application  of  unbiased  common- 
sense  is  alone  needed  to  dispel  such  notions.  Jackson  was 
not  an  anarchist  and  inculcated  no  anarchical  principles. 
'Nor  was  he  a  demagogue.  Democracy  is  not  license,  even 
though  its  manifestations  sometimes  shock  the  bigotry  and 
complacency  of  that  class  which  would  be  more  at  home 
under  a  monarchy.1  The  restlessness  of  the  people  that  is 
incidental  to  some  periods,  accompanied  with  the  violence 
of  men  who  always  chafe  under  the  restraint  of  the  crim 
inal  law,  bespeaks  more  for  our  institutions  than  is  shown 
by  passive  and  comfortable  indifference  to  the  stealthy  en 
croachments  of  favoritism  and  class  advantage.  But  apart 
from  this  it  is  a  fallacious  view  of  social  phenomena  that 
does  not  penetrate  beyond  mere  external  symptoms  into  the 
remote  and  complex  causes  that  produce  them. 

The  characteristics  of  Jackson's  period  were  not  duetto 
his  influence,  but  to  the  direction  of  the  popular  mind, 
which  made  his  elevation  and  doings  possible.  It  was  a 
time  of  remarkable  development,  expansion,  and  activity. 
When  he  appeared  before  the  public  eye  a  new  stream  of 
thought  and  action  had  started.  It  swept  about  him  and 
carried  him  with  its  torrent.  The  economic  and  political 
cleavage  of  the  Korth  and  South  was  becoming  more  and 
more  apparent.  The  attention  and  interest  of  the  people 
were  directed  toward  politics  as  they  had  never  been  before. 
The  democratic  impulse,  through  natural  and  necessary 


1  In  1840  the  "  aristocratic  elements  "  of  Boston  were  tired  of  our  polit 
ical  tendencies.  Otis  predicted  that  in  thirty  years  our  republican  system 
would  end.  Allston  said  that  in  "  eighty  years  there  would  not  be  a  gentle 
man  left  in  the  country." — Pierce's  Sumner,  vol.  iii.  p.  3. 


340  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

causes  too  large  and  various  to  possess  a  single,  much  less  a 
personal,  source,  was  revived  and  increased.  That  Jackson 
chanced  to  be  the  personage  to  whom  it  was  attracted,  and 
that  his  personality  contributed  to  intensify  it,  are  not  to  be 
regretted.  With  all  his  defects  and  administrative  errors 
~  the  sum  of  his  influence  was  beneficial.  The  sentiment  of 
patriotism  which  he  inculcated  far  outweighs  the  transient 
evils  he  may  have  caused  or  furthered ;  and  the  day  may 
come  when  the  example  of  his  Presidency  will  prove  a  bul 
wark  in  the  hour  of  the  nation's  need. 

It  is  noticeable  that  Clay  now  took  less  interest  than  had 
been  his  wont  in  minor  matters  that  came  before  the  Senate. 
Formerly  there  were  few  subjects  of  any  moment  that  did 
not  enlist  his  attention  and  comment.  His  suggestions  upon 
matters  not  involved  in  politics  were  accorded  great  respect, 
and  betoken  a  largeness  of  view  and  an  understanding  of  na 
tional  and  international  bearings  only  possible  to  a  mind  long 
accustomed  to  public  affairs.  There  were  that  increased 
weight  and  reposeful  power  in  his  utterances  which  always 
develop  in  the  speech  of  public  men  of  protracted  experience 
and  prestige.  He  .was  nearly  sixty  years  of  age,  and  almost 
half  his  life  had  been  conspicuously  passed  in  the  public  coun 
cils.  He  no  doubt  felt,  and  rightfully,  that  he  had  performed 
his  due  share  of  routine  legislative  labors.  The  Senate  no 
longer  had  any  strong  attraction  for  him  ;  yet  when  he  was 
confronted,  as  he  was  during  the  session,  with  the  necessity  of 
retiring  or  remaining,  he  reversed  his  determination  to  with 
draw  and  accepted  a  re-election.  His  friends  and  partisans 
throughout  the  country,  who  admired  and  supported  him 
with  an  enduring  fervor  and  enthusiasm  never  surpassed  in 
the  career  of  a  statesman  so  long  in  public  life,  insisted  that 
he  continue  in  the  body  of  which  they  and  his  political  ad- 


CH.  VIII.]  CLAY  DISMAYED  341 

versaries  alike  regarded  him  almost  as  an  essential  figure. 
But  lie  had  not  conquered  his  repugnance.  All  the  efforts 
of  the  Whigs,  under  his  leadership,  had  been  unavailing  to 
resist  the  triumphant  course  of  Jackson  and  the  Democrats, 
and  another  Democratic  administration  was  to  follow.  He 
was  almost  in  a  state  of  political  despair  and  felt  little  hope 
of  "Whig  supremacy  in  his  time.  A  year  before,  when  he 
had  determined  to  leave  the  Senate  at  the  end  of  his  term, 
he  wrote : "  If  I  were  persuaded  that  by  remaining  longer  in 
the  public  service  I  could  materially  aid  in  arresting  our 
downward  progress,  I  should  feel  it  my  duty  not  to  quit  it. 
But  I  am  not  sure  that  my  warning  voice  has  not  too  often 
been  heard.  Perhaps  that  of  my  successor  may  be  listened  to 
with  more  effect."  And  after  the  adoption  of  the  expunging 
resolution,  when  he  had  been  re-elected,  he  still  continued  to 
express  his  earnest  desire  for  retirement,  not,  however,  in  a 
strain  of  lamentation,  but  of  acute  disgust.  "  I  shall  hail," 
he  wrote,  "  with  greatest  pleasure  the  occurrence  of  circum 
stances  which  will  admit  of  my  resignation  without  dishonor 
to  myself.  The  Senate  is  no  longer  a  place  for  a  decent 
man."  And  again :  "  I  shall  escape  from  it  with  the  same 
pleasure  that  one  would  fly  from  a  charnel-house." 

This,  resolution  he  eventually  carried  out,  but  not  until 
five  years  later,  after  a  period  hardly  less  exciting  and  labori 
ous  than  during  Jackson's  Presidency,  and  when  at  last  the 
goal  of  his  great  ambition  seemed  within  his  grasp. 


CHAPTER  IX 

Van  Buren's  Intellectual  and  Political  Characteristics  — His  Policy  as 
Jackson's  Successor — The  Crisis  of  1837 — The  Tactics  of  the  Whigs — 
Webster's  Speech  at  Niblo's — The  Appeal  of  the  New  York  Merchants 
to  the  President — The  Extra  Session  of  Congress,  the  President's  Mes 
sage,  and  the  Democratic  Programme — Clay  Organizes  the  Opposition, 
and  Calhoun  Supports  the  Administration — The  Opening  Debate  on 
the  Independent  Treasury — The  Banks  and  Resumption — The  Regular 
Session — Renewal  of  the  Excitement  Over  the  Slavery  Question — Cal- 
houn's  Attitude 

THE  Presidency  is  a  precarious  honor.  With  its  possessor 
chance  plays  curious  tricks.  Jackson  and  Yan  Buren  il 
lustrate  both  extremes  of  this  peculiar  fortune.  Notwith 
standing  his  extraordinary  political  success  thus  far,  Yan 
Buren  came  to  the  Presidency  under  conditions  that  were 
extremely  unpropitious  and  trying.  When  he  attained  the 
coveted  distinction  his  good  fortune  forsook  him,  and  the 
very  causes  of  his  elevation  operated  against  him.  The  op 
posite  of  Jackson  in  everything  but  his  political  principles, 
he  was  entirely  without  Jackson's  popular  resources.  It  did 
not  avail  that  he  had  been  Jackson's  close  adviser  and  in 
full  accord  with  his  policy,  if  not  partly  responsible  for  it. 
He  was  devoid  of  every  attribute  to  continue  effectively 
Jackson's  executive  methods.  He  had  no  personal  prestige 
among  the  masses,  even  of  his  own  party.  Without  the 
popular  influence  that  invested  Jackson  with  his  peculiar 
power,  he  was  regarded  merely  as  an  official  President 
rather  than  an  important  political  force.  To  the  Whigs  he 


Cn.IX.]         VAN  BUREN  AND  THE  PRESIDENCY         343 

was  the  creature  of  Jackson's  favor,  thrust  into  power  by 
his  desire  and  dictation.  From  the  hour  his  Presidential  \  * 
prospects  opened  he  was  not  only  assailed  and  denounced, 
but  sneered  at  and  lampooned  as  a  mere  politician  and  deft 
manipulator.  "  The  Little  Magician "  was  the  sobriquet 
most  commonly  applied  to  him.  And,  in  truth,  had  his  rise 
from  the  Senate  to  the  Presidency  been  due  to  craft  alone, 
it  would  have  presented  much  the  same  appearance.  His 
service  in  the  Senate  was  too  short  to  assure  his  position 
as  a  statesman  and  reveal  his  truly  great  talent  and  ability 
for  public  life.  Every  move  after  that  was  a  step  for  and 
toward  the  Presidency,  and  as  such  instigated  the  attacks 
of  the  "Whigs,  and  the  jealousy  of  his  Democratic  rivals.1 

Without  opportunity  to  justify  his  pretensions  or  meet  his 
adversaries  with  their  own  weapons,  he  acted  on  the  only 
plan  open  to  him :  he  took  advantage  of  the  conditions  in 
which  he  was  placed,  and  with  the  utmost  adroitness  and 
skill.  It  is  unfortunate  for  his  fame  that  the  combination 
of  circumstances  that  fixed  his  destiny  precluded  him  from 
participating  directly  in  the  events  to  which  he  owed  his  ad 
vancement,  and  thus  from  forcibly  carving  his  own  career 
in  the  great  forum  of  the  Senate. 


1  Such  opinions,  though  in  some  degree  justified  by  his  tactical  skill, 
have  been  immensely  magnified  by  the  asperity  of  political  warfare  prior 
to  and  during  his  term,  and  were  subsequently  still  further  aided  by  the 
spleen  of  his  former  friends  because  of  his  candidacy  on  the  Free-soil 
ticket  in  1848. — See  Democratic  Review,  vol.  iii.  p.  121.  "Mr.  Van  Buren 
had  won  the  favor  of  the  hero  just  as  the  jackal  wins  the  good -will  of 
the  lion.  He  was  called  the  'mistletoe  politician,'  nourished  by  the  sap 
of  the  hickory-tree." — Wise's  Sewn  Decades  of  tlie  Union,  p.  121.  It  is 
significant  that  Von  Hoist's  disparaging  opinions  of  him  are  largely  drawn 
from  Mackenzie's  virulent  and  abominable  compilations.  The  corrective 
of  the  common  and  erroneous  views  concerning  Van  Buren  is  in  an  un 
biased  study  of  the  leading  facts  and  events  in  his  career.  See  Shepard's 
Van  Buren,  p.  387. 


344  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

His  entire  mental  and  physical  composition  was  not  such 
as  to  create  any  striking  impression  on  the  popular  mind. 
His  most  inherent  intellectual  qualities  made  him  deliberate, 
circumspect,  and  politic.1  The  success  of  his  early  public  life 
in  the  narrow  theatre  of  State  politics  was  largely  the  result 
of  the  methods  these  qualities  had  induced ;  and  subsequent 
circumstances  so  encompassed  him  that  his  sterling  powers 
of  mind  and  capacity  for  public  affairs  were  scantily  called 
into  play.  No  doubt  Jackson  was  drawn  to  him  by  the 
very  fact  that  they  were  so  completely  unlike,  for  this  is 
one  of  the  most  common  sources  of  friendship  and  confi 
dence  between  men.  Yan  Buren  was  unassertive,  insinuat 
ing,  and  amiable.2  He  seldom  gave  cause  for  personal  dis 
like.  He  was  too  conservative  and  complaisant  for  his  own 
advantage.  His  disinclination  to  assert  his  opinions  natu 
rally  led  to  the  common  notion  that  he  had  no  convictions 
contrary  to  his  political  interests.  His  mode  of  thought 
and  calmness  of  temper  made  him  slow  to  take  offence  or 


1  Martineau's  Retrospect  of  Western  Travel,  vol.  i.  pp.  74,  77 ;  Quincy's 
Figures  of  the  Past,  p.  355. 

2  "There  are  many  features  in  the  character  of  Mr.  Van  Buren  strongly 
resembling  that  of  Mr.  Madison — his  calmness,  his  gentleness  of  manner, 
his  discretion,  his  easy  and  conciliatory  temper.    But  Madison  had  none 
of  his  obsequiousness,  his  sycophancy,  his  profound  dissimulation  and 
duplicity.     In  the  last  of  these  he  much  more  resembles  Jefferson,  though 
with  very  little  of  his  genius." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  ix.  p.  369.    "  He  will 
be  a  party  President,  but  he  is  too  much  of  a  gentleman  to  be  governed  by 
the  rabble  wlio  surrounded  his  predecessor  and  administered  to  his  bad 
passions.     As  a  man,  a  gentleman,  and  a  friend,  I  have  great  respect  for 
Mr.  Van  Buren  ;  I  hate  the  cause,  but  esteem  the  man." — Hone's  Diary, 
vol.  i.  p.  246.     In  a  speech,  Clay  said  :  "I  have  always  found  him,  in  his 
manners  and  deportment,  civil,  courteous,  and  gentlemanly  ;  and  he  dis 
penses  in  the  noble  mansion  which  he  now  occupies,  one  worthy  of  a 
great  people,  a  generous  and  liberal  hospitality.     An  acquaintance  with 
him  of  more  than  twenty  years'  duration  has  inspired  me  with  respect 
for  the  man,  although  I  regret  to  be  compelled  to  say  I  detest  the  mag 
istrate." 


CH.  IX.]  VAN  BUREN'S   MENTAL  CHARACTERISTICS  345 

harbor  resentment.  Had  he  been  more  positive  and  com 
bative  he  would  have  received  more  respect  and  deference; 
he  certainly  could  not  have  been  more  bitterly  opposed. 
His  qualities  of  mind  and  character  were  thus  to  a  large 
extent  obscured,  and  it  was  not  until  extortionate  events 
compelled  it  that  his  firmness  and  strength  of  intellect  were 
revealed.  He  was  generally  regarded  as  the  most  non 
committal  of  politicians,  and,  despite  his  acts  while  Presi 
dent  and  afterward,  the  idea  still  persistently  attaches  to 
his  reputation.  His  face  gave  no  especial  indication  of  his 
intellectual  powers.  It  displayed  sanity  and  practicality, 
without  any  admixture  of  the  eccentric  or  the  ideal.  The 
keenness  of  his  glance  qualified  the  appearance  of  benignity 
and  philosophic  breadth  his  features  otherwise  possessed. 
Apart  from  the  healthy  good-nature  that  beamed  from  it, 
his  countenance  was  imperturbable.1  It  was  never  the  in 
dex  of  his  thoughts;  and  as  for  emotions,  he  had  none  that 
were  acute  or  violent.  "With  him  self-control  was  not  an 


1  "  He  looks  very  well,  and  from  his  ease  of  manner  and  imperturbable 
good  temper  it  might  be  supposed  that  he  had  less  to  occupy  his  mind 
than  any  man  in  New  York.  His  outward  appearance  is  like  the  un 
ruffled  surface  of  the  majestic  river  which  covers  rocks  and  whirlpools, 
but  shows  no  marks  of  agitation  beneath." — Hone's  Diary,  October  26, 
1835  ;  vol.  i.  p.  168.  These  lines  went  the  rounds  of  the  newspapers  : 

"  Good  Lord !  what  is  Van !  for  though  simple  he  looks, 
'Tis  a  task  to  unravel  his  looks  and  his  crooks ; 
With  his  depths  and  his  shallows,  his  good  and  hid  evil, 
All  in  all  he's  a  riddle  must  puzzle  the  devil." 

"Mr.  Van  Buren  was  rather  an  exquisite  in  appearance.  His  complexion 
was  a  bright  blond,  and  he  dressed  accordingly.  On  this  occasion  [at 
church  in  Rochester  in  1828]  he  wore  an  elegant  snuff-colored  broadcloth 
coat  with  a.  velvet  collar ;  his  cravat  was  orange  with  modest  lace  tips  ; 
his  vest  was  of  a  pearl  hue  ;  his  trousers  were  white  duck ;  his  shoes 
were  morocco  ;  his  neatly  fitting  gloves  were  yellow-kid  ;  his  long-furred 
beaver  hat  with  broad  brim  was  of  a  Quaker  color." — Stanton's  Random 
Eecollections,  p.  32. 


346  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

effort,  but  an  involuntary  instinct.  It  was  altogether  nat 
ural,  therefore,  that  he  should  without  unnecessary  effort 
utilize  the  opportunities  that  arose,  and  sail  with  the  current 
so  long  as  it  moved  toward  the  haven  he  sought. 

The  difficulties  he  was  to  encounter  had  long  been  gener 
ating  and  they  were  close  at  hand ;  yet  his  inaugural  address 
displayed  no  apprehension,  if  indeed  he  felt  any.  It  was 
thoroughly  Democratic  and  optimistic,  but  gave  little  indi 
cation  of  concrete  purposes,  save  in  regard  to  slavery.  On 
this  subject  he  declared  himself  explicitly,  as  he  had  done 
before  election,  firmly  opposed  to  any  interference,  either  in 
the  States  or  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  This  declaration, 
however,  had  no  novel  political  significance,  for  it  coincided 
with  the  opinion  of  the  great  majority  of  the  people  of  all 
parties  except  the  abolitionists,  who  were  not  yet  regarded  as 
a  political  factor.  But  touching  the  extension  of  slavery  he 
was  silent.  This  topic  had  not  yet  attained  the  character  of 
an  actual  problem.  Like  most  inaugurals  of  new  Presidents, 
his  was  essentially  a  salutatory,  inspired  by  the  satisfaction 
of  his  newly  acquired  honor  and  hopeful  expectations  not 
yet  disturbed  by  opposition  and  adversity.  His  main  design 
was  sufficiently  understood  without  his  dwelling  upon  it 
— he  proposed  to  sustain  so  far  as  he  could  the  measures  of 
his  predecessor.  His  respect  for  Jackson  verged  to  extreme 
humility,  and  was  doubtless  deemed  by  him  politically  ad 
vantageous  as  well.  In  his  letter  accepting  the  nomination 
he  said :  "  I  consider  myself  the  honored  instrument,  selected 
by  the  friends  of  the  present  administration,  to  carry  out  its 
principles  and  policy ;  and  that  as  well  from,  inclination  as 
from  duty  I  shall,  if  honored  with  the  choice  of  the  Ameri 
can  people,  endeavor  to  follow  generally  in  the  footsteps  of 
President  Jackson ;  happy  if  I  shall  be  able  to  perfect  the 


CH.  IX.]  VAN  BUREN'S  CABINET  347 

work  which  he  has  so  gloriously  begun."  And  he  closed 
his  inaugural  address  with  a  venerating  tribute  to  Jackson 
that  evinced  no  change  of  sentiment  or  purpose. 

This  general  plan  was  at  once  evidenced  by  the  reten 
tion  of  Jackson's  cabinet.  One  place,  however,  was  vacant 
— that  of  Secretary  of  War,  through  the  appointment  of 
Cass  as  Minister  to  France  in  1836.  Butler,  the  Attorney- 
General,  performed  the  functions  of  the  position  until  Yan 
Buren  came  into  office.  Poinsett,  one  of  the  few  prominent 
men  of  South  Carolina  who  had  opposed  nullification,  was 
then  appointed.  The  old  cabinet  had  been  largely  of  Yan 
Buren's  choice,  hence  no  change  was  expected.  Neverthe 
less,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  at  first  he  contemplated  several 
changes.  Benton's  leadership  of  the  administration  forces 
in  Congress  had  been  so  conspicuous  and  masterly  that  he 
was  urged  to  accept  a  portfolio;  but  he  wisely  declined. 
The  cabinet  as  then  constituted  was  still  personally  ac 
ceptable  to  Yan  Buren,  and  as  it  could  not  be  materially 
strengthened  from  those  who  were  available  after  Benton 
refused  to  enter  it,  he  concluded  to  retain  it  as  it  was.1  But 
there  was  urgent  need  that  it  be  as  strong  as  he  could  make 
it ;  for  the  new  administration  had  hardly  been  installed 
when  the  storm  which  had  been  so  long  gathering  broke 
with  appalling  fury.  The  crisis  of  183Y,  here  and  elsewhere, 
was  without  parallel,  and  none  more  severe  has  occurred 
since;  and  no  financial  and  commercial  disturbance  has 
been  more  fraught  with  economic  instruction.  It  seldom 
happens  that  so  many  of  the  causes  that  produce  mone 
tary  and  business  crises  are  operative  in  combination.  So 
suddenly  did  it  come  and  so  rapidly  and  widely  devastat- 

1  For  Van  Buren's  frank  statement  of  the  difficulties  in  forming  a 
good  cabinet,  see  his  Political  Parties  in  the  United  States,  p.  68. 


348  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

ing  were  its  consequences  that  on  May  15,  but  a  few  days 
over  two  months  after  Yan  Buren's  inauguration,  he  was 
constrained  to  convoke  an  extra  session  of  Congress  to  meet 
the  emergency.  It  was  called  for  September  4.  Meantime 
the  ravages  were  complete,  and  a  terrible  and  exacting  sit 
uation  confronted  the  public  councils. 

If  the  relative  importance  of  different  periods  of  national 
history  were  to  be  judged  by  statistics  alone,  the  period  un 
der  review  would  not  deserve  the  attention  it  demands.  In 
1837  the  population  was  about  15,000,000.  In  his  last  an 
nual  message  to  Congress,  in  December,  1836,  Jackson  es 
timated  that  the  total  public  expenditure  for  the  ensuing 
year  would  not  exceed  $32,000,000.  These  two  facts  fur 
nish  a  fair  idea  of  the  physical  proportions  of  our  national 
life  and  government  at  that  time.  But  principles  are  not 
dependent  on  mere  numbers  or  the  size  or  extent  of  the 
objects  on  which  they  operate.  Thus  it  is  that  a  thorough 
and  correct  understanding  of  the  history  of  this  country  is  a 
liberal  education  in  political  philosophy  and  economy.  It 
is  unfortunate  that  this  is  not  more  generally  recognized 
and  applied  in  the  higher  education  of  American  youth. 
And  it  is  still  more  unfortunate  that  Senators  and  Kepre- 
sentatives  in  Congress,  not  to  speak  of  other  public  men, 
should  exhibit,  as  they  commonly  do  at  the  present  day, 
ignorance  of  the  history  of  their  country.  Such  incapacity 
in  the  practice  of  any  profession  would  be  akin  to  crimi 
nal  ;  but  in  public  life,  where  the  consequences  involve  the 
interests  of  every  citizen,  it  excites  little  surprise  or  con 
demnation.  Comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  country's  his 
tory  among  our  public  servants  would  prevent  the  period 
ical  recurrence  of  time-worn  fallacies  and  mistakes  and 
lead  to  a  general  and  abiding  acquiescence  in  many  princi- 


CH.  IX.]  EFFECTS   OF  THE   CRISIS  349 

pies  that  should  be  elementary  in  the  political  creed  of  every 
public  man. 

The  premonitory  signs  of  the  impending  crisis  were  proxi- 
mately  caused  by  the  specie  circular.  The  blow  it  inflicted 
made  the  vast  hollow  of  the  financial  system  loudly  resound. 
Those  who  were  not  involved  in  paper  transactions  made 
haste  to  guard  their  interests  as  best  they  could — many  by 
hoarding  gold  or  withdrawing  as  far  as  possible  from  dan 
ger.  The  alarm  quickly  spread,  and  the  reckless  confidence 
upon  which  the  monetary  system  of  the  country  rested 
crumbled  and  fell.  The  most  serious  effects  of  the  distri 
bution  policy  followed  close  upon  those  of  the  specie  cir 
cular.  It  commonly  happens  that  the  consequences  of  error 
come  at  the  most  inopportune  times.  It  was  so  with  these. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  deposit  banks,  to  provide  for  the  in 
stalments  to  the  States,  were  forced  to  contract  their  loans. 
In  ordinary  times  this  would  have  strongly  affected  the 
money  market,  but  now  under  the  circumstances  the  press 
ure  was  prodigiously  increased.  Of  necessity  it  bore  hard 
est  upon  those  who  were  most  instrumental  in  creating  the 
plethoric  condition  that  existed.  Gold  rose  with  fatal  ra 
pidity.  The  situation  of  the  speculators  grew  from  bad  to 
worse.  Those  who  were  not  engaged  in  speculation,  but 
whose  fortunes  were  inseparably  linked  with  legitimate 
business  interests,  were  soon  affected  also,  and  finally  were 
likewise  drawn  into  the  widening  vortex  of  failure.1  Many 


1  "There  are  certainly  wild  speculators,  blind  and  desperate  gamblers 
here  also  ;  but  the  objects  of  their  schemes  are  almost  always  enterprises 
of  public  utility.  The  spirit  of  speculation  in  the  United  States  has  strown 
this  vast  country  with  useful  works  —  canals,  railroads,  turnpikes,  with 
manufactories,  farms,  villages,  and  towns  ;  amongst  us  it  has  been  more 
rash,  wild,  and  foolish,  and  much  less  productive  in  useful  results.  It  is  with 
us  mere  stock- jobbing." — Chevalier's  Society  in  the  United  States,  p.  166. 


350  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

of  the  strongest  business  houses,  unable  longer  to  withstand 
the  fearful  strain,  collapsed  like  the  weakest.1  The  puny 
paper-made  banks  succumbed  to  the  first  gust  of  the  tem 
pest  ;  and  when  the  oldest  and  stanchest  suspended  specie 
payment,  as  nearly  all  had  by  the  middle  of  May,  the  pros 
tration  and  consternation  were  complete  and  universal. 
Some  idea  of  the  extent  of  these  calamities  may  be  formed 
from  the  estimate  that  nearly  half  a  million  persons  became 
bankrupt ;  and  this,  of  course,  makes  no  account  of  the 
hardships  of  the  vastly  greater  number  dependent  on  wages 
and  salaries.  There  is  little  wonder,  therefore,  that  in  some 
cases  stores  and  warehouses  were  despoiled  by  mobs. 

One  of  the  most  forbidding  features  of  politics  is  that  no 
national  catastrophe  is  so  dire  and  universal  that  politicians 
will  not  utilize  it  for  partisan  advantage.  Despite  the  dismal 
havoc  of  the  crisis,  the  Whig  leaders  seemed  to  hail  it  with 
malign  delight.  With  vociferous  acclaim  they  paraded  their 
past  prophecies  and  pointed  to  the  wreck  and  ruin  on  every 
side  as  proof  of  their  realization.  Again  all  the  familiar 
accusations  and  denunciations  of  Jackson  were  revived  and 
volleyed  forth  with  inflamed  zeal.  That  most  of  them  had 
done  service  through  two  Presidential  campaigns  and  had 
been  signally  voted  down  only  swelled  the  energy  with 
which  they  were  now  renewed.  What  could  be  more  con 
vincing  !  Every  phase  of  the  grievous  situation  had  been 
foretold ;  for  years  it  had  been  the  constant  text  of  Whig 

1  "  For  the  last  two  weeks  there  has  been  a  succession  of  enormous  fail 
ures  in  New  Orleans  and  New  York,  extending  to  Philadelphia,  Boston, 
and  partially  to  other  cities." — Adams's  Diary,  May  4,  1837,  vol.  ix.  p.  355. 
"  The  number  of  failures  is  so  great  daily  that  I  do  not  keep  a  record  of 
them,  even  in  my  mind."  —  Hone's  Diary,  May  2,  1837,  vol.  i.  p.  253. 
Nevertheless,  there  were  some  light  tints  in  the  general  scene  of  distress. 
Hone  records  that  in  September  nine  theatres  were  running  in  New  York 
city.— Ibid.,  p.  266. 


Cn.IX.]  THE  PENNSYLVANIA   BANK  351 

orators  and  writers.  Jackson  had  been  honored  and  trusted 
by  the  people,  but  he  had  betrayed  them.  The  proof  was 
only  too  manifest.  His  ignorance,  perversity,  and  despotic 
will  had  stopped  the  sources  of  public  blessings  and  blasted 
national  prosperity.  Argument  was  no  longer  needful.  The 
broadcast  ruin  was  demonstration.  The  masses,  inclined,  as 
they  always  are,  to  trace  their  misfortunes  to  something 
immediate  and  tangible,  instead  of  remote  and  complex 
causes,  absorbed  the  quackery  thus  dinned  into  their  eager 
and  willing  ears. 

After  the  charter  of  the  bank  expired,  the  institution, 
with  amazing  effrontery  and  corruption,  transmigrated  into 
a  State  corporation  under  the  hybrid  name  of  "  Pennsyl 
vania  Bank  of  the  United  States."  It  did  not  follow  the 
usual  and  legal  course  of  liquidation  and  winding -up,  but 
merely  transferred  its  assets  and  obligations  to  the  new  cor 
poration  and  proceeded  without  material  interruption,  even 
reissuing  the  old  notes.  Moreover,  as  it  afterward  tran 
spired,  the  business  methods  and  operations  now  prosecuted 
were  shockingly  irregular  and  dishonest;  yet  Biddle  and 
his  allies,1  with  practised  skill,  at  once  assumed  the  initiative 
in  a  new  agitation  against  the  policy  it  was  believed  the 
new  administration  would  pursue.  In  short,  before  Yan 
Buren  was  inaugurated,  the  campaign  to  elect  a  "Whig  suc- 


1  Notwithstanding  the  action  of  the  bank,  Biddle  had  lost  nothing  of 
his  influence  among  the  Whigs.  March  28,  a  meeting  of  merchants  was 
held  in  New  York  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  the  bank  to  do  something 
to  mitigate  the  distress.  Hone  wrote:  "I  was  invited  to  attend  this 
meeting;  never  was  such  an  assemblage  of  woe-begone  countenances. 
Despondency  had  taken  the  place  of  that  indomitable  spirit  which  usual 
ly  characterizes  the  merchants  of  New  York,  and  Nicholas  Biddle,  the 
insulted  and  proscribed  of  Andrew  Jackson  and  his  myrmidons,  is  the 
sun  to  which  they  alone  can  look  to  illumine  the  darkness." — Diary,  vol.  i. 
p.  249. 


352  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

cessor  was  begun.  And  such  was  the  greedy  zeal  to  take 
advantage  of  the  coming  events  whose  lurid  shadows  already 
lay  athwart  the  activities  of  the  land,  that  the  formal  and 
spectacular  opening  of  the  campaign  was  arranged  for 
March  15,  but  eleven  days  after  the  inauguration.  It  took 
place,  according  to  the  programme,  at  the  city  of  New 
York,  with  all  the  accompaniments  of  such  occasions. 
Daniel  Webster  was  the  medium.  Elaborate  preparations 
were  made  to  greet  him  on  his  return  after  the  close  of  the 
session.  He  came  by  steamboat  from  Amboy  and  was  es 
corted  to  the  American  Hotel  by  a  great  procession.  In 
the  evening  he  spoke  at  Niblo's  for  two  hours  and  a  half 
to  a  rapt  audience  of  thousands.  His  speech  was  a  power 
ful  and  animated  resume  of  the  financial  controversies 
which  had  vexed  the  country  during  Jackson's  Presidency, 
and  was  laden  with  dismal  forebodings  of  calamities  to 
come  unless  the  measures  of  the  Whig  party  were  adopted. 
It  was  not  only  a  political  harangue,  but  it  was  calculated 
to  intensify  the  distress  that  was  daily  becoming  more 
manifest  and  terrifying.  JSTo  man  ever  lived  more  capable 
of  mastering  the  problems  of  national  finance  than  Webster. 
During  his  early  career  he  evinced  consummate  understand 
ing  and  grasp  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  whole 
subject,  and  the  genius  to  state  them  with  comprehensive 
ness,  lucidity,  and  power.  But  he  soon  receded  from  his 
original  principles — principles  that  cannot  die  or  change. 
He  lacked  mental  integrity.  He  was  faithless  to  his  own 
intellect.  In  his  eager  efforts  to  gain  the  Presidency  he 
sacrificed  great  opportunities  for  the  public  good  and  for 
his  own  lofty  reputation,  and  sank  in  the  mire  of  partisan 
advocacy.  Had  his  force  of  character  and  will  been  equal 
to  his  mind  he  would  not  have  become  merely  a  service- 


CH.  IX.]      SUGGESTIONS  TO   RELIEVE  THE   CRISIS      353 

able  auxiliary  to  lesser  men  who  dominated  him  and  then  re 
warded  his  servility  with  cold  indifference  to  his  ambition. 

His  reception  and  speech  were  but  the  first  phase  of  the 
prearranged  plan  to  make  political  capital  of  the  distress  of 
the  country.  April  25,  it  was  followed  by  another  imposing 
demonstration  in  the  same  city.  It  was  styled  a  meeting  of 
merchants,  and  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  a  set  of  resolu 
tions  ascribing  the  crisis  to  governmental  interference  with 
business  and  commerce,  intermeddling  with  the  currency, 
the  destruction  of  the  bank,  the  attempt  to  substitute 
metallic  for  credit  currency,  and  the  issuing  of  the  specie 
circular;  admonishing  the  administration  against  maintain 
ing  the  policy  of  its  predecessor ;  and  directing  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  committee  of  fifty  to  urge  the  President  to  with 
draw  the  circular,  forbear  the  enforcement  of  importers' 
bonds,  and  call  an  extra  session  of  Congress.  And,  to  en 
hance  the  popular  effect,  other  cities  were  invited  to  co 
operate  in  this  crusade.  It  was  also  provided  that  another 
meeting  be  called  to  receive  the  report  of  the  committee. 

May  3,  the  committee  waited  on  the  President  with  for 
mality  and  display,  and  presented  a  long  and  harrowing 
statement  of  the  existing  situation  and  the  alleged  causes 
that  produced  it.  The  relief  proposed  was  the  adoption  of 
the  entire  "Whig  programme  contained  in  the  resolutions  of 
the  merchants'  meeting,  with  the  addition  of  Clay's  land- 
money  plan.  The  arraignment  of  Jackson  was  harsh  and 
unstinted  and  in  the  usual  style  of  the  Whig  diatribes.  It 
was  rashly  imprudent,  if  not  insolent,  unless  the  committee 
acted  under  the  delusion  that  Yan  Buren  was  so  terrorized 
and  susceptible  that  he  could  be  forced  into  compliance. 
If  so,  the  character  and  temper  of  the  man  were  radically 
misunderstood.  He  received  the  committee  with  his  ac- 

23 


354  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

customed  urbanity,  and  calmly  listened  to  the  address. 
Had  he  been  like  Jackson  he  would  have  treated  it  as  an 
insult  and  shown  the  committee  the  door.  But  this  was 
not  his  method.  When  the  presentation  was  concluded  he 
suavely  bowed  the  gentlemen  out,  promising  a  written  re 
ply  the  next  day.  It  was  accordingly  delivered.  Although 
couched  in  temperate  phrase,  it  was  a  firm  refusal  to  accede 
to  any  of  the  demands,  except  that  he  promised  reasonable 
indulgence  to  the  importers.  He  assured  the  committee 
that  before  his  election  he  had  declared  his  approval  of  the 
measures  of  his  predecessor;  that  knowing  this,  the  people 
had  elected  him ;  and  that  he  proposed  to  adhere  to  them. 
The  committee  returned  to  New  York  professedly  indig 
nant,  but  probably  without  poignant  disappointment ;  for 
the  outcome  was  doubtless  supposed  to  be  politically  effica 
cious.  Biddle,  also,  had  not  neglected  the  opportunity.  He 
had  followed  at  the  heels  of  the  committee,  and  took  occa 
sion  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  President.  He  was  likewise 
treated  with  all  the  gracious  civility  that  any  distinguished 
caller  would  have  received.  But  as  his  counsel  was  not 
solicited — as  he  expected  it  would  be — he,  too,  felt  slighted 
and  aggrieved. 

May  8,  another  public  meeting  was  held,  at  which  the  com 
mittee  made  its  barren  but  rhetorical  report,  and  revealed 
the  animus  of  the  whole  performance  by  declaring  that  the 
only  hope  left  for  the  sorely  afflicted  country  was  the  arbit 
rament  of  the  ballot-box.  New  resolutions  reasserting  the 
declaratory  substance  of  the  previous  ones  were  adopted. 
They  virtually  constituted  the  platform  that  was  again  to 
serve  the  "Whig  party.1  On  the  10th,  the  banks  of  New 

i  "It  is  a  very  common  fact  that  for  thirty-four  years  (since  1828)  very 
few  merchants  of  the  first  class  have  been  Democrats.  The  mass  of  large 


CH.  IX.]     AN   INDISCRIMINATE   PAPER   CURRENCY     355 

York  suspended  specie  payment,  and  most  of  the  banks  of 
other  cities  immediately  followed  their  example.  Their  ac 
tion,  however,  was  at  once  legalized  by  the  State  legislat 
ures.  The  suspension  of  all  but  six  of  the  deposit  banks 
compelled  the  Treasury  Department  to  retain  most  of  the 
incoming  revenues  in  the  hands  of  the  collectors  or  on 
special  deposit.  This  situation  rendered  an  extra  session  of 
Congress  indispensable.  There  was  no  other  recourse,  and 
the  President  yielded  to  the  necessity. 

The  climax  of  the  crisis  had  now  been  passed.  The  whirl 
wind  of  ruin  had  spent  itself,  and  the  strain  and  excite 
ment  were  followed  by  a  period  of  commercial  stagnation. 
The  suspension  of  the  banks  required  them  to  accept  each 
other's  paper,  and  in  consequence  gold  and  silver  coin  van 
ished.1  Even  the  government  was  forced  to  receive  and 
disburse  depreciated  notes.  Inasmuch  as  no  paramount 
authority  was  exerted  over  paper  currency,  it  was  issued 
in  every  form  and  by  any  individual,  firm,  and  corpora 
tion  that  chose  to  do  so.  It  was  often  a  medium  of  coarse 
and  insulting  caricature  to  influence  the  masses  against 
the  administration,  for  they  were  instructed  by  all  avail 
able  means  to  regard  Jackson  as  the  cause  of  the  distress 
and  Van  Buren  as  the  obstacle  to  its  alleviation.  ISTor 
did  the  Whig  leaders  relax  their  efforts  to  solidify  their 
political  advantage.  Not  long  after  "Webster  delivered  his 


and  little  merchants  have,  like  a  flock  of  sheep,  gathered  either  in  the 
Federal,  Whig,  Clay,  or  Republican  folds.  The  Democratic  merchants 
could  easily  have  been  stowed  in  a  large  Eighth  Avenue  railroad-car." — 
Barrett's  Old  Merchants  of  New  York  (first  series),  p.  81. 

1  Gold,  "Jackson  money,"  had  come  into  common  circulation  and  was 
ostentatiously  carried  by  the  Democrats.  The  gold  eagle  had  not  been 
previously  coined  for  thirty-five  years. — Chevalier's  Society  in  the  United 
States,  p.  147 ;  Giles's  Register,  vol.  Iv.  p.  321. 


356  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1837 

speech  in  New  York  he  made  a  long  Western  tour  and 
spoke  in  several  places  in  much  the  same  vein,  endeavoring 
to  the  utmost  to  decry  and  cripple  the  administration.  He 
was  already  working  for  the  nomination  in  1840.  His  ut 
terances  furnished  the  stock  ideas  that  were  elaborated  and 
diffused  by  the  press  and  the  orators  of  the  Whig  party. 
The  Treasury  was  soon  in  critical  straits.  Aside  from  diffi 
culties  that  were  arduous  and  perplexing  without  forced  ag 
gravation,  it  was  in  the  serious  dilemma  of  having  to  pay  to 
the  States,  under  the  deposit  law,  what  it  urgently  needed 
for  current  expenses.  But  in  this  situation,  however  press 
ing  the  necessities,  the  interim  between  the  calling  of  the 
special  session  and  its  convening  was  none  too  long  to  allow 
the  excitement  to  abate  and  for  the  formulation  of  plans  to 
meet  the  emergency. 

The  personnel  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Congress  was  remarka 
bly  strong  and  brilliant.  The  prolonged  political  contests 
had  directed  the  ambition  of  many  able  men  toward  public 
life;  and  neither  the  Senate  nor  the  House  has  ever  con 
tained  a  greater  number  of  men  already  distinguished  and  to 
attain  distinction  than  met  on  the  first  Monday  of  Septem 
ber,  1837,  to  deal  with  the  unprecedented  condition  of  the 
country  and  the  national  finances.1  Yet  it  would  doubtless 
have  been  better  had  there  been  less  political  animosity,  am 
bition,  and  insistence ;  for  such  conditions  are  extremely  ad- 

1  Adams's  opinion,  however,  of  the  personnel  of  Congress  was  unfavor 
able  ;  but  his  estimates  of  men  were  seldom  complimentary.  December  27, 
1838,  he  wrote  :  "  When  I  look  upon  the  composition  of  these  two  bodies, 
the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States — the 
cream,  of  the  land,  the  curled  darlings  of  fifteen  millions,  scattered  over  a 
surface  of  two  millions  of  square  miles— the  remarkable  phenomenon  that 
they  present  is  the  level  of  intellect  and  of  morals  upon  which  they  stand  , 
and  this  universal  mediocrity  is  the  basis  upon  which  the  liberties  of  the 
nation  repose." — Diary,  vol.  x.  p.  78. 


CH.  IX.]      VAN  BUREN'S   VIEWS  ON  THE  CRISIS      357 

verse  to  the  rational  solution  of  financial  problems.  The 
chief  benefit  of  the  political  struggles  about  to  be  renewed 
in  Congress  were  the  lessons  that  they  were  to  teach  in  the 
future.  The  strenuous  character  of  the  impending  contest 
and  the  extremity  of  political  danger  in  which  the  admin 
istration  stood  were  plainly  indicated  by  the  slender  major 
ity  by  which  Polk,  the  administration  candidate,  was  elect 
ed  Speaker  of  the  House.  The  vote  was  116  to  103.  But  if 
any  doubt  existed  as  to  Yan  Buren's  firmness  it  was  dissi 
pated  by  his  message,  which  had  been  anxiously  awaited.1 
It  is  one  of  the  ablest  messages  ever  presented  to  Congress, 
evincing  profound  insight  into  the  situation  that  existed,  the 
causes  that  produced  it,  and  the  right  policy  to  pursue.  In 
later  times  it  has  received  the  general  and  decisive  sanction 
of  economists  and  financiers,  an  4  the  constrained  approval 
of  writers,  like  Yon  Hoist,  adversely  disposed  toward  Yan 
Buren  and  his  administration. 

He  first  adverted  to  the  immediate  reasons  for  convoking 
Congress — the  suspension  of  the  deposit  banks,  which  ren 
dered  nugatory  the  provisions  of  law  in  regard  to  the  "  de 
posit  and  safe-keeping  "  of  the  public  moneys ;  the  want  of 
means  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  government ;  the  ina 
bility  of  the  importers  to  meet  their  bonds  for  duties ;  and 
the  difficulty  of  the  Treasury  in  maintaining  specie  pay 
ments.  He  then  entered  upon  a  clear  and  forcible  exposition 
of  the  causes  of  the  crisis.  He  ascribed  them  to  "  over-action 
in  all  departments  of  business — an  over-action  deriving,  per 
haps,  its  first  impulses  from  antecedent  causes,  but  stimulated 


1  "The  President's  message  was  brought  on  to  this  city  by  railroad, 
steamboats,  and  horsemen,  and  carried  from  hence  to  Boston,  which  place 
it  reached  in  the  incredibly  short  space  of  twenty-four  hours  from  Wash 
ington,  a  distance  of  five  hundred  miles." — Hone's  Diary,  vol.  i.  p.  268. 


358  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

to  its  destructive  consequences  by 'excessive  issues  of  bank 
paper  and  by  other  facilities  for  the  acquisition  and  enlarge 
ment  of  credit."  "  The  consequences  of  this  redundancy  of 
credit,  and  of  the  spirit  of  reckless  speculation  engendered  by 
it,"  were  the  vast  foreign  debt  contracted  here ;  the  invest 
ment  of  many  millions  in  unproductive  Western  lands,  and 
the  creation  of  a  prodigious  amount  of  debt  for  other  real 
estate  equally  unproductive  and  at  prices  disproportionate 
to  its  actual  value ;  the  improvident  expenditures  for  public 
improvements ;  the  diversion  of  labor  that  should  have  been 
applied  to  agriculture,  resulting  in  the  necessity  for  large 
importations  of  grain ;  and  the  growth  of  luxury  founded 
on  fancied  rather  than  real  wealth.  To  these  he  added,  as 
aggravating  influences,  the  loss  of  capital  by  the  great  con 
flagration  in  New  York  city  in  1836 ;  the  disturbing  effects 
of  transferring  the  public  funds  under  the  deposit  law ;  the 
measures  of  foreign  creditors  to  reduce  their  loans,  and  the 
consequent  withdrawal  from  the  United  States  of  a  large 
portion  of  our  specie.  He  then  adverted  to  the  situation 
abroad,  always  an  element  necessarily  to  be  considered  in 
properly  investigating  the  financial  and  commercial  condi 
tion  of  this  country.  "  It  has  since  appeared,"  said  he,  "that 
evils  similar  to  those  suffered  by  ourselves  have  been  ex 
perienced  in  Great  Britain,  on  the  Continent,  and  indeed 
throughout  the  commercial  world ;  and  that  in  other  coun 
tries  as  well  as  our  own  they  have  been  uniformly  preceded, 
as  with  us,  by  unprecedented  expansions  of  the  systems  of 
credit." l 

1  "Great  gloom  then  gathered  over  our  commerce,  a  panic  set  in  in 
earnest,  and  bankruptcies,  cessation  of  business,  depreciation  of  goods  and 
securities,  prostration  of  trade,  followed  each  other  with  wonderful  rapid 
ity.  ...  At  Manchester  there  were  50,000  hands  out  of  employment,  and 
most  of  those  employed  were  working  only  on  half-time.  In  Scotland 


CH.  IX.]          THE   INDEPENDENT   TREASURY  359 

Such  was  the  introduction  to  the  leading  measure  to  which 
Yan  Buren  committed  his  party — the  establishment  of  an 
independent  Treasury,  "  to  separate  the  fiscal  operations  of 
the  government  from  those  of  individuals  or  corporations." 
It  was  necessarily  followed  by  an  elaborate  declaration 
against  the  re-establishment  of  a  national  bank  in  any  form. 
He  emphatically  denounced  this  plan,  which  was  the  chief 
feature  of  the  Whig  policy,  maintaining  that  it  would  be 
incompetent  to  effect  any  beneficial  purpose  and  would 
"  impair  the  rightful  supremacy  of  the  popular  will,  injure 
the  character  and  diminish  the  influence  of  our  political 
system,  and  bring  once  more  into  existence  a  concentrated 
money  power  hostile  to  the  spirit  and  threatening  the  per 
manency  of  our  republican  institutions."  He  cogently  de 
monstrated  that  a  national  bank  was  not  needed  to  facili 
tate  domestic  or  foreign  exchange,  and  asserted  that  it  is 
not  the  proper  and  Constitutional  province  of  the  govern 
ment  to  aid  individuals  in  the  transfer  of  their  funds  ex 
cept  through  the  post-office. 

He  was  equally  averse  to  the  use  of  State  or  local  banks 
as  depositories  for  the  public  moneys.  They  had  been  thus 
employed  during  three  periods — anterior  to  the  first  na 
tional  bank,  during  the  interval  between  the  first  and  the 
second,  and  since  1833 — and  had  proved  unsuccessful  not 
withstanding  the  precautions  and  safeguards  provided  by 


there  were  many  failures,  and  in  Ireland  the  state  of  trade  was  still  worse." 
— Levi's  History  of  British  Commerce,  p.  233.  "The  accounts  from  Eng 
land  are  very  alarming  ;  the  panic  prevails  there  as  bad  as  here.  Cotton 
has  fallen  ;  the  loss  on  shipments  will  be  very  heavy,  and  American  cred 
its  will  be  withdrawn.  The  paper  of  Southern  and  Western  merchants  is 
coming  back  protested."  "  Everything  in  England  is  tending  to  a  com 
mercial  crisis  like  that  in  which  we  are  placed." — Hone's  Diary,  March  20, 
May  12,  1837,  vol.  i.  pp.  248,  259. 


360  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

law.  This  forced  the  inquiry  whether  the  government  could 
not  and  should  not  be  entirely  severed  from  all  connection 
with  banks,  however  convenient  such  agencies  might  be  in 
ordinary  times.  He  reached  the  conclusion  that  "  the  collec 
tion,  safe-keeping,  transfer,  and  disbursement  of  the  public 
money  can  be  well  managed  by  the  officers  of  the  govern 
ment."  This,  in  brief,  was  the  general  scheme  of  the  pro 
posed  independent  Treasury,  the  details  and  difficulties  of 
which  he  carefully  considered.  He  incidentally  discussed 
the  character  of  the  funds  that  should  be  received  and  dis 
bursed  by  the  government,  and  urged,  as  a  salutary  check 
upon  issues  of  paper  currency,  the  continuance  of  the  pol 
icy  instituted  by  the  specie  circular,  and  the  propriety  of  a 
general  bankruptcy  law  that  would  include  corporations 
and  banks  as  well  as  individuals.  He  also  desired  that  the 
remainder  of  the  undistributed  surplus,  nearly  $9,400,000, 
should  be  retained  to  meet  government  necessities  instead 
of  being  turned  over  to  the  States.  The  sentiment  pervad 
ing  the  message  was,  as  expressed  at  its  close,  that  the  real 
duty  of  the  government  "  is  to  enact  and  enforce  a  system 
of  general  laws  commensurate  with,  but  not  exceeding,  the 
objects  of  its  establishment,  and  to  leave  every  citizen  and 
every  interest  to  reap,  under  its  benign  protection,  the  re 
wards  of  virtue,  industry,  and  prudence." 

As  soon  as  the  reading  of  the  message  was  concluded  in 
the  Senate,  Silas  "Wright,  who  was  to  be  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Finance,  and  who  sustained  much  the  same 
relation  to  Yan  Buren  that  Benton  had  to  Jackson,  made 
the  usual  motion  to  print.  Clay  immediately  seconded  the 
motion,  but  took  occasion  to  assail  the  President's  policy. 
"  While  I  am  up,"  said  he,  "  I  cannot  forbear  saying  that 
after  attentively  listening  to  the  reading  of  this  message  I 


CH.  IX.]      CLAY'S   OPPOSITION  TO   VAN   BUREN          361 

feel  the  deepest  regret  that  the  President,  entertaining  such 
views  and  proposing  such  a  plan  for  the  relief  of  the  country 
as  he  had  presented,  has  deemed  it  his  duty  to  call  an  extra 
session  of  Congress  at  this  inconvenient  period  of  the  year." 
This  was  only  a  slight,  yet  sufficient  indication  of  the  gant 
let  through  which  the  project  of  the  independent  Treas 
ury  was  to  run.  Nor  was  it  the  first  intimation  that  Clay 
had  given  of  his  intention  to  wage  systematic  warfare  on 
whatever  policy  the  administration  might  announce.  Im 
mediately  after  the  election  he  proposed  to  his  followers 
an  organized  opposition,  grounded  on  the  theory  that  Yan 
Buren  had  been  designated  by  Jackson  as  his  successor  and 
triumphed  through  the  machinery  and  patronage  of  the 
government.  "  Now  I  think,"  he  wrote  to  a  correspondent, 
"that  no  wisdom  or  benefit  in  the  measures  of  the  new  ad 
ministration  can  compensate  or  atone  for  this  vice  in  its 
origin." 

Clay  was  apparent!}7  too  anxious  for  the  Presidential  nom 
ination  in  1840  to  be  honest  with  himself  or  regardful  of 
the  true  interests  of  the  country.  Prompted  by  similar 
motives,  he  had  denounced  the  opposition  to  the  adminis 
tration  of  John  Quincy  Adams  as  factious  and  culpable.1 
Although  this  plan  of  campaign  was  meditated  before  the 
beginning  of  the  crisis,  it  was  not  changed  afterward.  The 
calamitous  situation  of  the  country  only  encouraged  the 
efforts  to  break  down  the  administration  and  to  frustrate 
every  measure  it  proposed.  And  within  this  general  move 
ment,  in  which  all  the  Whig  leaders  were  feverishly  active 
and  united,  were  the  operations  of  the  friends  of  the  several 
candidates,  who  sought  to  avail  themselves  of  the  final  re- 


Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  116. 


362  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

suits.  Clay's  adherents  were  early  in  the  field.  Soon  after 
Yan  Buren's  inauguration  a  meeting  was  held  in  New  York 
to  promote  Clay's  interests.  He  was  formally  notified  of 
the  proceedings,  and  in  August  replied  in  an  artfully  com 
posed  letter,  which  was  widely  published.  He  stated  that 
the  agitation  of  the  subject  was  premature,  especially  in 
view  of  the  distracted  condition  of  the  country.  Yet  he 
was  careful  not  to  rebuke  his  partisans  for  their  zeal  or  to 
advise  a  long  postponement.  He  agreed  that  in  regard  to  a 
candidate  for  the  Presidency  "  some  mode  should  be  adopted 
of  collecting  the  general  sense  of  those  who  believe  it  im 
portant  to  the  preservation  of  our  liberties  involved,  the  cor 
rection  of  abuses,  and  a  thorough  reform  in  the  Executive 
administration,  that  there  should  be  a  change  in  the  Chief 
Magistracy."  He  then  revealed  his  ardent  desire  for  the 
nomination,  but  in  the  temperate  and  diplomatic  language 
peculiar  to  candidates  in  his  situation.1 

Therefore,  Clay's  immediate  announcement  of  disapproval 
of  the  policy  outlined  by  the  message  was  not  surprising. 
However  his  candidacy  for  the  Presidential  nomination  was 
regarded  by  his  rivals,  he  was  the  chief  spirit  of  the  opposi 
tion  ;  his  leadership  was  still  paramount.  In  their  hostility 
to  the  administration  there  was  little  discord  among  the 
Whigs.  That  any  measure  emanated  from  the  administra 
tion  was  sufficient  reason  for  them  to  oppose  it  if  it  had 
a  political  bearing.  Measures  were  soon  proposed.  They 
were  in  the  form  of  seven  bills,  reported  by  Wright  from 


1  November  22,  1837,  the  Whigs  of  New  York  city  held  a  celebration 
of  their  local  victory.  "  The  indications  of  public  feeling  during  the  day, 
which  I  have  watched  carefully,  have  been  in  ray  opinion  decidedly  in 
favor  of  Mr.  Clay  as  the  Whig  candidate  for  President."— Hone's  Diary, 
vol.  i.  p.  280. 


CH.  IX.]     ADMINISTRATION   FINANCIAL   MEASURES     363 

the  Committee  on  Finance,  and  incorporated  substantially 
the  recommendations  of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury :  to  postpone  indefinitely  the  fourth  instal 
ment  of  deposit  with  the  States ;  to  authorize  the  issue  of 
Treasury  notes  to  relieve  the  necessities  of  the  government ; 
to  extend  the  time  of  payment  of  importers'  bonds ;  to  ad 
just  the  remaining  claims  upon  the  deposit  banks ;  to  pro 
vide  for  the  placing  of  imports  in  the  public  stores  and  the 
payment  of  duties  when  the  goods  were  withdrawn ;  to  im 
pose  additional  functions  upon  certain  public  officers — the 
independent  Treasury  system ;  to  revoke  the  charters  of 
such  banks  in  the  District  of  Columbia  as  should  not  within 
a  fixed  time  resume  specie  payments,  and  to  suppress  the 
issue  of  small  notes  in  the  District.  They  were  also  intro 
duced  in  the  House  to  expedite  debate.  "With  the  excep 
tion  of  the  bills  in  regard  to  the  revenue  bonds  and  to  ad 
just  the  claims  on  the  deposit  banks,  they  were  at  once 
attacked  with  all  the  vigor  and  ingenuity  the  opposition 
commanded. 

The  bill  to  postpone  the  fourth  instalment  of  deposit  was 
rancorously  assailed  as  a  breach  of  faith,  on  the  theory  that 
the  States  had  already  incurred  obligations  on  the  prospect 
of  receiving  it.  The  condition  of  the  Treasury  and  the 
source  of  the  fund  did  not  influence  the  absurd  and  dema 
gogical  efforts  to  defeat  it.  It  passed  both  houses,  however, 
and  was  the  first  of  the  proposed  measures  to  become  a 
law.  But  so  many  Democrats  in  the  House  were  reluctant 
to  yield  the  scheme  of  distribution  that  it  was  there  insisted 
that  the  postponement  be  made  definite — January  1,  1839 — 
and  the  Senate  concurred.  The  bill  also  took  from  the  Sec 
retary  of  the  Treasury  the  power  of  recalling  the  past  in 
stalments,  and  left  it  with  Congress— a  sufficient  guarantee 


364  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

that  it  would  not  be  exercised.  Despite  the  intention  to  car 
ry  out  the  original  plan,  the  fourth  instalment  was  not  de 
livered.  January  1, 1839,  the  condition  of  the  Treasury  still 
forbade  it,  and  the  instalment  was  at  length  relinquished. 
But  the  funds  that  had  been  "deposited"  with  the  States 
have  never  been  recalled.  It  is  not  probable  that  another 
distribution  will  ever  be  attempted.  The  profligacy  of  Con 
gress  is  likely  to  prove  an  adequate  solvent  of  any  surplus 
that  may  threaten,  even  should  there  be  a  disposition  to  ig 
nore  the  lesson  of  the  surplus  of  1837. 

The  bill  to  authorize  the  issue  of  Treasury  notes  (to  the 
amount  of  $10,000,000)  was  denounced  as  a  proposed  emis 
sion  of  paper  currency,  and  ridiculed  as  an  ignominious  re 
treat  from  the  much- vaunted  purpose  to  establish  an  entire 
ly  metallic  monetary  system.  In  truth,  the  proposition  was 
distasteful  to  many  friends  of  the  administration,  notably 
Benton.  Their  support  was  gained  only  by  the  urgency  of 
the  situation  and  by  removing  the  notes  as  far  as  practicable 
from  the  function  of  currency.  They  were  to  be  issued  in 
denominations  of  not  less  than  $50,  interest  bearing,  payable 
one  year  from  their  date,  and  transferable  only  by  endorse 
ment.  Though  receivable  for  public  dues,  they  were  not  legal 
tender  and  not  reissuable.  With  every  precaution  thus  taken 
to  prevent  the  issue  from  assuming  the  character  of  cur 
rency,  it  did  not  merit  the  animadversion  it  received.  Under 
the  circumstances,  it  was  probably  the  best  method  of  pro 
viding  the  means  indispensable  to  the  Treasury,  as  it  was 
more  expeditious  and  advantageous  than  a  direct  loan  would 
have  been.  It  encountered  more  opposition  in  the  House 
than  in  the  Senate,  where  Clay  grotesquely  assailed  it  as  at 
tempting  to  create  a  government  bank  of  issue  in  disguise. 
It  was  the  second  bill  of  the  session  to  become  a  law.  "With- 


CH.  IX.]         CALHOUN   SUPPORTS   VAN   BUREN  365 

in  the  next  five  years  this  mode  of  procuring  means  was  sev 
eral  times  resorted  to  without  much  question. 

The  main  struggle  of  the  session  was.  of  course,  waged 
over  the  proposed  independent  Treasury  —  the  "divorce 
bill,"  as  it  was  styled.  It  involved  all  the  principal  ele 
ments  of  the  great  controversy  between  the  two  parties.  As 
originally  proposed,  it  provided  that  the  revenues  should  be 
disbursed  by  the  proper  government  officials  at  the  Treas 
ury  and  the  Sub-Treasuries  to  be  established  at  the  chief 
commercial  centres.  In  this  form  the  measure  was  radical 
and  far-reaching,  as  it  would  entirely  terminate  the  use  of 
banks  for  any  purpose  by  the  government ;  but  the  possi 
bilities  of  the  system  were  not  fully  disclosed  until  Calhoun 
offered  an  amendment  providing  that  by  gradual  degrees, 
until  January  1, 1841,  the  revenues  of  the  government  from 
all  sources  should  be  paid  only  in  gold  and  silver  or  paper  is 
sued  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States  and  expressly 
permitted  by  law  to  be  received. 

Calhoun  had 'severed  his  late  alliance  with  the  Whigs  and 
engaged  with  his  usual  vigor  in  support  of  the  financial 
measures  of  the  administration.  And  his  support  was  so 
able  and  important  that  he  perforce  shared  the  Democrat 
ic  leadership  with  Wright  and  Benton.  His  speech  on  the 
specie  amendment  covered  with  clearness  and  power  the 
whole  subject  of  the  proposed  financial  policy  and  the  causes 
and  conditions  that  prompted  it.  He  necessarily  found  it 
awkward  to  reconcile  the  views  he  expressed  with  some 
phases  of  his  opposition  to  Jackson's  measures ;  yet  he  was 
hampered  by  no  radical  inconsistency  so  far  as  his  purely 
financial  opinions  were  concerned.  His  new  alliance  was 
not  unexpected.  For  some  time,  in  fact,  Clay  and  other 
prominent  Whigs  had  chafed  under  the  necessity  and  cir- 


366  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

cumstances  that  Induced  co-operation  with  the  nullifiers,1 
and  they  were  not  much  averse  to  the  change  of  situation 
that  dissolved  it.  They  expected  soon  to  need  no  aid  from 
without  the  party  to  execute  their  designs.  Calhoun's  ex 
planation  of  his  attitude — for  his  peculiar  political  position 
did  not  require  him  to  furnish  party  justification — was  that 
a  new  political  and  financial  era  had  arrived  and  that  he 
was  free  to  act  de  novo.  "  I  move  off,"  said  he,  "  under  the 
States  -  rights  banner,  and  go  in  the  direction  in  which  I 
have  been  so  long  moving." 

The  debate  was  long  and  earnest,  most  of  the  Whig  Sena 
tors  participating  and  vying  with  one  another  in  ingenuity 
to  adduce  arguments  against  the  Democratic  policy.  Most 
of  the  arguments,  however,  are  so  blended  with  political 
and  partisan  considerations  as  to  render  them  of  little  ser 
vice  to  the  science  of  finance.  The  principal  reasons  urged 
against  an  independent  Treasury  were  that  it  would  place 
too  much  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Executive,  by  increas 
ing  the  patronage  and  by  affording  opportunity  for  favor 
itism  in  one  way  and  another  to  political  friends ;  that  it 
was  calculated  to  impair  the  entire  banking  system  of  the 
country  and  abnormally  contract  the  currency ;  that  it 
would  necessitate  the  exclusive  use  of  coin  by  the  govern 
ment  and  paper  by  the  people ;  that  the  public  funds  would 
be  insecure ;  and  that  the  scheme  was  opposed  to  the  prin 
ciples  of  our  government  and  would  be  a  return  to  anti 
quated  methods. 

Webster  was  looked  to  as  the  chief  exponent  of  the 
strictly  financial  views  of  his  party ;  but  while  his  utter 
ances  contain  much  that  is  true  and  valuable,  he  was  too 

1  Clay  wrote  in  April,  1834  :  "  The  nullifiers  are  doing  us  no  good  here." 
— Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  382. 


CH.  IX.]  CLAY  ON  THE  INDEPENDENT  TREASURY  367 

much  imbued  with  partisanship  to  render  his  speeches  in 
vulnerable.  Like  all  his  Whig  colleagues,  he  suggested  no 
remedy  in  place  of  the  one  he  decried,  except  the  institution 
of  another  national  bank. 

Clay  spoke  toward  the  close  of  the  debate.  As  might  be 
expected,  his  speech  was  mainly  political.  A  large  part  of 
it  was  but  a  repetition  in  new  form  of  his  previous  speeches 
attributing  the  financial  condition  of  the  country  entirely 
to  Jackson's  measures.  He,  therefore,  took  issue  with  the 
President's  statement  with  regard  to  the  causes  of  the  crisis 
as  set  forth  in  his  message.  He  imputed  to  the  administra 
tion  the  design  to  subvert  the  State  banks  and  place  them 
at  the  mercy  of  the  federal  government,  and  argued  strenu 
ously  in  favor  of  a  convertible  paper  system  through  the 
medium  of  the  banks.  He  then  repeated  the  current  ob 
jections  to  the  measure :  insecurity  of  the  public  funds 
through  danger  of  peculation,  "the  liability  to  favorit 
ism,"  "  the  fearful  increase  of  Executive  patronage,"  "  the 
perilous  union  of  the  purse  and  the  sword " ;  and  that  the 
system  was  "  destined  to  become,  if  it  was  not  designed  to 
be,  a  vast  and  ramified  connection  of  government  banks, 
of  which  the  principal  will  be  at  Washington  and  every 
Sub -Treasury  will  be  a  branch,"  on  the  theory  that  the 
drafts  of  the  Secretary  on  the  Sub-Treasuries  would  oper 
ate  as  a  general  currency  in  the  place  of  bank-notes.  Af 
ter  alleging  inconsistency  between  the  views  of  the  late 
and  the  existing  administrations  on  the  subject  of  regu 
lating  the  exchanges,  he  passed  to  a  discussion  of  the  Whig 
panacea  for  the  ills  of  the  country  —  a  national  bank. 
"  I  declare,"  said  he,  "  that,  after  the  most  deliberate  and 
anxious  consideration  of  which  I  am  capable,  I  can  con 
ceive  of  no  adequate  remedy  which  does  not  comprehend 


368  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

a  national  bank  as  an  essential  part."  He  challenged  the 
statement  in  the  message  that  the  popular  will  had  twice 
been  "  solemnly  and  unequivocally  expressed  "  against  it, 
and  argued  that  Jackson's  re-election  after  his  veto  of  the 
bill  to  recharter  the  bank  did  not  signify  that  the  people 
were  adverse  to  any  bank,  but  to  the  one  proposed,  be 
cause  Jackson  himself  had  declared  in  his  veto  message 
that  if  he  had  been  consulted  he  could  have  furnished  a 
model  free  from  objection.  "I  am  perfectly  persuaded," 
said  Clay,  "that  thousands  and  tens  of  thousands  sustain 
ed  his  re-election  under  the  full  expectation  that  a  nation 
al  bank  would  be  established  during  his  second  term." 
If  he  really  believed  this  he  deceived  himself.  Political 
issues  have  seldom  been  more  clearly  defined  than  that  in 
the  campaign  of  1832  over  rechartering  the  bank.  And 
Yan  Buren's  election  after  the  struggles  in  relation  to  the 
bank  during  Jackson's  last  term  made  the  result  absolutely 
unequivocal.  His  argument  in  favor  of  a  bank  presented 
nothing  new.  ""We  are  all,"  said  he"  —  people,  States, 
Union,  banks — bound  up  and  interwoven  together,  united 
in  fortune  and  destiny,  and  all,  all  entitled  to  the  protect 
ing  care  of  a  parental  government.  ...  A  government,  an 
official  corps — the  servants  of  the  people — glittering  in 
gold,  and  the  people  themselves  —  their  masters  —  buried 
in  ruin  and  surrounded  by  rags!"  The  principal  idea  of 
the  speech  was  that  little  public  good  was  to  be  expected 
until  there  were  a  Whig  administration  and  a  Whig  Con 
gress. 

October  3,  Calhoun's  amendment  was  adopted  by  a  ma 
jority  of  one,  and  on  the  next  day  the  bill  as  amended  was 
passed  by  the  Senate,  26  to  20.  But  in  the  House  the  ad 
ministration  was  not  strong  enough  to  carry  it.  On  the 


CH.IX.]        NO  BANKRUPTCY   LAW  FOR  BANKS          369 

14th,  two  days  before  the  adjournment,  it  was  laid  on  the 
table  by  a  vote  of  119  to  107.  Nevertheless,  the  delay  of 
the  measure  was  of  little  practical  consequence,  as  the  sys 
tem  it  proposed  was  already  by  force  of  circumstances  in 
practical  operation.  Moreover,  the  momentum  was  started 
that  was  finally  to  carry  the  measure  through. 

Notwithstanding  the  opposition  to  the  independent  Treas 
ury  system,  both  houses  were  strongly  adverse  to  a  national 
bank.  Many  petitions  were  of  course  presented  in  favor  of 
a  bank.  In  the  Senate  they  were  referred  to  the  Finance 
Committee,  which  reported  a  resolution  stating  "  that  the 
prayer  of  the  petitioners  ought  not  to  be  granted."  When  it 
was  called  up,  Clay  said  that  he  could  see  no  utility  in  a  neg 
ative  resolution ;  that  he  could  recollect  but  one  example— 
Eandolph's  resolution  that  it  was  inexpedient  to  declare  war 
against  Great  Britain.  He  preferred  that  the  resolution  be 
laid  on  the  table,  but  if  that  course  was  not  taken  he  moved 
as  a  substitute  "that  it  will  be  expedient  to  establish  a 
United  States  bank  whenever  it  shall  be  manifest  that  a 
clear  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  in 
favor  of  such  an  institution."  This  was  rejected  and  the 
original  resolution  adopted,  31  to  14.  A  few  days  later  a 
resolution  declaring  "that  it  is  inexpedient  to  charter  a 
national  bank  "  was  adopted  by  the  House,  123  to  91. 

The  proposition  to  enact  a  bankruptcy  law  for  banks  met 
with  scant  encouragement.  Benton  wras  almost  alone  in  his 
advocacy  of  it.  Despite  his  indefatigable  support  of  the 
administration,  his  personal  relations  with  Van  Buren  were 
not  cordial.  Shortly  after  the  inauguration  he  warned  the 
President  of  the  impending  crisis,  and  strongly  urged  pre 
cautions  concerning  the  government  funds ;  and  his  pride 
met  a  rude  rebuff,  which  he  never  fully  pardoned,  when  Van- 

24 


370  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

Buren  blandly  told  him,  "  Your  friends  think  you  a  little 
exalted  in  the  head  on  that  subject." 

Several  bills  of  minor  importance  became  laws ;  but  the 
only  ones  to  succeed  connected  with  the  leading  policy  of 
the  administration  were  those  postponing  the  fourth  instal 
ment  of  deposit  with  the  States,  authorizing  the  issue  of 
Treasury  notes,  and  to  adjust  the  claims  against  the  deposit 
banks.  But  they  relieved  the  most  urgent  necessities  of  the 
government  and  left  the  administration  in  a  position  to  con 
tinue  the  struggle  for  the  regular  establishment  of  the  in 
dependent  Treasury. 

The  brief  interval  between  the  adjournment  of  the  special 
and  the  beginning  of  the  regular  session,  December  4,  de 
veloped  no  marked  change  in  the  general  condition  of  the 
country.  The  excitement  and  acute  symptoms  of  the 
crisis  had  subsided,  but  the  ravages  were  too  serious  to 
be  repaired  save  by  the  gradual  return  of  confidence  and 
the  slow  process  of  normal  recuperation.  Yet  some  im 
provement  was  visible.  The  business  houses  that  had  es 
caped  the  common  devastation  were  the  nucleus  of  that 
potential  energy  which  always  revives  and  supports  the 
activities  of  the  people,  however  severe  the  revulsion  that 
overwhelms  them.  This  never-failing  phenomenon  is  the 
most  convincing  demonstration  that  the  natural  laws  of 
trade  and  finance,  when  unimpeded,  work  more  sound  and 
enduring  good  than  legislative  stimulants  can  produce.  One 
evidence  of  improvement  was  the  decrease  in  the  premium 
on  gold,  which  had  fallen  from  eight  and  seven-eighths  to 
five  per  cent.  Besides  this  was  the  movement  on  the  part 
of  the  sound  banks  to  resume  specie  payments.  The  chief 
obstacle  was  the  Pennsylvania  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
which  still  wielded  great  influence.  Its  precarious  condition 


CH.  IX.]         THE   BANKS  AND   SPECIE  PAYMENT         371 

was  known  only  to  its  officers,  who  took  all  available  means 
to  delay  the  final  catastrophe.  As  resumption  would  be  the 
beginning  of  the  end,  it  was  industriously  but  diplomatically 
opposed.  The  bank  pleaded  its  own  cause  in  disguise  through 
the  specious  pretext  of  a  paternal  desire  to  aid  the  weak 
er  banks,  to  which  further  time  was  an  absolute  necessity. 
The  situation  of  the  New  York  banks  was  wholly  the  re 
verse.  The  State  law  legalizing  their  suspension  required 
them  to  resume  within  a  year,  which  would  expire  May  15, 
1838.  To  them,  therefore,  resumption  was  vital.  More 
over,  their  condition  as  well  as  their  relations  to  the  com 
merce  and  finance  of  the  country  were  such  as  to  impel 
them  to  pursue  a  sound  banking  policy.  Accordingly,  be 
fore  the  extra  session  of  Congress,  they  proposed  a  con 
vention  of  representatives  of  all  the  banks  of  the  country, 
to  agree  upon  a  time  for  general  resumption.  But  at  the 
instance  of  the  Pennsylvania  Bank  it  was  delayed  until 
Congress  rose,  to  await  legislative  action. 

Shortly  after  the  adjournment  the  New  York  banks  again 
took  the  initiative  and  issued  invitations  for  a  convention  to 
be  held  in  New  York  city,  November  27.  It  met  on  that 
day,  but  the  object  was  again  frustrated.  Resolutions  to 
resume  specie  payment  on  March  1  and  July  1,  1838,  were 
defeated.  The  convention  then  adjourned  to  April  15.  At 
that  time  there  was  still  a  strong  opposition  to  immediate 
resumption,  and  the  result  was  to  fix  January  1, 1839,  as  the 
date  for  resumption,  although  it  was  agreed  that  banks  so 
desiring  could  resume  sooner.  When  the  convention  end 
ed,  the  premium  on  gold  in  New  York,  which  had  been 
steadily  declining,  was  less  than  one  per  cent.  This  was 
due  to  the  position  of  the  New  York  banks,  which  were 
now  compelled  to  act  alone  to  save  their  charters.  They 


372  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1837 

all  resumed  specie  payment  on  May  10,  and  their  example 
was  speedily  followed  by  many  banks  in  other  States. 

The  results  of  the  elections  in  the  fall  of  1837  caused  the 
Whigs  much  rejoicing.  The  popular  tide  had  set  strongly 
in  their  favor — even  in  New  York,  notwithstanding  the  re 
conciliation  of  the  "  Locofoco  " '  faction  with  the  main  body 
of  the  Democratic  party.  This  faction  had  for  some  time 
been  in  revolt,  but  it  was  now  in  accord  with  the  policy  of 
the  administration.  "While  Yan  Buren  was  sensitive  to 
these  manifestations  of  popular  sentiment,  he  was  not  in 
fluenced  by  them.  He  expressly  recognized  them  in  his 
annual  message,  but  professed  that  the  decisive  factors  in 
the  various  elections  were  local  rather  than  national,2  and 
strongly  renewed  his  recommendation  of  the  independent 
Treasury  plan.  In  this  connection  he  called  attention,  in 
severe  terms  and  very  justly,  to  the  fact  that  over  $27,000,- 
000  of  the  notes  of  the  former  Bank  of  the  United  States 
were  still  uncancelled  and  over  $10,500,000  still  in  circula 
tion,  through  the  illegal  and  adventurous  operations  of  its 


1  This  name  was  applied  in  the  fall  of  1835.     In  a  contest  between  the 
two  factions  of  Tammany  Hall,  the  regulars  were  unexpectedly  outnum 
bered  and  turned  off  the  gas.     Apprehending  this,  the  other  faction  had 
brought  candles  and  locofoco  matches  and  at  once  relighted  the  hall. 
"  The  latter,  in  1836,  organized  the  Equal  Rights  party,  and  declared  it  an 
imperative  duty  to  the  people  to  '  recur  to  first  principles.'    Their  '  decla 
ration  of  rights '  might  well  a  few  years  later  have  been  drawn  by  a  stu 
dent  of  Spencer's  Social  Statics." — Shepard's  Van  Buren,  p.  293. 

2  This  reference  to  the  elections  provoked  Clay's  criticism.     "I  am 
shocked,"  said  he,  "  at  the  President  having  undertaken  in  his  message  to 
comment  on  the  result  of  local  elections.     It  is  unprecedented,  and,  I  must 
be  allowed  to  say,  undignified.     It  is  the  first  example  in  which  the  Presi 
dent  spoke  of  elections,  not  of  the  general  government,  but  of  State  gov 
ernments.  ...  A  State  Chief  Magistrate  may  in  his  message  refer  to  the 
result  of  the  elections  in  his  own  State  ;  but  what  decent  pretext  has  a 
President  of  the  United  States  to  take  notice  of  the  result  of  State  elections 
and  assign  causes,  dishonorable  causes,  for  them  ?" 


CH.  IX.]  THE  ABOLITIONISTS  A  POLITICAL  FACTOR  373 

successor.  He  also  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  policy  of 
disposing  of  the  public  lands  so  long  advocated  by  Benton 
— low  prices,  graduated  according  to  their  relative  value, 
and  liberal  pre-emption  privileges,  with  the  leading  object 
of  inducing  settlement  and  cultivation.  The  only  other 
topics  of  particular  interest  in  the  message  were  that  refer 
ring  to  the  controversy  of  long  standing  with  Great  Britain 
over  the  northeastern  boundary,  and  that  with  Mexico  over 
the  claims  which  had  during  the  preceding  administration 
been  pushed  so  vigorously.  Neither  had  been  much  ad 
vanced,  and  both  afforded  opportunity  for  patriotic  display. 
The  proceedings  of  the  session,  which  lasted  until  July 
7,  were  unusually  varied  and  of  lively  public  interest,  al 
though  comparatively  little  important  legislation  reached 
the  statute-books.  The  first  topic  to  engross  attention  was 
slavery.  Notwithstanding  the  financial  and  political  ques 
tions  apparently  uppermost,  the  antislavery  agitation  was 
again  obtruded  with  enhanced  energy.  From  the  startling 
increase  in  the  number  of  abolition  petitions  and  their  sign 
ers  it  was  evident  that  the  cause  was  progressing  and  aug 
menting  its  forces.  Most  of  the  petitions  were,  as  former 
ly,  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  frequently  described  slavery  in  terms  so  severe  and 
ill-restrained  that  the  Southern  Senators  and  Eepresenta- 
tives,  as  well  as  the  Southern  people  and  press,  regarded 
them  more  acutely  than  ever  before  as  flagrant  insults,  and 
were  thus  in  their  dread  and  rage  driven  to  a  more  uncom 
promising  and  vindictive  stand  than  they  had  previously 
assumed.  The  most  portentous  aspect  of  the  agitation,  and 
that  which  most  influenced  the  South,  was  the  fact  that 
the  abolitionists  were  becoming  a  political  force.  The 
legislature  of  Connecticut  had  repealed  the  "  black  law," 


374  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

under  which  Prudence  CrandalFs  school  had  been  sup 
pressed.  The  legislature  of  Massachusetts  had,  by  a  large 
majority,  adopted  resolutions  censuring  Congress  for  its 
treatment  of  abolition  petitions,  and  asserting  the  Constitu 
tional  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District. 
The  legislature  of  Vermont  had  not  only  adopted  similar 
resolutions,  but  went  so  far  as  to  protest  against  the  an 
nexation  of  Texas  because  it  would  be  a  slave  State.  And 
this  was  the  theme  of  many  petitions. 

The  feelings  of  the  Southern  members  now  passed  the 
bounds  of  mere  excitement,  and  the  most  ominous  scenes 
which  had  thus  far  been  enacted  took  place  in  the  House. 
The  swelling  multitude  of  petitions  and  petitioners  was 
alone  sufficient  to  create  profound  alarm,  and  but  slight 
provocation  was  needed  to  disclose  the  determination  of  the 
Southern  members  to  take  radical  action.  December  20, 
Slade,  of  Vermont,  who  had  previously  presented  some  pe 
titions  praying  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District, 
and  moved  to  refer  them  to  a  select  committee  with  instruc 
tions  to  report  a  bill  for  that  purpose,  began  a  speech  in  sup 
port  of  his  motion.  The  speech,  so  far  as  he  proceeded,  was 
an  attack  on  slavery  in  general,  after  the  type  common  to 
abolitionist  agitators.  As  soon  as  its  purport  was  manifest 
it  met  with  obstreperous  objections ;  and  after  much  wran 
gling  and  confusion  the  House  adjourned.  During  the  tumult 
the  members  from  several  of  the  Southern  States  had  been 
requested  to  withdraw ;  and  when  the  result  of  the  motion 
to  adjourn  was  announced,  Campbell,  of  South  Carolina, 
mounted  a  chair  and  with  stentorian  voice  gave  notice  that 
the  gentlemen  who  represented  the  slave-holding  States  were 
invited  to  meet  in  the  District  committee-room.  The  con 
clave  was  quickly  organized.  Many  of  those  present  were 


CH.  IX.]          RHETT  ADVOCATES   SECESSION  375 

ready  for  extreme  measures.  Rhett,  of  South  Carolina,  pro 
posed  resolutions  declaring  that  the  "Constitution  having 
failed  to  protect  the  South  in  the  peaceable  possession  of 
their  rights  and  peculiar  institutions,  it  is  expedient  that  the 
Union  be  dissolved,"  and  to  provide  for  the  appointment  of 
a  committee  of  two  members  from  each  State  to  report  upon 
the  best  means  of  peaceably  dissolving  it. 

Though  the  proposition  met  with  some  favor,  the  major 
ity  of  those  who  attended  the  conference  were  convinced 
that  it  was  unnecessary  to  press  it  at  that  juncture,  and  de 
cided  instead  to  again  employ  the  "  gag."  As  this  was  gen 
erally  acceptable  to  the  Northern  politicians,  there  was  no 
serious  difficulty  the  next  day  in  procuring  its  adoption  in 
the  most  stringent  form,  despite  vigorous  opposition  under 
the  lead  of  Adams.  To  do  it  required  the  suspension  of 
the  rules  by  a  two-thirds  vote,  which  was  easily  obtained. 
Debate  was  quickly  silenced  by  carrying  the  previous  ques 
tion,  and  the  "gag"  resolution  was  adopted.  Some  of  the 
Northern  members,  however,  who  voted  to  suspend  the  rules 
voted  against  the  resolution  in  order  to  satisfy  their  con 
stituents  ;  but  in  voting  to  suspend  the  rules  they  did  what 
was  most  needful  to  aid  the  Southern  policy.  Thus,  in  the 
House,  further  discussion  of  slavery  was  prevented  for  the 
session.  Rhett's  proposition  attracted  wide  attention.  While 
the  plan  it  contained  was  by  no  means  novel,  it  was  the  first 
time  it  had  been  formally  presented,  and  the  "  memorable 
secession"  from  the  House  became  a  stock  phrase,  and  se 
cession  of  the  South  a  standing  threat.  It  had  the  effect 
which  its  author  subsequently  explained  was  his  purpose  to 
produce — to  give  formal  notice  of  the  attitude  of  the  South 
in  the  event  of  any  interference  with  slavery. 

That  scenes  similar  to  those  in  the  House,  in  consequence 


376  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

of  the  abolition  petitions,  did  not  take  place  in  the  Senate 
was  mainly  due  to  the  character  of  this  body,  for  the  same 
provocation  existed,  and  the  disposition  of  the  Southern 
Senators  was  alike  to  that  of  the  Southern  Representatives. 
A  few  days  before  the  adoption  of  the  "  gag  "  by  the  House, 
Clay,  perceiving  the  increase  in  the  number  of  petitions,  re 
marked  :  "  It  is  manifest  that  the  subject  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia  is  extending  itself  in  the  public  mind, 
and  daily  engaging  more  and  more  of  the  public  attention. 
I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  the  Congress  ought  not  to  do 
what  is  asked  by  the  petitioners  without  the  consent  of  the 
people  of  the  District  of  Columbia.  I  am  desirous  of  inquir 
ing  whether  the  feeling  of  abolition  in  the  abstract  is  not  ex 
tending  itself,  or  whether  it  is  not  becoming  mixed  up  with 
other  matters — such,  for  instance,  as  the  belief  that  the 
sacred  right  of  petition  has  been  assailed.  It  becomes  the 
duty  of  the  Senate  to  inquire  into  this  business  and  under 
stand  the  subject  well." 

Discussion  at  once  ensued,  the  Southern  Senators  taking 
ground  against  receiving  the  petitions.  Calhoun  was  espe 
cially  pronounced.  He  was  "for  no  conciliatory  course,  no 
temporizing,"  and  appealed  to  the  Southern  members  to 
stand  by  him.  "There  is  but  one  question,"  said  he,  "  that 
will  ever  destroy  this  Union,  and  that  is  involved  in  this 
principle.  Yes,  this  is  potent  enough  for  it,  and  must  be 
early  arrested  if  the  Union  is  to  be  preserved."  Uninflu 
enced  by  the  outcry  of  Calhoun,  Clay  plainly  expressed  his 
opinion  as  to  what  should  be  done — that  the  petitions  should 
be  received,  referred,  acted  upon,  and  argued  down. 

The  motion  to  receive  the  petitions  was  laid  on  the  table. 
But  the  subject  did  not  remain  there.  The  next  day  Swift, 
of  Vermont,  presented  the  memorial  and  resolutions  of  the 


CH.  IX.]  CALHOUN'S   RESOLUTIONS  377 

legislature  of  that  State  in  relation  to  slavery  in  the  District 
and  the  annexation  of  Texas.  King  hotly  pronounced  them 
"an  infamous  libel  and  insult  on  the  South."  Calhoun  was 
nearly  benumbed  with  astonishment,  as  this  was  the  first 
he  had  heard  of  them.  He  admitted  that  he  was  not  pre 
pared  to  discuss  them,  and  desired  that  they  be  received 
and  laid  on  the  table,  that  he  might  "  prepare  his  mind  for 
action  on  the  subject,  determined  that  it  should  not  rest  un 
til  it  had  received  the  final  action  of  the  Senate."  At  Clay's 
request  the  documents  were  withdrawn  with  notice  that 
they  would  be  presented  later.  On  the  two  following  days 
occurred  the  proceedings  in  the  House  over  Slade's  motion 
,and  the  adoption  of  the  "gag."  Thus  Calhoun  had  ample 
incentive  to  exert  himself  to  the  utmost  in  defence  of  his 
political  doctrines.  And  he  did  so.  On  the  27th  he  pre 
sented  a  series  of  six  resolutions  asserting  his  principles. 

Of  all  men  of  that  day  whose  utterances  survive,  none 
understood  so  clearly  the  real  character  and  import  of  the 
issue  over  slavery.  He  was  doubtless  sincere  in  the  belief 
he  steadfastly  expressed  that  slavery  was  right  and  should 
be  preserved  for  the  interest  of  both  the  master  and  the 
slave.  This,  we  may  assume,  was  the  fundamental  premise 
upon  which  the  entire  superstructure  of  his  defence  was 
reared.  Yet  underlying  this  was  the  imperious  fact  that  sla 
very  had  become  a  controlling  element  in  the  social  fabric 
of  the  South,  the  chief  basis  of  its  activity  and  wealth,  and 
hence  the  dictator  of  its  public  and  political  sentiment. 
Even  the  ministers  of  the  gospel  were  hardly  less  zealous 
than  the  politicians  in  upholding  the  institution,  for  which 
they  found  abundant  sanction  in  Holy  "Writ.  Under  such 
circumstances  the  moral  aspect  of  slavery,  as  viewed  where 
slavery  did  not  exist,  could  not  appeal  to  the  Southern 


378  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1838 

people ;  and  the  fierce  criticism  and  agitation  in  the  North 
only  rendered  the  South  more  obdurate  to  reason  and  more 
energetic  to  fortify  and  extend  the  institution. 

Perhaps  the  most  singular  phase  of  the  whole  matter  is 
that  the  South  was  so  blind  to  its  true  material  interests.  In 
this  same  year,  in  a  commercial  convention  of  the  Southern 
States,  the  relative  conditions  of  the  North  and  South  were 
vividly  contrasted.  The  steadily  increasing  superiority  of 
the  North  over  the  South  in  population  and  wealth,  and  in 
dustrial  and  commercial  interests,  was  complainingly  recog 
nized  and  admitted.  The  cause  was  largely  ascribed  to  the 
tariff,  internal  improvements,  the  two  national  banks,  the 
paper  system,  pensions,  and  governmental  extravagance 
and  abuses,  which  gave  the  North  such  an  advantage  as 
to  make  the  South  its  tributary ;  and,  as  a  partial  remedy, 
direct  trade  between  Southern  and  foreign  ports  was  pro 
posed.  This  explanation  contained  some  truth,  but  it  was 
not  sufficient  to  account  for  the  disparity  in  the  condi 
tions  of  the  two  sections.  The  main  cause  was  in  the 
fatal  disadvantage  of  the  system  of  slave  labor  and  its  at 
tendant  evils  as  compared  with  that  of  free  labor.  As  the 
subject  is  studied  at  this  distance  of  time,  when  every  mo 
tive  for  ignoring  or  obscuring  the  truth  is  removed,  it  seems 
surprising  that  the  economic  superiority  of  free  labor  was 
not  perceived  and  utilized.  Had  this  phase  of  the  question 
been  properly  and  dispassionately  considered,  the  course  of 
events  would  doubtless  have  been  changed.  But  the  ob 
stacles  were  twofold — the  slaves  were  negroes,  whom  the 
most  enlightened  people  of  the  South  were  in  any  case 
afraid  to  liberate;  and  the  associations  and  habits  of  life 
were  such  as  to  exclude  the  contemplation  of  such  an  alter 
native.  The  philosopher  may  calmly  reason  now  on  the 


CH.  IX.]      CALHOUN'S   POLITICAL  INCONSISTENCY     379 

subject  of  slavery  extinct ;  but  then  the  planter  had  to  deal 
with  property  that  constituted  a  large  part  of  his  posses 
sions  and  with  conditions  created  generations  before  him. 

That  Calhoun  was  inconsistent  with  his  former  views 
whenever  they  conflicted  with  the  development  of  his  new 
theories  in  defence  of  slavery  did  not  deter  him.  Any  opin 
ions  he  had  ever  expressed  were  resolutely  abandoned  if 
contrary  to  the  logical  exigencies  of  his  position.  A  strik 
ing  instance  of  his  change  of  mind  was  in  relation  to  the 
Missouri  Compromise.  While  in  Monroe's  cabinet,  when 
the  bill  was  passed  and  signed,  he  favored  it ;  but  he  now 
emphatically  disapproved  it  as  being  a  "  dangerous  meas 
ure,"  which  had  "done  much  to  rouse  into  action  the  present 
spirit."  He  asserted  that  "  had  it  been  met  with  uncompro 
mising  opposition,  such  as  a  then  distinguished  and  sagacious 
member  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Kandolph),  now  no  more,  op 
posed  to  it,  abolition  might  have  been  crushed  forever  in  its 
birth."  He  had  no  faith  in  palliatives  to  allay  the  agita 
tion.  He  saw  that  there  could  be  no  pacification  of  the 
agitators,  and  that  the  only  mode  of  meeting  their  efforts 
was  in  the  rigid  denial  of  the  right  to  assail  slavery  in  Con 
gress  or  by  political  action.  He  sought  to  interpose  legal 
propositions  as  a  barrier  against  the  rising  tide  of  moral 
sentiment  against  slavery.  He  admitted  his  doubts  as  to  the 
efficiency  of  his  plan,  but  presented  it  as  the  most  promising 
one.  He  desired  that  the  Union  be  preserved,  but  not  unless 
slavery  could  be  secure  within  it ;  yet  he  foresaw  with  pro 
phetic  certainty  the  inevitable  danger  with  which  the  slavery 
question  was  fraught.  Most  of  the  Senators,  whatever  their 
opinions  upon  the  question,  deprecated  his  aggressive  policy. 
They  preferred  to  avoid  discussion  by  merely  receiving  the 
petitions  and  memorials  and  laying  them  on  the  table  with- 


380  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

out  debate.  Northern  Senators,  anxious  to  give  the  South  all 
reasonable  support,  felt,  out  of  regard  for  their  own  political 
safety  at  home,  that  Calhoun's  extreme  demands  were  more 
onerous  than  he  ought  to  impose.  But  he  would  not  swerve 
from  his  purpose.  The  stifling  of  discussion  was  not  what 
his  haughty  spirit  desired.  He  invoked  the  Constitution  as 
the  sufficient  guarantee  of  security  to  slavery,  and  insisted 
that  the  time  had  come  to  make  a  test  of  the  Senate's  dis 
position  toward  the  South.  His  resolutions  were  the  means. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Debate  on  Calkoun's  Slavery  Resolutions  and  Clay's  Substitutes — The 
Independent  Treasury  again  Defeated — Minor  Financial  Legislation — 
The  Doctrine  of  Instructions — The  Subsidiary  Coin — Clay's  Set  Speech 
on  the  Slavery  Question  and  Calhoun's  Comments — Clay's  Northern 
Tour — The  Obstacles  to  His  Nomination — The  Whig  National  Conven 
tion — Harrison  and  Tyler  Nominated — Clay's  Disgust  and  Acquiescence 

CALHOTJN'S  resolutions  were  designed  to  embrace  the  en 
tire  legal  status  of  slavery  and  to  furnish  a  complete  "  plat 
form"  of  its  Constitutional  rights.  The  essential  prop 
ositions  of  the  first  three  were  that  in  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  the  States  acted  as  free,  independent,  and 
sovereign,  and  "  entered  the  Union  with  the  view  to  its  in 
creased  security  and  against  all  dangers,  domestic  as  well  as 
foreign,  and  the  more  perfect  enjoyment  of  its  advantages, 
natural,  political, and  social";  that  they  "retained,  severally, 
the  exclusive  and  sole  right  over  their  own  domestic  institu 
tions  and  police,  and  are  alone  responsible  for  them,  and  that 
any  intermeddling  of  any  one  or  more  States,  or  a  combina 
tion  of  their  citizens,  with  the  domestic  institutions  and  police 
of  the  others,  on  any  ground  or  under  any  pretext  whatever, 
political,  moral,  or  religious,  with  the  view  to  their  altera 
tion  or  subversion,  is  an  assumption  of  superiority  not  war 
ranted  by  the  Constitution,  insulting  to  the  States  interfered 
with,  tending  to  endanger  their  domestic  peace  and  tran 
quillity,  subversive  of  the  objects  for  which  the  Constitution 
was  formed,  and  by  necessary  consequence  tending  to  weak- 


382  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1838 

en  and  destroy  the  Union  itself  ";  that  the  government  was 
instituted  by  "  the  several  States "  as  a  common  agent  to 
carry  into  effect  the  powers  they  had  delegated  by  the  Con 
stitution  ;  "  and  that  in  fulfilment  of  this  high  and  sacred 
trust  this  government  is  bound  so  to  exercise  its  powers  as 
to  give,  as  far  as  may  be  practicable,  increased  stability  and 
security  to  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  States  that  com 
pose  the  Union ;  and  that  it  is  the  solemn  duty  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  resist  all  attempts  by  one  portion  of  the  Union 
to  use  it  as  an  instrument  to  attack  the  domestic  institutions 
of  another,  or  to  weaken  or  destroy  such  institutions  instead 
of  strengthening  and  upholding  them,  as  it  is  in  duty  bound 
to  do." 

These  three  resolutions  formed  the  groundwork  of  gen 
eral  principles  applied  in  the  remaining  resolutions.  They 
contained  the  ultra  doctrine  of  States-rights,  and  Calhoun's 
familiar  theory  of  the  formation  and  character  of  the 
Union.  Yet  they  encountered  little  opposition  for  that 
reason.  The  first  was  adopted,  31  to  13.  The  second  re 
ceived  some  slight  verbal  amendment,  and  the  words  "  in 
sulting  to  the  States  interfered  with"  were  stricken  out. 
An  effort  was  also  made  to  strike  out  the  words  "  moral  and 
religious,"  but  it  was  unsuccessful,  for  Calhoun  earnestly 
maintained  that  they  were  vital.  Webster  criticised  the 
resolution  as  being  too  broad  and  too  vague  and  "  at  vari 
ance  with  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  Constitution," 
although  he  admitted  the  necessity  of  some  definite  action 
on  the  subject  by  Congress.  "  If  the  resolutions,"  said  he, 
"  can  be  modified  to  meet  the  Constitutional  requisitions, 
asserting  that  the  Constitution  permits  slavery  and  protects 
the  institution,  I  will  then  vote  for  them.  An  assertion  here 
that  the  Constitution  cannot  meddle  with  domestic  institu- 


CH.X.]     CALHOUN'S   RESOLUTIONS  CONSIDERED        383 

tions,  if  supported,  utterly  deprives  it  of  power  or  effect." 
The  second  resolution  was  adopted,  31  to  9. 

The  third  evoked  more  discussion.  The  objection  was 
urged  that  it  was  not  the  duty  of  the  government  to  in 
crease  the  stability  and  security  of  the  domestic  institutions 
of  the  States  or  to  strengthen  and  uphold  them.  The  argu 
ment  in  behalf  of  this  objection  was  so  cogent  and  so  gener 
ally  entertained  that  Calhoun  acquiesced,  and  the  clauses 
were  eliminated.  A  proviso  was  then  proposed  asserting 
that  the  resolutions  should  not  be  construed  as  adverse  to 
"  these  fundamental  principles  of  this  government :  That  all 
men  are  created  equal ;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Cre 
ator  with  certain  inalienable  rights ;  that  among  these  are 
life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  That  the  freedom 
of  speech  and  of  the  press  and  the  right  of  the  people  peace 
fully  to  assemble  and  petition  the  government  for  redress 
of  grievances  shall  never  be  abridged.  That  error  of  human 
opinion  may  be  tolerated  while  reason  is  left  free  to  combat 
it.  That  the  Union  must  be  preserved."  Calhoun  vigorously 
protested,  and  at  length  a  substitute  was  adopted  declaring 
that  "  nothing  in  the  foregoing  resolutions  is  intended  to 
recognize  the  right  of  Congress  to  impair  in  any  manner 
the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press  or  the  right  of  peti 
tion  as  secured  by  the  Constitution  to  the  citizens  of  the 
several  States,  within  their  States  respectively."  Presum 
ably  Calhoun  regarded  it  as  harmless  because  of  the  last 
phrase,  which  fell  short  of  the  express  provision  of  the  Con 
stitution.  An  addition  was  then  moved  that  "  the  right  of 
the  people  to  speak,  write,  print,  and  publish  anything  what 
ever  is  indisputable ;  and  that  they  are  amenable  only  to  the 
State  in  which  they  may  be  at  the  time." 

By  this  time  the  spirit  of  opposition  began  to  manifest 


384  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

itself  more  strongly ;  and  many  of  the  Senators  who  were 
willing  to  vote  for  the  resolutions  expressed  their  disap 
proval  of  the  whole  proceeding,  as  likely  to  produce  more 
harm  than  good.  To  these  criticisms  Calhoun  replied  with 
intense  earnestness,  asserting  that  the  Senate  did  "  not  suffi 
ciently  comprehend  the  extent  and  magnitude  of  the  existing 
dangers."  He  pointed  them  out  with  truth  that  grated  on 
the  political  sensibilities  of  the  Senators.  Disunion  was  the 
spectre  that  he  kept  constantly  before  their  eyes.  His  in 
dependent  position  left  him  free  to  bend  his  energies  to  the 
defence  of  Southern  interests,  without  regard  to  ulterior 
political  considerations.  Clay  wrote  that  Calhoun's  aim  was 
"  to  advance  the  political  interest  of  the  mover  and  to  affect 
mine";1  but  there  is  no  good  ground  to  suppose  that  in  this 
course  Calhoun  had  any  political  purpose  apart  from  the 
cause  he  represented.  His  entire  conduct  was  the  reverse 
of  politic,  and  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that  he  was  gov 
erned  by  the  belief  that  it  was  necessary  to  take  positive 
action  in  support  of  slavery  as  the  only  method  of  protec 
tion.  The  motion  was  defeated.  It  was  followed  by  an 
other  to  strike  out  the  words  "the  several  States"  and 
insert  "  the  people  of  the  United  States."  This  was  intend 
ed  to  counteract  Calhoun's  basic  theory.  In  regard  to  it 
Clay  remarked :  "  If  the  Senator  will  frame  his  amendment 
according  to  the  historical  fact  in  the  adoption  of  the  Con 
stitution  I  will  vote  for  it.  The  historical  fact  is  that  the 
Constitution  was  adopted  by  the  people  of  the  several 
States,  acting  within  their  respective  limits." 3  This  motion 

1  "I  am  greatly  deceived,"  he  continued,  "if  in  both  respects  he  has 
not  signally  failed.    He  was  caught  in  his  own  trap." — Clay  to  Brooke, 
January  13,  1838. 

2  In  a  subsequent  speech  on  this  subject  he  said  .  "  With  regard  to  the 
point  so  much  insisted  upon  in  this  debate,  and  which  has  produced  great 


CH.  X.]   TO  PREVENT  ATTACKS  ON  SLAVERY     385 

also  failed,  and  the  resolution  as  it  then  stood  was  adopted, 
31  to  11. 

The  fourth  specifically  applied  the  general  doctrines  of 
the  three  first  to  the  institution  of  slavery,  and  declared  that 
all  attacks  upon  it  "  are  in  manifest  violation  of  the  mutual 
and  solemn  pledge  to  protect  and  defend  each  other  given 
by  the  States  respectively  on  entering  into  the  Constitutional 
compact  which  formed  the  Union,  and  as  such  are  a  mani 
fest  breach  of  faith  and  a  violation  of  the  most  solemn  ob 
ligations,  moral  and  religious."  The  preceding  resolutions 
precluded  debate  on  this  one,  and  it  was  adopted,  34  to  5, 
after  the  words  "  moral  and  religious  "  were  stricken  out. 

Thus  far  the  resolutions  had  met  with  no  effective  opposi 
tion  ;  but  it  was  apparent  after  the  fourth  was  disposed  of 
that  the  two  last  could  not  be  adopted.  Calhoun  had  carried 
his  doctrines  too  far.  The  fifth  resolution  was :  "  That  the 
intermeddling  of  any  State  or  States,  or  their  citizens,  to  abol 
ish  slavery  in  this  District  or  any  of  the  Territories,  on  the 
ground  or  under  the  pretext  that  it  is  immoral  or  sinful,  or 
the  passage  of  any  act  or  measure  of  Congress  with  that  view, 
would  be  a  direct  and  dangerous  attack  on  the  institutions 
of  all  the  slave-holding  States."  It  was  plainly  not  accept 
able  to  the  majority.  One  Senator  contended  that  the  reso 
lution  was  not  declaratory  of  Constitutional  rights,  but  of 
expediency  —  a  legitimate  field  for  difference  of  opinion 
and  discussion.  Others  disapproved  of  the  phraseology 
while  agreeing  with  the  general  purport.  The  suggestion 

controversy  in  former  times,  whether  the  Constitution  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  work  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  collectively  or  of  the  separate 
States  composing  the  confederacy,  I  have  always  thought  that  more  im 
portance  is  attached  to  it  than  it  deserves.  The  real  question  in  consider 
ing  the  instrument  is  not  how  the  Constitution  was  made,  but  what  is  it  as 
it  is  ?" 
25 


386  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

was  made  that  Calhoun  should  consent  to  insert  "  on  any 
pretext  whatever "  instead  of  "  on  the  ground  or  under 
the  pretext  that  it  is  immoral  or  sinful";  but  he  refused. 
A  motion  was  then  made  to  insert  "  also  a  violation  of 
the  public  faith  implied  in  the  cession  of  this  District  by 
the  States  of  Virginia  and  Maryland."  Calhoun  said  that 
he  had  always  been  of  the  opinion  that  any  interference 
with  slavery  in  the  District  would  not  only  be  a  violation 
of  the  public  faith,  but  also  unconstitutional ;  and  that  he 
had  not  thought  proper  to  assert  it,  as  he  knew  that  a 
majority  of  the  Senate  was  of  a  different  opinion,  and 
therefore  his  "  object  was  to  place  the  question  on  no  par 
ticular  portion  of  the  Constitution,  but  on  its  general  char 
acter  and  structure,  which  was  much  stronger  and  much 
less  liable  to  be  disputed."  He  neither  objected  nor  con 
sented  to  the  proposed  amendment,  which  was  then  carried. 
These  details  are  essential  to  a  full  understanding  of  the 
origin  of  the  causes  that  led  to  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise  and  the  final  defence  of  slavery  that  resulted 
in  the  Rebellion. 

At  this  juncture  Clay,  who  had  taken  but  small  part  in 
the  previous  discussions,  spoke  at  some  length,  and  in  the 
course  of  his  speech  presented  a  series  of  resolutions  to  con 
form  to  his  own  conception  of  what  should  be  declared. 
He  declined  to  vote  for  either  the  fifth  or  sixth  of  Calhoun's 
resolutions,  and  asserted  that  he  had  voted  for  the  others 
"  not  from  any  confidence  in  their  healing  virtues."  Con 
sidering  all  the  circumstances,  especially  the  manner  in 
which  Calhoun  had  "  pressed  them  on  the  Senate,"  he  was 
of  the  opinion  that  at  the  North  they  might  "  increase  and 
exasperate  instead  of  diminishing  and  assuaging  the  existing 
irritation." 


CH.X.]  CLAY'S   RESOLUTIONS  387 

The  sixth  resolution  was  designed,  in  inferential  terms,  to 
protect  slavery  in  Texas,  should  that  country  be  annexed  to 
the  United  States.  To  this  Clay  objected  as  blending  "  the 
two  unhappy  causes  of  agitation  together."  He  also  con 
demned  Calhoun's  plan  to  create  what  was  afterward  called 
the  "solid  South,"  on  the  States-rights  platform,  and  to  place 
in  the  keeping  of  one  party,  instead  of  all,  the  peculiar  inter 
ests  of  the  slave-holding  States.  He  then  discussed  the  right 
of  petition,  declaring  himself  in  favor  of  rejecting  petitions 
that  prayed  for  relief  which  Congress  clearly  did  not  pos 
sess  the  Constitutional  power  to  grant,  but  in  other  cases  to 
receive  them  and  dispose  of  them  respectfully.  His  policy 
was  to  keep  the  abolitionists  "  separate  and  distinct  from 
all  other  classes,"  and  "  the  subject  of  abolition  separate  and 
distinct  from  all  other  subjects."  He  believed  in  argument 
to  quiet  the  agitation.  To  preserve  our  institutions  and 
the  Union,  he  "  would  argue  w^ith  any  one,  with  lunatics 
themselves  in  their  lucid  intervals,  and  argue  again  and 
again."  He  had  no  apprehension  for  the  safety  of  the 
Union.  "  We  allow  ourselves,"  said  he,  "to  speak  too  fre 
quently  and  with  too  much  levity  of  a  separation  of  the 
Union.  It  is  a  terrible  wrord,  to  which  our  ears  should  not 
be  familiarized.  I  desire  to  sea  in  continued  safety  and 
prosperity  this  Union  and  no  other  Union.  I  go  for  this 
Union  as  it  is,  one  and  indivisible,  without  diminution.  I 
will  neither  voluntarily  leave  it  nor  be  driven  out  of  it  by 
force.  Here  in  my  place  I  shall  contend  for  all  of  the  rights 
of  the  State  which  has  sent  me  here.  I  shall  contend  for 
them  with  undoubting  confidence  and  in  all  the  security 
which  the  Union  confers,  under  all  the  high  sanctions  which 
the  guarantees  of  the  Constitution  affords,  and  with  perfect 
conviction  that  they  are  safer  in  the  Union  than  they  would 


388  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

be  out  of  the  Union.  I  am  opposed  to  all  separate  confed 
eracies  and  to  all  sectional  conventions.  No  state  of  actual 
danger  exists  to  render  them  expedient  or  to  justify  deliber 
ation  about  them.  This  Union,  this  government,  has  done 
nothing,  nothing  whatever,  to  excite  the  smallest  alarm. 
It  will  do  nothing ;  but  if  it  should,  if  contrary  to  all 
human  probability  the  rights  of  the  slave -holding  States 
shall  be  assailed  by  any  authoritative  act  emanating  from 
this  capital,  a  state  of  things  for  resistance,  forcible  re 
sistance,  will  then  occur.  It  will  be  time  enough  then 
to  act." 

His  resolutions  were  eight  in  number.  The  two  first  de 
clared  that  slavery  in  the  States  was  exclusively  subject  to 
the  power  and  control  of  those  States  respectively ;  that  no 
other  State  nor  the  people  of  any  other  State  had  any  Con 
stitutional  authority  to  interfere  with  it ;  and  that  all  peti 
tions  touching  slavery  in  the  States  be  therefore  instantly 
rejected ;  the  fourth  and  fifth,  that  slavery  ought  not  to  be 
abolished  in  the  District,  but  that  in  deference  to  the  right 
of  petition  Congress  was  bound  to  and  would  receive,  re 
spectfully  treat,  and  refer  to  the  appropriate  committee, 
petitions  on  that  subject  if  couched  in  decorous  language ; 
the  seventh  and  eighth,  that  Congress  was  without  power  to 
prohibit  the  slave-trade  between  the  States  ;  and  that  while 
the  Senate  had  seen  with  painful  regret  the  antislavery 
agitation,  it  beheld  "  with  the  deepest  satisfaction,  every 
where  prevailing  an  unconquerable  attachment  to  the 
Union,  as  the  sure  bulwark  of  the  safety,  liberty,  and  hap 
piness  of  the  people  of  the  United  States."  As  no  action 
was  taken  on  these  six  resolutions,  their  only  interest  lies 
in  their  statement  of  Clay's  opinions,  on  the  points  upon 
which  they  touched ;  but  as  the  other  two  became  the  basis 


CH.  X.]  REASONS  TO   SUSTAIN  SLAVERY  389 

of  substitutes  for  Calhoun's  fifth  and  sixth  resolutions,  they 
possess  historical  importance. 

The  third  recited  that  when  the  District  was  ceded  by 
Virginia  and  Maryland  slavery  existed  in  both  States,  in 
cluding  the  ceded  territory,  and  that  as  it  still  continued  in 
both  States  "  it  could  not  be  abolished  within  the  District 
without  a  violation  of  that  good  faith  which  was  implied  in 
the  cession  and  in  the  acceptance  of  the  territory,  nor  unless 
compensation  were  made  to  the  proprietors  of  slaves,  with 
out  a  manifest  violation  of  an  amendment  to  the  Consti 
tution  of  the  United  States,  nor  without  exciting  a  degree 
of  just  alarm  and  apprehension  in  the  States  recognizing 
slavery,  far  transcending  in  mischievous  tendency  any  pos 
sible  benefit  which  could  be  accomplished  by  the  abolition." 
The  sixth  of  the  series  declared  that  "  it  would  be  highly 
inexpedient  to  abolish  slavery  in  Florida,  the  only  Territory 
of  the  United  States  in  which  it  now  exists,  because  of  the 
serious  alarm  and  apprehensions  which  would  be  thereby 
excited  in  the  States  sustaining  that  domestic  institution ; 
because  the  people  of  that  Territory  have  not  asked  it  to  be 
done,  and  wrhen  admitted  as  a  State  into  the  Union,  they 
will  be  exclusively  entitled  to  decide  that  question  for  them 
selves";  also  because  it  would  be  in  violation  of  the  Com 
promise  of  1820.  The  latter  reason,  however,  was  omitted 
when  the  resolution  was  considered.  After  some  further 
observations,  in  which  he  said  that  there  was  nothing  ab 
stract  or  metaphysical  in  his  resolutions,  and  that  he  did 
not  concur  in  declaring  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
District  would  be  a  direct  attack  upon  the  institution  of 
slavery  in  the  States,  Clay  proposed  to  offer  the  third  and 
sixth  as  amendments  to  Calhoun's  fifth.  He  concluded  by 
formally  moving  the  third  for  that  purpose. 


390  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

A  vigorous  discussion  followed,  principally  between  Cal- 
houn  and  Clay ;  for  Calhoun  was  extremely  averse  to  yield 
ing  on  any  part  of  his  programme.  He  thoroughly  disap 
proved  of  Clay's  conciliatory  method,  and  declared  that  the 
difference  between  them  was  "as  wide  as  the  poles."  But 
in  the  main  Clay's  propositions  received  decided  approba 
tion.  The  proposed  amendment  went  through  the  usual 
process  of  verbal  change,  and  was  finally  adopted,  36  to  9, 
•in  this  form :  "  That  the  interference  by  the  citizens  of  any 
of  the  States  with  the  view  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
this  District  is  endangering  the  rights  and  security  of  the 
people  of  the  District,  and  that  any  act  or  measure  of  Con 
gress  designed  to  abolish  slavery  in  this  District  would  be 
a  violation  of  faith  implied  in  the  cessions  by  the  States  of 
Virginia  and  Maryland,  a  just  cause  of  alarm  to  the  people 
of  the  slave-holding  States,  and  have  a  direct  and  inevitable 
tendency  to  disturb  and  endanger  the  Union." 

The  resolution  in  the  form  originally  submitted  by  Clay 
was  much  the  better,  as  it  stated  the  concrete  reasons  for 
the  sentiment  it  expressed.  But  Clay  never  stood  out  for 
any  particular  formula  of  words  when  the  substance  he 
sought  was  stated ;  results  were  always  his  object,  though 
they  could  only  be  attained  by  sacrifice.  In  1836  he  ad 
mitted  the  Constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  abolish 
slavery  in  the  District,  and  that  there  was  no  condition  in 
the  cession  to  prevent  its  exercise.  The  "  violation  of  faith  " 
asserted  in  the  resolution  was  not  placed  on  either  ground, 
but  on  the  inexpediency  of  abolition  in  the  District  under 
all  the  circumstances ;  and  this  position  was  unquestionably 
sound.  Webster  showed  conclusively  that  there  would  be 
no  violation  of  anything  contained  in  the  statutes  and  in 
struments  which  effected  the  cession  if  slavery  were  abol- 


CH.X.]  SLAVERY   IN  THE  TERRITORIES  391 

ished  in  the  District,  and  he  objected  to  the  terms  of  the 
resolution,  though  he  was  opposed  to  any  interference  with 
slavery  there.  He  voted  against  all  the  resolutions  because 
he  could  not  approve  the  terms  in  which  they  were  ex 
pressed. 

Clay's  sixth  resolution  was  then  taken  up.  Reference  to 
the  Compromise  was  omitted,  and  the  resolution  was  made 
to  apply  to  "  any  Territory  of  the  United  States  "  instead  of 
to  Florida.  The  additional  reason  was  inserted  that  any 
attempt  to  abolish  slavery  in  such  Territory  "  would  be  a 
violation  of  good  faith  towards  the  inhabitants  who  have 
been  permitted  to  settle  with  and  hold  slaves  therein." 
Thus  changed,  the  resolution  was  adopted,  35  to  9.  Cal- 
houn's  last  resolution  was  laid  on  the  table,  and  the  de 
bate,  which  had  extended  over  two  weeks,  was  terminat 
ed.1  The  Senate  turned  with  relief  to  other  things;  for 
not  only  was  discussion  of  the  slavery  question  distasteful 
to  nearly  all  the  members,  and  in  their  judgment  unwise 
and  impolitic,  but  they  did  not  regard  the  subject  as  of  suf 
ficient  importance  to  receive  the  attention  that  Calhoun 
compelled.2  And  in  the  public  mind  it  was  of  minor  conse- 

1  Webster  spoke  on  March  12  and  13.     "  The  House  was  deserted  again 
this  day.     Webster  finished  his  speech  in  the  Senate,  universally  thought 
the  most  splendid  and  powerful  of  his  efforts.     There  was  no  possibility 
of  keeping  a  quorum  in  the  House." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  ix.  p.  509. 

2  The  action  of  the  Senate  on  these  resolutions  is  styled  by  Von  Hoist 
"cheap  and  cowardly  cunning,"  and  Clay's  compromises,  "opiates  to  stu 
pefy  the  thought  and  especially  the  moral  feeling  of  the  people."    This 
author,  here  as  elsewhere,  is  unmindful  of  the  true  and  practical  considera 
tions  :  that  constitutionally  and  legally  the  resolutions,  as  adopted,  were 
for  the  most  part  sound  ;  that  Congress  was,  as  it  always  will  be,  influ 
enced  by  practical  considerations  ;  and  that  under  all  the  circumstances 
the  temporizing  policy  was  the  only  practical  and  efficacious  one  to  pur 
sue.    The  only  logical  alternative  is  to  say  that  all  the  Constitutional  guar 
antees  of  slavery  should  have  been  overthrown,  and  slavery  forcibly  abol 
ished.    Such  criticism  hardly  deserves  refutation. 


392  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

quence  as  compared  with  the  state  of  the  country  and  the 
political  and  financial  questions  of  the  hour. 

The  leading  topic  before  Congress  was  again  the  inde 
pendent  Treasury.  A  bill  similar  to  the  one  that  failed  at 
the  special  session  was  soon  introduced.  The  debate  upon 
it  was  even  more  extended  and  elaborate  than  before,  al 
though  substantially  the  same  arguments  were  employed. 
It  was  passed  by  the  Senate  by  a  majority  of  two  votes,  but 
not  until  the  provisions  requiring  specie  payments  to  the 
government  were  stricken  out,  which  caused  Calhoun  and 
his  followers  to  vote  against  it.  In  the  House  the  bill  was 
defeated  by  a  majority  of  14,  the  defection  from  the  admin 
istration  being  still  the  obstacle.  But  the  system  continued 
as  before,  de  facto. 

The  chief  interest  aroused  by  the  debate  centred  in  an 
encounter  between  Clay  and  Calhoun,  which  is  notable  in  our 
parliamentary  annals.  February  15,  Calhoun  delivered  a  set 
speech  on  the  measure.  It  was  a  plain  argument,  stating 
with  more  care  and  deliberation  the  views  he  had  previous 
ly  expressed,  and  containing  no  personalities.  Clay  spoke 
on  the  19th.  It  was  manifest  that  his  speech  had  been  thor 
oughly  considered  and  that  it  was  designed  for  political  ef 
fect,  and  incidentally  the  castigation  of  Calhoun,  to  which 
the  latter  part  of  it  was  devoted.  For  seven  years  Clay, 
Webster,  and  Calhoun  had  co-operated  in  the  leadership  of 
the  opposition  to  the  Jackson  party ;  and  when  Calhoun 
forsook  them  to  join  in  the  support  of  Yan  Buren  it  natu 
rally  aroused  in  his  former  allies  a  feeling  of  resentment 
bound  to  be  revealed,  notwithstanding  their  growing  aver 
sion  to  an  alliance  with  the  nullifiers.  Indications  of  it  were 
shown  during  the  special  session ;  but  that  his  attack  might 
have  all  the  force  possible,  Clay  patiently  bided  his  time. 


CH.  X.]    A  SECOND  INDEPENDENT  TREASURY  BILL   393 

The  plan  was  devised  with  great  skill  and  executed  with  his 
wonted  oratorical  power. 

He  began  by  an  impressive  statement  of  his  sense  of  re 
sponsibility,  and  continued :  "  Never  before  have  I  risen  to 
express  my  opinions  upon  any  public  measure  fraught  with 
such  tremendous  consequences  to  the  welfare  and  prosperity 
of  the  country,  and  so  perilous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people, 
as  I  solemnly  believe  this  bill  to  be.  ...  And  I  have  thanked 
my  God  that  he  has  prolonged  my  life  until  the  present 
time  to  enable  me  to  exert  myself  in  the  service  of  my  coun 
try  against  a  project  far  transcending  in  pernicious  tendency 
any  that  I  have  ever  had  occasion  to  consider."  After  brief 
ly  describing  the  "  eminently  prosperous  "  condition  of  the 
country  before  "  Andrew  Jackson,  not  by  the  blessing  of 
God,  was  made  President  of  the  United  States,"  he  com 
pared  the  country  in  its  existing  condition  to  a  ship  "  help 
less  and  immovable  upon  breakers,  the  surge  beating  over 
her  venerable  sides,  and  the  crew  threatened  with  instanta 
neous  destruction,"  brought  there  "  by  his  bungling  naviga 
tion  or  by  his  want  of  skill  and  judgment." 

He  then  set  out  to  prove  five  propositions :  that  it  was 
the  deliberate  purpose  of  the  late  administration  to  estab 
lish  a  Treasury  bank  to  be  administered  and  controlled  by 
the  Executive  Department ;  that  with  this  end  in  view  the 
intention  was  to  overthrow  the  entire  banking  system  of  the 
country ;  that  the  attack  was  first  confined  to  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  and  after  its  overthrow  the  attack  was  di 
rected  against  the  State  banks ;  that  Van  Buren's  adminis 
tration  was  pledged  to  complete  and  perfect  the  principles, 
plans,  and  policy  of  Jackson's  administration  ;  and  that  the 
independent  Treasury  bill  was  intended  to  execute  that 
pledge  "  by  establishing  upon  the  ruins  of  the  late  Bank  of 


394  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

the  United  States  and  the  State  banks  a  government  bank, 
to  be  managed  and  controlled  by  the  Treasury  Department 
acting  under  the  commands  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States."  The  argument  in  support  of  these  propositions  pre 
sented  nothing  that  was  novel  except  a  new  arrangement 
of  materials  which,  for  the  most  part,  Clay  had  employed 
many  times  before.  The  first  three  propositions  were  based 
on  Jackson's  messages  and  farewell  address,  and  the  ar 
gument  was  interspersed  with  specimens  of  Clay's  long- 
practised  art  of  denouncing  Jackson,  which  these  passages 
amply  illustrate : 

"  "War  and  strife,  endless  war  and  strife,  personal  or  na 
tional,  foreign  or  domestic,  were  the  aliment  of  the  Presi 
dent's  existence.  War  against  the  bank,  war  against  France, 
and  strife  and  contention  with  a  countless  number  of  indi 
viduals.  The  wars  with  Black  Hawk  and  the  Seminoles 
were  scarcely  a  luncheon  for  his  voracious  appetite.  And 
he  made  his  exit  from  public  life  denouncing  war  and  ven 
geance  against  Mexico  and  the  State  banks.  .  .  .  His  ad 
ministration  consisted  of  a  succession  of  astounding  meas 
ures  which  fell  on  the  public  ear  like  repeated  bursts  of  loud 
and  appalling  thunder.  Before  the  reverberations  of  one 
peal  had  ceased  another  and  another  came,  louder  and  loud 
er  and  more  terrifying.  Or  rather,  it  was  like  a  volcanic 
mountain  emitting  frightful  eruptions  of  burning  lava.  Be 
fore  one  was  cold  and  crusted,  before  the  voices  of  the 
buried  villages  and  cities  were  hushed  in  eternal  silence, 
another  more  desolating  was  vomited  forth,  extending  wider 
and  wider  the  circle  of  death  and  destruction." 

In  connection  with  the  fourth  proposition — that  the  ad 
ministration  was  pledged  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  its  pre 
decessor — Yan  Buren  became  the  object  of  Clay's  invective. 


CH.  X.]         CLAY  AND  VAN  BUREN'S   POLICY  395 

He  exultingly  cited  the  passage  in  Van  Buren's  letter  of 
acceptance  saying  that  he  was  "  the  honored  instrument 
selected  by  the  friends  of  the  present  administration  to 
carry  out  its  principles  and  policy,"  and  that  if  elected  he 
should  "  endeavor  generally  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of 
President  Jackson."  "  The  honored  instrument !"  Clay  ex 
claimed.  "  That  word,  according  to  the  most  approved  def 
inition,  means  tool.  He  was,  then,  the  honored  tool — to  do 
what  ?  To  promote  the  honor  and  advance  the  welfare  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States  and  to  add  to  the  glory  of 
the  country  ?  No,  no ;  his  country  was  not  in  his  thoughts. 
Party,  party  filled  the  place  in  his  bosom  which  country 
should  have  occupied.  He  was  the  honored  tool  to  carry 
out  the  principles  and  policy  of  General  Jackson's  adminis 
tration." 

That  Van  Buren  was  striving  to  execute  Jackson's  finan 
cial  policy  was  undisputed,  hence  there  was  no  difficulty  in 
demonstrating  the  fact ;  but  that  there  was  an  ulterior  de 
sign  to  create  a  government  bank  in  hostility  to  the  State 
banks,  as  Clay  contended,  was  not  true,  and  his  argument 
was  far-fetched.  His  reasoning  was  practically  the  same  as 
that  of  his  speech  at  the  special  session,  and  failed  to  justify 
the  awful  apprehensions  he  had  expressed  with  such  dra 
matic  solemnity  in  his  exordium.1 

After  concluding  this  part  of  the  speech,  in  which  all 
that  Calhoun  had  opposed  was  vividly  arrayed,  he  charac 
terized  him  as  the  one,  next  to  Van  Buren,  "  most  conspicu 
ous  of  those  who  pressed  this  bill  upon  Congress  and  the 

1  "  And  what  was  the  question  at  issue  ?  It  was  whether  Nicholas  Biddle 
should  have  the  custody  of  the  public  money  and  use  the  average  balance 
in  discounting  notes,  or  whether  Mr.  Cisco  should  keep  it  at  New  York  in 
an  exceedingly  strong  vault  and  not  use  any  of  it  in  discounting  notes." — 
Parton's  Famous  Americans,  p.  46. 


396  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

American  people,"  and  referred  to  the  disparaging  esti 
mates  of  Yan  Buren  that  Calhouri  had  often  expressed. 
"  On  one  occasion,  not  very  distant,  denying  to  him  any  of 
the  nobler  qualities  of  the  royal  beast  of  the  forest,  he  at 
tributed  to  him  those  which  belong  to  the  most  crafty,  most 
skulking,  and  one  of  the  meanest  of  the  quadruped  tribe." 
Calhoun  had  intimated  that  the  course  of  Clay  and  his 
friends  was  unpatriotic.  Clay  denied  the  justice  of  the  re 
proach. 

"  We  united,"  said  he,  "  if  indeed  there  were  any  alliance 
in  the  case,  to  restrain  the  enormous  expansion  of  Execu 
tive  power,  to  arrest  the  progress  of  corruption,  to  rebuke 
usurpation,  and  to  drive  the  Goths  and  Yandals  from  the 
capital,  to  expel  Brennus  and  his  horde  from  Home.  .  .  . 
And  how  often  have  we  witnessed  the  Senator  from  South 
Carolina,  with  woful  countenance  and  in  doleful  strains, 
pouring  forth  mournful  and  touching  eloquence  on  the  de 
generacy  of  the  times  and  the  downward  tendency  of  the 
republic.  Day  after  day  in  the  Senate  have  we  seen  the 
displays  of  his  lofty  and  impassioned  eloquence.  ...  At  the 
critical  moment  the  Senator  left  us  ;  he  left  us  for  the  very 
purpose  of  preventing  the  success  of  the  common  cause.  He 
took  up  his  musket,  knapsack,  and  shot-pouch,  and  joined  the 
other  party.  He  went,  horse,  foot,  and  dragoon,  and  he  him 
self  composed  the  whole  corps.  .  .  .  We  did  no  wrong  to  the 
distinguished  Senator  from  South  Carolina.  On  the  contrary, 
we  respected  him,  confided  in  his  great  and  acknowledged 
ability,  his  uncommon  genius,  his  extensive  experience,  his 
supposed  patriotism ;  above  all,  we  confided  in  his  stern  and 
inflexible  fidelity.  Nevertheless,  he  left  us  and  joined  our 
common  opponents,  distrusting  and  distrusted.  He  left  us,  as 
he  tells  us  in  his  Edgefield  letter,  because  the  victory  which 


CH.X.]  CLAY  ATTACKS  CALHOUN  397 

our  common  arms  were  about  to  achieve  was  not  to  inure 
to  him  and  his  party,  but  exclusively  to  the  benefit  of  his 
allies  and  their  cause.  I  thought,  actuated  by  patriotism, 
that  noblest  of  human  virtues,  we  had  been  contending  to 
gether  for  our  common  country,  for  her  violated  rights,  her 
threatened  liberties,  her  prostrate  Constitution.  Never  did 
I  suppose  that  personal  or  party  considerations  entered  into 
our  views." 

He  then  passed  to  Calhoun's  speech,  which  he  slightingly 
characterized  as  "  plausible,  ingenious,  abstract,  metaphysi 
cal,  and  generalizing,"  not  "  adapted  to  the  bosoms  and 
business  of  human  life  " ;  and  replied  to  it  without  further 
personalities  except  to  say  that  Calhoun's  opinions  as  to  the 
constitutionality  of  a  national  bank  had  entirely  changed. 
And  there  was  no  need  of  any — his  blow  had  struck  home. 

As  soon  as  he  had  concluded,  Calhoun  arose  and  said  that 
Clay  had  misstated  and  perverted  every  argument  he  had 
advanced ;  that  he  intended  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  Sen 
ator  at  the  first  opportunity;  and  that  when  he  did  so 
the  debt  between  them  would  be  fully  discharged.  Clay  re 
joined  that  whether  or  not  he  had  misstated  or  perverted 
Calhoun's  arguments  was  not  for  that  Senator  to  say — he 
would  appeal  to  a  less  partial  judge,  the  Senate ;  that  as  to 
any  intention  of  paying  on  the  Senator's  part,  he  was  as 
ready  to  receive  as  the  Senator  was  to  pay ;  that  he  sought 
a  contest  with  no  man  and  should  not  avoid  one  with  the 
Senator.1  The  significance  of  the  affair  was  well  understood. 


1  "  The  galleries  were  all  filled  two  hours  before  the  time  of  the  Sen 
ate's  meeting.  .  .  .  Mr.  Clay  rose  to  the  order  of  the  day  at  one  o'clock 
and  spoke  until  half-past  five.  In  the  course  of  the  speech,  Mr.  Clay  bore 
somewhat  hard  upon  Mr.  Calhoun  for  his  recent  apostasy  and  replied  to 
his  arguments  in  favor  of  the  bill,  to  which  the  latter  replied  in  a  few  ex- 
ceedingl}7  harsh  and  ill-natured  remarks.  ...  I  thought  there  was  a  degree 


398  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1838 

Clay  had  put  Calhoun  on  trial  for  inconsistency  ;  and  the 
charges  were  so  grave  that  he  was  obliged  to  meet  them 
with  all  the  ingenuity,  eloquence,  and  power  that  he  pos 
sessed.  Clay's  indictment  was  so  well  matured  and  effec 
tively  preferred  that  Calhoun  fully  appreciated  the  neces 
sity  of  a  defence  prepared  with  equal  deliberation  and  the 
utmost  thoroughness.  It  was  to  be,  as  he  declared,  the  vin 
dication  of  his  public  life  and  character.  He  was  in  no 
haste.  'Not  until  March  20  did  he  deliver  his  reply.1 

The  first  part  of  his  speech  related  to  his  former  argu 
ments,  which  he  alleged  Clay  had  perverted.  He  then  pro 
ceeded  with  his  personal  defence.  So  far  as  concerned  his 
position  on  financial  questions  while  acting  with  the  Whigs, 
he  was  successful  in  showing  that  his  present  attitude  was 
not  inconsistent.  Had  he  been  able  to  rest  his  case  there 
it  would  have  been  quite  secure.  He  was  not  a  Whig,  and 
he  was  under  no  obligation  to  co-operate  with  the  Whig 
party.  His  support  of  Yan  Buren's  administration,  there 
fore,  involved  in  itself  no  treachery  and  no  breach  of  polit 
ical  propriety  toward  his  late  allies.  But  while  he  stoutly 
contended  for  this  he  had  admitted  in  his  Edgefield  letter — 
a  communication  to  friends  in  South  Carolina  in  which  he 
declined  a  public  dinner — that  in  supporting  Yan  Buren  he 
was  influenced  by  another  motive  than  to  abide  by  his  con 
victions  as  to  the  right  financial  policy  for  the  government 
to  pursue :  that  by  continuing  his  alliance  with  the  Whigs 

of  acrimony  and  ill-nature  in  his  reply  much  greater  than  the  occasion  jus 
tified." — Hone's  Diary,  vol.  i.  p.  290. 

1  "  I  happened  to  know  that  in  this  time  he  refreshed  his  reading  of  the 
Oration  on  the  Crown  ;  and,  as  the  delivery  of  the  speech  showed,  not 
without  profit.  Besides  its  general  cast,  which  was  a  good  imitation,  there 
were  passages  of  a  vigor  and  terseness  —  of  a  power  and  simplicity  — 
which  would  recall  the  recollection  of  that  masterpiece  of  the  world."— 
Benton's  Thirty  Tears'  View,  vol.  ii.  p.  98. 


CH.X.]  CALHOUN  REPLIES   TO   CLAY  399 

at  the  new  juncture  of  events  it  was  "  clear  that  the  victory 
would  inure  not  to  us,  but  exclusively  to  the  benefit  of  our 
allies  and  their  cause."  ISTor  did  he  in  his  speech  disavow 
or  qualify  the  truth  of  that  statement :  he  strove  to  justify 
his  course  in  that  respect  as  being  legitimate  political  tac 
tics  to  preserve  the  States-rights  party  and  its  principles.  It 
was  at  best  but  slippery  ground  upon  which  to  stand ;  and 
although  his  justification  was  presented  with  his  usual  sub 
tleness  and  ability,  it  manifestly  lacked  that  quality  of  ster 
ling  political  rectitude  which  he  would  have  sustained  in 
the  early  part  of  his  career. 

To  Clay's  characterization  of  his  speech  as  metaphysical, 
he  made  a  keen  reply.  "  I  cannot  retort,"  said  he,  "  on  the 
Senator's  charge  of  being  metaphysical.  I  cannot  accuse 
him  of  possessing  the  powers  of  analysis  and  generalization, 
those  higher  faculties  of  the  mind  (called  metaphysical  by 
those  who  do  not  possess  them)  which  decompose  and  resolve 
into  their  elements  the  complex  masses  of  ideas  that  exist 
in  the  world  of  mind — as  chemistry  does  the  bodies  that 
surround  us  in  the  material  world  ;  and  without  which  those 
deep  and  hidden  causes  which  are  in  constant  action  and 
producing  such  mighty  changes  in  the  condition  of  socie 
ty  would  operate  unseen  and  undetected.  The  absence  of 
these  higher  qualities  of  mind  is  conspicuous  throughout 
the  whole  course  of  the  Senator's  public  life.  To  this  may 
be  traced  that  he  prefers  the  specious  to  the  solid  and  the 
plausible  to  the  true.  To  the  same  cause,  combined  with  an 
ardent  temperament,  it  is  owing  that  we  ever  find  him 
mounted  upon  some  popular  and  favorite  measure,  which  he 
whips  along,  cheered  by  the  shouts  of  the  multitude,  and 
never  dismounts  till  he  has  ridden  it  down.  ...  It  is  the 
fault  of  his  mind  to  seize  on  a  few  prominent  and  strik- 


400  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

ing  advantages,  and  to  pursue  them  eagerly  without  look 
ing  to  consequences." 

He  then  reviewed  his  own  public  life,  in  the  effort  to  show 
that  he  had  uniformly  acted  according  to  his  convictions, 
regardless  of  party  trammels ;  and  cited  his  opposition  to 
the  restrictive  system,  his  support  of  the  navy,  and  his 
attitude  toward  "Mr.  Dallas's  bank  of  1814-15"  to  justify 
his  contention.  Then  "  passing  the  intervening  instances," 
he  extolled  his  administration  of  the  War  Department. 
The  Yice-Presidency,  he  said,  afforded  him  the  leisure  and 
opportunity  "  to  study  the  genius  of  the  prominent  measure 
of  the  day,  then  called  the  American  System ;  of  which  I 
profited.  I  soon  perceived  where  its  errors  lay  and  how  it 
would  operate.  I  clearly  saw  its  desolating  effects  in  one 
section  and  corrupting  influence  in  the  other ;  and  when  I 
saw  it  could  not  be  arrested  here  I  fell  back  on  my  own 
State,  and  a  blow  was  given  to  a  system  destined  to  destroy 
our  institutions,  if  not  overthrown,  which  brought  it  to  the 
ground." 

Such  was  the  tenor  of  his  defence.  He  had  studiously 
avoided  the  most  vulnerable  features  of  his  career,  which 
were  caused  by  his  radical  change  of  views  and  his  conduct 
in  relation  to  the  tariff,  internal  improvements,  and  a  nation 
al  bank ;  and  by  asserting  that  the  nullification  proceed 
ings  had  crippled  protection,  he  gave  Clay  precisely  the  ad 
vantage  best  suited  to  his  method  and  style  of  attack.  Clay 
was  now  relieved  of  the  necessity  of  making  veiled  allusions 
and  general  statements.  Calhoun  had  opened  the  way  for 
particular  denunciation,  and  Clay  promptly  and  with  impas 
sioned  zeal  seized  the  opportunity.1 

1  Salmon  P.  Chase  wrote  in  his  diary,  April  10,  1830:  "It  is  said  that 
he  [Calhoun]  was  desirous  of  supporting  the  administration  of  Mr.  Adams, 


CH.  X.]        NULLIFICATION  AND  PROTECTION  401 

He  began  by  expressing  his  regret  at  precipitating  a  per 
sonal  controversy,  and  by  asserting  that  what  he  had  said 
was  in  the  performance  of  a  public  duty.  He  had  long 
served  with  the  Senator,  admired  his  genius,  and  struggled 
to  think  well  of  him ;  but  the  Edgefield  letter  had  changed 
his  opinions.  He  indignantly  repelled  the  assertion  that 
nullification  overthrew  the  protective  system.  "  At  the  com 
mencement  of  the  session  of  1832,"  he  said,  "  the  Senator 
was  in  any  other  condition  than  that  of  dictating  terms. 
Those  of  us  who  were  then  here  must  recollect  well  his  hag 
gard  looks  and  his  anxious  and  depressed  countenance.  A 
highly  estimable  friend  of  mine,  Mr.  J.  M.  Clayton,  of  Dela 
ware,  alluding  to  the  possibility  of  a  rupture  with  South 
Carolina,  and  declarations  of  President  Jackson  with  respect 
to  certain  distinguished  individuals  he  had  denounced  and 
proscribed,  said  to  me  on  more  than  one  occasion,  referring 
to  the  Senator  from  South  Carolina  and  some  of  his  col 
leagues,  *  They  are  clever  fellows,  and  it  will  never  do  to 
let  old  Jackson  hang  them.' ''  Clay  maintained  that  nullifi 
cation,  instead  of  overthrowing  protection,  had,  by  aiding 
the  Compromise,  expressty  sanctioned  the  Constitutional 

but  was  overruled  by  his  native  State.  'He  proposed,'  a  gentleman  who 
had  ample  means  of  knowing  the  truth,  recently  remarked  to  me,  '  to  sup 
port  the  administration,  in  a  caucus  of  South  Carolinians.'  The  proposition 
was  received  with  disgust,  and  Governor  Taylor  rose  and  exclaimed  : 
'  Crucify  1dm T  So  decided  disapprobation  alarmed  and  discouraged  him. 
He  fell  in  with  the  prevailing  sentiment  and  went  for  Jackson." — War 
den's  Chase,  p.  214.  Certainly  he  at  once  entered  actively  into  the  opposi 
tion,  and  as  Vice-President  appointed  the  Senate  committees  adversely  to 
the  administration. — Sumner's  Jackson,  p.  111.  He  declared  that  "Such 
was  the  manner  in  which  it  came  into  power  that  it  must  be  defeated  at  all 
hazards,  regardless  of  its  measures." — Von  Hoist's  Calhoun,  p.  65.  This 
was  the  leading  sentiment  of  the  opposition.  "  In  the  words  of  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  of  General  Jackson's  supporters,  the  administration 
must  be  put  down,  '  though  as  pure  as  the  angels  at  the  right  hand  of 
God.'"— Sargent's  Clay,  p.  123. 
26 


402  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

power  and  perpetuated  the  system;  and  that  in.  every  in 
stance  where  he  and  Calhoun  had  disagreed  concerning  the 
terms  of  the  Compromise  Calhoun  had  yielded.  "  Nullifica 
tion!"  he  exclaimed;  "a  strange,  impracticable,  incompre 
hensible  doctrine,  that  partakes  of  the  character  of  the 
metaphysical  school  of  German  philosophy,  or  would  be 
worthy  of  the  puzzling  theological  controversies  of  the 
Middle  Ages !" 

He  admitted  that  "  no  one,  in  the  commencement  of  the 
protective  policy,  ever  supposed  that  it  was  to  be  perpetual. 
We  hoped  and  believed  that  temporary  protection  extended 
to  our  infant  manufactures  would  bring  them  up  and  en 
able  them  to  withstand  competition  with  those  of  Europe." 
He  commented  caustically  on  Calhoun's  acknowledged  po 
litical  motive  in  dissolving  the  alliance,  and  explained  his 
own  action  in  voting  for  Adams  in  1824,  to  which  Calhoun 
had  alluded,  and  his  change  of  opinion  in  1816  in  regard  to 
a  national  bank,  the  only  time  he  had  ever  changed  his  "  de 
liberate  opinion  upon  any  great  question  of  national  policy." 
"  The  distinguished  Senator,"  said  he,  "  sticks  long  to  no 
hobby.  He  was  once  gayly  mounted  on  that  of  internal 
improvements.  We  rode  that  double,  the  Senator  before 
and  I  behind  him.  He  quickly  slipped  off,  leaving  me  to 
hold  the  bridle."  This  he  showed  by  stating  what  Cal 
houn  proposed  in  his  advocacy  of  that  policy.  In  the  same 
manner  he  illustrated  Calhoun's  early  favor  of  a  national 
bank.  He  closed  in  a  strain  of  mingled  sarcasm  and  con 
tempt. 

"  How  profound  he  may  suppose  his  power  of  analysis  to 
be,  and  whatever  opinion  he  may  entertain  of  his  own  meta 
physical  faculty,  can  he  imagine  that  any  plain,  common- 
sense  man  can  ever  comprehend  how  it  is  Constitutional  to 


CH.  X.]      CALHOUN  AND  HIS   EARLY   PRINCIPLES      403 

prolong  an  unconstitutional  bank  for  twelve  years?  ...  I 
do  not  speak  of  this  in  any  unkind  spirit,  but  I  will  tell  the 
Senator  when  he  will  be  consistent.  He  will  be  so  when  he 
resolves  henceforward  never  to  pronounce  that  word  again. 
"We  began  our  public  career  nearly  together ;  we  remained 
together  throughout  the  war  and  down  to  the  peace.  We 
agreed  as  to  a  Bank  of  the  United  States — as  to  a  protective 
tariff — as  to  internal  improvements — and  lastly,  as  to  those 
arbitrary  and  violent  measures  which  characterized  the  ad 
ministration  of  General  Jackson.  No  two  prominent  public 
men  ever  agreed  better  together  in  respect  to  important 
measures  of  national  policy.  We  concur  now  in  nothing. 
We  separate  forever." 

The  speeches  then  subsided  into  a  colloquy,  in  which  Cal- 
houn  endeavored  to  explain  away  Clay's  assertions  as  to  his 
early  career  and  Constitutional  views ;  but  he  was  not  and 
could  not  be  successful.  He  had  radically  changed  his  opin 
ions,  and  there  was  no  escape  from  the  fact.1  The  liberal 
statesman  had  become  the  chief  defender  of  the  slavery  inter 
est,  and  by  necessary  consequence  had  revised  and  metamor 
phosed  his  former  tenets  to  conform  to  his  new  creed.  On 


1  "  It  will  excite  some  surprise  at  the  present  day,"  says  Edward  Ever 
ett,  in  his  Memoir  of  Webster,  "  in  the  consideration  of  the  political  history 
of  the  last  thirty  years,  to  find  how  little  difference  as  to  the  leading  meas 
ures  existed  in  1816  between  these  distinguished  statesmen  [Clay,  Calhoun, 
Webster,  Lowndes,  and  Cheves].  No  line  of  general  parly  difference  sepa 
rated  the  members  of  the  first  Congress  after  the  peace."  And  this  simi 
larity  of  opinion  continued  until  1824.  In  the  Presidential  campaign  of 
that  year,  before  the  election  by  the  House,  Benton,  Buchanan,  Tyler, 
Blair,  and  others  who  afterward  stood  high  in  the  Democratic  party,  were 
warm  supporters  of  Clay.  At  that  period  Van  Buren  also  shared  the  pre 
vailing  opinions  in  favor  of  internal  improvements  and  protection.  In  the 
Senate  he  supported  the  tariff  of  1828.  He  was  among  the  first,  how 
ever,  to  change  his  ground,  and  he  led  the  way  to  the  reconstruction  of 
the  Democratic  creed.  See  Shepard's  Van  Buren,  pp.  83,  85. 


404  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1838 

the  whole,  therefore,  Clay  had  the  advantage  both  on  the 
merits  of  the  subject  and  in  the  superiority  of  his  talent  for 
that  kind  of  controversy ; l  and  the  result  of  the  encounter 
afforded  the  "Whigs  keen  delight,  for  the  debate  was  printed 
and  read  throughout  the  country. 

Several  financial  measures  of  less  importance  than  the 
proposed  independent  Treasury  were  enacted.  In  accord 
ance  with  the  recommendation  of  the  President,  the  issue 
and  circulation  of  all  bills,  notes,  and  other  securities  of 
corporations  whose  charters  had  expired  were  prohibited 
and  made  penal,  the  law  being  particularly  aimed  at  the 
notes  of  the  former  Bank  of  the  United  States.  The  banks 
in  the  District  were  compelled  to  adopt  the  financial  policy 
of  the  administration.  They — and  by  another  act,  all  cor 
porations,  firms,  and  individuals  also — were  required  to  cease 
the  issue  and  circulation  of  all  paper  currency  of  a  lower 
denomination  than  five  dollars ;  and  those  that  had  issued 
such  paper  were  required  to  redeem  it.  The  District  banks 


1  "  The  truth  and  the  victory  were  with  Clay,  who  closed  with  the  taunt 
ing  hope  that  the  settlement  of  accounts  was  as  satisfactory  to  the  Senator 
from  South  Carolina  as  it  was  to  him.  Clay  spoke  of  the  South  Carolina 
nullification  with  such  insulting  contempt  that  it  brought  out  Preston,  who 
complained  of  it  bitterly.  Preston's  countenance  was  a  portraiture  of  agon 
izing  anguish.  The  personal  oratorical  encounters  between  Clay  and  Cal- 
houn  are  Liliputian  mimicry  of  the  orations  against  Ctesiphon  and  for  the 
Crown  or  the  debate  of  the  second  Philippic." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  ix.  p. 
505.  In  Calhoun's  speech  in  1817  on  the  bill  to  set  aside  the  dividends  and 
the  bonus  of  the  bank  as  a  permanent  fund  for  internal  improvements,  he  ex 
pressed  these  sentiments :  "  I  am  no  advocate  for  refined  arguments  on  the 
Constitution.  The  instrument  was  not  intended  as  a  thesis  for  the  logician 
to  exercise  his  ingenuity  on.  It  ought  to  be  construed  with  plain  good 
sense."  "  If  we  are  restricted  in  the  use  of  our  money  to  the  enumerated 
powers,  on  what  principle  can  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  be  justified  ?" 
"  The  uniform  sense  of  Congress  and  the  country  furnishes  better  evidence 
of  the  true  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  than  the  most  refined  and 
subtle  arguments." 


CH.  X.]    CLAY  ADVOCATES  PAPER  CURRENCY   405 

were  also  required  to  resume  specie  payments  on  or  before 
January  1,  1839,  or  sooner  if  the  banks  of  Baltimore  and 
Eichmond  should  do  so.  Clay  opposed  the  measures.  He 
vigorously  condemned  the  suppression  of  small  notes  in  the 
District.  Among  other  things  he  said :  "  The  committee 
have  wholly  reversed  the  natural  order  of  things;  they  have 
begun  at  the  wrong  end.  They  were  looked  to  for  some 
remedy  to  the  disordered  state  of  the  currency ;  we  had 
hoped  for  some  cure  to  the  general  disorder;  but  instead 
of  that  they  begin  with  this  little  District.  .  .  .  This  bill  is 
aimed  at  the  poor,  the  miserable,  the  wretched  portion 
of  the  community;  against  slaves,  negroes,  and  beggars; 
against  women  and  children!  Here  are  fines  to  punish 
boys  and  girls  if  they  go  to  market  or  offer  to  buy  anything 
with  the  only  money  you  have  enabled  them  to  have  in 
their  possession."  And  again :  "  The  committee  have  since 
the  commencement  of  the  session  strained  every  nerve,  and 
have  produced  this  sixpenny  bill  to  put  down  shin-plasters." 
He  was  persistent  in  his  advocacy  of  paper  currency.  Be 
fore  the  time  arrived  for  the  New  York  banks  to  resume 
specie  payments  he  introduced  a  joint  resolution  to  permit 
the  demand  notes  of  sound  banks  to  be  paid  for  all  public 
dues  and  to  be  disbursed  to  public  creditors  willing  to  re 
ceive  them.  His  professed  purpose  was  to  aid  resumption  ; 
his  real  object  was  to  aid  the  delinquent  banks  and  indi 
rectly  restore  the  paper  system  by  rescinding  the  specie 
circular.  The  resolution  was  vigorously  opposed  by  the 
leading  supporters  of  the  administration ;  but  its  tactical 
efficiency  carried  it  through  after  an  entire  change  of 
phraseology.  Late  in  the  session  it  was  adopted  in  this 
form :  "  That  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  to  make  or  continue  in  force  any  general 


406  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1838 

order  which  shall  create  any  difference  between  the  dif 
ferent  branches  of  revenue,  as  to  the  money  or  medium  of 
payment  in  which  debts  or  dues  accruing  to  the  United 
States  may  be  paid."  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  how 
ever,  was  enabled  to  preserve  the  policy  of  the  specie  cir 
cular  under  provisions  of  law  which  Congress  had  appar 
ently  overlooked. 

Some  other  topics  were  discussed.  Notwithstanding  his 
position  as  the  expectant  Whig  nominee  for  the  Presidency, 
he  spoke  on  them  with  his  usual  freedom.  On  presenting  one 
of  the  many  petitions  for  the  establishment  of  a  national 
bank,  he  took  occasion  to  detail  his  plan  for  such  an  institu 
tion.  He  opposed  the  public-lands  policy  of  the  administra 
tion;  and  supported  a  bill  to  prohibit  duelling,  which  became 
a  law  at  the  next  session.1 

He  also  expressed  his  views  on  three  international  ques 
tions.  In  regard  to  the  proposal  to  erect  a  Territorial 
government  for  Oregon,  he  urged  such  a  course  as  would 
obviate  difficulty  with  Great  Britain  over  the  mooted  north 
western  boundary.  But  concerning  the  affair  of  the  Caroline, 
which  had  recently  occurred,  his  attitude  was  bolder.  The 
Caroline  was  a  steamboat  owned  by  American  citizens,  and 
was  seized  and  destroyed  in  our  waters  by  Canadian  militia, 


1  "It  is  well  known,"  said  he,  in  the  course  of  his  remarks,  "that  in 
certain  quarters  of  the  country  public  opinion  is  averse  to  duelling,  and  no 
public  man  can  fly  in  the  face  of  that  public  opinion  without  having  his 
reputation  sacrificed ;  while  there  are  other  portions  again  which  exact 
obedience  to  that  fatal  custom.  The  man  with  a  high  sense  of  honor  and 
nice  sensibility,  when  the  question  is  whether  he  shall  fight  or  have  the 
finger  of  scorn  pointed  at  him,  is  unable  to  resist,  and  few,  very  few,  are 
found  willing  to  adopt  such  an  alternative.  When  public  opinion  is  ren 
ovated  and  chastened  by  reason,  religion,  and  humanity,  the  practice  of 
duelling  will  at  once  be  discontinued.  It  is  the  office  of  legislation  to  do 
all  it  can  to  bring  about  this  healthful  state  of  the  public  mind." 


CH.X.]      VARIOUS   LEGISLATIVE  ENACTMENTS  407 

who  killed  several  men  in  the  affray.  The  act  was  insti 
gated  by  the  fact  that  the  vessel  was  employed  in  aid  of  the 
insurgents.  It  was  one  of  the  numerous  disturbances  along 
the  border  which  arose  from  the  Canadian  rebellion.  Clay 
denounced  the  affair  as  an  "  unparalleled  outrage,"  and  vig 
orously  maintained  that  redress  should  be  demanded.  On 
the  subject  of  the  Mexican  claims  he  expressed  himself  in 
much  the  same  manner  as  he  had  when  it  was  previously 
before  Congress.  "  The  want  of  dignity,"  said  he,  "  and 
the  want  of  temper  that  have  been  manifested  by  persons 
connected  with  the  government  in  relation  to  this  whole 
matter  are  greatly  to  be  deplored."  The  session  ended 
July  9. 

The  last  session  of  the  Twenty -fifth  Congress  —  from 
December  3  to  March  3,  1839 — developed  little  of  historic 
interest.  The  Sub -Treasury  question  was  allowed  to  rest 
until  the  next  session,  as  the  political  conditions  were  still 
unfavorable  to  the  passage  of  the  bill.  Much  useful  and 
necessary  legislation  was  enacted ;  but  having  no  relation 
to  politics,  it  did  not  cause  prolonged  debates.  Besides  the 
law  against  duelling,  the  most  conspicuous  acts  of  general 
interest  were  those  abolishing  imprisonment  for  debt,  on 
process  issued  out  of  the  Federal  courts  in  States  where 
that  policy  was  adopted ;  and  to  authorize  the  President 
to  maintain,  by  force  if  necessary,  our  claim  to  the  territory 
in  the  extreme  northeast,  to  which  the  British  government 
had  thus  far  refused  to  accede.  On  this  subject  there  was 
considerable  public  excitement. 

The  administration  bill  to  reduce  and  graduate  the  prices 
of  the  public  lands  was  finally  passed  by  the  Senate.  Clay 
earnestly  opposed  it,  but  Webster  supported  it.  It  failed, 
however,  in  the  House.  In  connection  with  some  resolu- 


408  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

tions  adopted  by  the  legislature  of  North  Carolina  declar 
ing  the  expunging  resolution  unconstitutional,  the  question 
incidentally  arose  as  to  what  extent  Representatives  were 
bound  by  such  instructions.  Clay  thus  expressed  the  theory 
then  commonly  entertained : 

"  What  is  the  basis  and  what  the  principle  of  the  doctrine 
of  instruction?  To  a  certain  extent  I  have  always  believed 
in  this  doctrine  and  have  been  ever  ready  to  conform  to  it. 
But  I  hold  to  the  doctrine  as  it  stood  in  1798,  that  in  gen 
eral,  on  questions  of  expediency,  the  Eepresentative  should 
conform  to  his  instructions,  and  so  gratify  the  wishes  and 
obey  the  will  of  his  constituents,  though  on  questions  of 
constitutionality  his  course  might  be  different.  .  .  .  Is  it  not 
that  we  are  to  conform  to  the  wishes  of  our  constituents? 
Is  it  not  that  we  are  here  to  act,  not  in  our  own,  but  in  a 
delegated  character  ?  And  will  any  who  stand  here  pretend 
that  whenever  they  knew  the  wishes  or  will  of  those  who 
sent  them  here  they  are  not  bound  to  conform  to  that  will 
entirely  ?  Is  it  not  the  doctrine  that  we  are  nothing  more 
than  a  mirror  to  reflect  the  will  of  those  who  called  us  to 
our  distinguished  office  ?  That  is  the  view  I  take  of  the  doc 
trine  of  instruction." 

It  originated  in  the  early  distrust  of  centralized  govern 
ment.  It  prevailed  very  generally  prior  to  the  Civil  "War,- 
and  was  often  applied.  The  constitutions  of  several  States 
expressly  authorized  it,  although  no  method  was  provided 
for  enforcing  it  in  case  the  Representatives  declined  to  fol 
low  the  instructions  they  received ;  public  sentiment,  how 
ever,  was  commonly  efficacious.  But  the  doctrine  gradually 
fell  into  disuse,  and  has  been  superseded  by  the  English 
theory,  as  enunciated  by  Blackstone  and  Burke,  that  repre 
sentatives  do  not  serve  their  local  constituencies  alone,  but 


Cn.  X.]  THE   SILVER  COINAGE  409 

the  whole  nation,  and  therefore  they  are  not  subject  to  in 
structions,  and  that  their  tenure  is  fixed  by  their  election. 
This  has  proved  to  be  the  wiser  and  more  orderly  practice 
as  applied  to  members  of  legislative  bodies. 

Another  topic  of  interesting,  though  brief,  discussion  was 
the  subsidiary  silver  coin.  In  some  localities  there  was  a 
dearth  of  it.  "  I  happened,"  said  Clay,  "  to  receive,  but  a 
few  days  ago,  a  communication  from  an  intelligent  gentle 
man  in  one  of  our  principal  seaports,  affirming  that  the 
scarcity  of  silver  change  was  one  of  the  effects  of  the  pas 
sage  of  the  gold  bill ;  because  by  reducing  the  standard  of 
gold  coin  it  became  less  valuable  as  an  article  of  exportation 
than  silver,  and  therefore  the  latter  was  always  exported. 
Now  this  is  exactly  what  was  predicted  by  myself  and 
others  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  law  for  the  adjust 
ment  of  the  value  of  the  two  coins ;  and  the  result  has 
proved  the  correctness  of  the  prediction.  Gold  cannot  be 
exported  under  that  law  without  disadvantage  unless  ex 
change  is  greatly  against  us ;  but  silver  can  profitably  be 
exported,  and  when  exportation  becomes  necessary  it  is  of 
course  made  in  that  species  of  coin  in  which  it  can  be  sent 
abroad  without  loss." 

His  statements  were  at  once  challenged.  "  I  think,"  said 
Niles,  "  there  is  no  such  scarcity ;  I  know  that  in  many  places 
it  is  abundant.  Within  my  own  experience  banks  have  re 
fused  to  receive  it.  This  is  convincing  proof  that  there  is 
an  abundance  of  it.  It  is  known  to  every  one  who  has  in 
quired  into  the  subject  that  silver  change  is  never  exported, 
because  its  nominal  value  would  be  lost  and  it  could  only  be 
disposed  of  as  bullion  to  be  recoined,  occasioning  much  loss 
by  the  process.  There  may  be  a  scarcity  of  change  in  some 
States,  but  that  is  the  result  of  their  paper  systems.  The 


410  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1839 

hostility  of  paper  to  silver  is  well  known ;  indeed,  so  hostile 
is  it  that  where  it  has  the  power  even  silver  fippem^  bits 
are  driven  out  of  circulation.  What  was  the  result  in  Phila 
delphia,  where  the  mint  was  located,  during  the  late  suspen 
sion  ?  In  that  city,  which  previous  to  the  suspension  was 
thoroughly  saturated  with  silver  change,  after  the  barrier 
was  broken  down  and  the  emission  of  shin-plasters  author 
ized,  no  change  whatever  could  be  procured.  In  a  single 
night  the  state  of  things  was  completely  changed.  Instead 
of  an  abundance  of  silver  change  there  was  an  entire  ab 
sence  of  it.  And  a  similar  result  will  always  follow  a  simi 
lar  cause;  and  to  the  extension  of  our  paper  system,  the 
circulation  of  one-dollar  notes,  and  notes  for  a  fractional 
part  of  a  dollar,  may  we  much  more  appropriately  look  for 
the  scarcity  of  silver  change  than  the  operation  of  the  gold 
bill  of  1834." 

Niles  was  corroborated  by  others,  particularly  Benton. 
The  truth  is  that  silver  had  been  undervalued  by  the  act  of 
1834,  which  had  to  some  extent  caused  its  exportation  and 
conversion  into  bullion ;  and  paper  had  forced  it  out  of 
circulation  in  some  parts  of  the  country.  The  lessons  are 
obvious. 

At  this  session  Clay  made  another  of  his  calamitous  mis 
takes.  But  for  his  blunder  he  would  probably  have  been 
nominated  and  elected  President  in  1840.  It  was  occa 
sioned  by  a  set  speech  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  Aside 
from  it  and  Calhoun's  comments  on  it,  there  was  no  other 
discussion  of  the  question  in  the  Senate.  In  the  House 
the  usual  "gag"  was  at  once  adopted;  but  this  time  it 
was  prefaced  by  several  resolutions  introduced  by  Ather- 
ton,  of  New  Hampshire,  which  echoed  the  Senate  resolu 
tions  adopted  at  the  preceding  session.  Clay  was  the  lead- 


CH.X.]          CLAY   A  PRESIDENTIAL  CANDIDATE          411 

ing  Whig  candidate  for  President,  and  the  prospect  of  his 
nomination  seemed  certain.  But  he  was  not  satisfied  to  rest 
upon  his  record  in  regard  to  slavery;  he  determined  to 
speak  again  on  abolition,  and  this  time  more  fully  and  de 
liberately  than  he  had  ever  spoken  before,  in  the  effort  to 
placate,  so  far  as  possible,  hostility  to  him  on  the  part  of 
the  people  of  the  South,  and  those  of  the  North  who  were 
not  radical  in  their  antislavery  opinions.  He  was  mani 
festly  becoming  alarmed  at  the  spread  of  the  agitation  and 
the  feeling  toward  it  in  the  South.  It  is  not  unlikely  that 
the  speech,  which  was  delivered  February  7,  was  prepared  at 
Ashland  during  the  recess.  That  he  was  anxiously  revolving 
the  question  in  his  mind  appears  from  his  correspondence.1 
It  was  unusual  for  him  to  revise  a  speech  after  he  had 
made  it,  much  less  to  write  it  out  before ;  but  in  this  case 
he  not  only  wrote  it,  but  he  read  it  to  a  number  of  his  close 
political  friends  for  their  opinion  as  to  its  expediency.  It 
may  be  inferred  from  what  little  is  known  of  this  consulta 
tion  that  he  was  advised  against  delivering  the  speech.  He 
nevertheless  pursued  his  common  course,  of  listening  to 
counsel,  but  following  his  own  judgment.  It  was  on  this 
occasion  that  he  made  his  famous  remark :  "I  had  rather 
be  right  than  be  President." 2  The  Presidency,  however, 


1  In  a  letter  to  his  friend  Brooke  he  expressed  solicitude  on  account  of 
the  introduction  of  the  abolition  element  into  the  elections,  the  first  time 
it  had  been  known,  and  the  fear  that  the  contagion  would  spread  through 
all  the  free  States,  which  might  ultimately  result  in  the  abolitionists  gain 
ing  control  of  the  government,  proscribing  slave-holders,  abolishing 
slavery  in  the  District  and  the  slave-trade  between  the  States.  "And," 

he  continued,  "  the  end  will  be My  own  position  touching  slavery  at 

the  present  time  is  singular  enough.  The  abolitionists  are  denouncing 
me  as  a  slave-holder  and  the  slave-holders  as  an  abolitionist,  while  the 
both  unite  on  Mr.  Van  Buren." — Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  430. 

*  Colonel  Thomas  "  says  that  Mr.  Clay  himself  got  up,  and,  he  believes 
wrote,  the  anti-abolition  petition  from  the  District  upon  which  he  made  his 


412  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

was  his  object,  and  the  speech  limped  sorely  behind  this 
ideal  pretension.  For  so  important  a  speech  it  was  deliv 
ered  on  an  unusual  pretext — the  presentation  of  a  petition 
signed  by  numerous  residents  of  the  District  praying  against 
the  abolition  of  slavery  there. 

He  recurred  to  the  opinion  he  had  repeatedly  expressed, 
that  the  wisest  way  to  treat  abolition  petitions  was  "  to  re 
ceive  and  refer  them  without  opposition  and  report  against 
them  in  a  calm  and  dispassionate  and  argumentative  appeal 
to  the  good  sense  of  the  whole  community."  As  this  had 
not  been  done,  he  proposed  "  to  advert  to  some  of  those 
topics  which  might  have  been  usefully  embodied  in  a  report 
by  a  committee  of  the  Senate,  and  which,  he  was  persuaded, 
would  have  checked  the  progress,  if  it  had  not  altogether 
arrested  the  efforts,  of  abolition."  He  divided  those  who 
were  opposed  to  slavery  into  three  classes :  "  those  who 
from  sentiments  of  philanthropy  are  conscientiously  op 
posed  to  the  existence  of  slavery,  but  who  are  no  less 
opposed  at  the  same  time  to  any  disturbance  of  the  peace 
and  tranquillity  of  the  Union  or  the  infringement  of  the 
powers  of  the  States  composing  the  confederacy,"  notably 
the  Society  of  Friends;  "  apparent  abolitionists  —  that  is, 


anti-abolition  speech  at  the  last  session  of  Congress,  and  that  its  effect 
has  been  to  demolish  his  last  possible  chance  for  the  Presidency.  .  .  .  Pres 
ton  has  avowed  in  a  speech  at  a  Whig  meeting  and  in  a  public  letter  that 
he  was  one  of  a  small  party  of  friends  to  whom  Clay  read  his  speech  be 
fore  he  delivered  it  in  the  Senate." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  x.  p.  116.  Pres 
ton,  who  was  Clay's  chief  supporter  in  the  South/said  in  the  speech  to  which 
Adams  refers  :  "  On  one  occasion  Mr.  Clay  did  me  the  honor  to  consult 
me  in  reference  to  a  step  which  he  was  about  to  take,  and  which  will  per 
haps  occur  to  your  minds  without  more  direct  allusion.  After  stating 
what  was  proposed,  it  was  remarked  that  such  a  step  might  be  offensive  to 
the  ultras  of  both  parties,  in  the  excitement  which  then  existed.  To  this 
Mr.  Clay  replied  :  '  I  trust  the  sentiments  and  principles  are  correct  ;  I 
had  rather  be  right  than  be  President.'  "  • 


CH.  X.]          CLAY  AND   THE  ABOLITIONISTS  413 

those  who,  having  been  persuaded  that  the  right  of  petition 
has  been  violated  by  Congress,  co-operate  with  the  aboli 
tionists  for  the  sole  purpose  of  asserting  and  vindicating 
that  right ";  and  "  the  real  ultra-abolitionists,  who  are  re 
solved  to  persevere  in  the  pursuit  of  their  object  at  all 
hazards  and  without  regard  to  any  consequences,  however 
calamitous  they  may  be."  The  latter  class  he  denounced  in 
terms  so  passionately  severe  as  absolutely  and  permanently 
to  complete  their  alienation  from  his  support,  and  he  thus 
defeated,  as  events  demonstrated,  the  possibility  of  his  elec 
tion  to  the  Presidency.1  "  It  is,"  said  he,  after  his  terrible 
arraignment,  "  because  these  ultra-abolitionists  have  ceased 
to  employ  the  instruments  of  reason  and  persuasion,  have 
made  their  cause  political,  and  have  appealed  to  the  bal 
lot-box,  that  I  am  induced  upon  this  occasion  to  address 
you." 

He  reviewed  the  different  periods  during  which  the  spirit 
of  abolition  had  displayed  itself,  and  ascribed  the  agitation 
then  existing  principally  to  "  the  example  of  British  eman 
cipation  of  the  slaves  in  the  islands  adjacent  to  our  country," 
and  to  "  persons  in  both  parts  of  the  Union  who  sought  to 
mingle  abolition  with  politics  and  to  array  one  portion  of 
the  Union  against  the  other,"  but  denied  that  either  of  the 
two  great  political  parties  had  "  designs  or  aim  at  abolition." 
He  discussed  the  power  and  expediency  of  abolishing  slavery 
in  the  District  and  the  Territory  of  Florida,  and  of  pro 
hibiting  the  slave-trade  between  the  States,  repeating  and 


1  Clay's  "speech  in  the  United  States  Senate,  on  February  7,  1839, 
apropos  of  the  petitions  for  abolition  in  the  District,  was  his  bid  for  the 
Presidency,  and  as  such  was  the  most  notable  event  of  the  year.  It  de 
stroyed  the  last  shred  of  his  antislavery  reputation  at  the  North,  except 
among  the  Friends,  whom  he  was  cunning  enough  to  flatter." — Life  of 
Garrison,  vol.  ii.  p.  282. 


414  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1839 

amplifying  the  arguments  he  had  advanced  in  connection 
with  the  resolutions  on  those  subjects.  But  these  subjects, 
he  asserted,  "  are  but  so  many  masked  batteries  concealing 
the  real  and  ultimate  point  of  attack.  That  point  of  attack 
is  the  institution  of  domestic  slavery  as  it  exists  in  these 
States.  It  is  to  liberate  three  millions  of  slaves  held  in 
bondage  within  them." 

To  the  abolition  of  slavery  he  urged  three  obstacles.  The 
first  was  the  want  of  Constitutional  power,  which  he  showed 
and  which  was  incontestable.  The  second  was  the  presence 
of  three  millions  of  slaves.  "  In  the  slave  States,"  said  he, 
in  maintaining  this  proposition,  "the  alternative  is  that  the 
white  man  must  govern  the  black  or  the  black  govern  the 
white.  In  several  of  those  States  the  number  of  the  slaves 
is  greater  than  that  of  the  white  population.  An  immediate 
abolition  of  slavery  in  them,  as  these  ultra-abolitionists  pro 
pose,  would  be  followed  by  a  desperate  struggle  for  imme 
diate  ascendency  of  the  black  race  over  the  white  race,  or 
rather  it  would  be  followed  by  the  instantaneous  collision 
between  the  two  races,  which  would  break  out  in  civil  war 
that  would  end  in  the  extermination  or  subjugation  of  one 
race  by  the  other.  In  such  an  alternative  who  can  hesitate  ? 
Is  it  not  better  that  the  existing  state  of  things  should  be 
preserved  instead  of  exposing  them  to  the  horrible  strifes 
and  contests  which  would  inevitably  attend  an  immediate 
abolition  ?  This  is  our  true  ground  of  defence  for  the  con 
tinued  existence  of  slavery  in  our  country.  It  is  that  which 
our  Revolutionary  ancestors  assumed.  It  is  that  which,  in 
my  opinion,  forms  our  justification  in  the  eyes  of  all  Chris 
tendom."  The  third  obstacle  was  the  vast  amount  of  capital 
invested  in  slave  property,  which  he  estimated  at  twelve 
hundred  millions  of  dollars.  He  asserted  the  legality  and 


CH.  X.]        WHAT   ABOLITION   WOULD  EFFECT  415 

rightfulness  of  property  in  slaves,1  and  that  if  the  scheme 
of  abolition  were  to  be  executed  the  slave  property  should 
be  paid  for,  and  its  value  assessed  entirely  upon  the  free 
States. 

He  contended  that  the  agitation  had  retarded  the  pros 
pect  of  any  kind  of  emancipation,  gradual  or  immediate,  in 
any  of  the  States,  and  "  increased  the  rigors  of  legislation 
against  slaves  in  most  if  not  all  of  the  slave  States."  Though 
he  had  favored  gradual  abolition,  he  now  declared  that  he 
would  "  oppose  any  scheme  whatever  of  emancipation  be 
cause  of  the  danger  of  an  ultimate  ascendency  of  the  black 
race  or  of  a  civil  contest  which  might  terminate  in  the  ex 
tinction  of  one  race  or  the  other."  In  his  opinion,  emanci 
pation  would  also  result  in  the  emigration  of  hordes  of 
negroes  to  the  North,  which  would  increase  the  hardships  of 
free  labor  there.  He  condemned  the  opposition  of  the  aboli 
tionists  to  colonization  and  to  a  separation  of  the  two  races, 
"  which  by  their  physical  structure  and  color  ought  to  be 
kept  asunder,  should  not  be  brought  together  by  any  proc 
ess  whatever  of  unnatural  amalgamation."  The  question 
whether  or  not  the  negroes  were  to  remain  forever  in  bond 
age  he  hopefully  left  to  the  future,  but  predicted  that  "  in 
the  progress  of  time,  some  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  two 
hundred  years  hence,  but  few  vestiges  of  the  black  man 
will  remain  among  our  posterity."  Notwithstanding  his 
sanguine  opinions  at  the  preceding  session,  he  now  said  that 
"abolition  should  no  longer  be  regarded  as  an  imaginary 
danger."  Union  on  one  side  would  beget  union  on  the 
other.  "  And  this  process  of  reciprocal  consolidation  will 


1  Webster  said,  in  1848  :  "I  am  not  at  the  present  moment  aware  of 
any  place  on  the  globe  in  which  this  property  of  man  in  a  human  being  as 
a  slave,  transferable  as  a  chattel,  exists,  except  in  America." 


416  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

be  attended  with  all  the  violent  prejudices,  embittered  pas 
sions,  and  implacable  animosities  which  ever  degraded  or 
deformed  human  nature,  a  virtual  dissolution  of  the  Union 
will  have  taken  place,  while  the  forms  of  its  existence  re 
main.  The  most  valuable  element  of  union — mutual  kind 
ness,  the  feelings  of  sympathy,  the  fraternal  bonds — which 
now  happily  unite  us  will  have  been  extinguished  forever. 
One  section  will  stand  in  menacing  and  hostile  array  against 
the  other.  The  collision  of  opinion  will  quickly  be  followed 
by  the  clash  of  arms." 

"  I  am,"  he  continued,  "  no  friend  of  slavery.  The  Search 
er  of  all  human  hearts  knows  that  every  pulsation  of  mine 
beats  high  and  strong  in  the  cause  of  civil  liberty.  Wher 
ever  it  is  safe  and  practicable,  I  desire  to  see  every  por 
tion  of  the  human  family  in  the  enjoyment  of  it.  But  I 
prefer  the  liberty  of  my  own  country  to  that  of  any  other 
people,  and  the  liberty  of  my  own  race  to  that  of  any  other 
race."  He  palliated  slavery  as  "  a  stern  and  inexorable  ne 
cessity,"  for  which  his  generation  was  not  responsible,  and 
closed  with  an  eloquent  appeal  to  desist  from  further  agi 
tation  for  abolition. 

The  speech  was  received  in  the  Senate  and  through  the 
country  with  profound  surprise.  By  it  Clay  practically 
abjured  the  peculiar  antislavery  character  he  had  hitherto 
maintained.  Not  only  had  he  been  in  the  Senate  the  lead 
ing  defender  of  the  right  of  petition,  but  he  had  uniformly 
uttered  the  loftiest  sentiments  of  freedom.  Although  he 
was  a  slave  -  holder  and  had  strongly  deprecated  the  anti- 
slavery  movement,  his  personal  situation  was  assigned  to 
his  unavoidable  surroundings,  and  provoked  no  serious  dis 
favor  except  among  the  most  radical  abolitionists,  and  with 
these  chiefly  because  of  his  efforts  in  behalf  of  colonization. 


Cn.  X.]          CLAY'S  POLITICAL  VACILLATION  417 

The  arguments  presented  by  his  speech  were  by  no  means 
novel,  and,  in  the  main,  were  generally  entertained  by  the 
conservative  elements  in  the  North ;  yet  the  speech  was  in 
spired  by  a  sentiment  totally  different  from  that  which  had 
distinguished  his  former  utterances  on  slavery.  It  varied  lit 
tle,  except  as  to  the  right  of  petition,  from  the  anti-abolition 
speeches  of  the  champions  of  slavery.  Despite  his  proud 
vaunting  of  consistency  and  his  criticism  of  Calhoun's  oscil 
lations,  he  now  subjected  his  own  conduct  to  the  same  re 
buke.  His  protestations  that  there  was  nothing  thus  far  in 
the  extent  and  effect  of  the  agitation  that  boded  danger  to 
the  Union  were  still  fresh  in  the  public  mind.  Certainly 
there  were  no  new  developments  within  the  last  few  months 
to  render  the  situation  more  critical.  Besides  all  this,  his 
course  was  so  unexpected  and  gratuitous  that  his  motive 
was  imputed — as  it  deserved  to  be — to  the  hope  of  political 
advantage.1  The  speech,  therefore,  gave  the  prevailing 
opinion  of  him  a  rude  shock.  And  evidence  of  the  effect 
of  his  performance  was  soon  forthcoming.  Calhoun  at  once 
commended  him  in  terms  that  contained  a  sardonic  tone  of 
triumph.  He  began  by  alluding  to  the  change  in  Clay's 
sentiments,  which  he  warmly  commended,  and  then  spoke 
of  the  Senate  resolutions  of  the  preceding  session,  the  Ath- 
erton  resolutions  in  the  House,  and  an  address  to  the  peo 
ple  signed  by  a  number  of  public  men,  as  breaking  the 
force  of  the  abolition  movement.  "  The  work  is  done," 
said  he.  "  The  spirit  of  abolition  is  overthrown,  of  which 


1  "  The  Governor  of  Kentucky  and  the  members  of  the  delegation  from 
that  State  in  the  House  are  now  so  deeply  committed  upon  all  slavery 
questions  that  it  is  impossible  to  get  the  vote  of  Massachusetts  for  Mr. 
Clay  ;  and  his  only  chance  of  election  is  by  the  Southern  and  slave-holding 
interest.  .  .  .  There  is  no  good-will  lost  between  Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  Web 
ster." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  x.  p.  77. 
27 


418  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

we  have  a  strong  confirmation  in  what  we  have  this  day 
heard.  ...  Of  all  the  dangers  to  which  we  have  ever  been 
exposed  this  has  been  the  greatest.  "We  may  now  consider 
it  as  passed.  The  resolutions  to  which  I  have  referred, 
with  the  following  movements,  gave  the  fatal  blow,  to 
which  the  Senator  from  Kentucky  has  given  the  finishing 
stroke." 

Calhoun  was  soon  to  see  how  utterly  mistaken  he  was  in 
supposing  that  any  progress  had  been  made  in  allaying  the 
agitation ;  but  neither  he  nor  Clay  was  to  see  how  greatly 
they  erred  in  thinking  that  emancipation  would  be  followed 
by  a  violent  struggle  for  race  supremacy.  What  Clay's  feel 
ings  were  while  Calhoun  was  complacently  discoursing  on 
his  conversion  and  his  own  fallacies  cannot  be  known,  but 
they  may  be  imagined.  The  candidate  had  renounced  the 
sentiments  of  the  man,  and  he  bore  his  self-sought  humilia 
tion  mutely.  He  looked  for  compensation  in  the  success  of 
his  ambition.  But  he  had  vaulted  too  far. 

He  returned  to  Ashland  confident  that  he  would  be  nomi 
nated  for  President  at  the  "Whig  national  convention  to  be 
held  at  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania,  December  4.  The  pros 
pect,  indeed,  seemed  flattering.  He  was  the  acknowledged 
chief  of  the  party,  the  foremost  champion  of  its  principles, 
and  the  most  popular  among  its  masses.  He  had  sustained 
its  organization  and  morale  through  adversity  and  defeat.  If 
ever  any  great  political  party  owed  its  existence  and  endur 
ance  mainly  to  one  man  the  "Whig  party  is  an  example.  He 
had  able  and  dexterous  coadjutors,  yet  no  "Whig  could  be 
compared  with  him  in  leadership  and  influence.  In  point 
of  prominence  and  public  service  no  one  in  the  party  could 
be  named  with  him  except  Webster;  but  Webster  was 
markedly  deficient  in  the  attributes  of  leadership.  There 


CH.  X.]         CLAY'S   ASPIRATIONS   THWARTED  419 

was  never  a  day  when  he  had  the  remotest  possibility  of 
becoming  President,  for  at  no  time  did  he  have  any  consid 
erable  support  in  his  continuous  candidacy  for  the  nomina 
tion.  Perhaps  no  statesman  of  genius  and  intellectual  power 
was  ever  so  barren  of  political  influence.  His  supporters  for 
the  Presidency  were  always  mostly  confined  to  a  small  cote 
rie  of  his  New  England  admirers.  Though  mighty  in  seri 
ous  debate,  he  lacked  those  indefinable  qualities  that  inspire 
popularity  among  the  masses  and  political  deference  among 
leaders.  Nevertheless,  his  ambition  to  attain  the  Presi 
dency  was  morbidly  intense,  and  he  cherished  a  degree  of 
envy  toward  Clay  that  led  him  to  interpose,  so  far  as  he 
could,  to  thwart  Clay's  preferment.1  This  want  of  mag 
nanimity  toward  Clay,  under  all  the  circumstances,  was 
not  creditable  to  him.  Had  not  Clay  pre-eminently  de 
served  from  his  party  the  distinction  he  sought,  it  is  not 
probable  that  he  would  have  allowed  his  rivalry  to  impede 
Webster's  elevation  if  he  saw  no  reasonable  prospect  of  his 
own.  Perhaps  this  quality  partly  explains  his  great  popu 
larity  and  his  capacity  for  leadership.  Selfishness  was  not 
among  his  faults.  It  was  soon  apparent  that  he  would  be 
stoutly  opposed.  "Webster  was  in  the  field,  if  not  to  ob 
tain  the  nomination,  at  least  to  aid  covertly  in  defeating 
him.  He  was  forced  to  decide  upon  the  latter  course.  He 
withdrew,  advised  his  friends  that  Clay  was  not  the  most 
available  candidate,  and  spent  the  summer  in  Europe.  But 
the  danger  from  Webster's  attitude  was  the  least  that  con- 


1  "  Some  years  after  Mr.  Webster's  death  John  J.  Crittenden  said  : 
'  We  all  desired  to  see  Clay  and  Webster  elected  to  the  Presidency,  and 
we  felt  that  to  accomplish  this  object  it  was  necessary  that  Clay  should 
come  first  ;  but  we  were  never  able  to  make  Webster  and  his  friends  see 
this,  and  therefore  neither  of  them  won  the  prize.'" — Stanton's  Random 
Recollections,  p.  151. 


420  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1839 

fronted  Clay ;  it  was  but  a  small  factor  in  the  combined 
forces  that  were  to  accomplish  his  defeat. 

John  Randolph  once  remarked  that  the  principles  of  the 
Whig  party  were  seven — five  loaves  and  two  fishes.  This 
sarcasm  contained  much  truth.  The  party  was  a  hetero 
geneous  composition.  It  had  its  origin  in  Clay's  factious 
opposition  to  Monroe's  administration  and  matured  in  op 
position  to  Jackson's.  It  of  course  assumed  certain  distinc 
tive  Constitutional  principles,  the  outgrowth  of  which  were 
protection,  internal  improvements,  and  a  national  bank.  But 
to  these  policies  were  added  one  by  one  through  the  exigen 
cies  of  political  opposition  other  features,  such  as  the  distri 
bution  of  the  surplus,  the  disposition  of  the  public  lands,  and 
the  various  assaults  on  Jackson's  financial  policy.  The  disaf 
fected  and  recalcitrant  elements  of  the  Democratic  party  were 
made  welcome  in  the  Whig  fold ;  and  to  accommodate  them, 
concessions  were  made.  Moreover,  a  large  part  of  the  North 
ern  wing  of  the  party,  though  not  abolitionist,  was  averse 
to  slavery,  and  to  mollify  and  restrain  it  had  been  a  studied 
feature  of  the  party  policy.  In  short,  efforts  had  been 
directed  to  combine  with  the  Whigs,  so  far  as  practicable, 
all  who  were  not  Democrats,  but  who  could  be  reconciled 
to  the  wide  and  variegated  mosaic  of  the  Whig  platform. 
And  now  to  all  these  elements  of  this  complex  array  was 
added  the  host  of  victims  of  the  late  crisis,  whose  main  po 
litical  desire  was  a  change  of  administration.  The  feelings 
of  this  class  had  no  relation  to  persons.  Any  suitable  can 
didate  would  answer,  and  all  the  better  if  he  were  not 
prominently  identified  with  the  theories  and  measures  over 
which  the  past  struggles  had  been  so  fiercely  waged. 

The  practical  effect  of  these  conditions  upon  the  party 
was  to  beget  a  type  of  managers  similar  to  those  who  had 


CH.X.]        THE  TACTICS   OF   PARTY   POLITICS  421 

brought  the  Democratic  party  into  power.  They  were  pro 
fessional  politicians.1  They  may  be  likened  to  horse-hairs 
in  a  pool,  moved  by  animalcule.  They  were  not  hero-wor 
shippers.  Party  principles  were  only  among  their  weapons. 
Their  object  was  victory.  Prestige,  worth,  past  service, 
alone  weighed  little  with  them.  The  base  of  their  opera 
tions  was  the  choice  of  candidates  who  could  poll  the  most 
votes.  This  decided,  their  processes  and  manipulations  were 
directed  to  that  result  with  a  skill  and  an  adroitness  which 
politicians  of  the  present  day  have  not  surpassed.  These 
methods,  as  we  have  seen,  were  not  new  in  the  Democratic 
party.  They  began  to  be  applied  in  Burr's  time  and  were 
brought  to  perfection  by  Yan  Buren  and  the  Albany  Re 
gency.  They  started  Jackson  on  his  career  as  candidate  and 
President.  They  had  now  been  adopted  by  the  "Whigs,  par 
ticularly  in  the  State  where  they  originated,  and  their  chief 
practitioners  were  William  H.  Seward  and  Thurlow  Weed. 
Such  was  the  new  danger  to  which  Clay  but  slowly  and 
partially  awoke. 

It  was  more  difficult  to  contend  with  this  obstacle  than 
with  those  which  resulted  from  his  former  positions  on 
various  public  questions.  The  latter  he  had  for  some  time 
labored  to  counteract  by  letters  and  speeches  designed  to 
mitigate  the  impression  that  his  opinions  were  extreme  and 
inflexible.  He  had  been  assured  by  friends  in  the  State  of 
New  York  that  he  was  decidedly  the  favorite  of  the  Whigs 
there;  and  that  Seward,  then  Governor,  and  Weed,2  and  the 


1  "  When,  as  in  the  United  States,  republican  institutions,  instead  of  be 
ing  slowly  evolved,  are  all  at  once  created,  there  grows  up  within  them 
an  agency  of  wire-pulling  politicians,  exercising  a  real  rule  of  the  people  at 
large.  ...  So  that  in  the  absence  of  a  duly  adapted  character,  liberty  given 
in  one  direction  is  lost  in  another." — Spencer's  Sociology,  vol.  ii.  p.  662. 

2  "On  one  important  question  Mr.  Weed  and  I  were  antipodes.    Be- 


422  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

machine  of  which  they  were  the  head,  were  "  warmly  and 
zealously  "  for  him,  notwithstanding  that  they  deemed  it  at 
the  time  "inexpedient  to  make  public  declaration  of  their 
preference."  But  as  his  information  grew  more  reliable  he 
became  suspicious  of  duplicity  and  determined  to  visit  the 
State  to  do  something  for  himself.  Accordingly,  in  July 
and  August  he  made  a  tour  through  some  parts  of  Canada, 
ostensibly  for  health  and  pleasure.  He  stopped,  however, 
at  Buffalo,  where  he  was  accorded  an  enthusiastic  reception 
and  made  a  brief  speech.  In  the  course  of  his  remarks  he 
touched  cautiously  on  politics,  and  then  referred  to  his  can 
didacy.  On  the  latter  subject  he  advanced  the  argument 
that  was  to  accomplish  his  defeat.  "  If  my  name,"  said  he, 
"  creates  any  obstacle  to  cordial  union  and  harmony,  away 
with  it,  and  concentrate  upon  some  individual  more  accept 
able  to  all  branches  of  the  opposition.  What  is  a  public 
man  worth  who  is  not  ever  ready  to  sacrifice  himself  for  the 
good  of  his  country?  I  have  unaffectedly  desired  retire 
ment  ;  I  yet  desire  it,  when,  consistently  with  the  duties  and 
obligations  which  I  owe,  I  can  honorably  retire.  No  veteran 
soldier,  covered  with  scars  and  wounds  inflicted  in  many 
hard  campaigns,  ever  received  his  discharge  with  more  pleas 
ure  than  I  should  mine.  But  I  think  that,  like  him,  with 
out  presumption,  I  am  entitled  to  an  honorable  discharge." 

He  proceeded  from  Montreal  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain 
to  Saratoga,  where  he  arrived  August  9,  and  remained 
several  .days.  There,  as  at  all  places  he  visited,  he  was  re 


lieving  that  a  currency  in  part  of  paper  kept  at  par  with  specie  and  cur 
rent  in  every  part  of  our  country  was  indispensable,  I  was  a  zealous  ad 
vocate  of  a  national  bank  ;  which  he  as  heartily  detested,  believing  that  its 
supporters  would  always  be  identified  in  the  popular  mind  with  aristoc 
racy,  monopoly,  exclusive  privilege,  etc."  —  Greeley's  Recollections  of  a 
Busy  Life,  p.  314. 


CH.  X.]      CLAY   IN   HIS   PRESIDENTIAL   CAMPAIGN      423 

ceived  with  enthusiasm  and  display.1  While  there  he  had 
interviews  with  Weed,  who  was  now  ready  to  disclose 
the  disposition  of  the  Whig  managers  toward  his  candi 
dacy.  He  was  informed  that  in  their  judgment  he  could 
not  succeed  in  the  election,  notwithstanding  the  preference 
for  him  in  the  party.  But  he  was  too  familiar  with  un 
favorable  counsel  and  adverse  circumstances,  as  well  as  too 
much  impressed  with  his  apparent  popularity,  to  be  per 
suaded  that  he  would  not  be  as  strong  as  any  other  candi 
date.  He  did  not  intimate  that  he  understood  the  true  sig 
nificance  of  Weed's  deliverance — that  the  delegation  from 
the  State  would  be  against  him  in  the  convention.2  Pre 
sumably  he  relied  on  the  majority  of  the  party,  which  wras 
undoubtedly  in  his  favor,  to  override  the  plans  of  the  leaders. 
If  so,  he  totally  misjudged  their  power. 

He  reached  the  city  of  ]N~ew  York,  his  principal  destina 
tion,  on  the  21st,  and  was  greeted  by  a  demonstration  of  ex 
ceptional  magnitude  and  fervor.3  All  that  he  saw  and  heard 
touching  himself  and  his  candidacy  confirmed  his  confidence. 
To  all  appearances  the  tour  had  produced  the  effect  he  sought. 
His  return  to  Ashland  was  followed  by  the  usual  occupation 
of  a  leading  candidate  for  Presidential  nomination — conduct 
ing  a  profuse  correspondence  and  receiving  zealous  friends 
and  advisers. 


1  Hone's  Diary,  vol.  i.  p.  374. 

2  Thurlow  Weed's  Autobiography,  vol.  i.  p.  480. 

3  Hone's  Diary,  vol.  i.  pp.  376-7.     "  In  the  summer  of  1839  I  heard  Mr. 
Clay  deliver  an  elaborate  speech  on  the  bank  and  Sub-Treasury  question 
from  an  open  barouche  at  the  steps  of  the  New  York  City  Hall.     He  had 
been  conducted  by  a  long  cavalcade  of  horsemen  from  the  bank  of  the 
Hudson,  and  he  was  surrounded  by  an  immense  concourse.     I  stood  at  the 
junction  of  Broadway  and  Park  Row.     His  voice  rang  so  loud  and  clear 
that  his  words  were  distinctly  reverberated  from  the  wall  of  the  Astor 
House." — Stanton's  Eandom  Recollections,  p.  153. 


424  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

The  operations  of  his  opponents  were  already  well  under 
way.  In  New  York  the  Whig  leaders  were  undoubtedly 
opposed  to  his  nomination  for  the  reasons  they  professed. 
The  State  was  the  centre  of  the  Anti  -  masonic  element, 
which  was  against  Clay ;  and  the  abolitionists,  continually 
increasing  in  number,  were  irrevocably  hostile.  Besides,  the 
State  was  nominally  Democratic.  Thus,  while  Clay  was  pre 
ferred  by  the  Whig  leaders,  as  well  as  by  most  of  the  regular 
rank  and  file  of  the  party,  they  were  sincere  in  their  asser 
tions  that  he  could  not  be  elected,  and  determined  that  the 
advantages  and  spoils  of  victory  should  not  be  imperiled  by 
sentiment  if  they  could  prevent  it.  Yet  it  was  impolitic  to 
affront  Clay  and  his  steadfast  friends  by  openly  advocating 
the  nomination  of  Harrison,  his  chief  rival,  who  possessed 
the  requisite  ^qualifications  of  an  "available"  candidate. 
General  Scott,  therefore,  was  made  the  foil  of  their  real  de 
sign  and  the  medium  of  their  operations.  Clay  was  fervent 
ly  eulogized  ;  his  ability,  services,  and  desert  were  eloquently 
recognized ;  his  unfortunate  position  and  political  weakness 
pathetically  mourned.  Every  contrivance  of  political  in 
genuity  was  utilized  to  circumvent  the  choice  of  delegates 
pledged  to  his  support.  Perhaps  the  most  successful  was 
what  became  known  as  the  "triangular  correspondence." 
The  leader  in  one  locality  would  regretfully  write  to  the 
leaders  in  others  that  Clay's  prospects  were  hopeless  in  his 
district,  and  therefore  advise  extra  efforts  elsewhere ;  the 
others  would  reply  in  the  same  strain,  and  the  replies  would 
be  industriously  circulated.  In  many  cases  this  device 
worked  so  well  as  to  prevent  the  selection  of  delegates  for 
Clay,  contrary  to  the  decided  preponderance  of  sentiment 
for  him.  The  outcome  of  these  dexterous  manipulations  was 
that  Clay  had  but  ten  votes  from  the  State  of  New  York, 


CH.  X.]     HARBISON  THE   PRESIDENTIAL  NOMINEE     425 

while  Harrison  had  two  avowedly,  Scott  twenty  nominally, 
but  subject  to  orders. 

The  convention '  was  held  in  a  Lutheran  church ;  and 
the  incongruity  of  the  place  with  the  occasion  was  made 
still  more  anomalous  by  the  most  extraordinary  machina 
tions  that  ever  shaped  the  results  of  a  national  political 
convention.  The  most  decisive  part  of  the  proceedings  be 
gan  at  the  Astor  House2  in  New  York  city,  where  Weed 
stopped  on  his  way  to  Harrisburg  to  confer  with  other 
leading  pilgrims  on  their  mission  to  save  the  country. 
Among  them  were  Ashmun  and  Jones,  two  of  Webster's 
lieutenants,  who  were  authorized  by  him  "to  support 
the  candidate,"  as  Weed  mellowly  states,  "most  likely  to 
strengthen  the  ticket."  Harrison  was  of  course  agreed 
upon  as  that  candidate.  But  it  was  found,  before  the  con 
vention  opened,  that  a  large  plurality  of  the  delegates 
favored  Clay,  and  that  he  was  apt  to  carry  the  convention. 
Then  ensued  more  conferences  and  cogitations,  by  which 
more  schemes  were  evolved.  No  serious  difficulty  was  ex 
perienced  in  uniting  all  the  adverse  interests  upon  Harrison. 


1  It  should  be  remarked  that  as  there  had  previously  been  no  "Whig 
national  convention  there  was  no  regular  organization  formally  to  call 
one,  and  the  movement  for  this  one  was  instituted  by  the  "opposition 
members  of  Congress  without  distinction  of  party." — Niles's  Register,  vol. 
Ivii.  p.  47. 

*  "  There  was  reserved  for  Mr.  Weed's  exclusive  use  during  these  years 
of  active  political  leadership  a  room  in  the  Astor  House,  which  he  always 
occupied  when  called  to  the  city.  '  He  retained  room  11,'  writes  one  who 
knew  him  well.  '  Could  that  room  but  speak,  what  a  story  it  might  tell ! 
It  was  an  audience  chamber  and  council  closet,  where  all  sorts  of  persons 
went  month  after  month,  year  after  year.  In  it  caucuses  were  held,  cam 
paigns  arranged,  Senators,  members  of  the  cabinet,  Governors,  Ministers, 
and  even  Presidents  were  made  and  unmade.  For  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
century  more  political  power  and  influence  probably  emanated  from  that 
little  apartment  than  from  any  other  source  in  the  entire  republic.'" — 
Barnes's  Life  of  Weed,  p.  237. 


426  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

This  done,  it  was  resolved  to  adopt  the  "unit  rule,"  then 
originated — that  the  majority  of  each  delegation  should  de 
cide  the  full  vote  of  its  State.  In  conjunction  with  this,  to 
prevent  any  contagious  eloquence  in  Clay's  behalf,  it  was 
determined  that  a  committee  of  not  more  than  three  should 
be  appointed  from  each  delegation  "  to  receive  the  views  and 
opinions  of  such  delegation  and  communicate  the  same  to 
the  assembled  committee  of  all  the  delegations,  to  be  by 
them  respectively  reported  to  their  principals."  Thereupon 
each  delegation  was  to  meet  separately  and  ballot  for  can 
didates,  after  which  the  committees  were  to  assemble  and 
compare  results.  This  process  was  to  be  repeated  until  a 
majority  vote  was  reached.  In  consequence,  the  real  de 
liberations  of  the  convention  were  to  be  held  by  detach 
ments  outside  of  it.  This  crafty  scheme  assured  success.1 
The  method  was  opposed  in  the  convention,  but  Clay's  par 
tisans  lacked  his  energy  and  persistence,  and  the  resolution 
was  adopted.  The  result  of  the  first  ballot  was  103  for 
Clay,  94  for  Harrison,  and  57  for  Scott.  The  influences  to 
disintegrate  Clay's  strength  were  then  brought  to  bear. 
Seven  ballots  were  taken,  Harrison  gaining  mainly  by  the 
transfer  to  him  of  Scott's  previous  votes.  His  nomination 
was  certain,  but,  in  the  eager  and  imploring  efforts  to  recon 
cile  Clay's  angered  and  rebellious  supporters,  the  last  ballot 
was  delayed  twenty -four  hours.  The  final  ballot  stood 
148  for  Harrison,  90  for  Clay,  and  16  for  Scott.  Thus  the 
result  of  twelve  years  of  "Whig  uproar  and  exertions  to 
preserve  our  imperiled  institutions  was  to  nominate  the 
/'tertium  quid,  as  Wise  sarcastically  called  Harrison,  and 
/\by  methods  more  intriguing,  unfair,  and  tyrannical  than 

1  Benton's  Thirty  Years'  View,  vol.  ii.  p.  204. 


CH.  X.]    THE  CLAIMS  OF  PARTY  FEALTY       427 

Jackson  or  the  Albany  Regency,  so  long  and  so  vehe 
mently  denounced  by  the  Whigs,  had  ever  conceived.  Even 
Greeley  in  after  years  piously  apologized  for  the  transaction 
as  being  the  only  means  to  nominate  a  candidate  who  could 
be  elected  and  thus  carry  out  the  patriotic  purpose  of  the 
party.1 

In  Harrison's  nomination,  however  achieved,  Clay's  ad 
herents  were  compelled  to  acquiesce.  Treason  to  the  party, 
under  the  conditions  that  existed,  could  not  be  contem 
plated.  But  the  dread  of  it  and  the  provocation  for  it 
caused  the  victorious  managers  deep  anxiety.  As  soon  as 
the  result  of  the  last  ballot  was  announced  to  the  conven 
tion  one  of  the  Kentucky  delegation  declared  its  concur 
rence  in  Harrison's  nomination.  He  was  followed  by  an 
other  member,  who  spoke  to  the  same  effect,  and  asked  that 
a  letter  from  Clay,  which  had  been  for  some  days  in  the 
possession  of  a  delegate,  but  which,  to  avoid  the  appearance 
of  intent  to  excite  sentiment  for  Clay,  had  not  been  shown, 
be  read  to  the  convention.  Permission  was  given,  and 
the  letter  was  produced  and  read.  In  it  Clay  stated  that 
should  any  other  candidate  be  chosen  he  would  cordially 
support  him,  and  adjured  his  friends  to  be  guided  solely  by 
the  motive  of  uniting  the  party,  that  its  success  in  the  elec 
tion  might  be  attained.  When  he  sent  this  letter  he  could 
not  foresee  the  unprecedented  means  that  were  used  against 
him ;  hence  it  was  feared  by  some  that  he  would  not  con 
sider  himself  bound  by  the  pledge  to  support  the  ticket, 
and  would  remain  fatally  inactive  throughout  the  canvass. 
But  the  letter  was  none  the  less  hailed  with  exuberant  ap 
proval.  Speeches  in  the  most  laudatory  style  were  made 


lGreeley's  Recollections  of  a  Busy  Life,  p.  131. 


428  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1839 

upon  his  character  and  devotion.  "  I  envy  Kentucky,"  ex 
claimed  one  of  the  speakers, "  for  when  he  dies  she  will  have 
his  ashes !"  Yet  the  sombre  countenances  of  his  discom 
fited  friends  seemed  to  bode  ill,  and  the  gloom  was  deep 
ened  by  the  difficulty  in  finding  a  suitable  man  willing  to 
accept  the  nomination  for  Yice-President. 

Long  before  the  convention,  Weed  had  offered  to  Web 
ster  the  support  of  the  New  York  delegation  for  the  place, 
if  Harrison  were  nominated  for  President;  but  Webster 
haughtily  declined  the  proposition.  Clay's  friends  were 
eagerly  besought  to  make  the  selection,  and  four  of  them 
—Leigh,  Clayton,  Tallmadge,  and  Southard — successively 
refused  to  stand.  At  length,  as  the  last  resource,  John 
Tyler  was  proposed.  His  political  career  and  principles  had 
been  hybrid — partly  Democratic  and  partly  Whig.  While 
Senator  he  had  disapproved  the  removal  of  the  deposits ; 
and,  refusing  to  vote  for  the  expunging  resolution  in  com 
pliance  with  the  instructions  of  the  Yirginia  legislature,  he 
had  resigned  his  seat.  By  the  aid  of  the  Whigs,  under  Clay's 
advice,  he  was  defeated  in  his  attempt  to  be  re-elected ;  but 
he  was  promised,  as  the  reward  for  his  martyrdom,  the 
nomination  for  Yice-President.  At  all  events,  he  was  one 
of  Clay's  most  ardent  supporters  in  the  convention,  and 
confessed,  it  was  said,  that  he  had  wept  at  Clay's  defeat.1 
He  was  nominated.  The  convention  neither  formulated  a 
platform  nor  adopted  resolutions  defining  the  programme 
of  the  party.  This  was  left  to  the  conjectures  that  each 
element  of  voters  should  deem  most  consistent  with  its 


1  "  Mrs.  Tyler  says  that  she  once  remarked  on  this  tale  to  her  husband, 
and  that  he  laughed  heartily,  and  said  that  he  wished  that  was  the  greatest 
of  the  falsehoods  propagated  concerning  him." — Letters  and  Times  of  the 
Tylers,  vol.  i.  p.  595. 


CH.  X.]         CLAY'S   BITTER  DISAPPOINTMENT  429 

principles  and  desires.  "  Efforts  were  made,"  says  Weed, 
"  during  the  last  hours  of  the  convention  to  awaken  some 
enthusiasm  for  the  ticket.  But  the  deep  mortification  of  the 
friends  of  Mr.  Clay  rendered  those  efforts  but  partially  suc 
cessful.  The  delegates  separated  less  sanguine  than  usual 
of  a  united  and  zealous  effort  to  elect  the  ticket."  So  termi 
nated  this  remarkable  convention,  the  consequences  of  which 
are  without  parallel  in  our  history.1 

Clay  was  at  Washington  attending  the  first  session  of  the 
Twenty-sixth  Congress,  which  began  December  2,  when  the 
result  of  the  convention  was  made  known  to  him.  His 
feelings  overcame  all  dignity  and  restraint.  He  strode  back 
and  forth  in  violent  excitement  and  wrath,  bitterly  and 
profanely  accusing  his  ill-fortune  and  the  impotence  of  his 
friends.2  But  he  was 

....  "the  engineer 
Hoist  with  his  own  petar." 


1  The  Democratic  press  was  as  outspoken  as  Clay's  friends  in  regard  to 
his  defeat.    Among  other  things  the  Democratic  Review,  of  February,  1840, 
said  :  "  We  cannot  dissemble  an  indignant  contempt — not  less  sincere  that 
•we  have  but  few  political  sympathies  in  common — for  the  mean  ingrati 
tude  which  has  thus  so  basely  betrayed  him  in  the  last  hours  of  his  public 
life,  to  sacrifice  him,  his  rights,  and  his  fame  to  a  cunning  intrigue  and 
to  a  cold  calculation  of  party  expediency,  which  we  verily  believe  to  have 
been  as  shallow  and  impolitic  as  it  was  heartless  and  false.     In  the  words 
of  Fouche,  it  was  worse  than  a  crime— it  was  a  blunder." 

2  "Such  an  exhibition  we  never  witnessed  before,  and  we  pray  never 
again  to  witness  such  an  ebullition  of  passion,  such  a  storm  of  deprecations 
and  curses.    He  rose  from  his  chair,  and,  walking  backwards  and  forwards 
rapidly,  lifting  his  feet  like  a  horse  string-halted  in  both  legs,  stamped  his 
steps  upon  the  floor,  exclaiming  :  'My  friends  are  not  worth  the  powder  and 
shot  it  would  take  to  kill  them.'    He  mentioned  the  names  of  several,  in 
voking  upon  them  the  most  horrid  imprecations,  and  then  turning  to  us  ap 
proached  rapidly  with  a  violent  gesture  and  in  a  loud  voice  said  :  'If  there 
were  two  Henry  Clays  one  of  them  would  make  the  other  President  of  the 
United  States.'   Trying  to  bring  him  to  his  senses,  we  replied  :  '  If  there  were 
two  Henry  Clays  the  continent  would  not  be  large  enough  to  hold  them,  and 


430  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

Availability  had  carried  the  day.  Clay  had  laboriously 
built  up  a  conglomerate  party,  of  many  elements  and  inter- 
ests,  and  a  various  combination  of  policies,  with  but  one  pur 
pose  in  common — the  overthrow  of  the  Democratic  regime. 
The  test  of  the  candidates  of  such  a  coalition  is  always 
availability.  He  had  recognized  it  by  his  own  recent  course 
as  a  trimmer ;  and  doubtless  the  poignant  appreciation  of 
his  corresponding  sacrifice  of  political  character  intensified 
his  disgust.  But  his  acute  disappointment  quickly  subsided. 
He  was  soon  absorbed  in  his  customary  functions  in  the 
Senate.  He  was  still  chief  of  the  Whigs,  and  he  maintained 
all  his  zeal  for  the  success  of  the  party.1 


they  would  not  leave  a  morsel  of  each  other  ;  they  would  mutually  destroy 
themselves.  You  were  warned  by  Judge  White  of  this  result  when  it 
might  have  been  prevented,  but  you  would  not  take  heed.'  'Ah!  yes,' 
said  he  ;  '  you  and  Judge  White  are  like  the  old  lady  who  knew  the  cow 
would  eat  up  the  grindstone.  It  is  a  diabolical  intrigue.  I  now  know 
which  has  betrayed  me.  I  am  the  most  unfortunate  man  in  the  history 
of  parties ;  always  run  by  my  friends  when  sure  to  be  defeated,  and 
now  betrayed  for  a  nomination  when  I  or  any  one  else  would  be  sure 
of  an  election.'  " — Wise's  Sewn  Decades  of  the  Union,  p.  172. 

1  "After  the  adjournment  of  the  Harrisburg  convention  many  of  the 
members  went  to  Washington,  where  it  was  found  that  of  these  were  one 
or  more  delegates  from  eighteen  out  of  the  twenty-two  States,  which  had 
been  represented  in  that  patriotic  and  enlightened  body.  They  called  in 
a  body  upon  Mr.  Clay  to  do  homnge  to  the  high  moral  principle  which  had 
influenced  his  conduct.  The  friends  of  Harrison  and  Scott,  with  those 
originally  enlisted  for  Webster,  were  as  ready  to  acknowledge  the  high 
claims  of  Clay  to  the  proud  distinction  of  their  nomination  as  he  and  his 
friends  had  been  to  surrender  those  claims  in  favor  of  a  candidate  who 
was  thought  to  be  more  available.  The  particulars  of  this  touching 
ceremony,  together  with  those  of  the  great  Whig  dinner  given  on  the 
same  day,  are  detailed  admirably  in  the  National  Intelligencer." — Hone's 
Diary,  vol.  i.  p.  399. 


CHAPTER  XI 

The  Financial  and  Political  Situation — Organization  of  the  House — The 
Independent  Treasury  Established — Other  Proceedings  of  Congress — 
Slavery  and  International  Law  —  The  Democratic  Convention  —  The 
Campaign  of  1840— Clay's  Platform  for  the  Whig  Party— William  H. 
Harrison  and  his  Opinions — The  Election— Harrison  and  Clay  and  the 
Construction  of  the  Cabinet — The  Inaugural  Address — The  Clamor  for 
the  Spoils — Strained  Relations  Between  Clay  and  Harrison— The  Death 
of  the  President — John  Tyler — The  Close  of  the  Jacksonian  Epoch 

WITH  the  partial  recovery  of  the  country  from  the  effects 
of  the  crisis,  the  prospect  of  a  Whig  victory  diminished. 
About  the  time  when  Clay  started  on  his  tour,  Yan  Buren 
did  likewise,  visiting  several  places  in  Pennsylvania,  New 
Jersey,  and  New  York.  His  reception,  especially  in  the 
city  of  New  York,  was  most  gratifying  to  him  and  encour 
aged  his  belief  that,  by  the  time  of  the  election  in  1840,  the 
factitious  promise  of  a  Whig  triumph  would  disappear. 
Popular  demonstrations  of  regard  for  public  men,  however, 
are  rarely  significant  of  political  strength:  there  is  com 
monly  in  most  places  a  sufficient  number  of  the  admiring 
and  the  curious  to  form  an  imposing  crowd.  But  aside  from 
the  greeting  Yan  Buren  received  on  his  tour,  there  were 
other  causes  to  make  him  sanguine.  Business  was  reviving, 
and  foreign  commerce  was  rapidly  regaining  its  normal  vol 
ume.  The  revenues,  from  customs  duties  and  the  public 
lands,  were  steadily  approaching  their  former  level.  All 
signs  of  returning  prosperity  seemed  propitious.  In  the 
fall  of  1838  the  results  of  the  elections  indicated  a  renewal 


432  THE   JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1839 

of  confidence  in  the  administration.  But  in  October  of  the 
following  year  the  promising  aspect  of  the  situation  began 
to  fade.  England  had  experienced  a  relapse  of  the  crisis, 
and  the  effects  were  quickly  communicated  to  this  country. 
The  banks  in  Philadelphia,  including  the  Philadelphia  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  suspended,  and  their  example  was 
generally  followed,  save  in  New  York  and  in  New  Eng 
land,  with  some  few  exceptions.1  The  manifestations  of 
distress  were  not  so  acute  as  before,  but  the  general  situ 
ation  was  much  the  same.  A  paralyzing  stupor  fell  upon 
trade  and  business,  from  which  they  were  slow  to  recover. 
Nevertheless,  Yan  Buren,  with  laudable  firmness,  met  Con 
gress  with  his  usual  recommendations  of  sound  finance,  re 
tracting  nothing  of  his  former  policy.  He  was  now  strong 
enough  in  both  houses  of  Congress  to  carry  the  great  meas 
ure  of  his  administration. 

The  legislative  proceedings  of  the  session  were  delayed 
two  weeks  by  an  acrimonious  struggle  over  the  organization 
of  the  House.  There  was  a  contest  for  the  five  New  Jersey 
seats,  the  possession  of  which  would  be  vital  to  either  party  ? 
as  they  would  determine  the  political  control  of  the  House. 
The  formal  credentials  were  held  by  the  Whigs.  The  Con 
gressmen  from  that  State  were  voted  for  on  a  general  ticket. 
The  returns  from  two  election  districts  were  thrown  out  for 
alleged  irregularities,  although  the  Democrats  insisted,  just 
ly  in  all  probability,  that  this  action  was  wrongful ;  at  all 


1  September  17,  1839,  Senator  Linn  wrote  from  London:  "Since  my 
arrival,  money  affairs  here  have  been  in  the  worst  possible  condition — men 
looked  into  each  other's  faces  with  suspicion  and  turned  with  disgust  from 
every  proposition  relating  to  American  property  and  security,  and  the  re 
cent  protest  in  Paris  of  a  million  and  a  half  of  drafts  drawn  by  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  I  fear  will  give  the  finishing  blow  to  everything  Amer 
ican." — Life  of  Linn,  p.  110 


CH.  XL]          FORCING  THE   TREASURY  BILL  433 

events,  it  decided  the  result  of  the  election  and  engendered 
much  excitement  and  asperity.  On  calling  the  roll  the  clerk 
declined  to  include  either  delegation  or  to  put  any  motion 
whatever,  even  to  adjourn.  After  four  days  of  confusion 
and  tumult  John  Quincy  Adams  was  asked  to  suggest 
some  mode  of  solving  the  difficulty.  He  did  so  in  a  very 
characteristic  way.  Briefly  addressing  the  members,  he 
proposed  that  the  House  proceed  to  organize  itself;  and 
when  several  members  asked  who  would  put  the  question 
he  made  the  historic  reply,  "  I  will  put  the  question  myself." 
He  was  made  chairman,  and  presided  until  the  16th,  when 
E.  M.  T.  Hunter,  of  Virginia,  was  elected  Speaker  by  a 
union  of  the  Whig  members  with  Calhoun's  friends,  who 
were  incensed  at  the,  refusal  of  some  of  the  administration 
Democrats  to  vote  for  one  of  their  number.  Hunter  was 
an  Independent,  but  a  States-rights  man  and  supporter  of 
the  Sub-Treasury  plan.  Neither  of  the  New  Jersey  delega 
tions  was  allowed  to  vote.  The  contestants  were  finally 
seated. 

The  proceedings  of  the  session  were  heavily  charged  with 
politics.  Party  feeling  was  intense.  Both  sides  labored 
to  the  utmost  to  gain  every  possible  advantage  for  effect 
in  the  pending  Presidential  campaign.  The  chief  struggle, 
which  occurred  over  the  independent  Treasury  bill,  was 
waged  with  extreme  energy  and  bitterness.  The  adminis 
tration  was  determined  to  force  the  measure  through,  and 
the  confidence  of  the  "Whigs  in  their  success  at  the  ensuing 
election  gave  them  additional  ground  for  denouncing  the 
programme.  The  bill  was  early  introduced  in  the  Senate, 
and  its  progress  hastened  by  every  available  means.  Clay 
delivered  the  most  conspicuous  speech  against  it.  None  of 
his  speeches  so  well  exhibit  his  versatility  as  the  series  on 

28 


434  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1839 

this  much  -  debated  subject;  but  unfortunately  they  are 
better  evidence  of  his  skill  as  a  debater,  with  a  view  to 
influencing  public  opinion,  than  they  are  of  his  wisdom 
and  judgment  on  questions  of  national  finance.  "While  this 
speech  contained  no  new  arguments,  those  which  he  had 
urged  before  were  stated  in  a  form  well  adapted  to  the 
uses  of  campaign  literature.  Moreover,  the  degree  of  his 
zeal  in  support  of  Harrison  was  a  matter  of  deep  and  gen 
eral  interest,  which  his  speech  amply  satisfied.  His  descrip 
tion  of  the  financial  condition  of  the  country  is  so  faithful 
and  complete  that  it  should  be  quoted. 

"  The  general  government,"  said  he,  "  is  in  debt,  and  its 
existing  revenue  is  inadequate  to  meet  its  ordinary  expendi 
ture.  The  States  are  in  debt,  some  of  them  largely  in  debt, 
insomuch  that  they  have  been  compelled  to  resort  to  the 
ruinous  expedient  of  contracting  new  loans  to  meet  the  in 
terest  on  prior  loans  ;  and  the  people  are  surrounded  by  diffi 
culties,  greatly  embarrassed,  and  involved  in  debt.  While 
this  is,  unfortunately,  the  general  state  of  the  country,  the 
means  of  extinguishing  this  vast  mass  of  debt  are  in  constant 
diminution.  Property  is  falling  in  value ;  and  all  the  great 
staples  of  the  country  are  declining  in  price,  and  destined,  I 
fear,  to  further  decline.  The  banks  are  rapidly  decreasing 
the  amount  of  their  circulation.  About  one -half  of  them, 
extending  from  New  Jersey  to  the  extreme  Southwest,  have 
suspended  specie  payments,  presenting  an  image  of  a  para 
lytic,  one  moiety  of  whose  body  is  stricken  with  palsy.  The 
banks  are  without  a  head ;  and  instead  of  union,  concert, 
and  co-operation  between  them,  we  behold  jealousy,  dis 
trust,  and  enmity.  We  have  no  currency  whatever  possess 
ing  uniform  value  throughout  the  whole  country.  That 
which  we  have,  consisting  almost  entirely  of  the  issue  of 


Cn.  XL]        THE   TREASURY  BILL   BECOMES   LAW        435 

banks,  is  in  a  state  of  the  utmost  disorder,  insomuch  that  it 
varies,  in  comparison  with  the  specie  standard,  from  par  to 
fifty  per  centum  discount.  Exchanges,  too,  are  in  the  great 
est  possible  confusion ;  not  merely  between  distant  parts  of 
the  Union,  but  between  cities  and  places  in  the  same  neigh 
borhood;  that  between  our  great  commercial  marts  of  New 
York  and  Philadelphia,  within  five  or  six  hours  of  each 
other,  vacillating  between  seven  and  ten  per  centum.  The 
products  of  our  agricultural  industry  are  unable  to  find 
their  way  to  market  from  the  want  of  means  in  the  hands 
of  traders  to  purchase  them,  or  for  want  of  confidence  in 
the  stability  of  things;  many  of  our  manufactories  are 
stopped  or  stopping,  especially  in  the  important  branch  of 
woollens ;  and  a  vast  accumulation  of  their  fabrics  on  hand, 
owing  to  the  destruction  of  confidence  and  the  wretched 
state  of  exchange  between  different  sections  of  the  Union." 
January  23  the  bill  was  passed  by  the  Senate,  24  to  18. 
In  the  House  it  encountered  still  more  strenuous  opposi 
tion  ;  but,  as  there  was  now  a  majority  for  it,  it  was  pushed 
with  vigor.  As  Benton  says :  "  The  shortest  road  was  taken 
to  its  passage ;  and  that  was  under  the  debate-killing  press 
ure  of  the  previous  question.  That  question  was  freely 
used,  and  amendment  after  amendment  cut  off,  motion 
after  motion  stifled,  speech  after  speech  suppressed;  the 
bill  carried  from  stage  to  stage  by  a  sort  of  silent  struggle 
chiefly  interrupted  by  the  repeated  process  of  calling  yeas 
and  nays,  until  at  last  it  reached  the  final  vote— and  was 
passed  —  by  a  majority  not  large,  but  clear — 124  to  107. 
This  was  the  30th  of  June,  that  is  to  say,  within  twenty 
days  of  the  end  of  a  session  of  near  eight  months."  The 
spirit  of  the  opposition  is  shown  by  the  ridiculous  motion  to 
amend  the  title  of  the  bill  so  as  to  read,  "  An  act  to  reduce 


436  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

the  value  of  property,  the  products  of  the  farmer,  and  the 
wages  of  labor,  to  destroy  the  indebted  portions  of  the  com 
munity,  to  place  the  Treasury  of  the  nation  in  the  hands  of 
the  President,  and  to  enable  the  public  money  to  be  drawn 
from  the  public  Treasury  without  appropriation  made  by 
law."  This  motion  received  eighty-seven  votes. 

This  was  the  only  measure  of  general  importance,  other 
than  the  ordinary  legislation,  to  become  a  law.  A  bank 
ruptcy  bill  was  passed  by  the  Senate,  but  in  the  House  it 
was  laid  on  the  table.  The  principal  objections  to  it  were 
those  urged  by  Clay  —  to  compulsory  proceedings  against 
individuals  and  to  making  the  bill  applicable  to  banks  and 
other  corporations.  But  the  bankruptcy  throughout  the 
country  was  not  confined  to  corporations  or  persons.  The 
most  striking  examples  of  it  were  furnished  by  many  of  the 
States,  which  had  incurred  vast  debts,  largely  abroad,  for 
the  prosecution  of  unremunerative  public  works.  At  least 
thirteen  States  were  thus  virtually  bankrupt.  Some  of  them 
even  repudiated  their  obligations,  to  the  serious  injury  of 
American  credit  and  the  American  character.1  An  effort 
was  made,  originating  in  London,  to  induce  the  government 
to  assume  the  State  debts.  Benton  offered  a  series  of  reso 
lutions  denouncing  the  scheme  as  unconstitutional  and  un 
wise.  Crittenden  proposed  an  amendment,  asserting  that 
it  would  be  just  and  proper  to  distribute  among  the  States 

1  "  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  anything  more  painful  and  mortifying 
to  one,  either  by  birth  or  adoption  an  American,  than  the  contemptuous  and 
reproachful  comments  which  any  mention  of  the  United  States  is  sure  to 
elicit.  The  commercial  and  financial  delinquencies  of  some  of  the  States,  but 
principally  of  Pennsylvania,  have  created  a  universal  impression  through 
out  Europe  of  utter  want  of  faith,  honor,  and  integrity  on  the  part  of  the 
whole  nation." — Mrs.  Butler's  (Fanny  Kemble)  Year  of  Consolation,  vol.  i. 
p.  37.  See,  also,  Democratic  Review,  vol.  xi.  p.  212  ;  ibid.  vol.  xiv.  p.  1  ; 
Life  of  Clay  (anonymous),  vol.  i.  p.  182 ;  De  Tocquemlle,  vol.  i.  p.  165. 


CH.  XL]         CLAY'S  BELLICOSE  TENDENCIES  437 

the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands  to  aid  them 
in  paying  their  debts.  As  this  was  the  favorite  feature  of 
Clay's  programme  he  supported  it;  but  it  was  defeated, 
and  Benton's  resolutions  were  adopted. 

The  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  made  a  temperate 
and  pacific  report  in  regard  to  the  difficulty  with  England 
over  the  northeastern  boundary.  Clay  concurred  in  the  re 
port,  but  contended  that  if  the  two  governments  should, 
through  the  ordinary  course  of  diplomacy,  be  unable  to 
agree,  the  question  could  be  submitted  to  arbitration  under 
a  provision  in  the  treaty  of  Ghent.  Should  these  means 
fail  to  settle  the  dispute,  he  scouted  any  dread  of  the  re 
sult  of  war.  Van  Buren  favored  any  expedient  rather 
than  force.  This  attitude  made  him  unpopular  in  Maine 
in  the  same  manner  as  his  firm  stand  for  neutrality  dur 
ing  the  Canadian  rebellion  injured  him  in  the  northwest 
ern  counties  of  New  York.  This  was  doubtless  the  mo 
tive  for  Clay's  bellicose  encomium  on  our  power  and  our 
prowess. 

On  presenting  an  abolition  petition  Clay  reasserted  the 
right  of  petition,  but  took  occasion  to  remark  that  he 
thought  the  crisis  of  the  agitation  was  passed,  and  also  to 
express  the  gratification  he  had  derived  from  the  perusal 
of  some  valuable  works  from  Northern  pens  on  the  subject 
of  abolition.  He  mentioned  several  such  works,  and  ap 
proved  the  argument  presented  by  one  of  them,  that  "  two 
communities  of  distinct  races  cannot  live  together  without 
the  one  becoming  more  or  less  in  subjection  to  the  other." 
The  tenor  of  his  remarks  shows  that  his  real  opinions  on  the 
slavery  question  had  undergone  no  change,  and  that  his  re 
spect  for  the  right  of  petition  had  not  abated.  And  his  in 
stinctive  sentiment  against  slavery  was  manifested  not  long 


438  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

afterward  in  connection  with  some  resolutions  that  Calhoun 
had  introduced. 

In  1830  the  American  coasting  schooner  Comet  was 
wrecked  on  one  of  the  Bahamas.  A  number  of  slaves  on 
board  who  were  being  transported  from  the  District  of 
Columbia  to  New  Orleans,  were  freed  by  the  local  author 
ities.  Four  years  later  the  Encomium  was  wrecked  near 
the  same  place,  and  the  slaves  she  carried  were  treated  in 
a  similar  manner.  In  1835  the  brig  Enterprise  was  driven 
by  storm  into  Port  Hamilton,  Bermuda,  and  the  slaves  on 
board  of  her  were  likewise  liberated.1  In  all  these  cases 
the  owners  of  the  slaves  besought  our  government  to  pro 
cure  redress.  After  protracted  negotiations  the  British 
government  paid  the  value  of  the  slaves  taken  in  the  two 
first  cases,  but  absolutely  refused  to  make  compensation 
in  the  last — for  the  reason  that  it  had  taken  place,  unlike 
the  previous  ones,  after  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
British  West  Indies.  Calhoun  made  the  matter  the  subject 
of  resolutions  applying  to  slave  property  the  ordinary  law 
of  nations  protecting  vessels  with  persons  and  property 
on  board,  when  lawfully  engaged,  but  forced  by  stress  of 
weather  into  ports  of  friendly  powers;  and  therefore  de 
claring  that  the  act  of  the  local  authorities  of  Port  Hamilton 
in  freeing  the  negroes  on  the  Enterprise  was  in  violation  of 
international  law.  He  argued  at  length  in  support  of  his 
proposition,  which  was  denied  by  nations  that  did  not  rec 
ognize  slavery.  No  Senator  voted  against  the  resolutions, 
although  but  thirty-three  of  the  fifty-two  Senators  voted. 
Clay  voted  for  them,  but  emphatically  disapproved  the  in 
troduction  of  them  on  the  ground  that  negotiations  concern- 


Niles's  Register,  vol.  xlviii.  p.  44. 


CH.  XL]  THE  FEUD  BETWEEN  CLAY  AND  CALHOUN  439 

ing  the  subject  were  closed  by  language  so  decisive  as  to 
preclude  expectation  that  they  would  be  resumed,  and  that 
the  resolutions  were  without  practical  utility.  "I  think," 
he  added,  "  a  too  frequent  use  of  the  expression  of  opinions 
on  subjects  merely  abstract  by  a  body  of  such  high  and 
grave  authority  as  the  Senate  will  have  a  tendency  to  bring 
our  opinions  into  disrepute/'  Calhoun  replied,  and  Cla}r,  in 
rejoining,  made  the  grounds  of  his  objection  more  explicit 
and  more  significant  of  his  dislike  to  the  assertions  of  inter 
national  law  in  behalf  of  slavery. 

The  standing  feud  between  Calhoun  and  Clay  was  vigor 
ously  displayed  again  in  course  of  the  discussion  of  a  land 
bill  which  Calhoun  had  introduced,  similar  to  the  one  he 
had  urged  two  years  before.  What  led  to  the  renewal  of 
the  personal  debate  was  Clay's  inquiry  whether  the  admin 
istration  favored  the  bill.  "  The  inquiry,"  said  he,  "  I  should 
not  make  if  the  recent  relations  between  the  Senator  who 
introduced  the  bill  and  the  head  of  that  administration  con 
tinued  to  exist ;  but  rumors,  of  which  the  city,  the  cercles, 
and  the  press  are  full,  assert  that  those  relations  are  entirely 
changed  and  have  within  a  few  days  been  substituted  by 
others  of  an  intimate,  friendly,  and  confidential  nature." 
Calhoun  pronounced  the  inquiry  indecorous  and  his  personal 
relations  with  the  President  none  of  Clay's  concern.  "  But," 
said  he,  "  the  Senator  assumes  that  a  change  in  my  personal 
relations  involves  a  change  of  political  position ;  and  it  is  on 
that  he  founds  his  right  to  make  the  inquiry.  He  judges, 
doubtless,  by  his  own  experience  ;  but  I  would  have  him  to 
understand  that  what  may  be  true  in  his  case  on  a  memor 
able  occasion  is  not  true  in  mine.  His  political  course  may 
be  governed  by  personal  considerations ;  but  mine,  I  trust,  is 
governed  strictly  by  my  principles,  and  is  not  at  all  un- 


440  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

der  the  control  of  my  attachments  or  enmities."  Clay  in 
sisted  that  the  public  was  entitled  to  know  whether  the  bill 
was  an  administration  measure.  "  Is  it,"  he  asked,  "  of  no 
importance  to  the  public  to  learn  that  these  pledges  and 
compromises  have  been  entered  into?  —  that  the  distin 
guished  Senator  has  made  his  bow  in  court,  kissed  the  hand 
of  the  monarch,  was  taken  into  favor,  and  agreed  henceforth 
to  support  his  edicts  ?"  Calhoun  then  recurred  to  the  coali 
tion  scandal  of  1824,  and  reasserted  his  own  independence 
and  consistency.  Clay  repeated  the  details  of  his  justifica 
tion  for  supporting  Adams,  and  referred  to  Calhoun's  com 
pliant  part  in  the  Compromise  of  1833.  "  But  for  that  Com 
promise,"  he  added,  "  I  am  not  at  all  confident  that  I  would 
now  have  the  honor  to  meet  that  Senator  face  to  face  in  this 
national  capital."  This  allusion  to  Jackson's  threat  to  prose 
cute  Calhoun  for  treason  brought  him  to  his  feet  again. 

"As  the  Senator,"  said  he,  "  has  thought  proper  to  refer  to 
it  [the  Compromise]  and  claim  my  gratitude,  I  in  turn  now 
tell  him  that  I  feel  not  the  least  gratitude  towards  him  for  it. 
The  measure  was  necessary  to  save  the  Senator  politically ; 
and  as  he  has  alluded  to  the  subject,  both  on  this  and  on  a 
former  occasion,  I  feel  bound  to  explain  what  might  other 
wise  have  been  left  in  oblivion.  The  Senator  was  then  com 
pelled  to  compromise  to  save  himself.  Events  had  placed 
him  flat  on  his  back,  and  he  had  no  way  to  recover  himself 
but  by  the  Compromise.  This  is  no  after-thought.  I  wrote 
more  than  half  a  dozen  letters  home  at  the  time  to  that 
effect."  He  then  went  on  to  explain  that  Jackson's  course 
had  rallied  around  him  the  friends  of  protection ;  that  Clay 
was  thus  left  in  a  hopeless  condition,  and  that  Webster 
"  would  have  reaped  all  the  political  honors  and  advantages 
of  the  system  had  the  contest  come  to  blows."  For  these 


CH.  XL]  CLAY   REPLIES   TO   CALHOUN  441 

reasons,  he  asserted,  Clay  was  obliged  to  compromise  as 
his  "  only  means  of  extrication."  "  I  had  the  mastery  over 
him  on  that  occasion.  I  have  never  taken  any  credit  for 
my  agency  in  the  Compromise  act.  I  claim  a  higher— that 
of  compelling  the  Compromise ;  and  I  would  have  dictated 
my  terms  .  .  .  had  not  circumstances  not  proper  to  explain 
here  prevented  it.  ...  I  never  contemplated  a  sudden  re 
duction  of  duties.  I  never  desired  to  destroy  the  manufact 
ures,  and  at  no  time  contemplated  a  full  reduction  under  six 
or  seven  years." 

"The  Senator  from  South  Carolina,"  replied  Clay,  with 
indignant  emphasis,  "  said  that  I  was  flat  on  my  back  and 
that  he  was  my  master.  Sir,  I  would  not  own  him  as  my 
slave.  He  my  master !  and  I  compelled  by  him !  And  as  if 
it  were  impossible  to  go  far  enough  in  one  paragraph,  he 
refers  to  certain  letters  of  his  own  to  prove  that  I  was  flat 
on  my  back !  and  that  I  was  not  only  on  my  back,  but 
another  Senator  and  the  President  had  robbed  me !  I  was 
flat  on  my  back  and  unable  to  do  anything  but  what  the 
Senator  from  South  Carolina  permitted  me  to  do !  "Why,  sir, 
I  gloried  in  my  strength,  and  was  compelled  to  introduce  the 
Compromise  bill,  and  was  compelled,  too,  by  the  Senator, 
not  in  consequence  of  the  weakness,  but  of  the  strength  of 
my  position.  If  it  were  possible  for  the  Senator  from  South 
Carolina  to  introduce  one  paragraph  without  showing  the 
egotism  of  his  character,  he  would  not  now  acknowledge 
that  he  wrote  letters  home  to  show  that  I  was  flat  on  my 
back,  while  he  was  indebted  to  me  for  the  measure  which 
relieved  him  from  the  difficulties  in  which  he  was  involved." 

He  then  gave  his  version  of  the  case,  asserting  that  he 
produced  and  carried  through  the  Compromise  notwith 
standing  Webster's  unceasing  opposition ;  that  he  was  in- 


442  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

fluenced  by  no  personal  considerations,  but  was  actuated 
by  the  motive  of  pacifying  the  country  and  preventing  the 
effusion  of  blood.  " There  was,"  he  continued,  "another 
reason  that  powerfully  operated  on  me.  ...  I  saw  that 
the  protective  system  was  in  danger  of  being  swept  away 
entirely,  and  probably  at  the  next  session  of  Congress,  by 
the  tremendous  power  of  the  individual  who  then  filled  the 
Executive  chair;  and  I  felt  that  the  greatest  service  that 
I  could  render  it  would  be  to  obtain  for  it  '  a  lease  for  a 
term  of  years,'  to  use  an  expression  that  has  heretofore 
been  applied  to  the  Compromise  bill." ' 

However  interesting  these  explanations  of  the  Compro 
mise  may  be,  they  were  but  a  brief  interlude  to  the  ardent 
attention  devoted  to  the  existing  political  situation.  The 
Presidential  campaign  began  as  soon  as  the  Whig  conven 
tion  adjourned,  and  was  carried  on  with  increasing  energy 
until  the  day  of  election.  Exciting  as  some  of  the  previous 
campaigns  had  been,  there  has  never  been  one  that  could 
compare  with  this.  In  the  methods  employed  it  was  a  new 
departure.  The  dexterity  of  the  Whig  managers  in  pro 
curing  Harrison's  nomination  was  fully  equalled  by  the 
novel  skill  employed  in  arousing  popular  sentiment  in  his 
support.  There  was  no  necessity  to  await  the  formal  action 
of  the  Democratic  party,  for  it  was  well  understood  that 
Yan  Buren  would  be  renominated,  as  he  was  in  several 
States  and  by  the  Democratic  national  convention  at  Balti 
more  May  5.  The  nomination  for  Vice-President  was  left 
to  the  party  organizations  in  the  States,  most  of  which 
renominated  Johnson.  The  convention  did  not  imitate  the 


1  Even  John  Tyler,  in  an  address  delivered  in  March,  1855,  gave  Clay 
the  credit  of  the  Compromise. — Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  vol.  i. 
pp.  601-2 


CH.XI.]     THE   POLICY   OF   STRICT   CONSTRUCTION    443 

non-committal  policy  of  the  "Whig  convention,  but  adopted 
a  clearly  worded  and  explicit  platform,  asserting  the  car 
dinal  tenets  of  the  party.  It  declared  for  strict  construc 
tion  of  the  Constitution,  and  therefore  against  the  power 
to  carry  on  a  general  system  of  internal  improvements, 
fostering  one  branch  of  industry  to  the  detriment  of  an 
other,  chartering  a  national  bank,  interfering  with  slavery 
and  the  abolition  movement  in  all  its  objects ;  for  economy 
in  every  department  of  the  government,  and  the  raising  of 
only  sufficient  revenue  for  administrative  purposes,  and  the 
granting  of  liberal  privileges  to  foreigners  becoming  citizens 
and  acquiring  lands.  This  was  supplemented  by  an  address 
repeating  more  fully  these  principles,  denouncing  the  aboli 
tionists,  whose  fanatical  zeal  was  imputed  to  the  instigation 
of  the  "VVhigs,  defending  Yan  Buren's  administration,  assert 
ing  that  Harrison  was  a  Federalist  and  that  his  military 
glory  was  doubtful,  and  criticising  the  pageantry  of  the 
Whig  campaign  as  addressed  merely  to  the  senses.  The 
convention,  however,  was  gloomy,  for  the  prospect  of  suc 
cess  was  dubious.  Already  the  country  was  stirred  with 
the  commotion  created  by  the  exertions  and  enthusiasm  of 
the  Whigs. 

Public  meetings  and  political  harangues  were  by  no  means 
a  novelty  in  Presidential  canvasses,  but  the  extent  to  which 
they  were  now  employed  far  surpassed  that  of  all  previous 
campaigns.  The  speeches  were  generally  made  in  the  open 
air  before  vast  concourses  of  people.1  In  some  cases  these 


1  "  The  people  rose  almost  en  masse.  The  whole  country  was  divided, 
as  if  in  civil  war,  in  hostile  factions.  Banners  flouted  the  sky;  the  people 
met  in  armies  ;  the  pursuits  of  business  were  neglected  for  the  strife  and 
strivings  of  political  canvassing;  and  an  excitement  careered  over  the  land, 
which  in  any  other  country  would  have  drenched  it  in  blood  and  upheaved 
the  government  from  its  foundation  stones.  At  Nashville  a  multitude 


444  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

gatherings  were  so  large  that  the  places  they  occupied  were 
surveyed  and  measured  to  determine  the  number  of  acres 
of  people  that  attended.  Clay  and  Webster,  as  well  as  the 
less  conspicuous  Whig  leaders,  joined  with  unprecedented 
fervor  in  this  party  service.  ISTor  did  they  wait  until  Con 
gress  adjourned,  but  began  their  operations  early  in  the 
session.  Clay  spoke  in  Baltimore,  May  4,  before  an  im 
mense  crowd — twenty  thousand,  he  estimated — drawn  to 
gether  by  a  national  convention  of  young  men.  He  de 
clared  himself  unreservedly  for  Harrison  and  buoyantly 
predicted  an  overwhelming  victory.  "  This,"  he  exclaimed, 
"  is  no  time  to  argue ;  the  time  for  argument  has  passed ; 
the  nation  has  already  pronounced  its  sentence."  l  Yet  he 
did  argue  on  many  occasions  and  in  several  States.  His 
principal  speech  was  delivered  in  his  native  county  in  Vir 
ginia,  June  27,  and  became  one  of  the  text -books  of  the 
campaign. 

He  began  by  asserting  his  earnest  support  of  Harrison 
and  gracefully  referring  to  his  visit  to  the  county  of  his  na 
tivity.  "  Why,"  he  then  asked,  "  is  the  plough  deserted,  the 


which  no  man  might  number,  composed  of  the  old  enemies  of  Clay,  hung 
upon  his  accents,  and  as  he  denounced  the  principles  and  measures  of  Jack- 
sonism,  rent  the  air  with  thunder-shouts  of  applause  which  invaded  even 
the  peace  of  the  Hermitage." — Baldwin's  Party  Leaders,  p.  844. 

1  "The  convention  itself  consisted  of  thousands;  an  immense,  unwieldy 
mass  of  political  machinery  to  accomplish  nothing — to  form  a  procession 
polluted  by  a  foul  and  unpunished  murder  of  one  of  their  own  marshals, 
and  by  the  loss  of  several  other  lives.  I  am  assured  that  the  number  of 
delegates  in  attendance  from  the  single  State  of  Massachusetts  was  not  less 
than  twelve  hundred.  And  in  the  midst  of  this  throng  Henry  Clay,  Daniel 
Webster,  William  C.  Preston,  Senators  of  the  United  States,  and  four 
times  the  number  of  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  have  been 
two  days  straining  their  lungs  and  cracking  their  voices  to  fill  this  multi 
tude  with  wind}'  sound  for  the  glorification  of  William  Henry  Harrison 
and  the  vituperation  of  Martin  Van  Buren." — Adams's  Diary,  vol.  x. 
p.  282. 


CH.  XL]       CLAY   AND  THE  EXECUTIVE  POWER          445 

tools  of  the  mechanic  laid  aside,  and  all  are  seen  rushing  to 
gatherings  of  the  people  ?  What  occasions  those  vast  and 
universal  assemblages  which  we  behold  in  every  State  and 
in  almost  every  neighborhood?  Why  those  conventions  of 
the  people  at  a  common  centre,  from  all  extremities  of  this 
vast  Union,  to  consult  together  upon  the  sufferings  of  the 
community  and  to  deliberate  upon  the  means  of  deliverance? 
Why  this  rabid  appetite  for  public  discussion  ?  What  is  the 
solution  of  the  phenomenon  which  we  observe  of  a  great 
nation  agitated  upon  its  whole  surface  and  to  its  lowest 
depths,  like  the  ocean  when  convulsed  by  some  terrible 
storm  ?  There  must  be  a  cause,  and  no  ordinary  cause." 
This  led  him  to  his  accustomed  theme  of  "the  encroach 
ments  and  usurpations  of  the  Executive  branch  of  the  gov 
ernment —  subordination  of  the  entire  official  corps,  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  to  the  will  of  the  President; 
political  proscription  and  abuse  of  the  power  of  dismissal ; 
seizure  of  the  Treasury ;  all  tending,  if  not  designed,  to  con 
centrate  the  powers  of  the  government  in  the  hands  of 
the  Executive.  He  excepted  the  army  and  navy  from  this 
influence,  but  asserted,  as  evidence  of  design  to  bring  the 
military  into  partisan  subjection,  that  two  officers  of  the 
army  had  been  court-martialed  for  purchasing  supplies  from 
Whigs  instead  of  Democrats;  and  he  assailed,  as  further 
proof  of  a  sinister  purpose,  a  recent  recommendation  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  increase  the  militia  to  two  hundred 
thousand.  He  ridiculed  and  combated  the  charge  that  the 
Whigs  were  really  Federalists.1 


1  That  the  Whig  principles  were  substantially  those  of  the  former 
Federal  party  was  early  and  candidly  admitted  by  John  Quincy  Adams  in 
a  letter  to  Clay,  April  21,  1829.  "The  objection,"  he  wrote,  "  there  ap 
pears  to  me  to  be  against  applying  the  denomination  of  Federalists  to 


446  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

The  necessity  he  proclaimed  for  a  change  of  administra 
tion  implied  the  adoption  of  positive  and  corrective  meas 
ures  ;  and  he  did  not  hesitate,  unlike  the  Whig  convention, 
to  assert  his  own  programme,  though  he  was  careful  to 
speak  only  for  himself.  Under  the  circumstances  he  could 
not  do  otherwise ;  but  he  doubtless  spoke  with  much  as 
surance  that  his  views  would  be  decisive.  He  proposed 
that  no  person  should  be  eligible  to  the  Presidency  after 
serving  one  term ;  that  "  the  veto  power  should  be  more 
precisely  defined  and  be  subjected  to  further  limitations 
and  qualifications" — particularly,  that  provision  should  be 
made  for  bills  passed  within  ten  days  of  the  close  of  a  ses 
sion  of  Congress,  to  prevent  "pocket  vetoes,"  and  that  a 
majority  of  all  the  members  of  each  house  should  override 
a  positive  veto ;  that  "  the  power  of  dismission  from  office 
should  be  restricted  and  the  exercise  of  it  rendered  respon 
sible" — particularly  in  cases  of  the  removal  of  officials  ap 
pointed  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate,  and  that  in 
such  cases  where  removals  should  be  necessary  the  reasons 
should  be  fully  communicated ;  that  "  the  control  over  the 
Treasury  should  be  confided  and  confined  exclusively  to 
Congress,  and  all  authority  of  the  President  over  it,  by 
means  of  dismissing  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  or  other 
persons  having  the  immediate  charge  of  it,  be  vigorously 
precluded " ;  and  that  "  the  appointment  of  members  of 
Congress  to  any  office,  or  any  but  a  few  specific  offices,  dur 
ing  their  continuance  in  office  and  for  one  year  thereafter, 
should  be  prohibited."  These  propositions,  it  will  be  ob 
served,  were  suggested  by  his  contests  with  Jackson  and  Yan 


the  opposers  of  protection  to  manufactures  and  internal  improvements 
is  that  I  believe  the  fact  to  be  otherwise.  The  old  Federalists  were  gen 
erally  friendly  to  those  interests.  Washington  was  pre-eminently  so." 


CH.  XL]    AN  EXPOSITION  OF  WHIG  DOCTRINES        447 

Buren.  None  of  them  have  ever  been  adopted.  He  inti 
mated  the  opinion  that  the  establishment  of  a  national  bank 
was  necessary  to  the  creation  of  a  sound  currency;  but 
he  was  careful  not  to  pledge  himself  to  that  policy.  The 
public  lands  he  would  treat  as  provided  for  in  the  bill  that 
Jackson  rejected.  The  protective  system  should  "  be  adhered 
to  and  maintained  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  and  in  the 
spirit  of  the  Compromise."  "  A  pruning-knife,  long,  broad, 
and  sharp,  should  be  applied  to  every  department  of  the 
government."  The  States  having  made  so  much  progress 
in  their  systems  of  internal  improvement,  and  having  been 
so  much  aided  by  the  distribution  under  the  deposit  act, 
they  should  receive  no  further  assistance  from  the  govern 
ment,  except  the  payment  of  the  last  instalment  under  that 
act,  the  absolute  relinquishment  to  them  of  the  previous  in 
stalments,  and  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands, 
as  prescribed  in  his  bill.  "  The  right  to  slave  property,  be 
ing  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  and  recognized  as  one  of 
the  compromises  incorporated  into  that  instrument  by  our 
ancestors,  should  be  left  where  the  Constitution  had  placed  it, 
undisturbed  and  unagitated."  This  speech  was  the  most  au 
thoritative  exposition  of  the  Whig  creed,  and  maybe  taken  as 
the  type  of  the  innumerable  Whig  speeches  of  the  campaign. 
The  most  powerful  aid  to  the  Whig  ticket  was  the  condi 
tion  of  the  country  resulting  from  the  financial  crisis.  No 
argument  was  necessary  to  make  that  plain,  and  that,  in 
itself,  was  enough  to  convince  a  large  portion  of  the  people 
that  the  government  was  at  fault.1  Want  and  logic  seldom 


1  "Hundreds  and  thousands  of  persons,  destitute  of  employment  and 
almost  destitute  of  bread,  found  relief  in  swelling  the  Harrison  processions 
and  gatherings,  in  singing  patriotic  songs,  and  shouting  for  reform." — 
Goodrich 's  Recollections,  vol.  ii.  p.  350. 


448  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

consort.  It  is  not  supposable  that  at  such  a  time  the  mass 
of  the  people  reasoned  much  whether  there  should  be  a  na 
tional  bank  or  an  independent  Treasury,  or  what  was  the 
best  system  upon  which  to  deal  with  the  public  lands. 
Multitudes,  moved  by  destitution  and  encouraged  by  clamor, 
naturally  believed  that  a  change  of  administration  would  be 
beneficial.  "  They  feel,"  said  Clay,  "  the  absolute  necessity 
for  a  change,  that  no  change  can  render  their  condition 
worse,  and  that  any  change  must  better  it.  This  is  the 
judgment  to  which  they  have  come ;  this  is  the  brief  and 
compendious  logic  which  we  daily  hear."  And  this  im 
pulse  was  urged  on  by  all  the  arts  of  stump  declamation. 
The  argument  of  most  weight  in  the  popular  mind  was  that 
the  administrations  of  Jackson  and  Yan  Buren  were  char 
acterized  by  prodigal  and  profligate  extravagance  and  waste 
of  the  public  funds.  It  was  in  this  that  the  highly  spec 
tacular  feature  of  the  campaign  had  its  impetus. 

The  charge  was  more  than  specious.  The  new  political 
temper  displayed  after  Jackson's  election,  begetting  an  in 
ordinate  desire  for  oifice,  which  was  furthered  by  the  spoils 
system,  led  insidiously  to  the  creation  of  new  places  to  be 
filled,  new  expenditures  to  be  made,  and  the  concoction  of 
innumerable  schemes  to  plunder  the  government  by  indi 
rection.  In  times  of  great  political  activity  and  excitement 
the  public  eye  is  too  little  directed  to  the  minor  means  that 
ingenious  and  unscrupulous  men  employ  to  filch  the  public 
funds.  During  the  Revolution  these  plunderers  enriched 
themselves  through  the  woes  of  the  country.  Similar  opera 
tions  prevailed  during  the  "War  of  1812  and  the  Rebellion. 
During  the  Jacksonian  period,  after  the  national  debt  was 
paid,  there  set  in  a  spirit  of  laxity  that  increased  and  spread 
until  the  results  became  scandalous.  Wherever  the  public 


CH.  XL]  AN  ERA   OF  PECULATION  449 

moneys  presented  temptation  they  were  in  danger.  After 
the  method  was  instituted  of  keeping  and  disbursing  the 
revenues  through  the  medium  of  the  officials  instead  of  the 
banks,  defalcations  and  peculations  became  so  common  that 
only  the  more  flagrant  cases  attracted  attention.1  Swart- 
wout,  collector  of  customs  at  the  port  of  New  York,  was  a 
defaulter  to  the  extent  of  nearly  $1,250,000,'  and  the  United 
States  district-attorney  at  the  same  place,  §72,000.  Many 
of  the  land  officers  were  guilty  in  lesser  degrees.3  The 

1  "Defalcations  are  no  crime.    Mr.  Van  Buren   in  his  message  pro 
poses  to  make  defalcations  of  public  money  felony  and  punishable  in  the 
state-prison.     Nonsense  !    Neither  party  will  agree  to  such  an  absurdity  ! 
Never  !"— New  York  Herald,  December  10,  1838. 

2  "  Swartwout's  appointment  was  opposed  by  the  leading  friends  of 
General  Jackson  and  Mr.  Van  Bureu  in  New  York.     Mr.  Van  Buren  op 
posed  it  most  earnestly."     "This  man  [Hoyt]  was  a  pet  of  Van  Buren's. 
I  have  understood  he  was  a  grocer,  and  became  bankrupt.     He  was  after 
ward  appointed  by  Van  Buren  collector  of  the  port  of  New  York.     He 
certainly  then  purloined  a  large  amount  of  the  public  money." — Rem 
iniscences  of  J.  A.  Hamilton,  pp.  125,  126.     Swartwout  wrote  to  Hoyt, 
March  14,  1829  :  "  Your  very  beautiful  and  entirely  interesting  letter  of 
the  8th  was  received  in  due  course.     I  hold  to  your  doctrine  fully,  that 

no  d d  rascal  who  made  use  of  his  office  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  Mr. 

Adams  in  and  General  Jackson  out  of  power  is  entitled  to  the  least  lenity 
or  mercy,  save  that  of  hanging.     So  we  think  both  alike  on  that  head. 
Whether  or  not  I  shall  get  anything  in  the  general  scramble  for  plunder 
remains  to  be  proven  ;  but  I  rather  guess  I  shall." 

3  "  Out  of  sixty-six  receivers  of  public  money  in  the  new  States,  sixty- 
two  were  discovered  to  be  defaulters  ;  and  the  agent  sent  to  look  into  the 
affairs  of  the  peccant  office-holder  in  the  Southwest  reported  him  minus 
some  tens  of  thousands,  but  advised  the  government  to  retain  him  for  a 
reason  one  of  yEsop's  fables  illustrates — the  agent  ingeniously  surmising 
that  the  appointee  succeeding  would  do  his  stealing  without  any  regard  to 
the  proficiency  already  made  by  his  predecessor  ;  while  the  present  incum 
bent  would  probably  consider,  in  mercy  to  the  Treasur}',  that  he  had  done 
something  of  the  pious  duty  of  providing  for  his  household." — Baldwin's 
Flush  Times  of  Alabama  and  Mississippi,  p.  85.     "A  list  of  some  of  the 
most  prominent  of  the   defalcations  exhibits   that  this  sad  condition  of 
things  was  not  sectional  or  local,  and  had  increased  lamentably  within  a 
brief  period.     The  public  Treasury  had  been  plundered  of  about  twenty 
millions  of  dollars  within  a  few  years." — Memoirs  of  J.  G.  Bennett,  p.  257. 

29 


450  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

government  was  more  or  less  blamable  for  inattention; 
yet  something  should  be  allowed  for  inexperience  with  the 
system  which  had  so  recently  come  into  existence. 

A  still  greater  loss  to  the  Treasury  came  through  extrava 
gant  appropriations,  fraudulent  contracts,  and  the  like,  for 
which  Congress,  without  regard  to  party,  was  more  respon 
sible  than  the  administration.  The  details  of  this  source  of 
waste  were  not  known  during  the  campaign ;  it  was  only 
after  subsequent  investigation  that  they  were  ascertained. 
Still,  the  idea  was  abroad.  The  total  expenses  of  the  gov 
ernment  had  rapidly  increased,  and  this  furnished  abundant 
ground  for  denunciation.  During  the  last  session  some  in 
quiries  were  started  in  Congress  which  resulted  in  showing 
that  Yan  Buren's  life  in  the  White  House  was  conducted 
in  an  elegant  style.  Speeches  were  made  in  the  House,  in 
which  his  mode  of  living  was  graphically  contrasted  with 
the  simpler  manner  of  his  predecessors ;  and  these  speeches 
were  profusely  circulated  as  campaign  documents,  with  tell 
ing  effect.  It  was  said  that  golden  goblets  and  spoons,  gilt 
candelabra,  silver  plate,  knives  and  forks,  costly  china  and 
fine  linen,  satin  chairs  and  damask  sofas,  carriages  and  ser 
vants  were  his  portion,  while  the  masses  toiled  and  suffered 
to  pay  for  them.  He  was  charged  with  being  an  aristocrat 
and  a  monarchist,  and  thus  unworthy  of  support  by  true 
Americans. 

Early  in  the  campaign  a  Eichmond  newspaper  observed 
derisively  of  Harrison :  "  Give  him  a  barrel  of  hard  cider 
and  a  pension  of  two  thousand  dollars,  and  our  word  for  it 
he  will  sit  the  remainder  of  his  days  contented  in  a  log- 
cabin."  It  was  an  unfortunate  remark  ;  for  it  was  at  once 
taken  up  by  the  Whig  journals  and  speakers,  and  prompted 
the  spectacular  features  of  the  extraordinary  canvass  that 


CH.  XL]  HARRISON'S   CAREER  451 

followed.1  Log -cabins  and  hard  cider  became  the  symbols 
of  a  popular  crusade  and  an  irresistible  argument  against 
the  extravagance  of  the  government  and  the  alleged  con 
tempt  of  the  administration  for  the  people.  And  there 
was  enough  truth  in  the  idea  of  Harrison  they  represented 
to  give  them  more  than  merely  picturesque  effect. 

Harrison  was  nearly  sixty-eight,  poor,  plain,  and  unassum 
ing.2  But  his  descent  and  career  were  highly  honorable.  He 
was  the  son  of  a  distinguished  citizen  of  Virginia,  who  was 
repeatedly  Speaker  of  the  colonial  Congress,  and  a  signer  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence.  At  the  age  of  nineteen, 
while  a  medical  student,  he  left  his  studies,  and  was  com 
missioned  as  an  ensign  in  the  arduous  Indian  war  during 
Washington's  administration.  He  served  with  gallantry, 
and  retired  in  1797,  with  the  rank  of  captain,  to  take  the 
appointment  of  secretary  of  the  Northwest  Territory.  A 
year  later  he  became  a  delegate  in  Congress.  Soon  after- 


1  "In  an  evil  hour  the  Locofocos  taunted  the  Harrison  men  with  hav 
ing  selected  a  candidate  who  lived  in  a  log-cabin  and  drank  hard  cider, 
which  the  Whigs,  with  more  adroitness  than  they  usually  display,  appro 
priated  to  their  own  use,  and  now  on  all  their  hanners  and  transparencies 
the  Temple  of  Liberty  is  transformed  into  a  hovel  of  unhewn  logs  ;  the 
military  garb  of  the  general,  into  the  frock  and  shirt-sleeves  of  a  laboring 
farmer.     The  American  eagle  has  taken  his  flight,  which  is  supplied  by  a 
cider  barrel,  and  the  long-established  emblem  of  the  ship  has  given  place 
to  the  plough." — Hone's  Diary,  vol.  ii.  p.  22. 

2  In  April,  1840,  Horace  Mann  visited  Harrison,  and  in  a  letter  gave  a 
minute  description  of  his  rustic  abode  and  simple  habits  of  life.    "The 
house  was  a  building  with  two  wings.     Part  of  the  central  building  was 
veritable  logs,  though  now  covered  externally  by  clapboards  and  within 
by  wainscoting.     This  covering  and  these  wings  have  been  added  since 
the  log  nucleus  was  rolled  together.     The  furniture  of  the  parlor  could 
not  have  drawn  very  largely  upon  any  one's  resources.    The  walls  were 
ornamented  with  a  few  portraits,  some  in  frames,  some  disembodied  from 
a  frame.     The  drawing-room  was  fitted  up  more  in  modern  style  ;  but  the 
whole  furniture  and  ornaments  in  these  rooms  might  have  cost  two  hun 
dred  or  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars."— Life  of  Horace  Mann,  p.  127. 


452  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

ward  the  Territory  was  divided,  and  of  that  part  of  it  made 
to  constitute  the  Territory  of  Indiana  he  was  appointed 
Governor,  serving  thirteen  years  with  honesty  and  ability. 
In  the  Indian  war  with  Tecumseh  he  commanded  at  the 
successful  battle  of  Tippecanoe.  In  1812,  at  the  desire  of  the 
soldiers,  he  was  made  major-general  of  the  Kentucky  mili 
tia,  and  had  performed  some  service  when  he  was  appoint 
ed  commander  of  the  Northwestern  army.  He  conducted 
the  operations  that  resulted  in  the  victory  of  the  Thames. 
While  none  of  his  military  achievements  were  of  much 
magnitude,  they  were  all  successful  and  brought  peace 
throughout  a  wide  region.  From  1816  to  1819  he  served 
in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  from  1825  to  1828  in 
the  Senate,  from  Ohio.  In  1828  he  was  appointed  Minister 
to  Colombia,  but  in  the  following  year  he  was  removed  by 
President  Jackson,  because  he  defended  Clay  against  the 
charge  of  bargain  and  corruption.  Returning  to  Ohio,  he 
had  recourse  to  farming  for  a  livelihood,  which  was  aided 
by  his  acting  as  the  clerk  of  a  court.1 

Like  all  other  men  who  have  served  the  public  for  any 
considerable  length  of  time,  he  had  not  escaped  censure 


1  "  I  met  with  one  incident  iu  Cincinnati  which  I  shall  long  remember. 
I  had  observed  at  the  hotel  table  a  man  of  about  medium  height,  stout 
and  muscular,  and  of  about  the  age  of  sixty  years,  yet  with  the  active 
step  and  lively  air  of  youth.  I  had  been  struck  with  his  open  and  cheer 
ful  expression,  the  amenity  of  his  manners,  and  a  certain  air  of  command 
which  appeared  through  his  plain  dress.  '  That  is,'  said  my  friend,  '  General 
Harrison,  clerk  of  the  Cincinnati  court  of  common  pleas.  ...  He  is  now 
poor,  with  a  numerous  family,  neglected  by  the  federal  government, 
although  yet  vigorous,  because  he  has  the  independence  to  think  for  him 
self.  As  the  opposition  is  in  the  majority  here,  his  friends  have  bethought 
themselves  to  come  to  his  relief  by  removing  the  clerk  of  the  court  of  com 
mon  pleas,  who  was  a  Jackson  man,  and  giving  him  the  place,  which  is 
a  lucrative  one,  as  a  sort  of  retiring  pension.'" — Chevalier's  Society  in  the 
United  States,  p.  196. 


Cn.  XL]       HARRISON'S  RELATIONS  TO  CLAY  453 

and  abuse;  but  there  was  nothing  in  his  career  to  justify 
severe  criticism.  His  humble  circumstances  were  good  evi 
dence  of  his  honesty ;  and  his  inferior  position  was  equal 
ly  good  evidence  that,  with  the  opportunities  he  had  had, 
he  possessed  little  talent  for  political  advancement  and  in 
fluence.  He  understood  perfectly  that  his  nomination  was 
made  solely  because  of  his  availability ;  but  naturally  he 
was  not  unwilling  to  profit  by  it.  He  acknowledged  his 
situation  very  frankly  to  Clay,  to  whom  he  wrote  several 
months  before  the  convention.  "  I  can  only  say  that  my 
position  in  relation  to  yourself  is  to  me  very  distressing 
and  embarrassing.  How  little  can  we  be  judge  of  our 
future  destinies !  A  few  years  ago  I  would  not  have  be 
lieved  in  the  possibility  of  my  being  placed  in  a  position 
of  apparent  rivalry  to  you,  particularly  in  relation  to  the 
Presidency,  an  office  which  I  have  never  dreamed  of  at 
taining,  and  which  I  ardently  desired  to  see  you  occupy. 
I  confess  that  I  did  covet  the  second,  but  never  the  first 
office  in  the  gift  of  my  fellow-citizens.  Fate,  as  B®naparte 
would  say,  has  placed  me  where  I  am,  and  I  await  the 
result  which  time  will  determine."  Certainly  he  had  no 
political  record  to  warrant  his  elevation.  His  opinions  on 
the  questions  which  had  agitated  Congress  during  the  last 
twelve  years  were  quite  unknown  to  the  people.  His  can 
didacy  in  1836  had,  under  the  circumstances,  attracted  no 
especial  attention  to  his  political  convictions,  though  the 
fact  that  he  ran  in  that  year  as  a  Whig  candidate  no  doubt 
created  a  presumption  as  to  his  position.  After  his  nomi 
nation  the  subject  necessarily  arose ;  not  only  was  he  per 
sonally  belittled  and  lampooned,  but  he  was  accused  of 
being  a  Federalist  and  an  abolitionist.  The  truth  was  that 
his  official  career  had  small  political  significance  and  no  ma- 


454  THE   JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1840 

terial  bearing  on  his  present  situation.  That  he  had  been 
removed  from  office  by  Jackson  for  favoring  Clay  was  the 
most  prominent  political  fact  that  appeared. 

But  he  was  not  slow  to  express  himself.  He  began  by  let 
ters,  which  for  the  most  part  were  high-sounding  generali 
ties,  avoiding  so  far  as  practicable  the  expression  of  his  views 
on  particular  questions.  It  was  well  enough  for  him  to  say 
that  the  President  should  not  be  devoted  to  his  party  rather 
than  to  the  whole  country,  that  he  should  commit  no  usur 
pations  or  abuse  of  power,  that  he  should  not  resort  freely 
to  the  veto,  and  that  proscription  on  account  of  party  should 
not  prevail ;  the  real  difficulty  is  in  the  application  of  these 
excellent  principles.  A  President  is  easily  convinced  that 
his  party  is  the  true  exponent  of  what  is  best  for  the  coun 
try  and  that  only  its  members  should  be  intrusted  with  the 
execution  of  its  policy.  In  his  speeches,  for  he  made  sev 
eral,  Harrison  became  somewhat  more  explicit  as  the  press 
ure  increased.  He  admitted  in  complimentary  terms  the 
superior  attainments  and  claims  to  preferment  of  Clay  and 
Webster,  and  thus  indirectly  sanctioned  their  views  of  pub 
lic  policy  and  courted  their  co-operation.  He  declared  him 
self  distinctly  in  favor  of  only  a  single  term  for  the  Presi 
dent,  and  pledged  himself  not  to  stand  for  another  if  elected. 
In  1822  he  maintained  that  a  national  bank  was  absolute 
ly  unconstitutional ;  in  1836  he  had  overcome  his  scruples 
sufficiently  to  say  that  he  would  consent  to  approve  a  bill 
to  charter  a  bank  if  the  collection  and  disbursement  of  the 
revenue  would  suffer  without  one ;  but  he  now  intimated, 
although  he  professed  that  his  Constitutional  views  were  un 
changed,  that  such  a  result  would  follow  without  a  bank, 
and  that  the  popular  will,  if  clearly  expressed,  in  favor  of 
a  bank  should  not  be  resisted.  "  Methinks,"  said  he,  on  one 


CH.  XL]  HARRISON   AND   THE    SLAVERY   QUESTION  455 

occasion,  "  I  hear  a  soft  voice  asking,  <  Are  you  in  favor 
of  paper  money  ?'  I  am."  He  favored  protection,  but  ac 
cepted  the  Compromise  as  inviolate.  He  denied  the  charge 
that  he  was  an  abolitionist,  declared  that  slavery  should 
not  be  abolished  in  the  District  without  the  consent  of  Yir- 
ginia  and  Maryland,  and  that  while  the  right  of  petition 
should  be  observed,  the  antislavery  agitation  was  not  sanc 
tioned  by  the  Constitution.  He  did  not  dwell  on  the  sub 
ject,  but  it  cannot  justly  be  said  that  he  veiled  his  opinions 
concerning  it.  In  the  latter  part  of  his  Governorship  of  the 
Indiana  Territory  he  incurred  unpopularity  for  a  time  by 
opposing  the  abolition  of  slavery  there ;  and  his  votes  in  the 
House  on  the  Missouri  bill  were  against  the  restriction  of 
slavery.  But  notwithstanding  this  record  and  his  avowed 
sentiments,  he  did  not  repel  the  Whigs  who  favored  the 
abolition  movement ;  for  the  character  of  the  campaign 
made  the  slavery  question  a  minor  consideration.1  Though 
little  was  said  as  to  Anti-masonry,  Harrison  "was  acceptable 
to  its  adherents,  and  this  was  a  secret  but  powerful  element 
in  his  support  in  several  States. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  Yan  Buren  would  be  defeated. 
However  motley  the  array  that  effected  Harrison's  nom 
ination,  the  supporters  of  his  election  were  still  more  va 
ried,  as  they  included  large  numbers  who  had  never  before 
acted  with  the  Whig  party.  "Whatever  their  political  prin 
ciples,  and  however  they  may  have  differed  from  those 
which  Clay  had  so  long  advocated,  hostility  to  the  admin 
istration  was  the  sufficient  motive  for  supporting  Harrison. 

1  "In  spite  of  General  Harrison's  trimming  on  the  subject  of  slavery, 
and  the  evidence  of  his  consistent  hostility  to  the  abolition  movement,  his 
candidacy  carried  off  their  feet  an  alarming  number  of  Whig  abolitionists, 
while  the  Third  Party  had  captured  another  class." — Life  of  Garrison,  vol. 
ii.  p.  4.14. 


456  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1840 

Log-cabins,  decked  in  frontier  style  with  coon-skins,  bunches 
of  corn,  strings  of  peppers  and  dried  apples,  and  the  like,1 
were  built  in  the  cities  and  villages.  Inside  these  cabins 
copious  supplies  of  cider  were  on  tap  to  be  drunk  from 
gourds;  on  the  outside  crowds  assembled  to  absorb  still 
more  copious  and  inflaming  harangues.2  Huge  processions, 
music,  campaign  songs,  cartoons,  banners  with  such  legends 
as  "  Matty's  policy,  fifty  cents  a  day  and  French  soup  ;  our 
policy,  two  dollars  a  day  and  roast  beef,"  were  now  first 
introduced  as  a  prominent  feature  of  Presidential  cam 
paigns.  Besides  this,  all  the  devices  that  could  be  resorted 
to  were  used  to  swell  the  Harrison  enthusiasm  and  recruit 
the  ranks  of  his  followers.3  Benton,  indulging  in  his  usual 
frenzy  against  the  influence  of  banks,  asserts  that  they 

1  A  broom  at  the  door  represented  the  "clean  sweep  "  that  Harrison  was 
to  make.     And  it  was  not  forgotten  that  he  had  told  his  old  soldiers  that 
they  would  never  find  his  latch  -  string  pulled  in. — Life  of  Seward,  vol.  i. 
p.  490. 

2  Julian's  Political  Recollections,  pp.  10,  16. 

3  "  Tippecanoe  song-books  were  sold  bj^the  hundred  thousand.     There 
were  Tippecanoe  medals,  Tippecanoe  badges,  Tippecanoe  flags,  Tippe 
canoe  handkerchiefs,  Tippecanoe  almanacs,  and  Tippecanoe  shaving-soap. 
All  other  interests  were  swallowed  up  in  the  one  interest  of  the  election. 
All  noises  were  drowned  in  the  cry  of  'Tippecanoe  and  Tyler  too.'    The 
man  who  contributed  most  to  keep  alive  and  increase  the  popular  enthusi 
asm,  the  man  who  did  most  to  feed  that  enthusiasm  with  the  substantial 
fuel  of  fact  and  argument  was,  beyond  all  question,  Horace  Greeley. 
On  the  2d  of  May  the  first  number  of  The  Log-Cabin  appeared,  by  '  H. 
Greeley  &  Co.,'  a  weekly  paper  to  be  published  simultaneously  at  New 
York  and  Albany,  at  fifty  cents  for  the  campaign  of  six  months.     It  was 
a  small  paper  ;  but  it  was  conducted  with  wonderful  spirit,  and  made  an 
unprecedented  hit." — Parton's  Greeley,  p.  181.     "The  Herald  had  much 
to  do  with  the  election,  and  kept  pace  with  the  enthusiasm  of  the  times. 
It  astonished  newspaperdom.   Its  reports  of  speeches  at  Patchogue,  in  Wall 
Street,  and  other  localities  were  given  to  the  public  with  a  fulness  and 
with  a  speed  never  known  before  to  the  press." — Memoirs  ofJ.  G.  Bennett, 
p.  263.     See,  also,  Ben  ton's  Thirty  Years'  View,  vol.  ii.  p.  205  ;  Adams's 
Diary,  vol.  x.  pp.  352,  355;  Weed's  AutobiograpJiy ,  vol.  i.  p.  467;  Sher 
man's  Recollections  of  Forty  Years,  vol.  i.  p.  48. 


CH.  XL]  STATISTICS   OF  THE  ELECTION  457 

contributed  largely  to  defray  the  expenses  of  this  political 
pandemonium  and  to  provide  an  abundant  corruption  fund ; 
but  with  how  much  truth  it  is  impossible  to  know.  Re 
garded  from  any  point,  the  campaign  was  no  credit  to  our 
institutions,  although  not  an  unnatural  consequence  of  the 
conditions  that  existed.  The  total  vote,  including  7059  for 
the  Liberty  ticket,  was  2,410,778  —  912,573  more  than  in 
1836.  The  Whig  majority  was  139,256 ;  yet  the  Demo 
cratic  vote  was  367,153  more  than  in  1836.  But  seven 
States — only  one  Northern  state,  Illinois — went  Demo 
cratic.  Harrison  and  Tyler  received  234  electoral  votes; 
Van  Buren,  60.  The  Democratic  votes  for  Vice-President 
were  divided,  Johnson  receiving  48. 

Van  Buren  accepted  the  result  with  his  usual  composure. 
He  was  at  once  proclaimed  as  the  choice  of  the  party  for 
its  candidate  in  1844,  and  he  was  confident  of  his  eventual 
success.  He  met  Congress,  which  convened  December  7, 
as  firm  as  ever  in  the  maintenance  of  his  policy.  He  re 
ported  a  satisfactory  condition  of  the  finances  and  the  suc 
cessful  operation  of  the  independent  Treasury  system  under 
the  recently  enacted  law,  and  opposed  with  renewed  vigor 
the  establishment  of  a  national  bank.  This  part  of  the  mes 
sage  was  manifestly  intended  by  him  as  a  defence  of  the 
principles  of  his  administration.  It  was  composed  with 
great  ability  and  in  an  elevated  style.  It  is  perhaps  the 
best  of  his  state  papers. 

As  this  Congress  still  contained  a  Democratic  majority  in 
both  houses,  but  expired  at  the  same  time  as  the  adminis 
tration,  little  was  accomplished  beyond  passing  the  neces 
sary  appropriation  bills.  The  principal  debate  in  the  Senate 
related  to  the  public  lands.  It  was  occasioned  by  a  pre 
emption  bill,  which  was  finally  passed  by  the  Senate,  but 


458  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1841 

not  by  the  House.  On  January  28  and  29  Clay  spoke  on 
the  general  subject  of  distributing  the  proceeds  of  the  public 
lands.  His  speech  had  no  particular  reference  to  the  bill, 
but  was  entirely  devoted  to  a  justification  of  the  distribu 
tion  plan  he  had  so  long  advocated.  It  was  of  course  de 
signed  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  adoption  of  that  plan 
under  the  incoming  administration.  How  imperfectly  he 
divined  the  future  progress  of  the  nation  may  be  judged 
from  some  of  his  closing  remarks. 

"  If  to  the  other  ties,"  said  he,  "  that  bind  us  together  as 
one  people,  be  superadded  the  powerful  interest  springing 
out  of  a  just  administration  of  our  exhaustless  public  do 
main,  by  which  for  a  long  succession  of  ages,  in  seasons  of 
peace,  the  States  will  enjoy  the  benefit  of  the  great  and 
growing  revenue  which  it  produces,  and  in  periods  of  war, 
we  shall  be  forever  linked  together  with  the  strength  of 
adamantine  chains.  No  section,  no  State,  would  ever  be 
mad  enough  to  break  off  from  the  Union  and  deprive  itself 
of  the  inestimable  advantages  which  it  secures.  .  .  .  Age 
after  age  may  roll  away,  State  after  State  arise,  generation 
succeed  generation,  and  still  the  fund  will  remain  not  only 
unexhausted,  but  improved  and  increasing,  for  the  benefit  of 
our  children's  children  to  the  remotest  posterity." 

Clay  did  not  repress  his  exultation  over  the  Whig  vic 
tory.  Nor  did  he  wait  until  the  "Whigs  were  in  power,  and 
Harrison  could  formally  define  the  policy  of  his  adminis 
tration,  to  assail  the  Sub -Treasury  system.  Early  in  the 
session  he  introduced  a  resolution  declaring  that  the  "act 
ought  to  be  forthwith  repealed."  He  spoke  with  extreme 
elation.  "It  has  never,"  said  he,  "been  my  purpose  in 
offering  this  resolution  to  invite  or  partake  in  an  argu 
ment  on  the  great  measure  to  which  the  resolution  re- 


CH.  XL]    THE  ELECTION  AND  THE   SUB-TREASURY   459 

lates,  nor  is  it  my  purpose  now.  I  would  as  lief  argue 
to  the  convicted  criminal,  when  the  rope  is  around  his 
neck  and  the  cart  is  about  to  remove  from  under  his 
body,  to  persuade  him  to  escape  from  the  gallows,  as  to 
argue  now  to  prove  that  this  measure  of  the  Sub-Treasury 
ought  to  be  abandoned."  l  The  ordinary  forms  should  be 
dispensed  with.  The  measure  had  been  under  discussion 
for  three  years  and  a  half,  hence  further  argument  would 
be  unnecessary  and  misapplied.  "  This  nation,  by  a  tremen 
dous  majority,  has  decided  against  the  Sub-Treasury  meas 
ure.  And  when  the  nation  speaks  and  wills  and  commands, 
what  is  to  be  done?  There  is  no  necessity  of  the  forms 
of  sending  to  a  committee  for  a  slow  process  of  inquiry ; 
but  there  is  a  necessity  for  doing  what  the  country  re 
quires,  and  to  reform  what  Senators  have  been  instructed 
to  reform." 

Wright,  in  reply,  denied  that  the  result  of  the  election 
implied  the  popular  disapproval  of  the  Sub  -  Treasury. 
"  How  is  it  ascertained  ?  By  what  declaration  of  policy  or 
principle  on  the  part  of  that  party  which  has  become  pre 
dominant?  Why,  I  should  suppose,  if  the  result  of  the 
late  election  can  be  claimed  as  proving  anything,  it  is  to 
prove  that  we  are  to  take  down  the  splendid  edifice  in  which 
I  now  stand  and  erect  a  log-cabin  in  its  place ;  that  instead 
of  the  rich  draperies  and  valuable  pictures  before  us  we 
are  to  hang  around  our  chamber  coon-skins,  cat-skins,  and 
other  trophies  of  the  chase."  Clay  winced  under  this  sar 
casm  and  retorted  with  much  earnestness ;  but  as  usual  he 

1  He  afterward  complained  that  this  "casual  expression "  had  been 
"terribly  perverted  by  the  public  prints.  The  papers  have  represented 
me  as  having  compared  the  gentlemen  of  the  Senate  who  differ  from  me 
in  opinion  with  regard  to  that  measure  as  a  company  of  convicts  with 
halters  around  their  necks." 


460  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1841 

relied  mainly  on  the  well-known  character  of  his  own  prin 
ciples  as  the  guarantee  of  what  those  of  the  new  adminis 
tration  would  be.  Calhoun  maintained  that  "  the  election 
decided  nothing  but  that  General  Harrison  should  be  elected 
President  for  the  next  term,"  and  protested  "  against  the 
attempt  to  make  any  other  inference  the  basis  of  official 
action,"  and  in  doing  so  he  "  but  took  the  ground  taken  by 
the  Senator  and  those  with  whom  he  acted  when  it  was 
attempted  to  construe  in  a  similar  manner  a  former  election 
to  have  decided  against  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the 
bank  and  in  favor  of  certain  measures  to  which  he  was 
opposed."  In  response  to  the  question  as  to  what  was  to 
be  done  after  the  Sub -Treasury  was  removed,  Clay  said, 
haughtily :  " ;  Sufficient  unto  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof.' 
We  have  nothing  now  but  the  Sub -Treasury  to  handle. 
That  is  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  any  measure.  Let  us 
first  remove  that,  and  it  will  then  be  time  for  the  Senator 
from  New  York  to  hand  in  his  inquiries."  The  resolution 
served  its  purpose,  and  toward  the  close  of  the  session  it 
was  laid  on  the  table. 

If  Clay  seemed  officious  he  no  doubt  felt  that  there  was 
abundant  reason  for  it.  There  was  no  Whig  platform  apart 
from  the  policy  with  which  he  was  inseparably  identified 
and  for  which  he  was  largely  responsible.  The  real  Whig 
party  was  the  Clay  party;  and  it  is  this  unquestionable  fact 
that  renders  his  career  so  important  historical]}7.  It  is  not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  Harrison  at  the  outset  should 
have  recognized  Clay's  support  as  indispensable,  and  willing 
ly  conceded  his  leadership.  Harrison's  letter  to  him  before 
the  nomination  was  followed  by  another  soon  after  that 
event,  in  which  he  expressed  his  gratitude  to  him.  "  I 
must,"  he  continued,  "beg  you  also  to  believe  that  if  the 


CH.  XL]       CLAY'S   POLITICAL  PREDOMINANCE  461 

claims  derived  from  your  superior  talents  and  experience 
(so  universally  acknowledged  by  my  supporters)  had  pre 
vailed  over  those  which  accidental  circumstances  had  con 
ferred  upon  me,  and  enabled  the  convention  to  name  you 
as  the  candidate,  you  would  have  had  no  more  zealous  sup 
porter  in  the  Union  than  I  should  have  been." 

After  the  election  they  first  met  at  the  home  of  Governor 
Letcher,  at  Frankfort ;  and  soon  afterward  Clay  entertained 
Harrison  at  Ashland.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  during 
this  time  Clay's  counsel  was  paramount  in  all  important 
matters  of  party  policy.  In  these  interviews  the  compo 
sition  of  the  cabinet  was  discussed.  Clay  was  offered  the 
choice  of  any  appointment  he  desired  in  the  administra 
tion  ;  but  he  at  once  declined  any  official  position,  preferring 
to  remain  in  the  Senate  until  the  principal  measures  decided 
upon  were  enacted,  and  then  retire,  in  view  of  his  prospec 
tive  candidacy  in  1844.  This  was  distinctly  understood  ; 
and  both  concurred  in  the  expediency  of  an  extra  session 
of  Congress  to  enact  these  measures.  Harrison's  inaugural 
address  was  subsequently  submitted  to  Clay,  and  all  his 
suggestions  but  one  were  adopted.1  Clay  advised  the  elimi 
nation  of  the  allusions  to  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  which 
Harrison  had  inserted  from  an  habitual  fondness  for  that 
kind  of  historical  illustration,  but  he  insisted  on  retaining 
them.8  It  is  related,  however,  that  Clay  was  so  peremptory 


1  "The  first  draft  of  his  inaugural  was  so  wantonly  offensive  to  the 
antislavery  Whigs  who  had  aided  in  his  election  that  even  Mr.  Clay  con 
densed  it  and  prevailed  on  the  General  to  modify  it.    He  had  declared  that 
'  the  schemes  of  the  abolitionists  were  fraught  with  horrors  upon  which  an 
incarnate  devil  only  could  look  with  approbation.'" — Julian's  Political 
Recollections,  p.  25. 

2  It  appears  that  the  address  was  also  submitted  to  Webster,  who  wrote 
a  substantially  new  one  for  Harrison  to  recite.     "  Twelve  Roman  procon- 


462  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1841 

in  some  things  that  he  drew  from  Harrison  the  remark : 
"  Mr.  Clay,  you  forget  that  I  am  the  President."  * 

Clay  was  willing  that  "Webster  should  enter  the  cabinet, 
although  he  told  Harrison  that  his  "  confidence  in  Webster 
had  been  somewhat  shaken  during  the  last  eight  years ;  he 
did  not  see  how  any  "Whig  President  could  overlook  him." 2 
The  cabinet  as  then  and  afterward  constructed  was  excep 
tionally  strong  and  made  up  chiefly  from  Clay's  stanchest 
friends — Crittenden,  his  colleague  in  the  Senate,  for  Attor 
ney-General  ;  Ewing,  of  Ohio,  for  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury  ;  Bell,  of  Tennessee,  for  Secretary  of  War ;  Badger,  of 
North  Carolina,  for  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Webster  was 
selected  for  Secretary  of  State,  and  his  friend  Granger  for 
Postmaster-General. 

In  his  inaugural  address  Harrison  deplored  the  tendency 
of  the  Executive  to  absorb  powers  vested  by  the  Constitu 
tion  in  the  other  departments  of  the  government.  He  de 
clared  himself  explicitly  in  favor  of  limiting  the  eligibility  of 


suls  and  several  citizens"  have  I  slain,  "and  yet  they  are  not  all  dead." 
Harrison,  however,  declined  to  use  Webster's  production. — Schouler's 
History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  iv.  pp.  360,  362. 

1  The  authority  for  this  assertion  is  a  letter  in  the  New  York  World  of 
August  31,  1880,  written  by  James  Lyons,  who  entertained  Harrison  in 
Richmond  in  February,  1841. 

2  Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  447  ;  Hone's  Diary,  vol.  ii.  p.  54.     "On  the 
morning  of  the  day  when  President  Harrison  was  expected  to  send  to  the 
Senate  the  names  of  the  members  of  his  cabinet  some  one  remarked,  in  the 
presence  of  Mr.  Clay,  Mr.  Crittenden,  and  several  other  members  of  Con 
gress,  that  Mr.  Webster  was  to  be  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.     '  Oh  no,' 
said  Mr.  Clay,  '  Mr.  Webster  is  to  take  the  Department  of  State.'     'That,' 
said  the  first  speaker,  'was  the  original  programme,  but  as  Mr.  Webster 
prefers  the  Treasury  Department,  the  President  has  consented  to  appoint 
him  to  the  Treasury.'    Instantly,  and  in  his  most  impassioned  manner, 
Mr.  Clay  replied :  '  I  will  oppose  it ;  I  will  denounce  it  in  open  Senate. 
The  State  Department  is  the  proper  place  for  Mr.  Webster.'" — Century 
Magazine,  vol.  xxiii.  p.  182. 


CH.  XL]    HARRISON   OX  THE  EXECUTIVE   POWER      463 

the  President  to  one  term,  and  renewed  his  pledge  that  he 
would  not  consent  to  serve  a  second  term.  He  maintained 
that  the  President  is  not  a  part  of  the  legislative  branch ; 
that  the  veto  power  should  be  exercised  only  to  preserve  the 
Constitution  from  violation  and  the  people  from  the  conse 
quences  of  hasty  legislation,  and  "  to  prevent  the  effects  of 
combinations  violative  of  the  rights  of  minorities."  He  as 
serted  the  "  right  and  privilege  of  the  people  to  decide  dis 
puted  points  of  the  Constitution  arising  from  the  general 
grant  of  power  to  Congress  to  carry  into  effect  the  powers 
expressly  given."  He  declared  against  the  union  of  the  sword 
and  the  purse.  "  It  was  certainly  a  great  error,"  said  he, "  in 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution  not  to  have  made  the  offi 
cer  at  the  head  of  the  Treasury  Department  entirely  inde 
pendent  of  the  Executive.  He  should  at  least  have  been 
removable  only  upon  the  demand  of  the  popular  branch  of 
the  legislature."  The  Executive  should  exert  no  influence 
over  the  elective  franchise,  and  he  should  not  interfere  with 
the  absolute  freedom  of  the  press  nor  with  legislation,  par 
ticularly  with  the  ways  and  means  of  raising  revenue.  As 
to  a  bank,  he  was  silent,  and  touched  the  subject  of  the  cur 
rency  only  to  declaim  against  metallic  money  "  as  fraught 
with  more  fatal  consequences  than  any  other  scheme  hav 
ing  no  relation  to  the  personal  rights  of  the  citizen."  He 
was  against  any  interference  with  slavery  either  in  the 
States  or  in  the  District.  Concerning  the  financial  embar 
rassment  of  some  of  the  States,  he  vaguely  suggested  that 
it  was  "  our  duty  to  encourage  them  to  the  extent  of  our 
Constitutional  authority  to  apply  their  best  means  and 
cheerfully  make  all  necessary  sacrifices  and  submit  to  all 
necessary  burdens  to  fulfil  their  engagements  and  maintain 
their  credit."  He  announced  his  desire  to  maintain  peace- 


464  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1841 

ful  and  honorable  relations  with  foreign  powers  and  to 
treat  the  Indians  with  justice  and  liberality;  and  closed 
with  a  rather  sophomoric  appeal  to  the  people  to  refrain 
from  the  violence  of  party  spirit.  On  the  whole,  the  ad 
dress  was  satisfactory  to  the  leading  "Whigs,  and  betokened 
Harrison's  readiness  to  co-operate  in  the  execution  of  the 
party  policy.1 

Weeks  before  the  new  administration  was  installed  it  was 
evident  that  the  pressure  for  office  would  be  tremendous. 
The  desire  of  the  Whigs  for  the  spoils  of  their  victory  proved 
even  more  general  and  urgent  than  that  of  the  Democrats 
after  Jackson's  first  election.  Washington  was  overrun  with 
office-seekers,  and  every  one  supposed  to  have  influence  in 
the  quest  for  place  was  overwhelmed  with  applications,  while 
those  who  dispensed  the  patronage  were  soon  dismayed.2 


1  "  It  was  not  creditable  to  the  manliness  of  Mr.  Adams  and  his  cabinet 
that  none  of  them  remained  at  their  posts  to  receive  their  successors.    They 
all  fled  as  if  an  enemy  was  in  hot  pursuit.     A  beautiful  contrast  was  ex 
hibited  by  Mr.  Van  Buren  and  his  friends  twelve  years  afterwards.     Mr. 
Van  Buren,  on  General  Harrison's  arrival  in  the  city,  invited  him  to  the 
White  House,  made  him  acquainted  with  its  inmates,  and  entertained  him 
as  his  guest  until  the  inauguration.     The  members  of  his  cabinet  remained 
in  their  several  offices  until  their  successors  made  their  appearance,  received 
them  courteously,  and  introduced  them  to  their  subordinates" — Kendall's 
Autobiography,  p.  308.     Van  Buren's  "tact  is  admirable,  and  whatever 
may  be  his  feelings  in  regard  to  the  success  of  his  distinguished  rival,  he 
will  never  afford  his  political  opponents  the  triumph  of  letting  them  be 
known." — Hone's  Diary,  vol.  ii.  p.  59. 

2  The  scene  was  long  fresh  in  Greeley's  memory.    In  1854  he  wrote  to 
Seward:  "Now  came  the  great  scramble  of  the  swell-mob  of  coon  min 
strels  and  cider-suckers  at  Washington.  .  .  .  Several  regiments  went  on 
from  this  city."    At  the  time,  he  wrote  of  the  "large  and  numerous  swarms 
of  office-hunting  locusts  sweeping  on  to  Washington  daily.    All  the  rotten 
land  speculators,  broken  bank  directors,  swindling  cashiers,  etc.,  are  in 
full  cry  for  office,  office."     "  Mr.  Fry  made  a  speech  one  evening  at  a  po 
litical  meeting  in  Philadelphia.     The  next  morning  a  committee  waited 
upon  him  to  know  for  what  office  he  intended  to  become  an  applicant. 
'  Office  ?'  said  the  astonished  composer.    'No  office.'    'Why,  then,' said  the 


CH.  XL]  HARRISON'S   REBUFF  TO   CLAY  465 

Webster,  representing  the  President,  issued  a  circular  to  the 
heads  of  departments  declaring  that  assessments  and  parti 
san  interference  with  popular  elections  on  the  part  of  gov 
ernment  officials  and  employes  would  be  cause  for  removal ; 
but  the  work  went  on  none  the  less.  Clay  prudently  decided 
to  have  nothing  to  do  with  appointments.  "  Without  the 
principle  of  non-interference,"  he  wrote,  "  if  the  day  had  a 
duration  of  forty -eight  hours  instead  of  twenty -four,  I 
should  be  unable  to  attend  to  the  applications  I  receive." 

Before  Harrison  went  to  Kentucky  he  wrote  to  Clay  sug 
gesting  that  it  would  be  better  for  them  to  communicate  with 
each  other  by  means  of  a  third  person,  from  the  fear  that 
their  "personal  meeting  might  give  rise  to  speculations,  and 
even  jealousies,  which  it  might  be  well  to  avoid."  Although 
this  notion,  which  could  occur  only  to  a  mediocre  man,  was 
waived  for  the  time,  the  dread  of  danger  to  his  dignity 
seems  to  have  grown  upon  him  after  he  reached  Washing 
ton,  and  was  doubtless  increased  by  those  who  sought  to 
lessen  Clay's  influence  with  him.  At  all  events,  but  a  few 
days  after  the  inauguration  Harrison  intimated  to  Clay  that 
he  preferred  to  have  him  communicate  in  writing  the  sug 
gestions  he  desired  to  offer,  instead  of  calling  personally.1 
The  incident  was  caused  by  the  efforts  to  procure  the  ap 
pointment  of  one  Edward  Curtis  as  collector  of  customs  at 
Kew  York.  Curtis  was  an  adroit  political  schemer  and  strat 
egist,  and  was  supported  by  Seward  and  Weed,  but  was  dis 
tasteful  to  Clay  because  of  his  activity  in  opposing  him  at 
Harrisburg.  He  was  appointed.2  Harrison's  rebuff  vexed 

committee,  '  what  the  h did  you  speak  last  night  for  ? ' "— Parton's 

Greeley,  p.  190.  See  also  Coleman's  Cnttenden,  vol.  i.  pp.  136, 149;  Wood- 
bury's  Writings,  vol.  i.  p.  128. 

1  Sargent's  Public  Men  and  Events,  vol.  ii.  p.  116. 

2  "There  is  a  pretty  good  hit  in  one  of  the  Southern  papers  upon  the 

30 


466  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1841 

Clay  sorely,  and  it  might  have  led  to  estrangement  had  the 
President  lived.  After  a  few  days,  Clay's  vexation  some 
what  cooled,  and  he  wrote  to  Harrison  a  mildly  reproach 
ful  letter  resenting  the  imputation  that  he  had  sought  to  dic 
tate  to  him  in  any  manner.1  He  then  left  for  Ashland,  and 
the  two  men  met  no  more.  On  April  4,  after  a  brief  ill 
ness,  Harrison  died.2  As  events  proved,  his  nomination,  elec 
tion,  and  inauguration  were  but  a  mere  episode.  The  im 
portant  result  was  incidental — it  made  John  Tyler  Vice- 
President. 

Tyler  at  once  took  the  oath  of  office  as  President,  and  as 
sumed  the  title  as  well  as  the  functions.  This  being  the  first 
instance  where  the  President  had  died  during  his  term,  there 
were  no  precedents  to  guide  the  formalities  of  the  succes 
sion.  There  was  some  transient  criticism  of  Tyler's  styl 
ing  himself  President  instead  of  Acting  President ;  but  it 
was  more  finical  than  substantial,  and  his  course  has  since 


rather  redundant  introduction  of  classical  illustrations  in  the  President's 
inaugural  address.  .  .  .  The  writer  says  that  General  Harrison  was  pre 
vailed  upon  to  consent  to  the  appointment  of  Edward  Curtis  as  collector 
at  New  York  by  being  told  that  he  was  a  lineal  descendant  of  the  Curtius 
of  Rome." — Hone's  Diary,  vol.  ii.  p.  70. 

1  Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  452. 

2  The  following,  from  Hone's  Diary,  sufficiently  illustrates  the  senti 
ments  that  prevailed  throughout  the  country  as  soon  as  Harrison's  death 
became  known  :  "On  receipt  of  the  news  here  yesterday  morning  a  spon 
taneous  exhibition  of  the  badges  of  woe  was  seen  throughout  the  city ;  the 
flags  on  all  public  places,  as  well  as  on  all  the  shipping  in  the  harbor  (not 
excepting  Tammany  Hall),  were  exhibited  half-mast,  and  some  of  them 
shrouded  in  black.    The  courts  in  session  immediately  adjourned.     The 
newspapers  were  clothed  in  mourning,  all  but  the  Evening  Post,  whose  .  .  . 
editor,  Bryant,  says  he  regrets  the  death  of  General  Harrison  only  because 
he  did  not  live  long  enough  to  prove  his  incapacity  for  the  office  of  Presi 
dent.     Most  of  the  places  of  amusement  were  closed  in  the  evening.     The 
last  words  uttered  by  the  President,  as  heard  by  Dr.  Worthington,  were 
these  :  '  Sir,  I  wish  you  to  understand  the  true  principles  of  the  govern 
ment  ;  I  wish  them  carried  out,  nothing  more.'" — vol.  ii.  p.  72. 


CH.  XL]       TYLER  ASSUMES   THE  PRESIDENCY  467 

been  followed  in  similar  cases.  It  was  of  vastly  greater 
moment  to  the  "Whigs  that  he  should  succeed  to  Harrison's 
policy  as  well  as  to  his  title.  Whether  he  would  was  at 
least  a  doubtful  question.  Danger  was  apprehended  that 
he  would  prove  refractory.  There  was  abundant  reason  for 
the  fear.  He  had  been  long  in  public  life,  his  course  had 
not  been  uncertain,  and  it  was  well  known.1 

He  was  of  an  old  and  distinguished  Virginian  family,  and 
had  strengthened  his  already  high  social  position  by  an  ad 
vantageous  marriage.  He  was  well  educated,  and  possessed 
a  fine  presence,  engaging  manners,  and  very  respectable 
powers  of  public  speech.2  He  was  admitted  to  the  bar  at 
the  age  of  nineteen  and  soon  acquired  practice  and  popu 
larity.  In  1811  he  was  elected  to  the  State  legislature,  and 
began  his  political  career  as  an  unbending  strict-construc- 
tionist.  He  was  opposed  to  the  recharter  of  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  and  signalized  his  views  by  proposing 
resolutions  censuring  the  Senators  from  Virginia  for  voting 
for  the  recharter  contrary  to  their  instructions.  He  served 
five  years  in  the  legislature,  and  was  then  elected  to  Con 
gress,  where  he  served  five  years.  While  in  the  House  he 

1  Adams  wrote  on  the  day  of  Harrison's  death :  "Tyler  is  a  political 
sectarian,  of  the  slave-driving,  Virginian,  Jeffersonian  school,  principled 
against  all  improvement,  with  all  the  interests  and  passions  and  vices  of 
slavery  rooted  in  his  moral  and  political  constitution — with  talents  not 
above  mediocrity,  and  a  spirit  incapable  of  expansion  to  the  dimensions  of 
the  station  upon  which  he  has  been  cast  by  the  hand  of  Providence,  un 
seen,  through  the  apparent  agency  of  chance." — Diary,  vol.  x.  p.  457. 

"2  A  man  of  striking,  manly  beauty,  with  hair  of  silky,  soft  chestnut 
brown,  flowing  in  curls  imperial  as  those  of  Jove  when  Olympus  shook 
with  his  nod  ;  a  strong  gray  eye,  which  glowed  as  he  breathed  forth  his  in 
spirations  of  intellect  and  heart ;  a  finely  chiselled  mouth,  expressing  the 
most  delicate  taste  and  sweet  benevolence  ;  and  a  nose  and  chin  of  manly 
fortitude ; — one  could  but  inwardly  exclaim  when  looking  at  him  and 
listening  to  him,  '  Os  nomine  sublime  dedit."}— Wise's  Seven  Decades  of  the 
Union,  p.  139. 


468  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1841 

was  conspicuously  rigid  in  his  advocacy  of  States-rights  and 
strict-construction.  He  was  opposed  to  the  policy  of  in 
ternal  improvements  and  protective  tariffs,  and  declared 
his  opinions  in  numerous  speeches.  In  1818  he  joined  in 
an  elaborate  report  against  the  bank.  He  opposed  Clay's 
resolutions  looking  to  the  recognition  of  the  South  Amer 
ican  states,  but  supported  those  in  censure  of  Jackson's 
proceedings  in  the  Florida  war.  He  followed  Randolph  in 
opposing  the  Missouri  Compromise,  maintaining  that  Con 
gress  had  no  power  to  impose  restrictions  upon  a  Territory 
in  the  formation  of  a  State  constitution,  or  to  control  sla 
very  in  any  way  in  the  territorial  domain. 

In  1821  he  retired  from  Congress  on  account  of  ill-health; 
but  two  years  later  he  was  returned  to  the  State  legislat 
ure,  mainly  to  promote  his  election  to  the  Senate.  He  was 
defeated,  however ;  but  in  1825  he  was  elected  by  the  legis 
lature  Governor  of  the  State.  In  1824  he  favored  Crawford 
for  the  Presidency ;  but  after  the  coalition  outcry  against 
Adams  and  Clay  he  wrote  a  letter  to  Cl&y  extolling  his  ac 
tion  in  supporting  Adams  and  entering  the  cabinet.  This 
letter  afterward  became  known  and  gave  him  some  trouble.1 
He  did  not  retract  the  sentiments  he  expressed,  although 
he  was  an  opponent  of  Adams's  administration.  His  ambi 
tion  while  Governor  was  still  to  enter  the  Senate,  and  he 
was  finally  elected  over  Eandolph,  taking  his  seat  in  Decem 
ber,  1827. 

During  Jackson's  first  term  Tyler  acted  chiefly  with  the 
administration  party,  and  he  supported  Jackson's  re-election 
in  1832.  He  evinced  no  change  in  the  principles  he  had 
followed  in  the  House.  He  was  still  opposed  to  internal 

1  Schurz's  Clay,  vol.  i.  p.  279 ;  Clay's  Correspondence,  p.  119  ;  Letters 
and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  vol.  i.  p.  41. 


CH.  XL]  TYLER'S   POLITICAL  CAREER  469 

improvements,  particularly  to  further  aid  in  the  construc 
tion  of  the  Cumberland  road.  He  opposed  Clay's  bill  to 
distribute  the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands.  He  was  also 
strongly  against  the  tariffs  of  1828  and  1832.  While  he  did 
not  approve  nullification,  his  language  against  the  injustice 
of  the  tariff  system  that  prompted  it  was  not  less  vigorous 
than  Calhoun's.  He  zealously  supported  the  Compromise, 
but  voted  against  the  force  bill.  He  had  ranked  as  an  ad 
ministration  man  with  independent  leanings.  He  was  held 
in  high  estimation,  and  his  conduct  was  ascribed  to  worthy 
motives  and  his  Constitutional  principles.  But  what  he 
deemed  strict  adherence  to  those  principles  gradually  led 
him  into  the  opposition.  The  first  indication  of  this  course 
was  to  oppose  the  action  of  the  President  in  employing 
diplomatic  agents  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  His 
hostility  to  the  principles  of  Jackson's  nullification  procla 
mation  and  the  force  bill  marked  an  increasing  alienation 
that  soon  became  complete.  Though  still  maintaining  the 
opinion  that  the  bank  was  unconstitutional,  he  disapproved 
the  removal  of  the  deposits,  voted  for  Clay's  resolution  of 
censure,  and  drew  the  report  of  the  Senate  committee  as 
serting  the  solvency  of  the  bank.  In  1833  he  was  re- 
elected  to  the  Senate;  but  in  1836  he  resigned  because  of 
his  refusal  to  obey  the  instructions  of  the  Virginia  legis 
lature  to  vote  for  Benton's  expunging  resolution.  Then 
occurred  his  effort  for  re-election,  from  which  he  was  in 
duced  to  withdraw  by  the  prospect  of  the  Vice-Presidency.1 
This  office  must  have  held  strong  attraction  for  him,  for 
he  was  anxious  to  run  with  Harrison  in  1836 ;  but  through 
Clay's  influence  Granger  was  nominated  instead. 


Wise's  Seven  Decades  of  the  Union,  pp.  157,  161. 


470  THE  JACKSONIAN  EPOCH  [1841 

From  these  leading  facts  of  Tyler's  previous  political 
career,  it  is  obvious  that  his  only  pretension  to  be  a  Whig 
was  through  his  having  acted  with  the  Whigs  in  the  Senate, 
not  on  any  positive  Whig  measure  of  policy,  but  solely  in 
opposition  to  Jackson.  His  acceptance  of  the  nomination 
X  for  Vice-President  can  only  be  explained  by  an  intense  de 
sire  for  the  honor  of  the  office ;  and  the  action  of  the  con 
vention  in  nominating  him,  by  the  lack  of  a  willing  and 
orthodox  candidate,  a  sentimental  impulse,  and  an  indiffer 
ence  to  the  contingency  that  came  to  pass  on  Harrison's 
death. 

Before  the  convention,  when  Clay's  nomination  seemed 
probable,  Tyler  wrote  to  him  for  a  statement  of  his  views 
on  several  political  subjects,  saying  that  he  was  regarded 
"  as  a  Eepublican  of  the  old  school,  who  had  indulged,  when 
the  public  good  seemed  to  require  it,  somewhat  too  much  in 
a  broad  interpretation  to  suit  our  Southern  notions."  Clay 
said  in  his  reply :  "  We  disagree  about  absolute  questions  of 
policy,  and  make  that  disagreement  available  to  prevent 
our  uniting  in  wresting  the  Constitution  from  the  hands  of 
men  who  have  put  them  into  its  living  vitals."  Eepeatedly 
during  the  campaign,  in  answer  to  inquiries,  Tyler  declared 
his  adherence  to  the  opinion  that  a  national  bank  was  un 
constitutional.  One  reason  why  Clay  had  so  much  inter 
ested  himself  in  Virginia  politics  was  that  in  the  expecta 
tion  of  being  nominated  he  was  anxious  that  his  native 
State  should  be  for  him  in  the  election.  The  prevailing 
opinion  of  its  public  men  had  long  been  against  the  con 
stitutionality  of  a  national  bank.  Hence  when  he  failed 
to  receive  the  nomination,  and  the  Whig  ticket  was  suc 
cessful  without  the  aid  of  Virginia,  he  was  outspoken  in 
his  disregard  for  the  opinions  of  the  Virginia  school.  In  a 


CH.  XL]         TYLER  AND  THE   WHIG  POLICY  471 

letter  to  his  constituents  in  September,  1842,  Wise  wrote : 
"  The  first  salutation  I  met  from  Mr.  Clay,  after  the  elec 
tion  of  1840,  and  when  we  met  in  Congress  in  December  of 
that  }7ear,  flushed  with  victory  and  all  rejoicing,  was,  <  Well, 
sir,  it  is  not  to  be  lamented  that  old  Virginia  has  gone  for 
Mr.  Yan  Buren,  for  we  will  not  now  be  embarrassed  by  her 
peculiar  opinions.' " 

Notwithstanding  the  apprehensions  of  the  Whigs  that 
Tyler  would  not  stand  firmly  by  their  programme,  they 
were  given  ground  for  confidence  by  his  cordial  retention 
of  Harrison's  entire  cabinet,  and  by  an  address  to  the  people 
promulgated  a  few  days  after  he  took  the  oath  of  office. 
From  the  general  tone  and  sentiments  of  this  address,  it 
might  well  have  been  written  by  a  stalwart  WThig.  Its  ref 
erences  to  the  late  administrations  were  severe  enough  to 
warrant  the  belief  that  Tj'ler  was  ready  to  go  as  far  as  any 
one  in  reversing  the  Democratic  policy.  He  did  not  declare 
himself  in  favor  of  a  national  bank,  but  his  remarks  on  the 
subject  of  currency  and  finance  created  the  impression  gen 
erally  that  he  would  approve  the  establishment  of  one.  "  In 
deciding,"  said  he,  "  upon  the  adaptation  of  any  such  meas 
ure  to  the  end  proposed,  I  shall  resort  to  the  fathers  of  the 
great  Republican  school  for  advice  and  instruction,  to  be 
drawn  from  their  sage  views  of  our  system  of  government 
and  the  light  of  their  ever-glorious  example." 

Clay  was  not  wholly  reassured  by  the  promising  sound  of 
this  address:  he  was  too  familiar  with  the  wide  orbit  of 
action  that  plausible  generalities  permit.  He  at  once  wrote 
to  Tyler  to  ascertain  his  views  more  definitely;  but  he 
gained  little  satisfaction.  The  only  topics  upon  which  he 
was  explicit  were  the  Sub-Treasury,  the  repeal  of  which  he 
regarded  as  inevitable,  and  the  distribution  of  the  proceeds 


472  THE  JACKSONIAN   EPOCH  [1841 

of  the  public  lands,  which  he  favored,  if  the  annual  appro 
priations  for  rivers  and  harbors  were  excluded.  He  said 
that  he  had  formed  no  plans ;  but  that  some  additional  bur 
dens  might  be  necessary  for  the  relief  of  the  Treasury,  and 
that  the  condition  of  the  military  defences  required  im 
mediate  attention.  As  to  a  bank,  his  remarks  were  porten 
tous.  He  said  that,  if  the  other  subjects  he  had  mentioned 
were  attended  to,  Congress  would  accomplish  much  good ; 
and  he  suggested  several  reasons  why  a  bank  should  not  be 
insisted  on.  He  added,  however,  that  he  should  leave  the 
matter  wholly  to  the  discretion  of  Congress,  and  be  gov 
erned,  so  far  as  his  action  was  concerned,  by  the  character 
of  the  measure  proposed;  but  he  significantly  requested 
Clay  to  consider  whether  he  could  not  "  so  frame  a  bank 
as  to  obviate  all  Constitutional  objections."  A  few  days 
after  receiving  this  letter  Clay  wrote  to  Brooke :  "  I  repair 
to  my  post  in  the  Senate  with  strong  hopes,  not,  however, 
unmixed  with  fears.  If  the  Executive  will  cordially  co-oper 
ate  in  carrying  out  the  Whig  measures  all  will  be  well. 
Otherwise  everything  is  at  hazard." 

It  was  to  be  otherwise.  The  Whig  triumph  was  to  prove 
barren — blasted  by  Tyler's  fortuitous  accession.  The  na 
tional  bank  question,  which  had  so  long  been  the  chief 
source  of  political  turmoil,  was  now  to  receive  its  quietus 
from  Tyler,  and  to  lie  entombed  under  Webster's  epitaph — 
"an  obsolete  idea."  Again  political  conditions  had  devel 
oped  a  new  stage.  Tyler's  pro-slavery  principles  had  made 
him  available  to  strengthen  the  Whig  ticket.  In  his  hands, 
sustained  by  Calhoun's  determined  efforts,  the  pro-slavery 
policy  was  to  be  advanced  until  it  dominated  all  others. 
The  Jacksonian  epoch  had  come  to  a  close. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

ONIY-«I~  NO.  642-M05 


70 


LD2lA-60m-3,'70 
(N5382slO)476-A-32 


General  Library     . 
University  of  California 
Berkeley 


YC  50535 


381 


THEUN.VERSlTYOFCAUFORN.AtBK. 


